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This thesis looks at the practices that classify ‘fragile states’ and their impacts. I 
analyse not only direct practices of ranking and categorisation but many indirect 
practices that make of ‘state fragility’ a measurable and manageable political truth. 
This research looks at the relations between the World Bank, OECD and the g7+ 
group of self-labelled ‘fragile states’ to understand how this measurable and 
manageable political truth is constructed, what power this construction involves and 
what its implications are. ‘State fragility’ has been largely quantified in systems 
used to compare state performance. Drawing from Bourdieu’s sociology and 
Hacking’s philosophy, I suggest these practices of quantification and classification 
are not a mere technicality; they answer to deep-seated successes of statistical 
reasoning, and their political entrenchment in policy-making has particular impacts 
in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. I suggest quantifying and classifying practices 
constitute a style of thinking and doing that carries symbolic power, a subtle but no 
less important form of power. Symbolic power is diffuse, and through the subtlety of 
practical sense it wins the complicity of those who seem least favoured by it – as 
crucially and richly exemplified by the self-labelling and self-measurement of the 
g7+ in terms of ‘state fragility’. However, in the diffuse and hardly traceable form of 
statistics, it also carries the elements that allow its own weakening and change. 
While direct power hardly leaves arms unattended, quantification by necessity 
travels with its tools and practices, hence, making it more possible to catch hold of 
some of these elements. I argue that by ignoring the practical sense in 
quantification and classification and by taking for granted what power is in these 
dynamics, how it is exerted and by whom, many critics paradoxically side-line the 
very subtle but important possibilities for weakening and change this symbolic 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N   
 
 





People in fragile and conflict-affected states are more than twice as likely 
to be undernourished as those in other developing countries, more than 
three times as likely to be unable to send their children to school, twice as 
likely to see their children die before age five….1 
 
 
Reports on ‘state fragility’ frequently convey as much human misery as 
possible in only a few lines, always punctuated by numbers and 
comparisons. Practitioners count on the ability to create visualisation to 
provoke action. It is believed that with the help of quantification the many 
problems of ‘fragile states’ can be easily viewed and interpreted by policy-
makers, speeding decision-making and aid allocation. If ‘fragile states’ are 
different from ‘other developing countries’, the reasoning goes, more 
research needs to be done to understand what differences these are. 
Moreover, these peculiarities need to be properly measured, studied and 
aggregated in order to provide a proper analytical frame for action, and any 
remedies need to be tailored to these measured realities.2 All ‘twice’, ‘three 
times’ and other comparisons seen as useful are constantly scrutinised and 
reworked. It follows that the urge to quantify and classify ‘fragile states’ 
encourage the development of new departments, measuring tools, 
procedures and expertise, besides an ironically unquantifiable number of 
reports and databases. 
                                                          
1 World Bank 2011b, p. 5. My emphasis. 
2
 For examples, see Department for International Development (DFID) January 2005; World 








In this thesis, I suggest it is ultimately these direct and indirect 
bureaucratic practices of classification, such as measuring, monitoring, 
advising and evaluation, with all their possibilities and limitations that guide 
the management of ‘fragile states at a distance. These practices are, 
therefore, the object of this research. 
 
1.  POINTS OF DEPARTURE 
 
In universities and think tanks, mainstream academics, just as practitioners, 
are parties in the quest for numerical comparisons. They seek to constantly 
improve data and classification3 and to increase the ‘efficiency’ of 
programmes delivered to ‘fragile states.4 Successful programmes are 
showcased, and examples are offered of solutions that did not work as they 
should. If children are three times less likely to attend school in a certain 
‘fragile state’, mainstream academics – or remote practitioners – will look at 
the country’s history, analyse statistics, talk to experts, and find the 
numbers that might show what specific actions hinder or promote 
development in the education sector in the country they study. These 
approaches commonly criticise generalisations in policy (not necessarily in 
theory) and argue for contextualisation and tailored solutions.5 The said 
focus on details in many cases concludes with the proposition of a new 
classification of ‘state fragility’ and/or a new ‘fragility’ spectrum (populated 
by generalised theoretical categories).6  
In another corner of academia, critical scholars do not deny the 
concrete human misery in ‘fragile states’ or the need to help; in fact, this is 
not problematised per se. These scholars channel their shock and 
unconformity instead towards the very framing of the problem, the labelling 
of postcolonial countries as ‘fragile’ or other labels deemed to be similar. 
These scholars criticise what they see as the imposition of development 
standards based on Western concepts of statehood and legitimacy, and 
condemn the lack of historical contextualisation around how countries 
                                                          
3
 Call 2010; Carment and Samy 15 June 2012; Grävingholt,  Ziaja et al. 2012 
4
 Rotberg 2004b; Call and Wyeth 2008; Haims,  Gombert et al. 2008. 
5
 For an example of contextualisation, see Roque February 2006. 
6








became ‘fragile’.7 Consequently, another approach to postcolonial countries 
is generally advocated, one to be framed by a new power-knowledge 
relationship. Essentially, these scholars defend that any labels that depict 
postcolonial countries as ‘the imperfect representation’ of Western 
countries should be dismissed.8 
In this thesis, I address these two approaches to ‘state fragility’ – 
henceforth,  ‘problem-solving’ and ‘politically sceptical’ respectively – by 
acknowledging a few basic points of departure: There is no denying the 
human situation in so-called fragile states demands action, some kind of 
response; it is also acknowledged that many numbers are useful in making 
sense of the problems in these countries. However, it is important to notice 
that the classification of ‘fragile states’, their labelling and measuring come 
at a cost, with powerful political and economic effects for ‘fragile states’, 
whose ranking by Western institutions might determine aid allocation and 
development priorities. Nevertheless, I also part ways significantly with 
many components of these arguments. 
I take here a path other than problem-solving or political scepticism, 
one focused on analysing the specific practices that classify ‘state fragility’. 
First, I take distance from a homogenous and collective ‘West’, as much as 
I do not see ‘fragile states’ as one and only oppressed, passive ‘Other’. 
Second, this research does not offer an epistemologically privileged view of 
actors’ interior plans and intentions in classifying ‘state fragility’. Finally, and 
very importantly, I believe that although some measuring is welcome to 
make sense of the issues afflicting so-called fragile states, the endless 
reworking of the numerical bureaucracy around the topic has achieved 
peaks of senseless quantification. A tantalising challenge of ever improved 
(and never perfect) numbers is bound to leave aside, in a systematic way, 
that which cannot be grasped by statistics. This research suggests one 
does not need to dive in an ocean of intentions to make sense of these 
issues, and moreover, that by seeking to do so, one might leave aside both 
how these dynamics take place and what changes they might enable. 
Indeed, this thesis does not look at why classification is done as it 
is, at least not in terms of assumed collective and homogenous intentions. I 
                                                          
7
 For a historical critique, see Grovogui 2002. 
8
 See Bilgin and Morton 2002, 2004; Hill 2005; Hameiri 2007. For an empirical example of 








ask ‘What practices classify “fragile states” and what are their impacts?’. I 
believe this question gives this research the potential to look at the impacts 
of measuring and labelling and, thus, at how power is exercised in the 
classification of ‘state fragility’ but without taking for granted who exerts it 
and how it can be exerted. In fact, these ‘who’ and ‘how’ are at the core of 
the research. This openness is fundamentally due to the possibility of 
looking at the many indirect and subtle practices that classify ‘state fragility’ 
on an everyday basis.  
I suggest that turning attention to measuring, advising, monitoring 
and many practices besides direct rankings opens space to understanding 
how the label sustains itself and if any dismissal is possible, desired and/or 
practical and in which terms. An analysis of the measuring that contributes 
to the labelling is also able to show what role bureaucratic numbers play, 
what expertise is involved in their production, how actors negotiate these 
skills and, thus, what role such skills play in the relations of power involved 
in this classification. Hence, the question raised allows addressing the main 
points of departure mentioned without losing sight of the important 
contributions made by the problem-solving and the politically sceptical 
approaches. The politics that classify ‘fragile states’ is approached in this 
thesis as a dynamic of power, but a subtle one. 
Some key theoretical guidelines direct my approach: The research 
analyses ‘state fragility’ as a political construction. However, it does not 
refute the concrete human misery the classification of ‘fragile states’ is seen 
to address or the fact that many countries called ‘fragile’ have this human 
misery in common. The research aims instead at understanding what ways 
of thinking and doing allow the common sense around ‘fragile states’ to 
take hold (despite many critiques to several of its elements) and at 
unpacking the impacts of such practices of labelling and measuring. This 
thesis, therefore, works with a specific idea of construction, one that does 
not problematise the reality of what numbers are supposed to represent as 
much as what it takes for them to represent anything and what they actually 
fail to show.9  
                                                          
9 For a discussion on the many understandings of ‘construction’ in social sciences and the 
values and limitations of different approaches, see Hacking 1999. I will not classify my own 
approach according to the categories Hacking proposes, as this would be ironic, to say the 








Therefore, by unpacking the impacts of measuring and classifying 
‘state fragility’, I look at the power that donor agencies can exert through 
labelling but I suggest this is a form of symbolic power – a shared and co-
authored form of power that links what some call ‘oppressor’ and 
‘oppressed’ in a joint practical endeavour.10 Crucially, the taking for granted 
of ‘fragile states’ as passive and oppressed victims does not take into 
account recent developments in international politics whereby so-called 
fragile states, members of the g7+ group, have taken to self-labelling and 
self-measurement in terms of ‘state fragility’.11 Moreover, the 
essentialisation of an oppressor-oppressed divide does not contribute to 
any empowerment critical scholars may advocate. Most critical proposals 
so far have circumscribed the question of what practical means make the 
label hold, thus being oblivious to both the dynamics that show some co-
option of the labelled and the practical pressures that led to this self-
labelling. I suggest those are precisely the issues that would turn the 
proposed dismissal of the label (and others deemed similar) a fruitless 
project. 
2.  POWER AND THE LABEL 
 
What is peculiar about the most recent label of ‘fragile states’? My decision 
to explore the practices that classify ‘state fragility’ is based on two main 
thoughts: that the label is fundamentally part of a history of labelling of 
postcolonial states, and that this labelling is not a ‘tool’ in a simple repetition 
of power relations. That means that ‘fragile state’ is indeed one more label 
applied initially by Western governments and agencies to postcolonial 
countries, a label also able to generate powerful political and economic 
impacts that should be analysed. However, if all labels are essentially the 
same, if they can be used interchangeably and have the same impacts, 
why would they change? Is there nothing specific in the context of the use 
and production of the ‘fragile state’ label? Are we really living, since colonial 
                                                                                                                                                    
importance to his insight that ‘[a]nything worth calling a construction has a history. But not 
just any history. It has to be a history of building’ (p. 50). As a history of building, this thesis 
looks at materials, people, techniques and tools. 
10
 Bourdieu 1990a, pp. 133-7. 
11
 This self-labelled group of ‘fragile states’ was officially founded in 2011 and, as of 2014, it 
is formed by 19 countries, most of those in Africa but also including Afghanistan, Yemen, 
Haiti and Timor-Leste, for instance. See g7+ 2014. Being it at the centre of this research, I 








times, one relation of power, one form of domination, one history? Are so-
called oppressors and oppressed the same characters in the unfolding of 
many decades and centuries of economic and political history?  
Labels have frequently and quickly changed and the ‘fragile state’ 
label will probably soon also be substituted or modified. To look at the 
practices and impacts of the ‘fragile state’ classification is to acknowledge 
the impacts of such label, but also to question the one power, one history 
narrative of certain accounts, by looking at the specific context in which the 
label is produced and reproduced.12 By having as background inspiration 
both questions of ‘what does the fragile state label make possible?’ and 
‘what makes the fragile state label possible?’, this research contributes a 
snapshot in the history of postcolonial labels (and only that). Nevertheless, 
this snapshot seeks to show the importance of enquiries that leave space 
for change by turning power into a question, rather than an empty, a-
temporal answer.  
This thesis focuses on where classification takes place, the territory 
of bureaucracy, techniques, skills and expertise, where changes are 
currently produced and felt, even if subtly. The hypotheses explored in this 
research will be further elaborated ahead, but the main suggestions are 
that  
a) the practices that classify ‘state fragility’ are embedded in a deep-
seated style of thinking and doing based on a measurement-for-
management rationale that has old roots in statistical reasoning. Thus, 
looking at such practices opens space to escape homogenised collective 
intentions by illustrating the practicality, that is, the practical sense in this 
reasoning, reflecting how entrenched these practices are and the 
fruitlessness of suggestions that the label be simply dismissed; 
b) the bureaucratic practices of measuring and classifying are also 
an avenue to understanding the move of the g7+ group towards self-
labelling and self-measuring, a move I suggest is led by the symbolic power 
of the labelling, reflected in the co-option of the ‘labelled’;  
c) the argument around symbolic power opens important paths to 
explore possibilities of weakening and change of this power, pointing at the 
                                                          
12
 It is important to highlight I use ‘context’ in the plain sense of the word. What I mean by 
context is simply the social and political conditions around a debate, which is further 








traps in which quantifiers find themselves, competing to not only produce, 
but also to provide useful data, hence, relying on their relationship with 
users – now very much composed by ‘fragile states’ officers who became 
users precisely by embracing the labelling and its practices; and  
d) the quantification and classification of ‘fragile states’ contribute to 
creating and reinforcing a realm that, in its technicality, becomes 
comfortably distanced from politicians. This does not mean that these 
practices evade politics, but that the politics in the measurement faces 
difficulties in being transposed to the realm of politicians, limiting the scope 
of change. 
These hypotheses highlight subtle power relations amid 
technological constraints. They also subtly point at how more subjective 
accounts are pushed away from a seemly irremediably quantified 
development discourse. Crucially, I suggest that the g7+’s self-labelling and 
self-measurement are essential for the group’s ability to play the game, with 
the tools that are more easily accessed – statistical tools and techniques, 
numbers, software and so on – and thus, to have at least a seat reserved at 
the table. This is not a guarantee of voice or vote, but it places the g7+ in 
the game with enough space so far to create new forms of assessment and 
a fairly known lobby in the major debates. Critics who ignore the price of 
disengagement in these numerical dynamics also eliminate the 
fundamental possibilities of access they bring, with the paradoxical result 
that the potential for change within the powerful exchanges taking place is 
also side-lined. This is not to say, however, that the costs for this 
participation in the game are not high; on the contrary, the price of 
engagement is substantial but, very importantly, it affects all actors, albeit 
differently. This is an essential part of the potential for change often 
ignored. 
 The next two chapters have two main objectives, to provide a 
historical introduction to the issue of the classification of ‘fragile states’ and 
to place my own approach to this classification amid the analyses already 
existent. The brief history in chapter one looks mainly at how the 
quantification and classification of ‘fragile states’ developed in the past 
decades, what actors and elements became part of the agenda and how. 








developments. It is important to highlight that although the historical 
overview touches upon different themes, the thesis will focus on one aspect 
of the ‘fragile states’ agenda, the development sector, as I discuss ahead. 
 Chapter two follows with a theoretical debate that seeks to 
acknowledge the contributions of critics but also parts ways with their 
central assumptions. There, I discuss the insights I borrow from Hacking’s 
philosophy and Bourdieu’s sociology, combined with many important 
contributions from sociologies of quantification. 
 The thesis proceeds, in chapter three, with a historical sociology, 
looking at what I suggest was the merge of a quantifying and classifying 
reasoning with the ‘fragile states’ agenda. I discuss how a Management for 
(Development) Results rationale took hold of the development agenda, how 
it turned its attention to ‘fragile states’ and how Timor-Leste was caught in 
these dynamics – its government set to become the co-founder and chair of 
the g7+, as an eloquent unfolding of years of intense and polemical 
intervention by donors. 
 In chapter four, I scrutinise practices of quantification and 
classification of ‘fragile states’ and their roots in old statistical reasoning. As 
will be explained in chapter two, I focus on measuring, monitoring, 
evaluation and advising. The chapter discusses specifically how it became 
accepted and expected that good enough statistical correlations will explain 
why states become ‘fragile’ and how to fix them. I look at these practices as 
the reflection of practical sense and seek to illustrate how an old and well-
established statistical thinking and doing that certify imperfect knowledge 
are practiced in the ‘fragile states’ agenda, supporting good enough 
techniques, good enough institutions and good enough governance. 
Moreover, I aim to show how the g7+ came to take part in these dynamics, 
and how its countermove in proposing country-specific indicators and 
‘realistic’ goals is based on this established reasoning around imperfect 
knowledge, but how it also seeks to somehow mould it anew. 
 In chapter five, I analyse the skills necessary in these practices of 
quantification and classification, how they are transferred, taught, learned 
negotiated and, crucially, how they become a measurable and manageable 
feature themselves, creating a standard bar for ‘fragile states’ experts. As 








political truth,13 but they are also a fundamental source of pressure over 
donors’ staff, illustrating the nuances in power this thesis aims to 
emphasise. I suggest quantifying experts are led to compete for the 
provision of useful data, with no guaranteed role on the final use of the 
(now common) free data provided, while trapped into ever-perfectible 
expertise, required to constantly enrol in training or partnerships to 
complement their knowledge. In that chapter, therefore, I also aim to 
understand precisely who all these actors are and how they are positioned 
in the game.  
 Chapter six finally discusses the symbolic power I identify in the 
‘fragile states’ agenda. It analyses the constant balancing of engagement 
and disengagement, with its ever-changing costs and gains. Thus, it looks 
at the co-option of the ‘fragile states’ through the self-labelling and self-
assessment of the g7+, but it also points at the possibilities of weakening 
and change brought to the fore by the pressures on experts created by the 
very demands of the agenda. I conclude chapter six with a discussion 
around how the quantifying and classifying practices can become a self-
contained game at the risk of distancing itself from politicians, and among 
points for further research, I highlight the challenge of keeping alive more 
subjective, that is, non-quantified accounts of ‘fragility’, once the g7+ has 
entered the game.  
 The ensemble of these chapters can be read as a ‘history of 
building’,14 in the sequence style of thinking and doing/habitus; practices; 
skills and resources/capitals; and symbolic power/power relations. 
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14








C H A P T E R  O N E  
 
 
A I D  A R C H I T E C T U R E  A N D  E N G I N E E R I N G :   




This chapter looks into the history of the ‘fragile state’ label, its place in a 
history of the labelling of postcolonial states, the actors involved in this 
history and the organisational changes that have been accompanying this 
classification. The idea is to offer a rich enough picture of the specific 
context in which ‘state fragility’ has appeared, as well as of the people, 
practices and techniques that make this classification possible, in order to 
analyse the critiques and propositions offered so far by various scholars. As 
will be seen, the power of practicality depicted in the following by the 
quantification and classification of ‘fragile states’ helps to think through the 
many impacts the classification has generated, and most importantly, it 
leads to an argument against the critical project for the label’s dismissal, for 
its fruitlessness, but mainly for the kind of approach to power it conveys. 
 
 
1.  CORRELATES OF ‘FRAGILITY’:   
    A TALE OF NUMBERS AND LABELS 
 
I divide this story into five parts: a brief account of the beginning of 
development assistance to ‘poor countries’ and the academic takes on 
these dynamics; the initial steps towards measuring ‘state fragility’ and the 








connection between security and development; the central role of the 
development industry in quantifying the ‘fragile states’ agenda; and the 
foundation of the g7+. 
 
1.1. AID TO THE POOR: A ‘RIGHT TO DEVELOP’ 
 
The underpinning practices of aid selection and allocation have changed 
dramatically in the past six decades, from ready-made speeches with 
executive powers, to ideologically-justified bribery, to the beginnings of a 
development industry, and now, to a highly skilled and quantified analysis 
that intersects with security concerns in previously unimagined bureaucratic 
practices. Slowly, since the end of the Second World War, not only did the 
labels for postcolonial countries change, but also the whole organisational 
machinery that makes classification of countries and aid allocation possible.  
The point of departure is well known: A giant in the history of 
development aid and a milestone commonly mentioned by practitioners and 
academics, the Marshall Plan was designed to rebuild countries after the 
Second World War.1 Europe alone received around $13 billion from the end 
of the war until 1951.2 It was justified as a ‘logical’ step in the ‘return of 
normal economic health in the world, without which’, in the words of the 
then US Secretary of the State, George Marshall, ‘there can be no political 
stability and no assured peace’.3 This was, however, a well understood 
case of merely recovering previously rich and ‘stable’ countries. It was only 
after the wave of independence in the colonies and in the context of the 
Cold War rivalries that aid to ‘poor countries’ was systematically 
implemented.4 It was also only after the Cold War that this aid became 
increasingly anchored in a complex ever changing set of indicators, turning 
policy-making into a quasi-science. 
During the Cold War, aid was the reward for alignment, no strings 
attached apart ideological ones.5 The Great Powers’ purpose was to win 
allies among the then called Third World for one block or the other.  Then 
recently independent countries were luring options and paid dearly but 
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indirectly for the aid received: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
for instance, was the scene of some of the most violent proxy clashes 
between the US and the Soviet Union.6  
Close to the end of the Cold War, aid was less explicitly strategic 
but many governments in the so-called Third World still received 
considerable support from the US or the Soviet Union. However, in the 
1980s, this form of allocating aid was already being problematised. Critics 
verbalised shock at the new international order and the fact that ‘weak 
states’ with no empirical sovereignty – no real ‘power’ – were being granted 
self-determination through international juridical guarantees of non-
intervention. They called this conceded sovereignty ‘juridical’ only, and 
many went as far as to argue that the rule of non-intervention was actually 
opening space for unsustainable political units that would have no incentive 
to develop ‘empirical’ sovereignty. In fact, Jackson argued in Quasi-States 
that with foreign aid compensating for institutional weakness, an 
‘international law of development’ was established. This, he argued, 
extended self-determination to the economic realm and granted 
‘sovereignty plus’ to states in the ‘Third World’, based on a ‘right to 
assistance’ or ‘right to develop’.7 According to the author, this ‘sovereignty 
plus’, in turn, made it hard for real development to take place.8 In response 
to this ‘new international order’, Jackson argued for ‘more intrusive forms of 
international trusteeship’, to mitigate the costs of ‘quasi-statehood’ for the 
country’s own people. For him, it was ironic that ‘the same institution which 
provided international recognition, dignity, and independence to all 
colonized populations could be exploited to deny domestic civility, liberty, 
and welfare to some’ in the poorest countries in the world.9  
This momentum in the debate about the ‘Third World’ was 
intensified by the end of the Cold War. It is argued that the lack of clear and 
pressing geopolitical concerns in fact removed what had been the major 
drives of foreign aid. In 1992, Helman and Ratner – then retired from the 
US Foreign Service and on leave from the State Department’s Office for the 
Legal Adviser, respectively – wrote an influential article for Foreign Policy 
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discussing the need to address the problems of ‘failed’ and ‘failing’ states. 
The authors stated that ‘the failed nation state’ was ‘utterly incapable of 
sustaining itself as a member of the international community’, and delivered 
an ominous warn that ‘heavy tolls’ would necessarily be inflicted on ‘failing 
states’’ own people and ‘on all countries’.10 They proposed new UN-
approved forms of trusteeship or conservatorship, as they called them, with 
the aim to enable states to resume responsibility for themselves.11  
Even if the solutions proposed varied considerably and not many 
policy-makers officially embraced more intrusive responses, the core of the 
argument was getting through, that ‘failed states’ needed special attention 
from the international community. Indeed, in 1993, the then US 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, stated, in a speech 
to justify aid and intervention in Somalia:  
The decision we must make is whether to pull up stakes and allow Somalia 
to fall back into the abyss or to stay the course and help  lift the country 
and its people from the category of a failed state into that of an emerging 
democracy. For Somalia's sake, and ours, we must persevere.12 
 
It was the ‘ours’ that denoted the image ‘failed states’ were 
acquiring at the time; their problems were slowly becoming ‘global’ 
problems. In 1994, this tone acquired apocalyptical notes when an 
American journalist, Robert D. Kaplan, wrote what was considered an 
extremely compelling article, The Coming Anarchy.13 The piece depicted a 
horrendous near future of human misery and chaos in what he called 
‘collapsing states’, previously part of the ‘Third World’ and mostly 
represented by African countries. It was a forecast and an admonition:  
Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee 
migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international 
borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and 
international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a 
West African prism. West Africa provides an appropriate introduction to the 
issues, often extremely unpleasant to discuss, that will soon confront our 
civilization.14 
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In the last paragraph of the article, he warns: ‘…Afrocentrists are 
right in one respect: we ignore this dying region at our own risk.’15  
This view reflected the assumptions of many scholars at the time 
that the world was somehow splitting into a ‘zone of peace’ and a ‘zone of 
turmoil’.16 The first was occupied by well-established and stable 
democracies whose problems transmuted into economic struggles, and the 
second was populated by then recently independent countries, politically 
unstable and frequently in conflict. One of the authors of this proposition, 
Max Singer, was also the founder of the Correlates of War project, at the 
University of Michigan, an initiative whose ‘fundamental goal [was] not just 
to measure the temporal and spatial variation in war but rather to identify 
factors that would systematically explain this variation.’17  
 
1.2. QUANTIFYING ‘STATE FRAGILITY’: WE WILL NOT BE TAKEN BY SURPRISE 
 
It was in this context that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
sponsored a State Failure Task Force, composed of academics from 
different American universities, tasked with designing an empirical research 
on the ‘correlates of state failure’ from the mid-1950s on.18 The overall 
feeling among analysts was that American politicians were keen to 
understand how the world had gotten them by surprise as it had with the 
end of the Cold War. There seemed to be a new compromise to produce 
enough data on key events around the world so this would not happen 
again.19 Hence, the objective of the Task Force was to measure causes of 
instability in the post-Cold War period through a data-driven research on 




 Singer and Wildavsky 1996. 
17
 Correlates of War, 'Project History'. My emphasis. The rationale was widespread at the 
60s and 70s. It was based on the strong position then increasingly occupied by 
Behavioralism in the American social sciences. Behavioralist scholars sought the systematic 
and scientific quantification of what were seen as patterns in social and political events for 
the sake of finding correlations that would explain and predict such phenomena. For an 
overview, see Hamati-Ataya 2012. Although the debates around Behavioralism are 
obviously pertinent to the issues discussed here, I look at the broad quantifying and 
classifying rationale growing around this time; first, because this was not the exclusive 
‘product’ of Behavioralism – chapter three will discuss how long-dated many of the bases 
are for this rationale – and, second, because such a debate would unhelpfully divert the 
focus on current practices in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. For an interesting indirect contrast 
that has more to contribute to this thesis, see Desrosières 18 march 2003. 
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‘state failure’. All outputs were visually peppered with maps, graphs and 
tables. The initiative would have long life, going much beyond the initial 
objectives to later work with data on democracy and terrorism.20 In fact, 
facing the ‘coming anarchy’, as ‘state failure’ was seen, analysts started to 
break it down and the labels started to multiply along with their perceived 
many components. Furthermore, the visual realisation that correlates of 
‘failure’ could be aggregated differently for different countries seems to 
have been a crucial step in the beginning of a broad move to produce 
varied subcategories. 
This move was still shy in the mid-1990s, but some research was 
already beginning to move against generalisations of ‘state failure’ and 
towards a continuum, from the ‘weakest’ to the ‘least weak states’. For 
instance, in 1996, in an article specifically aimed at developing a taxonomy 
of ‘state failure’, Gros presented five categories of ‘failed states’ – however, 
still then based on qualitative analysis: ‘anarchic’, ‘phantom’, ‘anaemic’, 
‘captured’ and ‘aborted’ states. These followed a Weberian understanding 
of the functions of a state and how efficiently and authoritatively they were 
fulfilled.21  
In the background of this urge to classify ‘state failure’, there was 
always a discussion on how feasible the so-called failed states actually 
were. As Jackson had done in 1990, Herbst proposed in 1997 to think of 
alternatives for the state system, from accepting the sovereignty of new 
states – viable parts of ‘failed’ ones – to considering the role of local 
authorities besides the state, and even the extreme solution of decertifying 
‘failed states’:22 ‘The international society has yet to acknowledge that 
some states simply do not work’.23 Others were thinking along the same 
lines of ‘active’ solutions to ‘state failure’ but based on more local 
responses. Mazrui’s propositions, for instance, focused on African coalition 
initiatives and the African use of force in the continent.24 
However, the breaking of what Herbst called an intellectual log-
jam25 and the acceptance of restraints to sovereignty in ‘failed states’ 
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advocated by Jackson, Herbst and others to come26 were never officially 
promoted as policy towards ‘state failure’. Instead, there were increasing 
efforts to make sense of what ‘state failure’ was and what its components, 
causes and consequences were, first and foremost. 
As part of these initiatives, the State Failure Task Force was 
working on the second report of its series on ‘failed states’. The document, 
published in 1999, reflected an increasingly detailed analysis of the types of 
‘failures’, with a renewed focus on democracy and its weight on ‘state 
failure’.27 The developed model worked with only three factors: the level of 
infant mortality, the level of trade openness, and the level of democracy, 
considered together the ‘most efficient discrimination between “failure 
cases” and stable states’.28 The main expressed concern was to find out 
which of all these factors could compromise post-Cold War stability and 
how much impact they would have. After this report, a third was yet 
released in 2000 in which the expressed goal was to identify which state 
characteristics could pose ‘a risk of serious political instability’.29 By then, 
the research counted on around two dozen experts and the database 
contained nearly 1,300 political, demographic, economic, social, and 
environmental variables from all countries between 1955 and 1998.30  
Quantification had taken momentum and was growing 
exponentially. In Canada, a similar initiative was taking place at Carleton 
University in partnership with the Canadian government,31 the Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy, ‘part of a broader effort to enable more 
effective international engagement in failed and fragile states’.32 The project 
has three key elements: a focus on monitoring, forecasting, and evaluation 
of ‘failed’ and ‘fragile states’; a methodology to analyse individual country 
performance; and statistical and theoretical work on the relation between 
‘state fragility’ and selected key variables.33 The last ranking of countries 
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available to the public was published in 2007, with Sudan and Somalia at 
the top.34 As with the State Failure Task Force,35 this was also a long-term 
research project and it involved dozens of experts in parallel streams of 
work.36 
By this time, research on ‘state failure’ was expanding in terms of 
scope, people and the volume of data produced. The more material was 
produced, the more nuances to ‘failure’ were been studied and proposed, 
along with new categories or subcategories, and more elements were 
mixed together in the form of variables and proxy indicators to analyse the 
causes and consequences of ‘state failure’. In the following eight to ten 
years, the ‘failed state’ label became less and less used,37 while ‘fragile’ 
was increasingly applied, along with a few other labels, such as ‘weak’ or 
‘crisis states’.38 ‘State fragility’ also became constantly linked to both 
security and development concerns, and the many reports produced on the 
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topic often mentioned the need for work in these areas to be interconnected 
in ‘fragile states’.39 
 
1.3. SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORING THE CONNECTION 
 
In that sense, the post-9/11 war on terror was a milestone in the 
international approach to ‘state fragility’. More attention, more concerns, 
and much more research were brought in, in an attempt to understand the 
social, economic and political risks allegedly presented by ‘fragile states’, 
those countries where, it was argued, terrorists come from and/or are 
trained in. The 2002 US National Security Strategy’s statement ‘America is 
now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones’ has 
been repeated ad eternum in policy reports and academic papers.40 The 
strategy presented by the document was to become known as the ‘3Ds’: 
defence, diplomacy and development.41 It presented development as one 
key pillar of US foreign policy to the extent it could work against potential 
security threats: ‘Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and 
murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak 
states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their 
borders’.42 The argumentative move was also practiced in think tanks, by 
practitioners and academics, while the link between ‘weak states’ and 
terrorism became irremediably absorbed by the literature, even if criticised 
by some.43  
These attacks constituted a wake-up call, in both the development and 
security communities, to a new, shared challenge. The large number of 
weak and failed states emerged as a central challenge of both the fight 
against terrorism and the fight against global poverty. It is in weak and 
fragile states that the development project often fails, and it is in those 
settings too where militant and extremist ideologies too easily take root.44 
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The connection of so many different elements under the ‘state 
fragility’ umbrella slowly increased awareness to new possible modes of 
mobilisation. In a 2008 conference on ‘weak and failed states’, then US 
Congressman Adam Smith made an important remark: 
I have been campaigning for a long time on a basic door-to-door status 
 going out and finding out what people in my suburban community care 
 about and they care about stuff that is immediate…National security is one 
 of those things that they now care about and I believe in order to get the 
 resources and focus on global poverty, on weak and failed states and all of 
 the issues that go into that, to get that focus we have got to make that 
 national security connection.  We have got to make it clear that we will not 
 be safe here in the U.S. as long as we have so much destabilization in so 
 many parts of the world and to get them involved and invested. 
 
Also telling, Smith was then serving at the Armed Services 
Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, he chaired the Terrorism 
Subcommittee on Armed Services and co-created the Congressional 
Caucus for Effective Foreign Assistance.45 The arguments in favour of 
combining security and development concerns, for one reason or another, 
were gaining ground. 
Similar moves could be seen in Europe. In 2003, the European 
Strategic Concept also presented ‘failed states’ as a ‘new threat’, proposing 
a set of mixed tools to stabilise and rebuild ‘failed states’, including military 
and economic instruments, humanitarian aid and civilian crisis 
management.46 In the same year, the European Security Strategy placed 
‘failed states’ among the ‘key threats’ facing Europe: ‘Collapse of the State 
can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or 
terrorism… Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing 
states.’47  
As the US National Security Strategy called for development as a 
key to deal with the security risks in ‘fragile states’ and such move was 
becoming increasingly strong in Europe, the phenomenon was also the 
target of new initiatives by development organisations. In 2001, the World 
Bank initiated a discussion on what it then called LICUS, Low-Income 
Countries under Stress, reflecting ‘the growing literature on the problems of 
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“failed states”, “fragile states”, “collapsed states”, and “difficult 
partnerships”’.48 One year later, it founded the LICUS Unit, which worked 
together with the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit to tackle 
‘state fragility’. The Bank’s efforts on LICUS countries were based on a new 
operational policy, allowing the Bank to work in conflict-affected states.49 
This work brought a new quantifying boost to the topic of ‘fragile states’, 
marked by the use of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) to band and therefore define ‘fragile states’ based on performance 
scores, and the creation of the Post-Conflict Performance Indicators 
(PCPI), to inaugurate the Bank’s measurement of indicators on security 
(these assessments are discussed ahead).50 The CPIA would soon provide 
the perhaps most numerical and well known definition available of ‘fragile 
states’: those states below the 3.2 threshold of its quantified ranking, which 
attributes scores to institutional performance. 
Also in 2003, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD), through its Development Co-operation Directorate 
(DCD), founded the Fragile States Group (FSG), now called International 
Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF),51 with the aim to ‘improve 
development effectiveness in fragile states’, by developing knowledge on 
issues of ‘state fragility’ and engaging with the World Bank, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European 
Commission.52 The collaboration produced what is now seen as a key 
document about the topic, the Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, subscribed by all major 
donors and organisations. The Principles suggests there is a need to 
recognise the link between security, political and development objectives, 
among other goals.53  
By this time, non-engagement was seen as a non-option, and 
solutions proposed advocated integrated and coordinated approaches. This 
could be seen to encompass anything, from debt relief and foreign aid to 
‘neotrusteeship’ for some scholars. Suggested by Fearon and Laitin, a 
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‘neotrusteeship’, as other forms of more intrusive interventions advocated,54 
would derive authority from an international coalition led by the UN, 
integrate several components and experts from different countries and aim 
to exert control, as in imperialist times, but also to exit quickly, supposedly 
marking a difference from colonial relations.55 This was an admittedly 
extreme version of what others at the time were calling ‘statebuilding’, 
‘whole of government’ approach or simply ‘policy coherence’. These more 
nuanced options were rapidly moving onto the table, seen as the 
multifaceted answers the ‘state fragility problem’ required.56  
With the discussion on the tools to be used also came a move 
towards operationalising these approaches, so that in 2005 several 
organisations produced key policy documents on ‘fragile states’, including 
development banks and multilateral institutions.57 In addition, new agencies 
were created to act on the ground, such as the US Office of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), later integrated to the Bureau 
of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO),58 and the Post Conflict 
Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), later named Stabilisation Unit, in the UK. The 
overall objective for both agencies was to come up with a structure that 
would allow and incentivise ‘whole of government’ approaches in ‘fragile 
states’59 – in the case of the S/CRS, this was based on what the US 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had called ‘smart power’, one which would 
make use of all diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural 
tools available.60 While these approaches were being refined, the agencies 
also invested in staff and expertise. In 2007, when the PCRU, coordinated 
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence 
(MoD), and the Department for International Development (DfID), became 
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the Stabilisation Unit, it established a Civilian Stabilisation Group, which 
counted, as of 2014, with more than 900 Deployable Civilian Experts 
‘willing and able to deploy to fragile and conflict-affected countries to assist 
the UK Government in addressing instability’.61 By 2005, also Canada had a 
specialized joint force to deal with ‘state fragility’, the Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Task Force (START), established to coordinate whole-of-
government projects in ‘fragile states’.62 START is supported by 12 national 
agencies and departments across the Canadian government and mobilises 
‘civilian experts’ to help ‘advance stabilization and reconstruction of fragile, 
failing or conflict affected states’.63 In common, CSO, the Stabilisation Unit 
and START aim to form and deploy experts to work in ‘fragile states’ as 
part of a national strategy that aims to establish connections between 
security and development concerns.  
 
1.4. MEASURING PERFORMANCE AND ACHIEVING RESULTS:  
THE ROLE OF INDICATORS  
 
Meanwhile, academics and analysts were working to influence the direction 
such initiatives would take, both in terms of priorities and operationalisation. 
In 2005, the Fund for Peace, for example, began its series of the Failed 
States Index, published annually by Foreign Policy, and since 2014 called 
Fragile States Index. The index analyses 12 indicators and 14 sub-
indicators for each of them, aiming to be a ‘user-friendly’ tool to facilitate 
policy-making, through an ‘empirically based’ and ‘objective’ approach. The 
stated reasoning: ‘Without the right data, it is impossible to identify 
problems that may be festering “below the radar.” Decision makers need 
access to this kind of information to implement effective policies.’64 With the 
same rationale and in the same year, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) also published a document on the tool 
it was developing for measuring ‘fragility’, the Conflict and Fragility Alert, 
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Consultation, and Tracking System (C/FACTS).65 The agency proposed a 
matrix of ‘state performance outcomes’, considering, on one side, 
effectiveness and legitimacy, and on the other side, political, security, 
economic and social indicators.66 The agency used ‘fragile state’ to 
embrace ‘failed, failing and recovering states’ and subdivided ‘fragile states’ 
between ‘crisis’ and ‘vulnerable states’.67 It is not clear how much of the 
framework and data were actually used by policy-makers, as the exercise 
as policy was officially abandoned in 2006, although it is said the rankings 
were still annually produced and circulated among US officials after that.68  
This move towards developing indicators, measuring performance 
of state institutions and understanding the impact of ‘state fragility’ was not 
only led and encouraged by the new focus of national strategies around the 
world, but also, and very importantly in this thesis, reflected the overall 
debate in the development sector in the mid-2000s. For practitioners then, 
it was clear that the usual performance-based aid allocation systems were 
leaving some countries behind, and this was the case of precisely those 
countries that needed aid the most.69 By 2005, the development debate 
was focusing on ‘fragile states’ as the aid orphans lagging behind on the 
path to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): ‘Aid to fragile 
states, other than those emerging from recent conflict, appears to be 
disproportionately low in aggregate terms and twice as volatile as in other 
low income countries.’70 Hence, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
called donors’ attention to the need to not only increase aid to ‘fragile 
states’ but also to harmonise it and make it more effective in reducing 
poverty and promoting growth.71 The problem identified by the development 
sector, however, was that ‘fragile states’, were, as all analysts were saying 
at the time, also a security challenge.  
The 2005 Human Development Report made this interconnection 
clear and advocated more integrated approaches to ‘state fragility’: 
‘Starving conflict-prone or post-conflict states of aid is unjustified. It is bad 
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for human security in the countries concerned – and it is bad for global 
security.’72 The report suggested that some of the challenges linked to 
human insecurity and violent conflict could be traced to ‘fragile’ and ‘failing 
states’, and argued for a new focus for the development agenda. If the 
MDGs were to be met in the ten years to follow, the document stated, the 
new agenda would have to be supported by three pillars: aid, trade and 
security.73  
The development industry was making a point of recognising the 
challenges of ‘fragile states’, acknowledging the risks of not responding to 
them and working to measure exactly how much impact aid could have on 
growth and specific policies in ‘fragile states’.74 This was a discussion tied 
to the need to improve not only aid performance in ‘fragile states’, but also 
to modify the organisational and operational structures of development 
agencies. If aid would be increased in favour of ‘fragile states’ in a context 
seen as one of instability and violence, agencies would need to offer clear 
accountability to donor countries – and these, to their citizens –  as to the 
results of the aid provided. Therefore, the new agenda on aid effectiveness 
became central, with increasing focus on how to make every dollar count.  
Accordingly, most agencies vested their programmes with a 
rationale of ‘measuring for results’, thus establishing clear targets for all 
projects funded and constantly monitoring performance against these 
targets.75 The realisation that the deadline for meeting the MDGs was close 
by and that ‘fragile states’ were far away on that track seems to have 
intensified practices of data production in the development industry. 
Statistics became crucial, as well as developing efficient methods for their 
collection, analysis and use in policy-making towards ‘fragile states’.  
Whether we wish to adjust the size of our fiscal deficit, increase social 
spending, pursue macroeconomic convergence in the region, or assess 
progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals, accurate, timely, 
useful data lie at the heart of all these efforts... Achieving the right policies 
requires the management of trade-offs informed by good statistics.76 
 
                                                          
72
 UNDP 2005, p. 13. My emphasis. 
73
 Ibid., Overview. 
74
 Ibid. See also Baliamoune-Lutz and McGlillivray April 2008; Bertoli and Ticci 2012. 
75
 United Nations Development Group and World Bank January 2005; International 
Development Association (IDA) November 2004. 
76
 Trevor Manuel, ‘Data for poverty measurement’, Opening address at the Joint National 
Treasury/World Bank Workshop, Pretoria, 28 June 2004, apud International Development 








By 2006 the World Bank was discussing the results of the first 
independent evaluation of the Bank’s engagement with ‘fragile states’. It 
was to decide on the changes that would be implemented in terms of 
operational policies, incentives to staff and improvements in the knowledge 
base available or how it was conveyed to staff.77 In 2007, as part of the 
consequent overhaul of the Bank’s strategy towards ‘fragile states’ and 
under the leadership of president Zoellick, the Conflict Prevention Unit and 
the LICUS Unit were almost merged into a Fragile and Conflict-Affected 
Unit. In addition, a Conflict, Fragile States and Social Development team 
was established inside the Bank’s Africa regional Vice Presidency. The 
World Bank aimed to become increasingly prepared to a reality where 
dealing with conflict was seen as an essential part of promoting 
development in the complex scenario of ‘state fragility’.78   
Around the same time and thereafter, practices that classify ‘fragile 
states’ multiplied exponentially. They combined ‘correlates of state fragility’ 
being increasingly produced and the focus of the development sector on 
aid effectiveness amid interventions designed to work in situations of 
conflict. The ‘fragile states’ agenda in the making became crucially based 
on the quantification of causes and consequences of ‘state fragility’ and the 
measured effectiveness of different forms of interventions.  
The common motivation for quantifying and classifying practices 
has been the belief that policy-makers are in constant need of improved, 
‘straightforward’, ‘user-friendly’ and ‘easily accessible’ tools based on 
empirical data and capable of generating supporting material for policy 
decisions as to where and how to allocate resources.79 In that sense, in 
2008 two well-known indices were produced: the Index of State Weakness 
in the Developing World, by Rice and Patrick, published by the Brookings 
Institution; and the Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State 
Fragility 2008, by Marshall and Cole, from the George Mason University.80 
In general, as seen, indices on ‘state fragility’ aim to order data in a way as 
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to enable easier and faster decision-making regarding the allocations of 
time, resources and personnel.81  
The mood for such initiatives was also encouraged by and reflected 
in certain works in academia that sought to refine the label as a conceptual 
and analytical tool, by proposing alternatives or subcategories along the 
same lines of measuring capacity, efficiency and stability.82 Meanwhile, 
analysts were also trying to determine the accuracy, impacts and political 
orientation of the many rankings being produced. However, it became clear 
that these impacts were hard to grasp with certainty.83 The World Bank’s 
CPIA, for instance, is vastly criticised; it measures four clusters of indicators 
on the policy and institutional performance of ‘client’ countries’ 
governments, rating each with a score from 1 to 6, all scores which are 
then added to complex formulae to calculate aid allocation. It is determined 
that any country with an average score below 3.2 is a ‘fragile state’.84 It has 
always been difficult for critiques to simultaneously take into account the 
fact that the ranking was never meant to classify ‘fragile states’,85 that it 
does so with a clearly expressed focus on efficiency rather than need, that 
it has powerful impacts on ‘fragile states’, and that ‘fragile states’, however, 
cannot completely disengage, if governments have plans to have access to 
further funding. Nevertheless, the system’s banding of ‘fragile states’ below 
the 3.2 threshold has been largely accepted as a practical (and numerical) 
definition of ‘state fragility’.86 
The CPIA ratings are intended to guide the resource allocation of 
the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), for which, 
as of 2014, 31 countries classified as ‘fragile’ were eligible.87 The CPIA is 
also largely adopted as the basis for decisions taken by various agencies, 
such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development 
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Bank (ADB), Scandinavian governments, the UK and France. Moreover, 
‘[e]ven where not used explicitly, CPIA rankings serve to signal “good 
performers” to other aid agencies’.88 Resources are limited but the demand 
is not, enhancing the relevance of this formula. As a natural unfolding, the 
system’s many powerful implications lead to frequent suggestions to either 
perfect or abolish it, based on critiques of its accuracy, theoretical 
background and applicability.89  
The critiques to the CPIA classification are similar to the ones 
directed at other rankings of ‘fragile states’, regarding the impossibility of 
measuring certain social features of a state, the accuracy of numbers, the 
aggregation of different indicators and the due contextualisation of certain 
comparisons between countries.90 However, as with many indices of ‘state 
fragility’, the visibility and impactful nature of numbers seem to draw 
criticism and encourage never-ending revisions, which, rather than 
weakening the data, only intensify their circulation. Nevertheless, as the 
producers of such exercises are requested by critics to open up their 
rationale and make clear their ‘scientific’ bases, these have tended to 
become more open. Therefore, as discussed ahead, critiques multiply and 
expand in paradoxical circularity.  
It was in this context that, since 2005 and the Paris Declaration, a 
stated compromise by the development industry to invest in dialogue with 
‘fragile states’ has been issued, allegedly aiming at improving 
comprehension and engagement. It was under this lead that the 
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) was 
created, in 2008, hosted by the OECD. The move that is central to this 
research was to be much connected to the establishment of this Dialogue. 
 
1.5. THE FOUNDATION OF THE G7+: LABEL AND NUMBERS 
In 2011, during the 4th High Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness in Busan, the 
g7+ group of self-labelled fragile states was created in a closed door 
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meeting of ‘fragile states’’ representatives, organised under the auspices of 
the OECD-NCAF and the IDPS. From 2010 to 2013, the g7+ was chaired 
by Timor-Leste’s Minister of Finance, Emília Pires, and in 2014, Kaifala 
Marah, Minister of Finance of Sierra Leone, took the lead.91 The group saw 
the initiative as a move towards leadership:  
Fragile states must take the reins when it comes to ways development 
partners give them official development assistance… For us to better guide 
our development partners and to contribute to a better management of 
external aid, we have to take the leadership.92 
 
In fact, the g7+ as a group never officially advocated for more aid to 
‘fragile states’; this is nowhere expressed among official documents. The 
main proposal has been for a ‘different paradigm’ for development 
assistance, that is, how aid is provided:93 ‘The g7+ was formed in response 
to a gap identified by conflict-affected states in the effectiveness of aid 
partnerships and delivery in their countries.’94 In that sense, the g7+ was 
quick to catch up with the latest practices in the development sector, and 
the New Deal proposed by the group as a new form of engagement with 
‘fragile states’ included their own Fragility Assessment.95 The group states 
that the exercise is their response to the measurement executed by donors 
with a ‘standard yardstick’, and a reaction to issues such as the use of 
outdated data – generally justified by donors as related to the difficulty of 
collecting data in these countries – and the establishment of ‘overambitious’ 
targets that do not consider the countries’ different points of departure. The 
group quantifies its self-labelled ‘fragility’ but it has also raised important 
critiques. Ultimately, the g7+ says, ‘indicators determined by international 
actors do not draw on the true experts on fragility – the citizens of fragile 
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states themselves’.96 The main point to be highlighted here is that this 
initiative of some governments to get together and to not only create a 
group of self-labelled fragile states, but also develop their own exercise of 
quantifying ‘state fragility’ has been the odd ball in the classification of 
‘fragile states’ narrative.  
The fact that rankings measure social elements in a way that many 
scholars find absolutely arbitrary, the realisation that rankings can have 
powerful impacts on aid allocation, and the fact that most of the impacts of 
most indices, or the indices themselves, will probably never be known for 
sure, lead many scholars to focus on criticising the idea of classifying states 
as a whole, for the potential impacts on the countries labelled. This adds to 
a long list of critiques raised against these forms of classifying postcolonial 
states, for their said Western bias and the power relations such labels are 
seen to reflect and enable. The initiative by the g7+, however, draws 
attention to the possibility of these practices being something less straight-
forward and unilateral and much more complex in terms of the relations of 
power involved. It raises questions about the necessary ‘evil’ of 
quantification and ranking, and about the role of those ‘labelled’ in these 
practices.  
As established by the points of departure mentioned in the 
Introduction, the impacts of the classification of ‘fragile states’ and its 
accompanying quantification permeate this whole thesis, as they are at the 
core of my research question. Therefore, I do not dedicate one specific 
section to the impacts of this classification at this point. In the following, I 
aim to discuss only the critical approaches towards the topic and the 
limitations I identify in those, and from there, discuss my own position in 
this debate. 
Before moving to these critiques, however, it is important to stress 
that although the historical analysis dealt with different labels, this does not 
mean they are, should or will be used interchangeably in this research. The 
same non-assumption guides the following section. Nonetheless, I present 
the critiques to the topic respecting their own position regarding the labels. 
The critical scholars to be mentioned generally affirm that ‘[d]espite 
differences between these [labels] in focus and emphasis, they are united 
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by a variety of shared assumptions’, which are precisely these critics’ 
target. Their focus being on the common ‘deviation’ from Western 
‘successful states’ that is said to be implicit in all these labels, specific 
labels are a matter of indifference, so long as the dichotomist rationale 
criticised is maintained.97 I, however, do not assume interchangeability. I 
focus here on the specific label of ‘fragile states’ because the objects I will 
look into, the practices and rankings that classify ‘fragile states’, do 
measure and label ‘fragile states’, and it is those specific practices and their 
effects that I aim to understand. 
 
 
2.  CRITIQUES TO CLASSIFICATION: THE STATE AND FRAGILITY 
 
Critics to the classification of postcolonial states see in the ‘fragile state’ 
label one more form of Western control and domination. Indeed, taking into 
account the many possibilities of direct intervention, monitoring, 
conditioning and restriction of access to assistance raised by certain forms 
of classification, the history of labelling postcolonial states in terms of 
‘failure’ or ‘fragility’ raises many concerns and much opposition among 
critical scholars. These critiques can generally be divided according to the 
targets they choose: the ‘fragile’ or the ‘state’ in the label – the first usually 
encompasses the latter, but not necessarily. I will start by the ‘softer’ kind of 
the latter and finish with what seems to be the most complete version of the 
former.98 Many of them can generally be linked to postcolonialism theory in 
International Relations, and some of the ‘softer’ versions are closely linked 
to (post)development studies.99 I do not explore the in-depths of either 
theory or their various general propositions, as this would go much beyond 
the scope of this thesis. More in tandem with the specific discussion on 
classification that will be explored in the following section, I look at the 
contributions some of these approaches bring to the debate on ‘fragile 
                                                          
97
 Hill 2005, p. 139. See also Bilgin and Morton 2002, p.  56. 
98
 Critiques that try to refine the label in terms of degrees or stages without actually 
engaging in deep questioning of the politics of classification or the given character of 
Western standards imposed are not dealt with in this section. They were diffusely mentioned 
in the previous section, as they can be seen as more focused on improving policy-making 
than on providing a political and theoretical critique to the power-knowledge relation the 
classification of postcolonial states might invite. 
99
  See the excellent comparison developed in Sylvester 1999. ‘Given the emphasis on local 
resistance, considerable faith in postdevelopment circles is placed in liaising with and 








states’ and how they dialogue with the theoretical and epistemological 
insights I explore in this research.  
The critiques to the ‘state’ in the ‘fragile state’ label generally 
converge towards questioning the ‘exportation’ of a Western model of 
statehood and the attempt at implementing this particular idea of state in 
postcolonial political orders. This idea of state is not necessarily criticised in 
itself, but the perceived highly problematic project of turning it into in a 
universal solution. Certain approaches simply aim to remind the 
development industry that non-state actors can play crucial roles in 
promoting national stability and peace, and they also highlight the 
importance of considering alternative forms of intervention that are not 
centred solely in the state. Hagmann and Hoehne, for example, focus on 
the case of Somalia to argue for an analysis of the ‘empirical emanations of 
statehood within and beyond the nation-state that emerge after or during 
the state collapse’.100 They defend that ‘failed states’101 be seen as a ‘global 
embedded phenomenon’, and therefore argue that current practices of 
statebuilding based on an ideal-typical nation-state model that ignore both 
local idiosyncrasies and global dynamics will not work. Instead, they 
support Herbst’s proposition that subnational units, as the ‘relatively stable’ 
Somaliland, be recognised by the international community.102  
Similarly, a publication by the German Berghof Research Centre 
argues for the substitution of the ‘fragile states’ label by ‘hybrid political 
orders’, allowing for new forms of governance to emerge, in a proposed 
novel approach to statebuilding that recognises ‘embedded’ societal 
structures.103 Generally articulated, this type of critique does not necessarily 
challenge the idea of a modern ‘state’ but its universalisation as a project: 
‘The point is not that this project did not work anywhere, but that it did not, 
and could not be expected to, work everywhere’.104 This approach provides 
an important critique to models of statebuilding that take for granted what 
should be constructed and how. It also gives due relevance to the 
consequences of the Western bias towards a given understanding of what 
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a state is or should be.105 It belongs, however, more to the realm of 
problem-solving approaches, or (post)development studies, in contrast with 
other critiques. 
In fact, another move in the critique to the labellisation of 
postcolonial states not only questions the universality of such Western 
model of statehood in terms of feasibility, but also aims to demonstrate that 
even its implementation in the West can be questioned if historical 
contingencies are taken into account. A key instance of such approach can 
be found in Grovogui’s article Regimes of Sovereignty, which makes use of 
historicisation to delegitimise the idea of the modern state as the sole 
model of statehood, and consequentially, to question the ethics and 
morality of the current regime of sovereignty. Grovogui discusses the 
examples of Belgium and Switzerland, which became states by the force of 
circumstances and with the support of more powerful neighbours, who 
aimed at stabilising the European political landscape. He argues that a 
homogeneous system of independent sovereign states has never truly 
existed, but only the project to promote and sustain it. Grovogui accuses 
what he calls the ‘Westphalian commonsense’ of effecting an economy of 
knowledge that is, until today, fundamentally harmful to African or ‘failed 
states’: 
 
Instead of treating the African condition as evidence that undermines the 
empirical thesis of a uniform international morality, theorists often construe 
deviations from the Western state model as a sign of the inability of African 
states to live up to the requirements of sovereignty.106 
 
Against the example of peacefully conceded sovereignty to Belgium 
and Switzerland, Grovogui places the ‘historical coordinates of sovereignty’ 
instituted by the West in Africa. This ‘regime’ would have contributed to ‘fail’ 
African states by constantly undermining their sovereignty through the 
‘intrusion’ of financial mechanisms, economic marginalisation and ‘other 
neoliberal orthodoxies’.107 Therefore, according to the author, not only is the 
Westphalian system of sovereign states not a historical and teleological 
truth, but it has contributed to form a common knowledge and a view of 
international reality that actually undermined/s the sovereignty of 
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postcolonial states to the point of ‘failure’. Grovogui does not negotiate with 
the labels or propose solutions; he limits his analysis to questioning the 
common sense about statehood in which the classification is based and the 
lack of accountability of the West for what he sees as the products of its 
constant intervention. 
The argument on history and contingency is vastly used by critics of 
the classification of postcolonial states, and mainly by those who focus on 
the ‘fragile’ as much as on the ‘state’ in the label. Differently from Grovogui, 
however, some scholars tend to directly engage with the labels in order to 
question and finally dismiss them, the politically sceptical approach I 
mentioned in the Introduction.108 ‘Politically’, because these approaches are 
openly engaged with a project of profound resistance and reform; 
‘sceptical’, because they dismiss all alleged ‘good’ in the relation between 
the West and ‘fragile states’. Some of them are self-labelled postcolonialist 
in theory, but their insights are not peculiar to this stream of thought;109 
hence, again, my adoption of a general and loose nomenclature and a 
focus on specific contributions. 
In his critique of the ‘“failed states” thesis’, Hill questions what he 
sees as a dichotomist approach based on a ‘universal standard of what 
constitutes a successful state’, and argues that the literature elaborated 
along these lines makes it impossible to contextualise individual paths of 
development.110 He concludes by advocating the complete dismissal of 
labels ‘such as weak state, quasi state, failed state and collapsed state’, as 
a response to what he perceives to be the constant representation of 
postcolonial states as the ‘deviant Other’.111  
Gruffydd Jones, in turn, argues there is a need to go beyond and 
develop an alternative analytical framework that can contribute with the 
‘challenge of explanatory critique.’112 She seeks to substitute the ‘unhelpful 
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generalization’ offered by indices for an approach informed by global 
political economy, drawing ‘attention to the interaction between local and 
global social forces and processes, understood in their historical 
specificity.’113 Gruffydd Jones argues the label ‘failed states’, ‘with its 
hierarchy of categories – “weak”, “fragile”, “failed”, “collapsed” – legitimises 
intervention by identifying lack, inferiority and incapacity.’114 The author is, 
thus, incisive about the need to dismiss the label(s). She argues the label is 
used in an imperialist justification for intervention precisely by generating 
rich adjective descriptions with no explanatory character, hence, producing 
an amnesia regarding the way imperialist endeavours contributed to ‘failing’ 
such states in the first place. The alternative analytical framework, 
however, does not move much beyond a historicisation of these conditions, 
as the proposed dismissal of the label(s) is anchored in a critique to an 
overarching imperialist power and political economy. 
Bilgin and Morton follow similar lines. Nevertheless, by grounding 
the ‘imperialist power’ on specific institutional changes and practices, they 
offer what is perhaps the most complete critique of the labels among those 
discussed here. The authors problematise the power-knowledge relation in 
which the labels are embedded by tracing the debate back to the 
institutional moves that led to what they call ‘the annexation of the social 
sciences’. Those moves, according to Bilgin and Morton, were based on 
thinking and practice that were rooted in the Cold War dynamics and 
contributed to a dissociation that still endures between society and state 
and between Political Economy and Security Studies. The authors suggest 
still that security has inherited a narrow and extremely militaristic approach, 
an approach also extremely centred on the state – what they call 
‘statolatry’.115 Furthermore, they argue that the division between Political 
Economy and Security Studies makes the discussion on ‘state failure’ blind 
to the political economy that made a Western liberal ‘zone of peace’ 
possible, while also creating a realist ‘zone of conflict’ in postcolonial 
states.116 Moreover, Bilgin and Morton suggest that the solutions being 
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proposed to deal with ‘failed states’117 lack a contextualised understanding 
of the local state/society relations, separating these realms when the 
relation between them, it is argued, is precisely what accounts for the 
specificities of these political orders. The critique concludes with a proposal 
to dismiss the labels and to think of ‘failed states’ in terms of ‘historical 
blocs’, inspired by Gramsci’s work and seen as essential to present an 
‘alternative to the construction of failed states as political practice’.118 
 Therefore, Bilgin and Morton go one step further by presenting their 
view on how the social sciences have come to be successful in the creation 
of the figure of ‘fragile states’, reflecting on institutional moves and 
processes. They also offer an alternative approach with more specific 
elements in which critics can base their work, but as such these 
propositions are limited to a dialogue with academics, not really engaging 
with how the labels are practiced, and thus how the process of dismissal 
would work for actors themselves.  
Nonetheless, later, in 2008, Bilgin made an important indirect 
contribution to expand this dialogue, by proposing the use of Bhabha’s  
notion of ‘mimicry’ to think of the ‘Other’ as often ‘similar, but not quite the 
same’ as the ‘West’.119 Her contribution is in extending this notion to 
criticise studies of difference that fail to see that similarities should raise 
interesting questions themselves, both in terms of the forces that lead to 
the need to mimic and in terms of the possibilities this can generate to 
disrupt authority, not least by breaking the clear-cut distinction between 
‘West’ and ‘non-West’:  
One advantage to this approach is that it permits recognition of the agency 
and agenda of ‘non-Western’ actors in adopting, adapting or bypassing 
‘Western’ ways of thinking about and doing world politics. The point is that 
‘non-Western’ resistance and/or ‘diﬀerence’ may take many forms – 
including a search for ‘similarity’.120 
 
The argument in favour of exploring why these similarities are 
developed and what possibilities they hold for challenging authority 
contributes for a debate beyond academia, exactly by problematising the 
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practical constraints and pressures actors endure. There is, however, a 
constant reference to an implicit agency of the ‘West’, as a homogeneous 
collective, that I strongly propose to avoid, as the remainder of this section 
explains. 
 
3.  PRACTICAL PRESSURES: THE ROLE OF PRACTICES 
 
The approach of this research is to emphasise precisely that aspect of a 
blurred relation between ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’, but without the 
tendency that so often creeps in along with such approaches to presume 
collective intentions of one kind of another.121 Also part of this blurred 
relation is the important insight on the price of disengagement, which I 
argue should not be side-lined in a meta-narrative of the relations between 
‘West’ and ‘non-West’, but instead should be at the very core of the 
research. In fact, here I follow Sylvester’s critique to some postcolonial 
approaches, and suggest that, although perhaps uniquely rich in their 
dedicated attention to the history of domination that underpins current 
relations with ‘fragile states’, there is a need to approach such relations 
through a practical lens, one that takes into account that there exist very 
concrete and immediate needs in so-called fragile states and, thus, a need 
to find practical ways to deal with them while taking into account the 
important discussion on power relations: ‘[P]ostcolonial studies does not 
tend to concern itself with whether the subaltern is eating.’122 Although a 
rather harsh critique, it has a point in that (unbalanced) engagement is 
quite often the only available move. In that spirit, I focus precisely on the 
elements that make ‘similarity’ or engagement in (pre-)established terms so 
necessary and strongly imposed, but I analyse this imposition as residing in 
the practical features of such elements rather than in an epistemologically 
privileged access to collective intentions.  
In asking ‘What practices classify “fragile states” and what are their 
impacts?’, I establish the aim of understanding how ‘fragile states’ become 
a political reality, and very importantly, my phrasing is not an attempt to 
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narrow down the object of research towards ‘practices’ but a declaration of 
my theoretical inclination. The history of quantification and classification 
presented in this chapter and the brief discussion about the way critics 
approach the ‘fragile states’ agenda had the purpose of bringing to the fore 
the role of practices of quantification and classification themselves. I take 
the critique I offered above, on the practical impositions of ‘similarity’, or 
simply ‘engagement’ (which here implies adopting certain practices), as 
point of departure to discuss my own approach to the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda. In the chapter that follows, I detail the many components of my 
research question, making the way I propose to answer it necessarily 
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The ‘construction of fragile states as political practice’ is undoubtedly 
powerful in its consequences and unbalanced in the ‘causes’ and problems 
it highlights. In emphasising these issues, critical scholars indeed bring to 
the fore extremely important discussions on the powerful relations involved 
in the classification of ‘fragile states’. However, the labelling of the ‘deviant 
Other’ should raise questions that go beyond the label itself, or the 
knowledge that leads to this formulation, to how this knowledge becomes 
so widespread it turns into a common sense. In the case of the 
classification of ‘fragile states’, sociologies of quantification can provide 
important insights.  
In general, labels are used because they are practical. ‘Practical 
taxonomies’,1 including the overarching one between ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ 
in academic discourse, become current when they can be used, mobilised, 
when they help explaining or summarising phenomena. In that sense, 
taxonomies need to approach people’s perception of the world to be of any 
use:2  
[T]echnical classifications grow out of and have to answer to our common 
sense, socially comfortable classifications. It just would not be socially 
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feasible to call a donkey a fish, no matter how good your scientific 
grounds.3  
 
Thus, the labelling is undoubtedly powerful, but how so? How is it 
that the classification of ‘fragile states’ becomes ‘socially comfortable’? 
These questions are largely side-lined in discussions that overwhelmingly 
privilege the work of collective intentions over practices, subsuming actors 
into homogenised assumed blocs. Here, however, practices are placed at 
the very centre of the research. An understanding of how self-labelling 
becomes possible needs to be accompanied by an account of how 
powerfully practical the labelling is. 
 In the following section, I briefly introduce the main theoretical 
bases of the approach I propose. In the second section, this approach is 
discussed along three sub-sections: I first look at the quantifying and 
classifying practices as part of a broader reasoning, a style of thinking and 
doing that authenticates itself through constant improvement in use. 
Subsequently, I focus on the practical sense amid which quantifying and 
classifying practices take place and what this notion means in terms of the 
critique to the critics I propose. The idea of practical sense is advanced as 
an antidote to intentions-based approaches that are so often presented as 
the only counter-move to mainstream views on ‘fragile states’. The third 
sub-section gathers the idea of a style of thinking and doing and the notion 
of practical sense to think of power in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. I suggest 
Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power provides the necessary nuances to the 
debate, opening space to considering and analysing the possibilities of 
weakening and change of this power. Combined, these three sub-sections, 
on style, practical sense and symbolic power, offer the detailed hypotheses 
of this thesis, presented together in the third section. Finally, the fourth and 
last section discusses the methodological bases of this research. 
 
1.  THE PROBLEM OF ASSUMED HOMOGENEOUS COLLECTIVE 
INTENTIONS AND PRE-ESTABLISHED OPPRESSION 
 
There is no questioning the political character of classifications such as 
‘fragile states’ and the political negotiations that go into the process 
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whereby they become common currency. Indeed, this research agrees with 
the many previous analyses on the power of classifications: They are 
powerful bureaucratic mechanisms whose elaboration is profoundly 
political, since their contingency, lack of situatedness and blindness to 
residual categories have important effects of power and subtle exclusion.4  
Notwithstanding these important critiques, this thesis deals with the 
power in the classification of ‘fragile states’ as a question, not a given 
answer. I approach this question in terms of how power is exerted, which 
should shed light on the forms of power involved. As seen in the previous 
chapter, many scholars examine how the labels and the tools to achieve 
them become a useful common sense by hypothesising homogeneous 
intentions and motivations of a collective sort: the ‘the West wants, plans, 
aims to’ in what I called politically sceptical approaches. These approaches 
often depict a rather consequentialist understanding of interests and a 
privileged epistemology of intentions: Power is understood as accumulated 
resources and automatically linked to a general intention to ‘oppress’. I take 
issues with the ‘intentions’ and the ‘oppress’. In the following, I dismiss the 
first and open up the second by asking who is involved in the politics of 
labelling ‘fragile states’ and how.  
This research argues that looking for a ‘why’ in the context of this 
debate is to ask the wrong question; and looking for ‘why’ with one 
homogeneous oppressor and one homogeneous oppressed in mind is to 
skew the question so that the very place and moment of politics are killed in 
anticipation. In fact, politically sceptical approaches generate a dangerous 
paradox: No room is left for the ‘oppressed’ to act, as any action in that 
sense is either merely pre-absorbed by the critique as potential non-
reflexive cooperation with the ‘oppressors’ caused by Western education, 
or dismissed as the utilitarian move of predatory elites who are not 
representative of their population. I argue instead that if the practices of 
classification are powerfully influential, those very practices should be the 
object of research. In the remainder of this chapter, I develop these 
critiques and the theoretical and methodological insights that provide the 
bases of my own approach. 
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2.  QUESTIONS OF CLASSIFICATION, PRACTICES OF 
‘FRAGILISATION’ AND POWER: THE KEY TARGETS 
 
In this section, I discuss my signposts or hypotheses in this research, that 
is, how I combine considerations regarding incontestable human misery, 
ubiquitous practical-but-dangerous quantification of complex political 
problems and the important insights of critics regarding the truly powerful 
negative impacts of labellisation. This section mixes epistemological and 
theoretical questions with the substantive issues raised by this 
configuration. In fact, I call the ideas in the following sub-sections signposts 
or hypotheses because the answers I suggest cannot be dissociated from 
how I propose to answer my research question. Borrowing Hacking’s 
analytical prompt, ‘it is best to avoid sweeping generalities and get down to 
discussable details’.5 
 
2.1. UNCONTESTED HUMAN MISERY MEETS CONTESTED SOLUTIONS:  
QUANTIFIED CLASSIFICATION AS STYLE OF THINKING & DOING 
 
There is currently a seemly incompatibility of focus between concerns over 
solving the problems in ‘fragile states’ and concerns over how the negative 
impacts of these very solutions reflect an overarching Western domination 
– respectively, the problem-solving and politically sceptical approaches. 
How to maintain the important human aspect of the debate without losing 
sight of the powerful impacts of the ‘fragile states’ labellisation? As seen, 
some critics argue for the dismissal of all labels that imply a ‘deviant 
Otherness’ and a Western standard of statehood. Practitioners and 
problem-solving authors, however, constantly work to supposedly refine the 
fragile state label and its measurement exactly with the stated aim of 
reducing such negative impacts. Therefore, I suggest a key to addressing 
the above question is in looking at what connects the human misery 
identified in ‘fragile states’ and the perceived problematic framework of 
solutions the label encourages, that is, the point where problem-solving and 
politically sceptical approaches intersect and disperse, the (quantified) 
practices of classification.  
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STYLE OF THINKING & DOING QUANTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION 
 
Overall, politically sceptical approaches go only as far as saying the 
constant measuring does not help to produce an encouraging picture of 
countries that are struggling to find support – a vicious cycle many, 
including practitioners, argue should not be undermined.6 ‘Fragile states’, 
they would say, are obviously not strengthened by ‘fragilisation’ practices. 
Indices of ‘state fragility’ have direct influence over the allocation of 
resources for many aid organisations and might also guide investments 
made by private companies. In addition, the quantified data reproduced in 
rankings and other classification schemes is used by citizens to hold their 
governments accountable but are often produced elsewhere and not 
necessarily updated. Also, the very fact that the ‘fragile states’ might be 
unable to produce such data independently (if there is such a way)7 may 
divert investors and partners to look for other sources of information, 
leaving ‘fragile states’ with little room for the establishment of goals and 
priorities. Moreover, a great part of this quantified classification is fed by 
and feeds other indirect – but not less important – practices of 
categorisation: The monitoring, evaluation and advising provided by donor 
agencies to ‘fragile states’ are by rule followed by increasingly quantified 
reports that take stock of ‘risks’ and results, and these practices depend on 
the same sort of exercises to establish targets and plans of action. The 
departure point for all these practices is data collection, often executed by 
mixed international and national teams in blurred processes of analysis and 
aggregation.8 In this sense, the unbalance in skills among actors involved is 
always a central factor when discussing the appropriateness of both 
exercise and result. 
These examples do not even begin to approach the complexity of 
discussions on ownership and state capacity, but provide a good idea of 
what critics to the quantified – or excessively quantified – classification of 
‘fragile states’ have to say. With all possible impacts envisaged and 
concretised, numbers are frequently pointed as arbitrary, mistaken in many 
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levels, incomplete or deliberately biased.9 Yet, the quantified practices of 
classification have multiplied and expanded in exercises of constant 
improvement in use, expressed, for instance, in the many recent initiatives 
offering massive open data about countries’ performance.10 In the case of 
‘state fragility’, the perceived inaccuracies and political problems inherent in 
the statistics do not halt the quest for classification, as one could expect, 
but actually encourage an ongoing work aimed at improvement and 
refinement. This approach to ‘fragile states’ is loosely interpreted by some 
scholars as a practice of governance by indicators,11 for its focus on 
technology and the opportunities it generates to produce and execute 
policy from a distance. 
The quantification of political issues is indeed intensifying and the 
level of supervision it allows is increasingly seen as both objectively 
desirable and politically problematic. Nevertheless, I suggest these 
practices of quantified classification go much beyond the technology 
needed for such analyses and the ubiquity of indicators in policy-making. 
They reflect as diverse factors as the agencies’ need to adapt to perceived 
new problems in international politics, as well as professionals’ struggles to 
adapt to a now much disputed job market, the need to adjust concrete 
approaches that had not previously shown adequate results and, not least, 
a perhaps increasing exchange with labelled-countries’ offices, much 
reflected by and in the recent dynamic of self-labellisation by ‘fragile states’, 
as discussed ahead. 
I propose to see this layered urge to classify and measure ‘fragile 
states’ as a style of thinking and doing political management of ‘fragile 
states’, borrowing Hacking’s term for a specific form of enquiring the 
world.12 Hacking is inspired by Crombie’s six styles of scientific enquiry, of 
which two are ‘ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy’ and 
‘statistical analysis of regularities of populations and the calculus of 
probabilities’.13 A combination of these seems to be exactly what the 
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political management of ‘fragile states’ has so far mobilised in the form of a 
measured taxonomy of statehood. Styles are not used because they are 
good; in Hacking’s words, ‘[t]hey are what we use’ and, therefore, ‘[t]hey 
become our standards for good reason’.14 Critics, or rather, political 
sceptics, ignore this dimension at their peril.  
As numbers or ‘numerical claims’ are reproduced and reworked, 
they ‘hold’; they become a bureaucratic routine as much as a reality.15 The 
quantification of aspects of ‘state fragility’ is at the heart of practices of 
classification and can only be considered of practical use if based on the 
perceived urge to have a classificatory grid – the method of the style and 
the style reinforce each other. In order to classify ‘fragile states’, one 
encodes aspects of ‘state fragility’, develops indicators through an extreme 
political process of commensurability and finally measure, compare and 
rank.16  
These quantified practices of classification obey an increasing 
technological proficiency. Nevertheless, actors are drawn to the tantalising 
project of measuring the world as much as they construct this style of 
thinking & doing themselves. The more entrenched the practices, the 
stronger claim to truth their objects of enquiry can hold, which in turn 
reinforces the role of the practices as producers or conduits of true 
knowledge. Thus, quantified practices of classification make use of 
available technologies and foment their development in the same way they 
measure objects that they help to create. In Hacking’s view, these objects 
might never have existed in their form if the classificatory construction had 
not taken place.17 Although intense human misery is common to so many 
countries named ‘fragile’, the encoding of this human misery into a category 
of ‘fragile state’, the commensurability of state capacity and willingness to 
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tackle this misery and the following classification of ‘fragile states’ based on 
manageable elements and processes – taxation, education, financial infra-
structure, among so many others – have created a ‘state fragility’ reality 
that albeit ‘apace with contingent events’, is stable enough to mobilise a 
huge bureaucratic machine and to exercise powerful effects on ‘classified’ 
and ‘classifiers’. Indeed, if objects are measured, someone has to measure 
them - and do it well. This aspect will be discussed ahead.18 
What is interesting in looking at these practices of classification, 
therefore, is that the power to hold in place among other possible styles is 
drawn precisely from the style itself. A style of thinking & doing, according 
to Hacking, is self-authenticating: ‘The style does not answer to some 
external canon of truth independent of itself’; it has no foundations. A style 
of thinking & doing is one which ‘works’.19 Hacking admittedly sees 
circularity in that, but this is welcome: ‘The truth is what we find out in such 
and such a way. We recognize it as truth because of how we find it out. 
And how do we know that the method is good? Because it gets at the 
truth.’20 Hacking has never been keen to subscribe to any correspondence 
theory of truth and thought of ‘truth’ as an elevator word that complicates 
discussion rather than elucidating analysis.21 The circularity in ‘truth’ is 
instead better approached by a look at the style of thinking & doing.  
All in all, a style, in my own view, is a work of practical fine-tuning: 
Existent methods and technologies gradually become efficient in producing 
and reproducing the objects they seek to think about and act upon, and can 
only hold while method and object hang together, through a constant work 
of thinking and doing. This, however, is not as much a conscious attempt to 
sustain a perceived artificial view of the world as such, as a response to a 
reality one helped to create, and this is where this approach contributes to 
an essential departure from the main critiques explored in the previous 
chapter.  
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In his elaboration, Hacking cites Bourdieu’s idea of reason as 
historic and William’s concept of truthfulness.22 In brief, Bourdieu’s notion of 
reason is necessarily historical because it is based on the author’s theory of 
practice, which places reason (not rationality, which is dismissed) in a 
configuration that intrinsically relies on the objective conditions of the world 
as much as on individual trajectories and positions.23 Accordingly, 
objectivity is in fact the character of a certain social order that is self-evident 
because it is engaged with through schemes of perception and appreciation 
that emerged from precisely that social order.24  
The ways of finding out about things of the world, therefore, are 
based on kinds of reasons that are peculiar to these styles.25 Each style of 
thinking & doing has its own methods of finding out, based on a form of 
reason (not necessarily unique to it), and also very importantly, it produces 
its own objects, by defining objects of enquiry that are candidates to truth. 
The issue, thus, is not in determining if the enquiries find the truth about 
their object, but how these styles of thinking & doing produce a form of 
truth-telling or truthfulness that holds, that is, how they become self-
authenticated.26 Hacking’s answer is pragmatic: Styles answer to pragmatic 
standards only, with no external canons.27 Styles that enquiry into 
‘interactive kinds’ have the capacity to produce what Hacking, in his 
‘dynamic nominalism’, calls ‘looping effect’.28 In my view, this is similar to 
Bourdieu’s notion of ‘theory effect’, fundamentally a summoning to which 
there tends to be some movement as an answer: The classified object 
becomes or rejects what it is summoned to be but it can hardly disengage 
once the theory or style of thinking & doing has successfully established the 
accepted candidates to truth.29 The more successful the style, the more 
pressure on objects and groups to assume or refute categorisation, hence, 
the stronger the style’s truthfulness.  
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Kauppi and Erkkilã, inspired by the notion of theory effect, provide 
an excellent example of such forces in an analysis of the indices on Higher 
Education in Europe:  
[F]or institutions of higher education to simply ignore these neo-liberal 
models, their managerial instruments, the philosophy of publish or perish,  
the  threat  to  national  sovereignty  and  society  they  represent,  and  
more broadly the structural forces in motion can be disastrous.30 
 
After this observation, they proceed to enumerate the many 
possible disasters disengagement would generate, ranging from loss of 
funding to the inability of attracting good students and the damaging of 
reputation that goes along all these consequences. The reasoning could 
not be more connected to the one I propose here. The idea of a self-
authenticating style of thinking & doing helps exactly to illustrate the price of 
disengagement, the damaging gap in politically sceptical approaches. 
The notion of style, thus, is a promising and rich way of approaching 
recent events in the topic of ‘fragile states’. Largely ignored in major 
critiques, the quantified practices of classifying 'state fragility’ and the 
relatively recent foundation of a self-labelled group of ‘fragile states’, the 
g7+, virtually scream to be connected under this highly insightful umbrella 
term of style of thinking & doing – in this case, I would say, thinking and 
doing political management of ‘fragile states’. This style, in constant work of 
refinement, seems extremely competent in creating a general need to 
classify ‘fragile states’ to the extent that a relatively successfully vocal self-
labelled group contributes to making the dismissal of the label if not a non-
issue, at least one that is embedded in such entrenched practices of 
quantification and classification that one cannot dissociate the method from 
the object of enquiry.  
Indeed, as states are classified according to ‘degrees of fragility’, a 
multiple ‘ontological slippage’ seems to shift the focus to the adjectivation 
rather than the ‘truthfulness’ of ‘state fragility’ itself, indicating the power of 
social and practical taxonomies Bourdieu describes.31 Assumed and 
naturalised, this qualified and quantified existence becomes ‘real in its 
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consequences’.32 Fragile states’ thereby become a reality of international 
politics without ceasing to be a scientific and political construction. 
Considering this power in use, the most analytically interesting 
aspect of the style is, thus, the fact that the pragmatic standards through 
which a style is judged are not founded on any external explanation, be it 
homogeneous collective intentions or the ‘reality’ of ‘fragile states’. The 
quantified classification and management of ‘fragile states’ is not 
widespread because it reflects a ‘truth’ about what a ‘fragile state’ is, 
because moral and ethical considerations make this style of thinking & 
doing legitimate, or, as discussed ahead, because it is driven by a 
conscious programmatic move to create artificiality. The style is successful 
because it works in the historically and epistemologically well-rooted 
context of the quantifying and classifying practices in which it is embedded.  
It is necessary to highlight, however, that I approach this ‘work’ in a 
slightly different version from the one provided by Hacking. For the author, 
‘work’ is related to results that were intended or that are of ‘our liking’.33 I 
suggest that the ‘work’ is rather a judgement regarding what is of ‘our 
liking’, and that the ‘intended results’ bit of his notion is clearly not a useful 
approach in this research. Hacking’s work is generally directed at medical 
and ‘hard-science’ issues, where, without going into important though here 
unnecessary philosophical debates, the ‘intended’ part might be differently 
understood. Different from hard sciences experiments, in the specific case 
of practices that classify ‘fragile states’, quantification is central and is done 
in such a global, diffuse and intense way that numbers are hardly traceable 
or attributable.34 Hence, verifying that results follow intentions is an 
epistemological dead-end. On the other hand, the judgment of style 
according to results of ‘our liking’, although seemly vague, can be actually 
an analytically rich way of looking at this style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states’, as long as the focus is on ‘practical liking’, 
or perhaps, to use a better phrase borrowed from Bowker and Star, what is 
‘socially comfortable’.35  
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In general, one can say we like what we are practically used to: 
Practitioners that compile statistics on ‘fragile states’ like statistics; active-
on-the-ground practitioners like to think they make a difference and, 
therefore, like easily observed results; directors with little time like reports 
that go straight to the point and facilitate decision-making. The argument 
easily goes on. However, to be fruitful, this approach to the success of the 
style needs to be grounded on the piece of ‘liking’ I have access to, that is, 
the practices of actors that work in classifying ‘fragile states’. The socially 
comfortable, after all, is what we accept to do, encourage others to do, do 
ourselves and learn how to do better by doing.  
 
THE FIRST SIGNPOST 
This sub-section discussed the first of three important signposts or 
hypotheses in this research: In trying to answer to ‘what practices classify 
“fragile states” and what are their impacts?’, I suggest the key is in 
quantified classification as a crucial set of practices and as a central 
method of enquiry towards ‘state fragility’. This, in turn, is established by 
what I suggest is a style of thinking and doing political management of 
‘fragile states’.36 I see the label itself as in a ‘matrix’, as Hacking says, 
composed of actors and practices; hence, my hypothesis considers this 
matrix is constituted and mobilised by a style, in such a way that judging 
the possibility of succeeding or vanquishing the labelling cannot be 
dissociated from an analysis of the style of thinking & doing in which the 
classification is embedded. Based on this understanding of style of thinking 
& doing, success can be judged only by pragmatic standards, which, as I 
suggested, are centred on ‘our liking’, or what is ‘socially comfortable’. The 
socially comfortable, I believe, is best expressed in actors’ very practices, 
what they entail and enable, and their accompanying practical sense, which 
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2.2. PRACTICES AS ANTIDOTE FOR HOMOGENEOUS COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS 
 
I suggest here that to understand the powerful implications of classifications 
of ‘fragile states’, to question their assumptions and to propose 
improvements or dismissals, there is no need to resort to an analysis of 
homogeneous collective intentions (henceforth, ‘collective intentions’). As 
discussed above, such analysis would present an epistemologically dead-
end, because the numbers generated in the style of thinking and doing 
political management of ‘fragile states’ are hardly traceable or attributable 
and, at the same time, are crucial in the classification of ‘fragile states’.37 In 
fact, I suggest most approaches that seems to offer an epistemologically 
privileged access to collective intentions do so precisely because they 
ignore the very quantified practices that make currently classification 
possible and, therefore, the crucial difficulty or even impossibility of 
attributing authorship to certain categorisations, much less the intentions in 
such presumed authoring. Such approaches privilege an assumed 
‘thinking’ over the ‘doing’, crucial to the style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states’; they in fact tend to offer only an arbitrary 
and strictly structural, even if appealing, form of ‘thinking’. This thinking is 
seen as dissociated from internal struggles, specific constraints and 
constant internal negotiation, annihilating human beings and (paradoxically) 
the structural constraints with which they live. 
By focusing on strictly structural and ungrounded intentions of the 
kind ‘the West seeks to’, one ends up with either stated or hidden 
intentions. A critical approach to the first can lead to a rather utopian moral 
crusade against political motivations;38 and a critical approach to the 
second, besides subsuming the issue of access, necessarily assumes the 
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results (perfectly) reflect anterior intentions, and also implies these 
intentions do not need to be attributed – they are no one’ and everyone’s 
intentions, leaving also the analyst absolutely unaccountable. Furthermore, 
there is usually a reliance on powerful deductions to assume a rather 
unilateral, one-dimensional and arbitrary type of perfectly formulated 
strategic intention to dominate – the least sophisticated and nuanced of 
these approaches are frequently called ‘conspiratory’. Not that these 
intentions are not plausible (individually), but to the methodological issue of 
access, a political one should be added: The problem is in that whatever 
good that is in the classification of ‘fragile states’, considering the misery at 
stake, this is somehow eliminated from the debate. Change and 
contingency are paradoxically side-lined by what in many cases are meant 
to be approaches of resistance. 
In that spirit, as indicated in the introduction to this chapter, I 
propose instead a focus on how classifications of ‘fragile states’ take place. 
In that how, a look at the practices is central, and that is the main argument 
of this section. My second signpost or hypothesis proposes to link 
quantifying and classifying practices to ‘practical sense’ and, thus, to avoid 
the pitfalls of collective intentions. First, however, I discuss two rich 
(collective) intentions-based approaches that I believe help to illustrate in 




Some intention-based approaches are seen as strong critiques to the 
Western practices towards ‘state fragility’ and, as such, of relevance to 
question the implications of the style of thinking & doing just discussed. 
However, they are also importantly limited themselves by their focus on 
homogeneous collective intentions. I would like to discuss two of them, both 
politically sceptical somehow but in very different ways: The first focuses on 
a said Western will to control and, mainly, to contain; the second, focuses 
on statebuilding as a set of therapeutic techniques that seek to allow the 
West to evade responsibility and accountability for outcomes in ‘fragile 
states’, as a part of an exercise of ‘empire in denial’. In both approaches, a 








through examples of outcomes that supposedly contradict the official 
discourse on aid to ‘fragile states’. This account of contradictions and the 
depiction of the negative consequences of intervention in ‘fragile states’ 
provide powerful insights and important discussion points. Nevertheless, 
they reach such disparate conclusions that questions can be raised 
towards their seemly privileged (in terms of both access and focus) 
epistemology of intentions: In a quasi-leap of faith and because the 
analyst’s certainty of the nature of the intentions analysed is all that takes to 
conduct the research, the same kind of examples can serve as evidence 
even for opposite views on the intentions at play. I suggest that is because 
one can only analyse such intentions if assuming that the character of the 
results is caused by the character of the assumed intention – which, itself, 
only needs to answer to the analyst’s certainty.  
I discarded Hacking’s view (part of it) of a style that works because 
it matches results and intentions precisely because I do not believe this 
tracing is possible in my study of the classification of ‘fragile states’, not 
when it implies attributing intentions to a whole and homogenous West and 
eliminating practitioners’ work, as will be argued. This kind of approach 
seems to very unnaturally eliminate both the possibility of error and the 
unpredictability of quantifying practices – ‘Actors plan, actors act, actors get 
the results sought’, even less comprehensible in a diffusely quantified 
context. On the other hand, I follow the other part of Hacking’s suggestion, 
that styles work because they are of ‘our liking’, or ‘socially comfortable’, as 
Bowker and Starr say. In that sense, arguments that propose the existence 
of collective intentions in fact do not address the issue of how the negative 
implications are made possible, through which practices, tools and 
techniques, that is, what means became comfortably established as the 
methods to address ‘state fragility’. Logically, even if an individual intention 
is to be put into practice, there would need first to be, in any case, the 
means and people for executing it.   
The first intentions-based approach I would like to discuss, 
developed by Duffield, is marked by the understanding that intervention of 
any sort in ‘fragile states’ represents the Western will to contain the 
circulation of non-desired people. Inspired by Foucault’s notion of 








states’ as labels is not based on empirical measurements, rather ‘the 
difference is practical, and concerns the sense of priority and policy tools 
with which the international community addresses “ungoverned” territory.’39 
 According to Duffield, there has been a re-conceptualisation of both 
security (underdevelopment becoming dangerous) and development (as 
including radical long-term goals, such as conflict resolution), which led to a 
security-development nexus and to the creation of a contingent and 
constantly negotiated sovereign frontier. This frontier, as the argument 
goes, is where Western actors intervene through ‘occupation’, attempting to 
contain spill-overs from what are seen as permanent emergencies, the 
‘fragile states’. According to Duffield, this notion of permanent emergency is 
essential to an international regulatory biopolitical regime that keeps 
underdevelopment at large.40Duffield’s work has a few important points in 
common with my second case of intentions-based approach, David 
Chandler’s analysis of statebuilding in ‘fragile states’.41  
Both Duffield and Chandler argue that sovereign frontiers have 
been blurred, with a constant presence of Western institutions within the 
governments of ‘fragile states’, which tends to make the sovereignty of 
‘fragile states’ increasingly contingent. They also criticise, using different 
notions, the focus on self-reliance or ownership in which an idea of good 
enough governance is based. According to the authors, the notion of good 
enough governance applied to programmes in ‘fragile states’ dislocate 
responsibility for development to the very states being assisted.42 However, 
the authors present very different reasons/intentions for these and related 
practices in the Western engagement with ‘fragile states’. As seen, while 
Duffield identifies a liberal regulatory biopolitics that aims to exert power to 
control and contain underdevelopment, Chandler suggests instead that the 
engagement with ‘fragile states’ actually reflects a lack of (self-) interests, a 
post-Cold War ‘anti-foreign policy’ that seeks to deflect responsibility and 
accountability by superficially intervening to reconstruct ‘fragile states’ but 
only half-heartened (which in fact looks like an interest).43  
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According to the author, the change in the acceptable forms of 
behaviour expected from the great powers has turned power into 
something to be hidden; almost an anti-realist movement in re-interpreting 
the world. In these new international relations, while the West is expected 
to reduce poverty and promote peace and development, the argument 
goes, it is considered unacceptable that Western self-interests are 
expressed or mobilised. Therefore, Chandler suggests, the statebuilding 
agenda becomes increasingly technical and apolitical, displacing national 
foreign policy interests and (purposefully, it seems) directing attention away 
from Western self-interests and capabilities:44 ‘In fact, the drive to extend 
these forms of regulation stems from the evasiveness brought about by the 
problems of legitimising power rather than the desire to exercise power 
more effectively.’45 Hence, a completely different interpretation of ‘Western 
intentions’ from those presented by Duffield; not a ferocious exercise of 
power, but a meticulous avoidance of it. 
Chandler in fact argues the exercise of Western power in a truly 
interested agenda of statebuilding might lead to more concrete 
development, as the politics in the self-interests would awake the 
accountability process: ‘[T]he denial of power is a dishonest, reactionary 
and elitist perspective which seeks to argue that power is not important and 
that there is not much that power can do’.46 He argues, thus, for the 
exercise of power. 
In these two intentions-based approaches to the topic of ‘fragile 
states’, it is interesting to note how they both depict collective intentions of 
‘the West’ but very different ones, and they both make use of the same 
argument on the lack of efficient solutions from the West but with very 
diverse interpretations. For Duffield, the lack of true ownership is a 
testament to the will of the West to develop governance that is just good 
enough in ‘fragile states’ so as to contain non-insured life,47 while for 
Chandler, the incongruence in practices of statebuilding that aim to allow 
for ownership by ‘fragile states’ indicates an absence of a proper foreign 
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policy, which would include clear self-interests and exercise of power.48 
Although analysing very similar cases and examples, both works provide 
very distinct views of the world: the West is manipulatively political and has 
a clear programme of action; or the West is lost in its use of power, lacks 
legitimacy to any social project and therefore (purposefully) opts out of 
politics and in for technical and bureaucratic assistance only. 
It is important to analyse these studies exactly to show how 
analyses of the same practices and events around ‘state fragility’ can come 
to such discrepant conclusions. This is intrinsically linked to their focus on 
collective intentions as object of enquiry, making of this collective 
something absolutely independent of actors’ practices, the ‘sweeping 
generalities’ to which Hacking refers.49 I suggest the disparities in the 
interpretation of examples reflect the fruitlessness of tracing results to 
intentions in such macro-analyses. The focus on intentions is 
epistemologically futile because it leads to all answers, thus, to no answer 
at all. Moreover, if the aim is to discuss and reclaim politics, these 
hyperbolic analyses actually choose less helpful weapons to hit the target.  
I suggest that if such intentions-based questions cannot be 
answered if not with multiple contradictory interpretations, we can attempt 
to answer how and have the important benefit of an analysis that, 
considering the negative impacts of such classifications, looks at how this 
impetus to quantify and classify sustains itself. This proposed how- 
approach is centred on a specific understanding of practice that is able to 
dismiss intentions while retaining the important aspect of self-
authentication, hence opening space for a discussion about how practices 
that classify ‘fragile states’ become and remain powerful. Moreover, and in 
practical terms, by dismissing an ontological priority of intentions, the 
approach proposed looks to access impacts that were not sought, aims 
which show no related results, intentions that make no sense, and sense 
that follows no intentions, therefore, expanding the possibilities for an 
analysis of power, as will be discussed later on. Not only power is not side-
lined in this approach, but it becomes possible to understand how it is 
practiced, thus, what contingencies and changes can be considered.  
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For this, the Bourdieusian concept of ‘practical sense’ is central, and 
it is at the core of my second signpost or hypotheses: practices can 
account for power without taking for granted what this power is, how it is 
exercised and by whom. Therefore, practices that classify ‘fragile states’ 
directly or indirectly offer a key site of research to understand both how the 
urge for classification is sustained and what powerful impacts it has in the 
case of ‘state fragility’. I suggest practices of quantification are part of the 
‘doing’ as much as of the ‘thinking’, not mere tools or employed 
technologies, but the very frame through which actors perceive ‘state 
fragility’ and, therefore, how ‘fragile states’ become a political reality. One 
does not reinforce or refute a label, but the style of thinking & doing that 
makes the labelling possible and is made possible by it. The issue, thus, is 
how practical the reinforcement or refutation can be. 
 
PRACTICAL SENSE 
The approach I propose to look at these practices fits within the broad 
‘practice turn’ in social sciences, in that it is ‘sufficiently psychological to 
avoid physical determinism [and] sufficiently nonpsychological to be 
embodied’.50 Bourdieusian ‘theory of practice’ is valued for its relational 
reading of everything social: ‘Against all forms of methodological monism 
that purport to assert the ontological priority of structure or  agent, system 
or actor, the collective or the individual, Bourdieu affirms the primacy of 
relations.’51 Actors’ objectives positions are always seen in relation to other 
actors’ positions, according to the compared volume and structure of 
capitals (economic, social, scientific and others), whilst the change in one’s 
position influence the others’. In this understanding of the social, the 
‘primacy of relations’ is crucial in providing the lens through which one can 
apprehend what guides practices: Practice, according to Bourdieu, is 
guided by the habitus, ‘a feel for the game turned into second nature.’52 The 
habitus is ‘a past which survives in the present and tends to perpetuate 
itself into the future by making itself present in practices structured 
according to its principles’;53 hence, self-authenticating. It is a past 
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embodied in the form of categories of perception and dispositions.54 In that 
way, I see habitus as much similar to Hacking’s notion of style of thinking & 
doing, as Bourdieu himself hinted at. Indeed, here Hacking’s dynamic 
nominalism and Bourdieu’s structural constructivism richly speak to each 
other.55  
 Bourdieu spoke of the conditions of a disciplinary habitus, its 
methods and concepts, as being constitutive of a style, the unity of which is 
the mark of all products of the same habitus, an insight which he attributes 
to Hacking.56 In the classification of ‘fragile states’, this style would include 
practices or methods of ordering/ranking and creating taxonomies by 
statistically analysing ‘state fragility’ and, therefore, reinforcing the view of 
‘fragile states’ as a concept that reflects the real. 
 In always being relational, this approach distances itself from 
holistic theories, considering that the field, the space of social relations, is 
also constantly being changed by actors’ struggles for position, which 
change the distribution of capitals, and therefore, modify the field itself. The 
habitus, in turn, although a form of embodied structural past experience 
that tends to reproduce this structure coherently, is also constantly leading 
to improvisation when it meets a changed field. Crucially, the habitus 
implies a critique to rationalisation as understood in rational choice theory:  
 [Actors] can conduct themselves in a way that, in a rational 
 evaluation of the probabilities of success, it seems they had reason to do 
 what they did, without us having reason to say that the rational calculus of 
 probabilities was the principle of the choice they made.57 
 
 Arguing for a ‘primacy of relations’ is to avoid the language and 
assumptions embedded in theories that imply ontological priorities. 
Avoiding rationalism (or intellectualist decision-making)58 and holism, the 
key is, instead, in ‘ontological complicity’.59 This is the idea that actor and 
world possess one another, that actors’ categories of perception and 
                                                          
54
 See also Bourdieu 1990a, p. 131. 
55
 Ibid., p. 123; Hacking 2007, pp. 40, 41; Hacking 2012, p. 601. 
56
 Bourdieu 2001b, p. 129. ‘les produits d’un même habitus sont marqués par une unité de 
style’. 
57
 Bourdieu 2008b, p. 138. ‘Eles podem se conduzir de tal maneira que, em uma avaliação 
racional das probabilidades de sucesso, pareça que eles tinham razão em fazer o que 
fizeram, sem que tenhamos razão ao dizer que o cálculo racional das probabilidades tenha 
sido o princípio das escolhas que fizeram’. 
58
 See Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992b, p. 24, footnote 43. 
59








appreciation and, therefore, their practices towards the world, are 
structured by this same world; just as the structure that provides 
possibilities and constraints are constantly shaped by the changing 
dynamics between actors’ capitals, their distribution and structure.60 This 
ontological complicity resonates Hacking’s understanding of styles as self-
authenticating by the very force of the mutual construction between style, 
methods and objects and the idea that what works is based on pragmatic 
standards.61 The insight I borrow from both works is the possibility of 
approaching the classification of ‘fragile states’ as one that is as much 
reliant on its many methods and practices, as on actors, their trajectories 
and positions (including their experience in learning the very skills to apply 
such methods, the comfort in applying and the power to mobilise them) 
and, finally, on the urge to measure and classify itself. The complicity 
among these elements can dismiss intentions without dismissing power. 
 Understanding and truly applying this ontological complicity is a 
crucial proposition here, in that the idea is largely theoretically absorbed 
among approaches inspired by the ‘practice turn’ in social sciences, but 
often subtly pushed aside in favour of easier operationalisation. The greater 
contribution a relational approach focused on the ‘logic of practice’ can offer 
is precisely a take on power that is not anchored in intentions. I discuss 
power in the next section. First, the very idea of ‘logic of practice’ needs to 
be fully explored, as even analyses that have a Bourdieusian inspiration in 
common often slide towards an attempt to rescue rational decisioning by 
placing it at a post-practical moment of reasoning.  
 In a Bourdieu-inspired logic of practice, what guides agents is 
primarily a feel for the game; by becoming a player, actors are not 
indifferent to what is at stake, but are not primarily moved by strategic 
rationality either.62 Actors become players by a form of subtle interest, what 
Bourdieu calls, illusio or libido, an acknowledgment of the importance of 
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being in the game, the feel for or inclination toward the game inculcated by 
habitus through a social existence where the game was seen as important 
and worth playing.63 Illusio is, thus, the practical participation in a game to 
which one is not indifferent.64 
 
 [The feel for the game] gives the game an objective sense, because the 
 sense of the probable outcome that is given by practical mastery of the 
 specific regularities that constitute the economy of a field is the basis of 
 “sensible” practices, linked intelligibly to the conditions of their enactment, 
 and also among themselves, and therefore immediately filled with sense 
 and rationality for every individual who has the feel for the game (hence 
 the effect of consensual validation which is the basis of collective belief in 
 the game and its fetishes).65 
 
 Therefore, practice, in Bourdieu’s theory, is not constituted by 
strategic interest calculated to achieve certain goals, but guided by 
protension, a form of acting that in foreseeing the results which are 
inscribed in the possibilities of the field is free, but free in the limits of 
possibilities offered by the field.66 If we think of the classification of ‘fragile 
states’ as part of a combination of the styles of ordering and developing 
taxonomies and of statistically analysing and comparing – what I called 
style of thinking & doing political management of ‘fragile states’, we can 
easily conceive of this impetus to measure and classify ‘fragile states’ as 
something more profoundly historical and embedded. This style of thinking 
& doing heavily relies in quantification, technologies and in hugely complex 
bureaucratic machinery composed of actors in different places and levels. 
Moreover, being historical and embedded, this style of thinking & doing can 
be seen as based on educational and professional trajectories, modes of 
engaging with people and populations in distant countries and ways of 
formulating and providing information in times of so many technological 
possibilities. These should be seen among other many factors that help 
thinking the classification of ‘fragile states’, in its huge bureaucratic 
endeavour, as something much more complex than homogeneous blocs of 
intentions and utilitarian decision-making can possibly depict.    
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THE SECOND SIGNPOST 
The idea of practices as imbued with practical sense, which in turn is 
intrinsically connected to a broader, historical and mutable style of thinking 
& doing, is my second signpost in this research. My related hypothesis is, 
thus, that the successful (in that they hold) practices of classification of 
‘fragile states’ are those which are able to mobilise all these elements and 
create the pragmatic standards that make thinking and doing ‘fragility’ the 
good reason among analysts. This view opens space for diverse practices, 
very importantly including indirect practices of categorisation, ‘incidental’ 
classification or failed attempts at changing methods and techniques; and I 
suggest all this helps to classify ‘fragile states’ in the sense that an 
ontological slippage takes place, making any different styles of thinking and 
doing powerfully impractical. I detail such practices ahead. 
 The vouched ontological complicity implies a careful policing against 
rationalist readings that insist in creeping in, even among approaches 
based on the same Bourdieusian ideas. Any concession made to a 
rationalised logic of practice tends to lose sight of the very subtleties the 
notion of practical sense should provide. There is no ontological priority to 
be attributed, not even to practices. At this point, however, and as 
Neumann points out, there is perhaps a need to clarify that this lack of 
ontological priority should not imply that practices are incorporated the 
same way in every account;67 they should not be reified, as I do not believe 
they are in Bourdieu’s approach. Also pointed out by Andersen and 
Neumann and perhaps the cause of such mistaken approaches to 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice is the fact that it is a theory, and a complete 
methodological framework is not easily grasped from it.68 As intrinsically 
connected to the habitus, practices are not to be dissociated from the 
history of the field, actors’ trajectories and the discourses that compose 
actors’ perception of the world. Thus, practices would always be 
approached according to the specificities of the object of research. 
Nevertheless, I approach the classification of ‘fragile states’ through an idea 
of style of thinking & doing precisely because I think this might depict in a 
clearer way the complexity of practices imbued with practical sense. For 
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this thesis, it makes more analytically intuitive the crucial analysis of 
techniques, technologies, processes and tools, so central in the measuring 
and classification of ‘fragile states’.69 It is an analytical choice that does not 
alter the thesis’ theoretical commitments, not least because, as seen, many 
of the key insights supporting this approach are shared by Bourdieu and 
Hacking. 
 I emphasise these points to avoid common pitfalls. Practice is not 
ontologically prior to the field or the habitus, as some approaches argue, 
looking forward to give prominence to practice as a new methodological 
tool in International Relations.70 Practices are the product of ontological 
complicity and can only be understood in its rich subtleties if addressed as 
such. The result of doing differently is to give the logic of practice priority 
over ‘other logics’, an approach that often equals the logic of practice with 
instinct, while rationality is attached to a second moment of practice, after 
the instinct has been refined. When Pouliot, for instance, argues that the 
logic of practice is ontologically prior to the logics of consequences, 
appropriateness, and arguing, that can rightly mean that the very idea of 
what is rational, right or appropriate is constructed through practices, but it 
can also lead to an understanding that it is still quite an individual and 
rationalised decision that guides each practice.71 This is an approach that 
looks at the practice not as the site where we can discuss the development 
and survival of a mode of thinking and doing, not as relational, but as 
simple raw data, which should be seen as complemented by other logics of 
action, developed by actors as a rational situated decision. This critique 
was also raised by Andersen and Neumann, who suggest Pouliot’s 
approach uses practice as ‘an epiphenomenal empirical manifestation of 
something else.’72  
 There are similar attempts to add ‘emotion’ to practice by investing 
practical moments with a background of feelings that would culminate in 
how actors choose to act.73 Emotions, as schemes of appreciation, are also 
part of field’ and habitus’ complicity, crucially composed of past 
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experiences and the knowledge about what they represent and what 
impacts they might cause.74 However, although emotions are of course 
human and, therefore, part of practice, they should not be analysed as a 
separate element, distinct from the other background factors that together 
compose habitus. If emotions are an addition to practical logic, the latter is 
nothing but structural material determination, while emotion is the place of 
actors’ decisioning. Being rationalisation or emotion, these approaches 
overall tend to give practice a different time, capable of being 
compartmented to the benefit of individual initiative. However, ‘[s]cience 
has a time which is not that of practice’, the same way it has ‘a logic which 
is not that of the logician’.75 With such compartmentalisation between 
moments of different logics, or moments of emotion and logic, intentions 
creep back in and become the individual’s mechanism of self-defence 
against instinct, merely individualising hyperbolic accounts: ‘As long as 
practice is seen as regular and stable, it can hardly be viewed as a realistic 
adjustment to a resistant, changing and transformed world.’76 
 Indeed, if individuals or blocs of them can be distinctly charged, in 
one way or another, with the ultimate exclusive (that is, isolated) 
decisioning regarding their practices, the reasoning goes that they can also 
be distinctly pointed as the very independent producers of their practices’ 
consequences. Thus, the embeddedness of practices is lost, and so are 
important exercises of diffuse power. Results without obvious producers 
are ignored, no matter their impact, or intentions are randomly assumed. 
Drawing the line between those who classify and those who are classified, 
those who ‘oppress’ and those who are ‘oppressed’ would be, thus, the 
logical consequent step. Practice would go from representing a way to 
discuss the complicity of structural constraints and actors’ experiences to 
an understanding that practice, as raw data, can be grasped as primary 
inclination only, while rationalisation (or emotion rationalised) is charged 
with turning causes into consequences (as in ‘stable deterrence’ and ‘arms 
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control’ turning into the idea of ‘strategic interaction’).77 This is precisely 
what I want to avoid by invoking practices.  
 This notion of ‘practical sense’ seeks to avoid the reproduction of 
 oppositions between reason and emotion and strategy as 
 consciousness and unconscious or spontaneous acts: oppositions 
 that have become normalized in so much international relations theory. A 
 more complex human anthropology is necessary. The reasons shaping 
 human actions are relational, driven by a practical sense and by a degree 
 of arbitrariness.78  
 
 The notion of practical sense allows an understanding of practices 
without rationalisation or consequentialism and away from privileged 
accounts of intentions. ‘To say that a system benefit certain people does 
not mean that they caused that benefit or that they control it’. Guzzini 
identifies this as a kind of ‘benefit-fallacy’ based on ‘power holder-centre 
and causal understanding’:79 The assumption of intentions leads the 
researcher to jump from the privileges or benefits to those who have them, 
connected by the programmatic intention to achieve these benefits. 
 Through the idea of practical sense, this research vehemently 
opposes this understanding, and it does so without losing sight of power 
and inequality. It does not look at one element of one power, much less an 
assumed one; rather it focuses on the way methods and objects combine in 
ontological complicity and pragmatic self-authentication, therefore, how 
power is made possible and sustained. This third signpost of the research 
is discussed below, along with my third hypothesis. 
 
2.3. SYMBOLIC POWER: NUANCES, CAVEATS AND A BLUR 
 
As emphasised, attention to quantification and comparison are central to 
this thesis’ discussion on the classification of ‘fragile states’. When 
databases collect, aggregate and rank statistics to measure human 
development through proxies such as ‘under 5 mortality rate’ and ‘births 
attended by skilled health staff’ in ‘fragile states’, one can hardly disagree 
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there is merit to that.80 It can help governments, international organisations 
and NGOs to prioritise, allocate resources and develop new plans. 
Numbers, however, do not stay put. As sociologies of quantification have 
shown, numbers are ubiquitous to current policy-making because they are 
allegedly capable of capturing complex scenarios in parsimonious objective 
accounts. Moreover, these accounts are said to be objective because they 
are produced with supposed impartiality, based on Maths and technology; 
therefore, they can be ‘safely’ used by decision-makers, who will make 
decisions ‘without seeming to decide’.81 Hence, for being practical numbers 
travel, are refined, reworked and re-aggregated, the results of which are 
then, in general, hardly traceable back to any origins, much less in 
analyses of the macro type. Furthermore, even in the process of 
production, authorship is fuzzy, as statistics in policy-making are hardly the 
product of one mind.82 Software, technologies, tools, and not least teams, 
compose, analyse and aggregate numbers, guided by a style of thinking 
and doing taxonomies and statistical analysis that has evolved from 
centuries of tests, studies and applied exercises. Ignoring this realm is to 
ignore important manifestations of power.  
 [Indicators] reconstruct the places and people that they purport to 
 measure, change how power and expertise are mobilized and often 
 reproduce themselves as they prompt the creation of new layers or tiers of 
 quantified evaluation.83 
 
 Numbers and quantified classifications that seem so practical are 
powerful exactly because they become the pragmatic and practical 
standard against which ideals are judged, in this case ideals of governance, 
statehood, legitimacy, capacity and so on.  
 Our perception and our practice, especially our perception of the  social 
 world, are guided by practical taxonomies (…), and the classifications 
 produced by these taxonomies owe their effectiveness to the fact that they 
 are ‘practical’, that they allow one to introduce just enough logic for the 
 needs of practical behavior, neither too much - since a certain vagueness 
 is often indispensable, especially in negotiations – not too little, since life 
 would then become impossible.84  
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 Facing such expansion and overwhelming force of standardisation, 
it seems actors who want to minimally engage in dialogue need to speak 
the same numerical language. Not because ‘the West’ imposes such 
practices, but because a deep-seated style of thinking & doing grounds 
practices in international politics and governance to a common routine of 
quantification and classification of which it is impractical to escape. Even 
though so many statistical analyses of ‘fragile states’ are constantly 
criticised by recipient governments, by critical scholars and practitioners in 
search of better methods and numbers, these numbers have become 
entrenched in everyday policy making – or rather has a style of thinking and 
doing political management of ‘fragile states’ that is intrinsically linked to 
practices of measuring and ordering or ranking. Despite the high costs 
incurred by data acquisition and the necessary mastery of techniques, 
statistical and technical knowledge reinforce their importance by ‘stripping 
away the contingencies of an object’s creation and its situated nature’, and 
producing the seemly objectivity of certain niches of policy-making.85  
 Following my first and second signposts, I suggest ‘fragile states’ 
are a pragmatic and practical reality of a style of thinking & doing of which 
they cannot be dissociated. Therefore, the price of disengagement is at the 
core of the third signpost. So much has been done with these schemes that 
any opposition has become impractical and too costly. It takes time for staff 
and equipment to assimilate new software and for knowledge to be 
acquired, and investments have to offer a return. Moreover, when a system 
has finally become practically usable, comfort and predictability dictate the 
options.  Indicators can  become powerful  by  the  subtle  imposition 
inherent in this cost: At the end of the day a ‘material culture of [numerical] 
bureaucracy’86  is so ingrained in our understanding of the world that writing 
down numbers and making them official is but a secondary step in a deeply 
seated style of thinking & doing. 
 I suggest understanding this practicality is crucial to look at the 
recent dynamics in international politics after the foundation of the g7+ 
group of self-labelled fragile states. I am not aware of any studies so far 
that have focused on analysing the group’s initiative to produce their own 
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Fragility Spectrum and Fragility Assessment, but one can confidently 
assume critics who protest against the measuring of postcolonial states 
based on Western standards would at least be uneasy about the projects.87 
The Fragility Assessments proposed, as will be discussed, are deeply 
quantified; they also simplify analyses of complex issues to produce 
proxies; and, crucially, they count on logistical assistance and advice from 
donor representatives who sit in the committees for the development of 
common and individual indicators for each country. There is, however, a 
stated aim not to rank the g7+’s member states based on these 
assessments, but merely to use the final scores to measure each country’s 
particular needs and performance.88 Nonetheless, not only did the g7+ 
countries embraced the fragile state label (at least internationally, as will be 
discussed), but the group has also incorporated the quantifying practices of 
donors, producing the numbers that might corroborate their classification. I 
come back to this central debate in chapter six. 
 
SYMBOLIC POWER 
My hypothesis is that rather than the classification of ‘fragile states’ being 
founded on a clear-cut relation of ‘oppressor’ vs ‘oppressed’, the recent 
events indicate it might be more of a rich picture to talk about symbolic 
power, a Bourdieusian notion that is strongly attached both to the idea of 
‘practical sense’ and to the dynamics of self-authentication of a style of 
thinking & doing. The hypothesis suggests the symbolic power might be the 
crucial impact of the quantified practices that classify ‘state fragility’. If 
techniques, tools, processes, discourses and practices change, it is 
conceivable that the relations of power are also transformed, adapted and 
differently expressed. That is strongly supported by the immensely practical 
power of statistics in the international political management of ‘fragile 
states’, very peculiar in its production and use and much less straight-
forward, but none less powerful. 
 The idea of symbolic power is centred in the practical sense in that 
the self-evident aspect of reality becomes so strong it is capable of drawing 
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the complicity of those in principle seen as least favoured by it. The 
dialogue outside of the principles of vision and di-vision of the world, of the 
style of thinking & doing at place, becomes impossible, as ‘a different way 
of thinking would prohibit any form of action on the world.’89 The power of 
the style and its self-authenticating character comes from the practical 
sense and the ‘naturalness’ it puts in place: ‘The most efficacious strategies 
of distinction are those which find their principle in the practical, pre-
reflexive, quasi-instinctual choices of habitus.’90 Hence, I suggest that a 
strongly established style of thinking and doing political management of 
‘fragile states’ based on statistical analysis and the development of 
taxonomies helped turning quantification and classification into practical 
necessities, the reflection of a view of the world that categorises statehood 
according to specific standards.  
 As my hypothesis goes, this implies that the foundation of the g7+ 
and the group’s development of a Fragility Spectrum and Assessment also 
respond to the widespread thinking & doing that became entrenched in the 
management of ‘fragile states’. The practical urge to dialogue and 
participate is strongly connected to the practical need to use the same 
‘language’. In the case of ‘fragile states’, it seems the measuring and 
classification became seen as of great need to ground requests for 
dialogue, different forms of interventions and resource allocation.  
 Therefore, the notion of symbolic power helps to address the 
seemly complicity of those classified, a key feature of the current scenario 
that has so far been ignored by most scholars. I would guess (it is all I can 
do with non-existent approaches) the general assumption is that either the 
movement will wither and, thus, deserves no proper research; that it is not 
legitimate and perhaps reflects the view of only a few Western-educated 
members of the elite in the member states; or that the group is 
programmatically and systematically applying the same style of thinking & 
doing with the strategic aim of getting hold of more resources. I suggest 
that, with the exception of the first possible assumption, which cannot be 
currently judged and in any case would not make an analysis less needed, 
these assumptions should not be seen in terms of either/or. More 
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importantly, they can easily lead to the dismissal of the very agency91 some 
of them may advocate. If the classified are engaging in self-classification, 
ignoring transformations and change undermines the very possibility of 
such events. 
 The idea of symbolic power is also relevant to approach the many 
nuances I see in the debate since the rankings became more widespread 
and, mainly, since the foundation of the g7+. In his work, Bourdieu presents 
strong critiques towards ‘pure linguistics’, suggesting their approach does 
not reflect the social conditions, social usages and relations of power 
involved in discourse and ‘proceed as if the theoretical mastery of the code 
sufficed to confer practical mastery of socially appropriate usages’.92 The 
symbolic power is, therefore, related to actors’ ability to make their authority 
known by making socially adequate use of the methods available, language 
or numbers – ‘the power to secure recognition of power’.93 In a world where 
state capacity and legitimacy is measured by numbers, statistics do not 
describe only the measured, but are also a reflection of the authority of 
those who do the measuring. Numbers ‘minimise the need for intimate 
knowledge and personal trust’, therefore de-humanising certain processes 
that become seen as technical and straight-forward.94 Hence, the many 
critiques towards the quantification of approaches to ‘fragile states’. 
 However, through an idea of symbolic power, numbers also bring 
important nuances to the politics of ‘classifiers’: The level of expertise made 
necessary by this increasingly technical and technological dynamic of 
management does not only make it impractical not to use the same 
language, but also puts a burden over those who classify. Bourdieu 
suggests the gentle violence of symbolic power is peculiar in that sense, as 
‘[t]he great can least afford to take liberties with the official norms and they 
have to pay for their outstanding value with exemplary conformity to the 
values of the group’.95 Skills and expertise, just as numbers, are never 
complete. Ignoring these ‘weakening’ elements hanging upon ‘classifiers’ 
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also seems a strange approach to relations of power one aims to evaluate 
and criticise.96 
 Thinking of the relations between ‘classifiers’ and ‘classified’ in the 
classification of ‘fragile states’ in terms of symbolic power contributes with 
yet other important nuances. It does seem the case that numbers that 
classify ‘state fragility’ respond to a broader, hugely powerful history of 
increasingly technical management and government, which makes them of 
perhaps unusually highly practical character.97 As sociologists of 
quantification have long suggested, numbers derive authority, legitimacy 
and fluidity from their technical image of objectivity and neutrality. It is 
important to emphasise that all countries, without exception, are currently 
measured in their many government’s capacities by all kinds of actors, from 
government, international institutions, think tanks, scholars to NGOs. The 
peculiarity in the use of quantification in approaches towards ‘fragile states’ 
is two-fold. First, numbers tend to have more direct and powerful impacts 
on international profile, hence, on resource allocation and leverage for 
negotiation in contracts, projects and priorities. Second, numbers also tend 
to be less endogenous in the case of ‘state fragility’, because frequent 
crises in so-called fragile states tend to eliminate the possibility of having 
stable, skilled and up-to-date staff and resources able to produce the same 
kind of statistics as development banks and other international 
organisations do, and at the same pace and volume.  
 Impacts on categorisation are well known and largely criticised. The 
unbalance in skills, however, can be richly analysed through the notion of 
symbolic power as part of the self-authenticating aspect of the style. The 
unbalance in skills make it necessary that certain numbers be produced 
elsewhere, which makes the bias of numbers an issue that can contribute 
to more fragilisation, and these impacts are seen as factors to encourage 
the development of local capacity, which reinforces the view that such 
capacities and their products are needed in the first place. Indeed, 
speaking of symbolic power means to consider how prescription and 
description can become one and the same among the practical pressures 
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in the game.98 All that packed in the never-ending cycle of refinement and 
re-aggregation, since by their very peculiar nature, and not least for the 
constant technological advances, statistics are always amenable to 
improvement. 
 
THE THIRD SIGNPOST 
Therefore, my hypothesis on symbolic power works with the self-
authenticating character of the style and the self-evident world generated 
by the practical sense to think of the nuanced possibilities of exercising 
power in the classification of ‘fragile states’. These nuances have the 
positive aspect of opening space to the possibility of change and 
transformation, by focusing on the initiatives of the g7+, without assuming 
irrelevance or purely strategic and utilitarian aims. Instead, I focus on what 
led to these initiatives and on the changes donors agencies also had to 
endure in order to cope with the challenges created by the style of thinking 
and doing political management of ‘fragile states’. The notion of symbolic 
power also crucially draws attention to the important role of ‘practicality’ or 
‘social comfort’ to which methods have to attend and outside of which 
dialogue is impractical. Thus, the notion sheds light on how description and 
prescription become one and the same, that is, on how symbolic power can 
be power, even if subtle. Very importantly, it also emphasises the role of 
skills and expertise in the acknowledgment of authority and, thus, in the 
practices that authenticate this style of thinking & doing. Finally, through my 
hypothesis, I suggest these issues of practicality and skilled authority 
cannot be ignored in any consideration of change and transformation. 
 
3.  COMBINED HYPOTHESES 
 
In seeking to answer ‘what practices classify “fragile states” and what are 
their impacts?’, this thesis raises three main hypotheses, discussed in turn 
in the previous three sections: 
 a) The practices that classify ‘state fragility’ are part of a broad style 
of thinking & doing historically embedded in the objective role of statistical 
analysis and in the importance attributed to order and taxonomy – 
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quantification and classification, therefore, are not mere technical tools, but 
the practices that lead to a widespread view of the world as divided, 
measurable and manageable; 
 b) These practices are not the operationalisation of a Western 
homogeneous intention to control and dominate, but in their bureaucratic 
mobilisation reflect a practical sense that answers to the style’s historical 
embeddedness, individuals’ trajectories and positions, hence, dispensing 
with utilitarian and intellectualist approaches to decision-making of both 
globally structural and strictly individualist kinds; 
 c) The self-authenticating force of this style, based on the ubiquity of 
numbers in management and policy and the practical sense that leads 
these quantified analyses to perpetuate one vision of the world effect a 
symbolic power in the ‘fragile states’ agenda, a power grounded on the 
complicity of ‘the labelled’, the costs imposed to the ‘labellers’, the central 
role of authority and expertise. 
 To these three main hypotheses, I add one that comes precisely 
from the combination of these ideas: I suggest the practicality in this style of 
thinking and doing political management of ‘fragile states’ through 
quantification and classification and the symbolic power in these practices 
contribute to creating and reinforcing a realm that, in its technicality, 
becomes comfortably distanced from politicians. This does not mean that 
these practices evade politics, and this thesis is based on this 
understanding. However, it means that, as the authentication of the style is 
made possible mainly by the engagement of quantifying experts, this 
authentication also tends to allow the disengagement of rather ‘non-
quantifying’ actors, such as Ministries beyond Finance and Development 
Cooperation. Moreover, as these developments unfold, I also suggest the 
g7+s risks losing the local stories its representatives have publicly 
cherished so far, that is, things that cannot be or are seen as better 
articulated if not quantified. As issues that are yet in development, I leave 
these debates open but importantly signalled in the last chapter.  
 One can raise the argument that these are not substantial 
hypotheses to the question proposed. I would answer they are, to the 
extent that they define the limits and possibilities of the specific answers I 








political management of ‘fragile states; b) showing the direct and indirect 
practices that help to strengthen this style of thinking & doing in terms of 
classification and quantification; and c) analysing the case of the g7+ with 
the many nuances just proposed, in terms of the politics of ‘classifiers’, the 
authority of skills, the moment of the foundation of the group in relation to 
the moment of entrenched quantification in policy and the struggles over a 
still ‘uncomfortable’ commonality.  
 The three signposts or hypotheses above delineate my own way of 
enquiring the debate; they reflect, for example, the understanding that 
practices which cannot be attributed to specific authors should also be 
considered, that unintended categorisation as much as planned ranking is 
equally powerful in reproducing the style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states, and that the power of practicality should not 
be undermined, thus, that things able to become ubiquitously comfortable 
should be seen as extremely powerful. The thesis builds upon these ideas 
block by block along the next chapters. 
 
4.  METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 
 
In attempting to answer my question ‘what practices classify “fragile states” 
and what are their impacts?’, and following the signposts above discussed, 
I look at practices that fit the style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states’ through statistical analysis and taxonomies. 
However, in the spirit of the discussions in the previous section, it is 
important to emphasise that the practices related to the style are not 
restricted to practices of quantification stricto sensu, but involve any 
practices that contribute to the thinking and doing of managing ‘fragile 
states’ in terms of measurable categories. Hence, one of the key 
contributions of this approach is the possibility of opening space to indirect 
but powerful practices of classification, and with that, as discussed, bringing 
nuances to an analysis of power in the topic.  
 Crucially and implicit in this style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states’ is an understanding of measures and names 
‘as practice’. As Andersen and Neumann suggest, this does not involve 
transforming all nouns into verbs - not simply ‘X-ing’, but the specific insight 








to the embeddedness of the style through practical sense.99 Thus, practices 
are not the verbalisation of nouns, not merely the raw ‘observable’ action or 
the actors’ description of what they do as practices, but the thinking and 
doing of a reality that becomes self-evident. Factors contributing to such a 
construction can be analysed as practices. The underlining point of 
departure, thus, is that ‘social meaning is defined as use’,100 not as inherent 
identities or assumed programmatic intentions. Therefore, a methodology 
towards practices and practical sense as imbued in a style of thinking & 
doing involves looking at practices as methods in the analysis of the objects 
the style helps to construct. ‘Methods’ here need to be understood in the 
context of my approach to style as the means to enquire the world or as 
ways to finding out.101 The reasoning is, thus, that it is essential to focus on 
practices that help to construct the reality of ‘state fragility’ as something 
measurable and manageable.  
 In addition, it is important to find among these practices those that 
contribute to a cycle of self-authentication, that is, those practices that, in 
creating and analysing this ‘lack of legitimacy and capacity’ by acting on it, 
reinforce the practicality of the measuring and classification, strengthening 
the practical sense that leads to see these quantified taxonomies as of 
practical use, as something that ‘works’. Methods/practices and objects 
cannot be dissociated. 
 Following these insights, this research focuses on the practice of aid 
allocation as an umbrella practice crucial in understanding how ‘fragile 
states’ are classified; after all, to paraphrase Desrosières, it is precisely 
because there is a will to act on things that it is necessary to name and 
describe them – including numerically.102 This, however, will be only in the 
background discussion of all practices analysed, since this is where they 
tend to convert in an analysis of priorities in decision-making. In seeking the 
practices that support the style of thinking & doing this political 
management, I break down aid allocation into the practices that are used to 
calculate aid and to decide on how to execute it, by directly or indirectly 
naming and describing ‘state fragility’: practices of ranking, advising, 
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monitoring and evaluation (generally called M&E, as parts of one same 
practice), all of which include the basic practice of data collection. I address 
them diffusely throughout the next chapters. 
 As discussed, these practices are understood as part of a broad 
context where objects and methods cannot be dissociated; they are 
intrinsically connected in a style of thinking & doing that authenticates itself 
by attending to pragmatic standards. It follows from this that practices and 
discourse cannot be separated, as the construction of meaning depends on 
both thinking and doing. In a first instance and very straight-forwardly, each 
of the many debates that are part of the approach to ‘fragile states’ rely on 
specific phrasings of the issues at hand: ‘service delivery’, ‘whole of 
government approaches’, ‘managing for results’, among so many others. 
As Neumann formulates, ‘[p]ractices are discursive, both in the sense that 
some practices involve speech acts (acts which in themselves gesture 
outside of narrative), and in the sense that practice cannot be thought 
“outside of” discourse.’103 Furthermore, as Leander suggests, taking 
practices into account in the Bourdieusian way means to consider that the 
discourse by itself does not account for the social position of actors, hence, 
for their authority to produce effective discourse, and that a focus on 
discourse alone might leave aside important unarticulated practices.104 
Indeed, Bourdieu sought to combine the analysis of discourse with the 
important power relations in which it is inserted, thus, to combine it with the 
practices that made possible for these relations to be sustained, for certain 
authority to be attributed to specific speakers and specific discourses, and 
for this authority to be acknowledged by a certain audience: ‘[B]y searching 
for them in discourse alone, “discourse analysis” prevents itself from finding 
the laws of construction of discourse which lie in the laws of construction of 
the social space of production of discourse.’105 In line with the idea of a 
style of thinking & doing, discourse, practices and power walk side by side. 
 In the following, I discuss what cuts I apply to the research and why, 
and what methods I use to operationalise my approach in a way as to 
consider the discussed insights on style, practical sense and symbolic 
violence. 
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4.1. RESEARCH CUTS 
 
First and crucially, as briefly mentioned in the Introduction, I choose to 
focus on the development sector of the ‘fragile states’ agenda. The 
historical overview offered in chapter one sought to show the main 
movements in the agenda because some of the points raised are important 
for the discussions to come, but the research focuses solely on the 
development industry. Precisely because the notion of power is perhaps 
less obviously represented in the development sector, it is also there where 
powerful practices seem to need deeper scrutiny. The sector is also of 
crucial importance because it combines what have been pointed at by 
‘fragile states’’ representatives themselves as the key issues of interest for 
these governments: It involves concerns over ‘physical’ interventions as 
much as poverty reduction, markets, financial assistance, jobs and capacity 
building.106 
 As such, I choose yet to limit my research to the relations between 
OECD, the World Bank and the g7+, as I think these are key agencies to 
understand the current politics of classifying ‘fragile states’. As seen, the 
g7+ is a unique and recent platform of self-labelled fragile states and, as 
such, it provides an extremely rich object of research, one also crucial to 
explore the hypothesised symbolic power previously discussed. Moreover, 
as shown, the g7+ has developed its own Fragility Spectrum and 
Assessment, which provide a promising source of data on the practices of 
classifying ‘fragile states’.  
 The World Bank and the OECD, in turn, are key donor agencies in 
the volume of resources flown to so-called fragile states and in terms of the 
production of reports that reflect the style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states’. These documents quantify ‘state fragility’, 
proposing correspondent targets and tools for measuring results, and link 
these elements with proposed forms of intervention and assistance. 
Furthermore, these documents tend to serve as the basis for many other 
agencies’ and government’s initiatives towards ‘fragile states’. A key 
example is OECD’s Principles for Good International Engagement in 
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Fragile States, now adopted by all major donors.107 Another example, 
briefly discussed in the previous chapter, is the World Bank’s CPIA, 
perhaps one of the most used and debated (indirect) rankings of ‘fragile 
states’, one which is employed by many other agencies.108  
 Furthermore, in terms of aid flows, the last Independent Evaluation 
Group (IEG)’s analysis of the World Bank’s performance in ‘fragile and 
conflict-affected states’ from 2000 to 2011 identified an increase in aid to 
‘fragile states’ of 250 percent, compared to 40 percent to ‘non-fragile 
states’. The report states that ‘DAC assistance has in effect reversed the 
trend of performance-based allocation of aid to low-income countries.’109 It 
is important to highlight that the DAC is one of the main bodies that 
constitute OECD; it is composed of 29 members, including the European 
Union, and others among the ‘most developed countries’ in the world.110  
 The World Bank’s assistance itself did not present such increase, 
although the volume of assistance is hugely significative compared to the 
total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to ‘fragile states’.111 
Nonetheless, the organisation has undergone what are perhaps the most 
radical structural changes among development agencies. It has adapted 
operational policies to deal with situations of conflict, and promoted 
changes in the usual performance-based allocation framework to increase 
financial flows to ‘fragile states’. It also created new departments, started 
offering increasing incentives and a special career plan for staff to work in 
‘fragile states’, besides investing in new expertise on conflict and 
security.112 Together, therefore, the OECD, the World Bank and the g7+ 
offer a unique depiction of current debates on ‘fragile states’. 
 Narrowing down this research cut, in the case of the g7+ I focus 
specifically on Timor-Leste, as the country that led the foundation of the 
group, together with DRC and Liberia, and chaired the initiative from 2010 
to 2013, in its crucial beginning and quick expansion.113 In addition, the 
Timorese Minister of Finance, Emília Pires, has been a highly active 
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spokesperson for the group, participating in various committees, including 
the High Level Panel for the post-2015 Development Agenda.114 
 
4.2. METHODS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
In a Bourdieusian understanding of practice as fundamentally embedded in 
history, individual objective positions and trajectories, and with the insight 
on the self-authentication of styles, I apply a cross-referencing of 
documents and interviews, which allows me to a) trace the power of 
discourses whose authorship can be traced; b) identify, in that case, which 
actors were crucial for the advance of such discourse and what kind of 
authority gave them this power; c) understand how this discourse comes to 
be, sustains itself and is practiced, that is, what mechanisms serve as basis 
for it to be said to ‘work’; d) approach, in that case, the struggles that take 
place between different ‘views of the world’; e) look at practices that cannot 
be traced back to specific origins – such as the case of many statistical 
exercises, therefore, taking into account the power of non-intended results; 
f) consider the power of practical imposition (practicality) and the impact it 
might generate in terms of symbolic power, by looking at the conditions in 
which such practices took place.  
 These contributions reflect the key understanding that practices are 
not raw data, hence, not restricted to what I, as analyst, can see. In this, I 
assume an different stance from Andersen and Neumann, one that is 
congruent with the objects of the research. In fact, several of the practices 
studied cannot be observed; this impossibility, however, is not an 
ontological one, but related to a crucial issue of access in the very specific 
case of quantifying practices. Many of these practices are imbricated in 
technologies, softwares and open databases that allow for an enormous 
numbers of inputs from different actors, and many uses made of certain 
numbers cannot be attributed to or matched with original designs.115 That 
means that some practices that are more deeply imbricated, such as basic 
data collection and analysis, long lost and covered by layers of re-work, can 
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only be studied through the mechanisms set in motion with them (it is 
impossible or nearly so to say ‘by them’), like technologies and software, 
and by the political implications that accompany them, developed in the 
context of development assistance. Nevertheless, I take on Andersen’s and 
Neumann’s suggestion to also approach practices through accounts of 
actors themselves, and here, to cross-reference them with documents.116 
 Indeed, the research cross-references official documents, reports, 
drafts and databases produced by the actors selected on the topic of 
‘fragile states’ and interviews with some of the professionals who work in 
the production of this data. The framework for selection of documents and 
interviewees is set by the specific practices I proposed to analyse: selection 
for aid, ranking, monitoring, evaluation, advising and data collection. The 
interviews were conducted with as varied a range of professionals as 
possible, to understand the many sources and inspirations of quantification 
and classification, and thus, how the style becomes entrenched. I 
conducted 30 interviews with professionals from OECD, the World Bank, 
the g7+ and the government of Timor-Leste, and attended two core high-
level meetings, one during the 2013 UN General Assembly, and the other 
during a ministerial event in OECD-INCAF, also in 2013. In the meetings, 
my aim was to observe the attendance, the relations among actors, how a 
dialogue took place, and what sort of ‘rituals’ they went through in asserting 
authority. Both events were held under Chatham House Rules, so names 
or nationalities cannot be attributed. Most of the individual interviewees, 
however, authorised identification.  
 The interviews were semi-structured and heavily based on specific 
documents or procedures to which the actors were particularly related. I 
strived to bring experts from different backgrounds. In the case of the 
complex bureaucracy and huge infra-structure of the World Bank, for 
instance, I interviewed experts in data and statistics, CPIA, education, 
gender, environment, Timor-Leste, Asia and Pacific, and crucially, 
professionals from the Global Center on Conflict, Security and 
Development, whose work focuses on ‘fragile states’. From OECD, I 
interviewed members of the INCAF and the IDPS, and from the g7+ and 
Timor-Leste, I interviewed the Finance Minister, Emília Pires, a member of 
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the staff in the same ministry, one government official from another g7+ 
country, and two staff members of the g7’s secretariat. 
 Borrowing Bourdieu’s insights means, as Bigo emphasises, that 
analysts should be reflexive as to their own positions and habitus; however, 
they will never be neutral and should never aim to ‘emancipate’ actors by 
placing themselves in a privileged position of those who speak the truth, 
which would only create another form of domination.117 I aim the research 
to be political, in the sense that it looks at struggles to determine a view of 
the world where ‘fragile states’ suffer important impacts of a specific style of 
thinking & doing. It is also political in its attempt precisely not to silence 
neither the weakening factors in the politics of ‘classifiers’, nor (and 
crucially) the self-labelling initiatives, therefore, avoiding to paradoxically 
side-line the counter-move critics are supposed to encourage.  
 As far as political and critical engagement go, my contribution is to 
open space for the subtleties of power exerted in indirect ways, the 
importance of practicality and the possibilities of change that the notion of 
symbolic power helps to problematise in this specific debate. The result is 
not a static theory of what the classification of ‘fragile states’ is or what it 
represents, but what debates, powerful implications and possibilities it 
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The curious point about the above maxim is how true it was when statistics 
were an infant practice and how false it would be considered now by those 
who affirm we are about to witness a data revolution.2 In his book on the 
history of statistical reasoning, Desrosières describes how Germany, one of 
the first countries to develop such tradition, quickly moved in the nineteenth 
century from general Aristotelian taxonomies of its tiny states, which had no 
special use other than for organisation, to an ‘equivalence space that led to 
quantitative statistics’, with cross tables being split into rows and columns 
that allowed comparison between states. Desrosières suggests this was 
the beginning of a clear differentiation ‘between graphic and spoken 
reasoning’, intensified by the requests to put numbers in the rows so as to 
further facilitate comparison. Already then, these infant quantitative 
statistics were criticised for erasing singularity and generating 
oversimplification.3 Meanwhile, in England, it became common practice for 
professionals from different areas to collect statistics on several aspects of 
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the population for the use of the Crown, a method that was then eloquently 
known as ‘political arithmetic’.4  
 Ideas of inference and probability could be found as far back as in 
the sixteenth century, but modern statistical analyses only began 
permeating science- and policy-making in the nineteenth century, when 
nation states became ‘essentially characterized by its statistics’ and, thus, 
in Hacking’s poetic words, the ‘world became numerical’.5 Desrosières, as 
others, suggests that it was ‘the need to know a nation in order to govern it 
[that] led to the organization of official bureaus of statistics’.6  
 Looking at statistical analyses today, we can say analysts still 
measure the same kind of social features of different populations and many 
of the core statistical techniques are in fact quite the same – regression, 
correlation, standard deviation and so on, so what has changed, if 
anything?7 And how is that relevant to the question of what practices 
classify ‘fragile states’ and what their impacts are? The answer is related to 
why the maxim previously mentioned would hardly be held true by current 
statisticians: The scope, volume, mobility, visualisation and speed of 
production of statistical analyses have turned the elaboration of statistical 
taxonomies into a perceived effective form of historical (and political) 
account. Because the numbers can change quickly, be re-aggregated and 
re-designed, that is, because there are skills, technology and reasoning for 
this work, statistics are seen as very much capable of depicting history in 
motion; it is as if numbers can move as fast as facts. The two important 
factors to consider in this chapter is how powerful these quantifying 
practices came to be in the classification of ‘fragile states’ and, crucially, 
how deeply entrenched this style of thinking & doing is in this politics of 
classification. 
 In the comparisons invited by analysis of ‘state fragility’, just as 
happened in Germany in the nineteenth century, quantification is essential 
to make difference become magnitude.8 In the intensity (that is, volume, 
speed, access and so on) with which statistical analyses of ‘fragile states’ 
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are currently practiced, numbers tell stories and stories can change 
because difference can be measured and managed so often and so quickly 
that measurement and management seem to work together also in real 
time. Being at the bottom of a taxonomy is presented as a rather mutable 
condition, as long as the numbers are known and tamed.  
 This chapter does not argue there is novelty in this use of statistics 
per se; on the contrary, the next chapter will work from the analysis 
discussed here to trace parallels with the statistical reasoning born in the 
nineteenth century. The points to be debated in this chapter are rather the 
unprecedented level in which this is put to practice now and the related 
perceived increase in the authority and necessity of these methods, to the 
point where being able to measure and classify is in itself a measurable, 
manageable and much sought capacity, as discussed along the thesis. In 
this sense, the statistical reasoning depicted here is one feature of the 
current development industry, in which context the composition of ‘state 
fragility’ is one of many numerical compositions, but an especially impactful 
one. 
 This chapter provides a brief ‘historical sociology’, or rather, a 
historical sociological argument. Indeed, Tilly points precisely at how 
historical sociology evolved from a deep dissatisfaction with development 
models. According to him, these models did not account for how 
‘underdevelopment’ was formed and for how ‘development’ had not worked 
quite that perfectly in Western countries either – such models were 
‘strangely timeless’, he says. In general, a historical sociological argument 
takes into account time and space; ‘take[s] temporal sequences seriously’; 
studies unintended as well as intended outcomes; highlights ‘the particular 
and varying’ specific kinds of social structures and patterns of change.9 
Therefore, it serves as an especially fitting kind of introduction to a research 
that aims to start by understanding the context in which the quantification 
and classification of ‘fragile states’ became ‘socially comfortable’. I look 
here at the historical sociology of the entrenchment of quantification in the 
development assistance towards ‘fragile states’. 
 Accordingly, the discussion in this chapter touches upon many 
aspects of the signposts previously discussed, but it focuses more 
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specifically on the first signpost, exploring the style of thinking and doing 
political management of ‘fragile states’ through quantification and 
classification. I discuss how the World Bank and OECD adapted to the 
topic of ‘state fragility’ while measuring and ordering it, and how these 
practices of quantification became increasingly associated with the very 
definition and management of ‘fragile states’. As the reasoning goes, the 
fact that numbers on ‘state fragility’ are produced means ‘fragile states’ can 
and should be measured, and if they can be measured, this ‘fragility’ is 
therefore a social reality to which methods need to constantly adapt in 
order to understand and manage. Accordingly, the argument goes, ‘[w]hen 
you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your 
knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.’10  
 In this chapter, I look at the events that led to the merge of this 
quantifying and classifying reasoning with the ‘fragile states’ agenda,11 
discussing organisational, structural, operational and substantial changes in 
the World Bank and OECD and the foundation of the g7+. These elements 
are distributed in three sections. The first focuses mainly on the 
transformations regarding the OECD and the World Bank both in terms of 
quantifying practices and in the forms of understanding and defining ‘state 
fragility’, which involve an increasing connection, at least on paper, of 
security12 and development. The second section uses the World Bank’s 
CPIA to exemplify both these changes and the increasing critique to 
donors’ measurements and their impacts. The third section places the 
foundation of the g7+ in the very culmination of the merge of a quantifying 
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and classifying reasoning with the ‘fragile states’ agenda, reflecting many 
accumulated critiques to the results of this merge. 
  
1.  A RACE FOR INDICATORS AND THE ‘FRAGILE STATES’AGENDA:     
AID EFFECTIVENESS, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY 
 
In 1997, the first edition of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI) forecasted: ‘The global economy is undergoing an information 
revolution that will be as significant in effect as the industrial revolution of 
the nineteenth century.’13 Notwithstanding the merit of this comparison, this 
section focuses on this information revolution in the specific case of the 
definition and political management of ‘fragile states’, by illustrating some of 
the key changes in the World Bank and OECD in their approach to the topic 
since the early 1990s. 
 
1.1. THE MERGE OF A QUANTIFYING AND CLASSIFYING REASONING WITH THE 
‘FRAGILE STATES’ AGENDA 
 
When in 1991, the OECD published a guide with principles for evaluating 
development assistance, it suggested: ‘Aid agencies should have an 
evaluation policy with clearly established guidelines and methods’; ‘[t]he 
evaluation process should be impartial and independent from the process 
concerned with policy-making, and the delivery and management of 
development assistance’; and ‘[t]he evaluation process must be as open as 
possible with the results made widely available.’14 This reflected an early 
concern among donors with keeping track of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and the results obtained. It was an effort to justify to 
these countries’ citizens the flow of donations and investments, and later to 
coordinate efforts and avoid overlaps. It was also part of a data collection 
rationale that had deep roots in the original mandate of the organisation, 
leading to its reputation as one of the most reliable producers of data in 
several aspects of politics, economics and social matters.15 However, for 
many years, until the mid-2000s, the organisation did not dedicate any 
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special attention to post-conflict countries or ‘fragile states’. It restricted 
itself to produce, analyse and circulate data that was seen as useful by its 
member states, with no particular programme towards non-OECD 
countries. This thinking substantially changed from the mid-2000s onwards.  
 In 1992, the DAC Principles for Effective Aid compelled members of 
the OECD-DAC to create the ‘fundamental conditions’ for aid effectiveness 
where recipient countries did not provide effective institutions and policies, 
hence, moving to considerations about the challenges of 
‘underdevelopment’ for the donors’ projects taking place: ‘[A]id can only be 
as effective as the policy, economic, and administrative environment in 
which it operates’.16 In the 1990s, the focus was on improving aid 
effectiveness as provided by donors, with no specific agenda about how it 
should work for recipient countries. In those terms, data was also produced 
as demanded by member states, and a quick search in OECD iLibrary 
shows that books and papers in the 1990s tended to concentrate on 
macroeconomic, financial and industrial issues.17 One key exception, 
however, was produced as the result of a partnership with the UN and in 
the context of the many meetings and conferences that would lead to the 
Millennium Declaration in 2000: In 1996, the OECD-DAC published the 
Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation, 
which provided reasons for development agencies to consider the role and 
importance of peace and conflict in development. As an often forgotten 
early document, the message was almost premonitory of what was to 
become widespread after 2001. In justifying DAC’s $60 billion-a-year 
contribution to ODA, it states: 
The first motive is fundamentally humanitarian. Support for development is 
a compassionate response to the extreme poverty and human suffering 
that still afflict one-fifth of the world’s population…The moral imperative of 
support for development is self-evident. The second reason for supporting 
development is enlightened self-interest. Development benefits people not 
only in poor countries, but also in the industrialised donor countries. 
Increased prosperity in the developing countries demonstrably expands 
markets for the goods and services of the industrialised countries. 
Increased human security reduces pressures for migration and 
accompanying social and environmental stresses. Political stability and 
social cohesion diminish the risks of war, terrorism and crime that 
inevitably spill over into other countries.18 
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 An unsuspecting researcher might think the quote was taken from a 
post-9/11 document. Nonetheless, the rationale was beginning to be 
delineated much earlier than 2001. The fact that the link between 
development and security was not incorporated later in the MDGs should 
be noted and highlighted. I will come back to this point later in this chapter. 
 The Shaping the 21st Century also argues for the need to improve 
monitoring mechanisms to check that the goals established for aid 
coordination would truly improve aid effectiveness. It suggested OECD 
members made use of the ‘growing body of work on results-oriented 
programming, evaluations and follow-up’, while also suggesting that 
members were continuously monitored themselves in the application of the 
document’s lessons.19 
 Following this drive to verify effectiveness, up until the 2000s 
OECD’s work led to efforts to both improve evaluation of aid programmes 
and to understand how development results could hinder peace and be 
hindered by conflict. In 1997, the OECD published a crucial document 
indicating the firm beginning of a discussion about how development, 
humanitarian assistance and conflict could be analysed together. The 
Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st 
Century stated:  
 Development co-operation, as well, must play its role in conflict prevention 
 and peacebuilding alongside the full range of other instruments available to 
 the international community: economic, social, legal, environmental and 
 military.20  
 
 
MEASURING STATES AND RECONSTRUCTING ENABLING CONDITIONS 
  
In the following couple of years, OECD produced a series of studies on 
best practices and guidelines for evaluating aid that slowly moved towards 
analysing whole countries instead of specific (economic) sectors, as 
requested by donors until then. These studies included Evaluating Country 
Programmes, which acknowledged the need and the reality of an 
increasing focus on the state as the ‘the logical unit of account and 
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evaluation’.21 It borrowed from the proposals raised by the 1997 World 
Bank’s World Development Report (WDR), which suggested both state-
dominated and stateless development had failed,22 and it was, thus, time to 
invest in ‘matching the state’s role to its capability’. However, because 
‘capability is not destiny’, the document argued, it was also suggested to 
‘raise state capability by reinvigorating public institutions.’23 It seems that as 
the scope of evaluation changed to the state, several areas were not only 
included but started to become connected, at least on paper.24  
 The 1997 WDR, which influenced the move of OECD towards 
evaluating states, was also the reflection of important changes in the World 
Bank. The then Bank’s president, James Wolfensohn, is pointed out as the 
person who moved the Bank after 1996 to include political considerations 
such as corruption in the services offered.25 In this context, it became 
possible for the Bank to consider, analyse and act upon situations of 
conflict and to study how these could be thought in relation to development 
aid. In the 1998 report Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The Role of the World 
Bank, there are direct proposals to account for how development aid could 
make conflicts worse, but also to study how it could contribute to peace: 
‘Reconstruction does not refer only to reconstruction of “physical 
infrastructure”…What is needed is the reconstruction of the enabling 
conditions for a functioning peacetime society’, and the World Bank was 
coming to offer support to this process.26 The document also mentioned the 
creation of the Post-Conflict Unit, in 1997. As seen, 1997 was also the year 
of the publication of the first WDI. It was indeed a time when the Bank was 
not only investing in refining its approach to development but also, and 
intrinsically connected, in producing more statistical knowledge about it.  
 While the OECD started discussions on how to improve evaluation 
systems, World Bank’s WDI was first published as a piece in itself, 
separated from the WDR, in 1997, and it purported to promote a new 
emphasis on development impacts and outcomes to help measuring ‘world 
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progress in reducing poverty and enriching the lives of people 
everywhere’.27 Until 2010, the same WDI generated $3 million a year for 
the Bank. After the Open Data Initiative, it became available for free online, 
with 50,000 to 60,000 accesses a day.28 In 13 years, the statistical 
compilation became not a luxury good produced by the Bank for sell, but a 
basic threshold to guarantee a top position among knowledge producers. In 
this context, making the WDI available for free and exponentially increasing 
the access to the database became even more desirable than making profit 
from it.  
We saw the opportunity of reaching a broader audience and using this data in a 




 It is important to understand how this reasoning was formed. 
 
MANAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT RESULTS (MFDR) 
Going back to 1998, we find the World Bank and OECD redirecting efforts 
towards more and better evaluation mechanisms, a focus on demonstrable 
results and aid effectiveness, and increasing attention being drawn to a 
connection between development and conflict. In November 1999, 
representatives of both organisations, in addition to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN got together to discuss exactly how these 
proposals could be combined and made mutually helpful. The UK 
representative to the meeting eloquently stated: 
I am increasingly convinced that improved statistics are key to us meeting 
the most important challenge facing humanity as we are about to enter a 
new century and new millennium…I also believe that we live at a time 
when it is possible to make a massive advance in systematically reducing 
this poverty. But in order to do this we need to turn the development efforts 
of the international community from an obsession with inputs and 
generalised rhetoric about poverty to a clear focus on outputs and year on 
year measurement of effectiveness in reducing poverty against our agreed 
targets in each and every country.30 
 
 The representatives at the meeting generally called for a new 
international strategy to ‘ensure adequate funding and support for national 
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statistical systems’, in order for ‘developing countries’ to plan and monitor 
poverty reduction and warn the international community of failures in 
progress.31 The main goal was to develop a said ‘culture’ of Management 
for Development Results (MfDR).32 The outcome was the creation of the 
Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st century (PARIS21), a 
consortium to continue the dialogue initiated at the meeting and to promote 
statistical initiatives.33 Whether these initiatives actually improved statistical 
work in recipient countries’ offices is beyond the scope of this research. It 
can be said, however, that the move towards understanding the role of 
‘better statistics’ in development has taken the World Bank and OECD in a 
sure path towards increasing and intensifying their own statistical 
production. 
 With the official establishment of the UN Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), in 2000, the urge to improve statistics became even more 
compelling. Following a decade of conferences and summits, the 
Millennium Declaration was signed on 8 September 2000. The eight MDGs 
include ‘eradicate extreme poverty’, ‘achieve universal primary education’, 
‘reduce child mortality’, among other goals to be achieved by 2015, each 
with specific targets, such as ‘halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day’ − measurable 
targets with a timeline.34 Hence, the MDGs generated a drive to produce 
precise statistics to monitor progress, achievements and failures. They also 
became the benchmark to verify which countries were lagging behind.35 
 
ADDING SECURITY TO THE BUREAUCRATIC MIX  
 
The beginning of the 2000s saw the move towards connecting security and 
development and the measurement of development itself becoming 
increasingly more focused on precise outcomes. Donors were making 
substantial structural and operational steps in both directions. In 2001, the 
World Bank established its Operational Policy 2.30 (OP2.30), with 
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guidelines for operations in post-conflict situations. It integrated ‘sensitivity 
to conflict in Bank assistance’ and ‘recognised’ that ‘economic and social 
stability and human security are pre-conditions for sustainable 
development’. Nevertheless, it still precluded interference in political 
matters of the recipient countries, direct involvement with peacekeeping, 
peacemaking or humanitarian relief, and it maintained the need to engage 
with authorities.36  
 Also in 2001, OECD published the second volume of its guidelines 
on conflict and development, the Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, which 
pushed donors further still into a broader consideration of what 
development and poverty reduction would entail: 
 
Development agencies now accept the need to work in and on conflicts 
rather than around them, and make peace-building the main focus when 
dealing with conflict situations. This is a significant step toward long-term 
engagement and away from an earlier short-term concentration on post-
conflict recovery and reconstruction efforts.37 
 
 
 As mentioned, the World Bank and OECD were slowly moving to a 
consideration of development as also encompassing efforts to reconstruct 
not only physical infrastructure, but also the economic and social conditions 
that would help recipient countries to avoid or to cope with violent conflict. 
The guidelines in Helping Prevent Violent Conflict were vague and clearly 
avoided commitment to peacekeeping or peacemaking: Principles such as 
‘do no harm’, ‘widen and deepen dialogue’, ‘act in timely and flexible ways, 
and think long term’ were broad enough so as to avoid establishing what 
actions donors would need to take. Even the directive to ‘reinforce local 
capabilities’ involved helping local capacities to find solutions (themselves) 
and suggested any resources should be ‘commensurate with absorption 
capabilities’.38 The line was thin in this emerging agenda, between 
acknowledging and acting upon the elements of violence that interfered 
with development results, gravitating towards acting only where violence 
touched upon the direct practices of development aid.  
 Nevertheless, and contrasting with OECD’s hesitation, in 2002, the 
World Bank’s OP2.30 was reinforced with a structural support, with the 
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creation of the Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) initiative, in a 
seemly much more assertive move towards the development-plus-security 
agenda than OECD member states were considering to make. As 
discussed in chapter one, the LICUS unit was to work together with the 
Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, which denotes the then 
increasing tendency to combine the themes, at least bureaucratically. The 
rationale of the LICUS group was that low performers low-income countries 
could not be completely abandoned; disengagement, the argument went, 
would lead to ‘severe deprivation’ and the risk of ‘state failure’ with regional 
and global effects.39 According to its director at the time, Sarah Cliffe, the 
aim was to separate these countries from others, breaking with the Bank’s 
previous understanding of ‘fragile states’ as ‘just a bit poorer or a bit 
weaker’.40 The initiative is seen to have generally responded to two 
developments: the realisation that the ‘fragile states’ were lagging behind in 
the achievement of the MDGs and the increasing perception that the 
problems of 'fragile states’ went much beyond their borders, generating 
spill-overs and danger to other countries as well.41  
 
RANKING, MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 
The LICUS initiative also led the way among development agencies in the 
numerical definition and classification of what would become ‘state fragility’. 
LICUS countries were identified through a threshold in income (GNI below 
$875 in 2001) and by being at the bottom one-third of the CPIA scores on 
policy management or service delivery and on responsiveness to their 
citizens.42 Some countries were classified as LICUS based on extreme low 
score in the CPIA only, but criteria were vague and by then not yet 
published. The Bank also separated ‘core’, ‘severe’ and ‘marginal’ LICUS.43  
 In the same month of 2002 when the World Bank published the 
LICUS Task Force Report, which explained the new approach of the Bank 
and how resources would be allocated to this seemly new category of 
countries, another document proposed the creation of the Post-Conflict 
                                                          
39
 World Bank Sep 2002, p. iv. 
40
 Interview Sarah Cliffe. 
41
 Ibid. See also USAID January 2005; World Bank 4 April 2011. 
42
 Ibid., p. 3. See also Chauvet and Collier Jan 2004. See Annex 2. 
43









Progress Indicators (PCPI). This would become the Bank’s tool to follow 
events in post-conflict countries and consider developments in the field 
when deciding on how to allocate resources.44 The PCPI generated an 
exceptional form of resource allocation, to assist low-income countries even 
if they did not fully achieve the Bank’s requirements in terms of 
performance.45 The establishment of the PCPI and the changes in the 
classification and quantification of LICUS were happening more or less at 
the same time. It is said that the idea with the PCPI was to avoid the 
creation of yet another index (besides the CPIA) while also increasing the 
‘granularity’ of data.46 For countries encompassed by the PCPI system, 
common development indicators regarding finances, for example, would 
not be applicable, but indicators for conflict and violence would be made 
available.47 The CPIA was seen as too compact for that purpose; it was 
necessary to zoom in on ‘fragile states’.48 After all, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the CPIA is meant to measure countries’ policy and 
institutional performance, and although a threshold of 3.2 was established 
below which states are considered ‘fragile’, the list was never meant to 
focus on ‘state fragility’ only.49 It seems that the CPIA and the PCPI were 
slowly paving the way to combine the quantification of development and 
security, while the Bank also made its way in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. 
 Interestingly, the PCPI allowed a third, non-official category to exist, 
that of ‘monitored’ countries, those whose situation of instability demands 
international attention but that do not fit the exceptional allocations 
categories.50 Coming from many different directions, conflict-affected, poor 
and unstable countries would slowly and soon gather in the ‘fragile states’ 
label. 
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 Still in 2002, development banks’ representatives met in 
Washington, in the first Roundtable on Development Results in the context 
of PARIS21. The event was entitled Better Measuring, Monitoring and 
Managing for Development Results.51 The aim was to ‘develop results-
focused corporate cultures and incentives’.52 As donors looked at 
development from a close, there was a perceived need to multiply and 
refine data on situations then less known and researched in the 
development sector. 
 Meanwhile, the OECD was investing in producing guidelines and 
best-practices for development assistance through specific debates on 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E). In 2002, it published a 40-pages glossary 
of key terms in evaluation in three languages.53 The range of indicators, 
categories, diagnostics and remedies involved in development aid was 
becoming exponentially larger, and while quantification and categorisation 
were intensified and spread, all these elements seem to have been 
mutually influential: The need to improve aid effectiveness encouraged the 
move towards understanding the impact of conflict and how it influenced 
development and vice-versa, and the need to understand these perceived 
correlations made it necessary to improve statistical production, analysis 
and circulation. On the other hand, the very technological possibilities and 
urge to measure that slowly made possible for certain offices and agencies 
to start producing this data – with the help of PARIS21, for example – led to 
ever more extensive databases, which contributed to build connections that 
were not there before. 
 Indeed, the 2000s brought even more possibilities to the forefront of 
the development agenda and to what would become the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda. In 2004, the second Roundtable on Development Results, in 
Marrakech, had as one of its speakers the then Advisor on Development 
Planning and External Coordination in Timor-Leste, Emília Pires, who 
would become a key figure in the g7+. Her arguments in this presentation 
are an important mark in my historical sociology: She talked about the first 
benchmarks or indicators set by the transitional government with the help of 
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international partners in the late 2000s, around a year after Timor-Leste 
became independent and during the period when the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was the sovereign national 
authority in the country. According to Pires then, the benchmarks had 
helped to accelerate reconstruction and allowed the Timorese leadership to 
manage expectations. However, she made three main critiques to the 
indicators: They lacked wider ownership, as they had been developed by 
only a few leaders and donors; they only measured the government, not the 
donors; and they focused on outputs instead of outcomes, not linked to an 
‘overall development vision’ for the country.54 A few of these and related 
points would be mentioned again in a speech in 2008, during the Accra 
Agenda meeting, as I discuss below. Although these concerns were 
obviously stronger among those governments that suffered the pressure to 
achieve results, there was a feeling among many professionals in donor 
agencies that the approach to development was indeed relying too much 
on templates and aggregations and that ‘capacity’ in recipient offices was 
being spread too thin, overwhelmed by unnecessary requirements.55  
Management for results is a good agenda but needs to be implemented well. For 
me, the single biggest problem is this madness to develop the same framework 
for everyone. People want certainty and they want to be able to compare 
countries. I am tired of these things. We ask these countries to do a thousand 
things that we don’t do ourselves! We don’t do a medium-term budget. I don’t 
even know what my budget is for the year!
56
 
Still in 2004, therefore, the World Bank commissioned a guide for 
practitioners on how to develop and apply a good result-based M&E 
system.57 As the document pointed to the possibilities the system was able 
to generate for development and poverty reduction, it also acknowledged 
the potential political problems related to the information produced and how 
it was produced:  
Bringing results-based information into the public arena can change the 
 dynamics of institutional relations, budgeting and resource allocations, 
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 personal political agendas, and public perceptions of governmental 
 effectiveness.58 
It goes beyond and also suggests that ‘providing such information 
may lessen or otherwise constrain the number of options available to 
politicians – leaving them less room to manoeuver in their policies.’59 On 
the positive side, the guide suggests M&E can help negotiate and justify 
priorities and budget requests, show results to citizens and other 
stakeholders, create and strengthen relations of trust with investors and the 
population. Around this time, notwithstanding the criticisms, it was clear for 
recipient governments that they needed to address the technical demand 
for M&E systems. Donors’ reports hardly made secret of these 
requirements:  
 
Many countries, particularly the developing countries, must now vie to 
become a part of international initiatives, organizations, and blocs in order 
to reap the desired socioeconomic, political, and security benefits. Part of 
the bargain inevitably involves adhering to a set of specific requirements, 
conditions, and goals—including monitoring and evaluation.60 
 
 
‘FRAGILITY’ IN THE MAKING  
 
The following year would intensify debates on how to measure and promote 
progress in what would officially become known as ‘fragile states’. In 
January 2005, the World Bank, UNDP, European Commission and OECD-
DAC held a Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile 
States,61 when the label started being more often applied and used instead 
of low-income, LICUS or, in some cases, non-OECD.62 The year was 
indeed central in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. 
 In March, the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was held in 
Paris, borrowing much from the core principles set in the Marrakech 
roundtable and generating a key development document, the Paris 
Declaration. It proposed donors took ‘far-reaching and monitorable actions’ 
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to reform the delivery and management of aid, especially in the context of 
the first five-year review of the progress towards the MDGs.63 The aim was 
to understand and increase the impact of aid in ‘reducing poverty and 
inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating 
achievement of the MDGs.’64 Among other key guidelines for aid 
effectiveness, the Paris Declaration suggested the promotion of ownership 
and mutual accountability. In fact, both ownership and mutual accountability 
were clearly and officially defined in a way that would be repeated many 
times thereafter.65 The document was emphatic about the importance of 
measuring to manage and specifically mentioned the Managing for Results 
agenda. It included monitoring as a target in itself: ‘[to] [r]educe the 
proportion of countries without transparent and monitorable performance 
assessment frameworks by one-third,’66 which logically implied the 
measurement of what this ‘without’ was and how many countries there 
were in this condition. 
 The following year, the World Bank and OECD published the first 
issue of a source book on Emerging Good Practices in Managing for 
Development Results.67 The document already used the ‘fragile states’ 
label, based on the draft produced by the 2005 Senior Level Forum. In 
2007, as seen in the previous chapter, this draft became the key Principles 
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,68 whose principles 
would be monitored and measured in the following years. The ‘fragile 
states’ agenda and the quantifying and classifying reasoning were merging 
in important ways. A remarkable event at the time was precisely the 
disclosure of the CPIA ratings for the first time, in 2006.69 The numbers and 
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QUANTIFYING AND CLASSIFYING 
 
In 2007, the World Bank Institute (WBI) held a roundtable with the title 
Because Governance Matters, Measuring it Matters too, where the focus 
was on how to balance the opportunities and limitations of using indicators 
to measure political performance. The bottom line of the arguments in the 
debate was simple and straight-forward: No indicators will ever be perfect 
to analyse governance, so how should the problems and limitations be best 
avoided or managed?70 These questions would be constantly asked among 
those doing the quantification of ‘state fragility’, even more so considering 
the important impacts of donor numbers in ‘fragile states’. 
 In the same year, the World Bank also turned the focus to ‘fragile 
states’ in a more definite way. The Bank published an IDA document that 
can be seen as a watershed in the agenda: It not only clearly used the 
‘fragile states’ label, but provided analysis of its definition, including uses by 
other agencies, and made officially clear that ‘fragile states’ would be those 
scoring below 3.2 in the harmonised CPIA ratings (which included ratings 
by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB)) or with the presence of a UN or regional mission of peacekeeping or 
peacebuilding in the previous three years.71 The CPIA will be discussed 
later in this chapter. For now, it is important to understand the move done 
by the Bank: Rui Coutinho, in charge of the CPIA exercise, says the overall 
debate at the time was about how to have a threshold that would include 
the countries donors felt needed to get more attention, but without including 
too many countries, so as to undermine the value of a new classification. In 
that sense, as one looks into the first events that led to the 3.2 threshold, 
the circularity is striking: The move to consider just the right number of 
‘fragile states’ led to a selection that, according to Coutinho, very much 
reflected the definitions and lists already existent, for example, those 
developed by the AfDB and the ADB.72 It is established that the 3.2 as a 
threshold is a harmonised average of all scores produced by the three 
banks. Thus, the currently widespread practical and numerical definition of 
‘fragile states’ was in fact elaborated by looking at which states were 
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already considered ‘fragile’ among key donors – a practical measure, not 
intended to become a central factor in defining ‘fragile states’.  
 Not that the AfDB or the ADB had officially and numerically applied 
the label before the World Bank, but because the lowest quintiles of their 
rankings had the same function of allowing resources to reach ‘poor-
performers’ and could then be used, or rather, were used, to align the 
definitions of ‘fragile states’ in terms that would be common to the banks, 
focusing on aid allocation.  
 Still in 2007, following the numerical definition of ‘fragile states’ and 
the definite adoption of the agenda in the World Bank, as seen in chapter 
one, the Conflict Prevention Unit and the LICUS Unit were almost merged 
into a Fragile and Conflict-Affected States Group. In addition, a Conflict, 
Fragile States and Social Development team was established. In terms of 
operational changes, the OP8.00 was also established in 2007 to allow the 
Bank to raise the limits for cost-sharing, increase speed, flexibility and 
simplicity of procedures in the case of crises and emergencies:  
 
 The Bank recognizes both the inherent risks involved in working in 
 emergencies, including the risks and lost opportunities associated with a 
 delayed response, and the critical importance of speed, flexibility, and 
 simplicity to an effective rapid response.73  
 
 It is said the response time with this and related operation policies 
was reduced to eight weeks − ‘quick, for an institution this size and with 
these resources’.74 These are seen as essential moves towards adapting 
the Bank’s bureaucracy to the needs identified with ‘fragile states’. The 
challenge was how to implement all the technical guidelines and new 
procedures in terms of M&E and, in addition, apply these with 
considerations regarding political environments seen as ridden with 
instability and violence – a sizeable challenge, considering the usual scope 
of development agencies that far.  
 As the agenda expanded and gained structural and operational 
support, its faults and loopholes also became more consequential and, 
thus, more visible. There was a growing feeling that donors still needed to 
develop better initiatives to tackle the lack of support to recipient countries 
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in terms of capacity and leadership. Therefore, in 2008, in the Accra High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the focus was on how to develop the 
capacity in recipient countries so that they could engage with M&E by 
themselves, through improved country systems that would provide enough 
technical capacity for aid to be disbursed via public mechanisms, instead of 
side-lining governments. It highlighted the importance of taking into account 
the Principles approved in 2007. The document, thus, emphasised the 
principle of ownership and the specific guidelines on the use of country 
systems and building country capacity, all of which had been rather dillutely 
mentioned in the Paris Declaration. In the three years between the two 
High Level Forums, these specific demands seemed to have increased in 
importance as demands by recipient offices also mounted. Indeed, the 
Accra meeting is seen as a milestone, and one specific event in that 
meeting is often mentioned as a catalytic factor for the future paths the 
agenda would take. The previous Timorese advisor who had talked about 
benchmarks and the opportunities and problems of indicators in the 2004 
roundtable in Marrakech, Emília Pires, was now the Minister of Finance in 
Timor-Leste, and the speech she offered in the Accra meeting was faced 
as a true representative outflow of discontentment from officials in ‘fragile 
states’ towards donors’ policies and approaches. In the speech, she spoke 
about being overwhelmed by the presence of more than 250 donor 
representatives in Timor-Leste at one point, and about the difficulties faced 
when trying to deal with these many actors while also doing a job hugely 
challenging in a post-crisis situation.75  
 
‘FRAGILE STATES’ AND THE DEMAND FOR RESULTS 
 
Representatives of ‘fragile states’ were increasingly demanding to see the 
results of the aid coordination and effectiveness agenda the donors had 
been engaging with since the early 2000s. The more the multiplying 
numbers made clear the reality of the criteria for aid allocation by different 
agencies, the more open these practices became for critiques as well. In 
that context, the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
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(IDPS) was created, hosted by OECD’s International Network on Conflict 
and Fragility (INCAF), with the stated aim of opening a dialogue with ‘fragile 
states’.76 
 The expressed goal of OECD-INCAF was to work with whole-of-
government approaches and engage with multiple kinds of actors.77 In 
2009, it started an exercise to monitor the application of the Principles, the 
Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey. During the Accra meeting, six 
‘fragile states’ volunteered as pilot countries, among them DRC and Timor-
Leste, which would soon lead the initiative to create the g7+.78  
 By the following year, however, it seems there was an increasing 
willingness of ‘fragile states’’ representatives to find or found their own 
space. In 2010, the first official meeting of IDPS was held, perhaps not 
coincidentally in Dili, Timor-Leste. It is said it was from this meeting and the 
expressed interest of many representatives of ‘fragile states’ present that 
the g7+ was created, mentioned for the first time in what was called the Dili 
Declaration. 
 In 2011, during the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 
held in Busan, the group and its main proposals were consolidated, and a 
New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States (hereafter, New Deal) was 
proposed under the auspices of IDPS but with the lobby and leadership of 
the g7+. In Accra, the OECD had sponsored a meeting of ‘fragile states’’ 
representatives, but this was regarded as a somehow mediated event.79 On 
the contrary, in Busan, the meeting between representatives of ‘fragile 
states’ was closed-doors, although sponsored and assisted by OECD-
INCAF and a few donor agencies.80 In that meeting, Timor-Leste, Liberia 
and the DRC led the movement to officially establish the g7+.  
 In the Dili Declaration, the group had stated that ‘without security 
there [could] be no development’. It also asked for more ownership, 
simplified procedures and untied assistance. Crucially, it welcomed what 
was perceived by representatives as a platform for ‘fragile states’. 
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We believe fragile states are characterized and classified through the lens 
of the developed rather than through the eyes of the developing; and that 
in order to make long lasting change and implement the principles of good 
engagement; the national context must guide each distinctive path to 
sustainable development…Although we all accept international standards, 
the donor community must be aware of our conditions and needs. That is 
why, we must give ourselves a transitional period to reinforce our 
capabilities and systems and not have complex and slow procedural 
requirements and conditions imposed upon us.81    
  
 The increasing formal dialogue between donors and ‘fragile states’ 
was creating more demands: The more the World Bank and OECD 
explored the agenda, looking for correlations between variables, solutions 
and new methods of evaluation, the more the recipient governments started 
to ask for in terms of ownership, accountability and effectiveness, because 
with clearer targets in the international agenda, the easier it became to find 
holes and failures not only in the policies of ‘fragile states’, but in those of 
donors as well. Moreover, these failures also became measurable, and 




The World Bank’s World Development Report in 2011 was a reflection of 
that debate. Its focus was on conflict, security and development and on 
how to understand and act upon the connections between these themes in 
a way as to acknowledge the efforts and leadership of recipient countries. It 
discussed the existence and pledges of the g7+ and the need to change 
bureaucratic procedures. The 2011 WDR also mirrored the g7+’s concern 
with security, justice and jobs,82 issues that would become part of the 
group’s agenda.83 
 The follow-up document, Operationalizing the 2011 World 
Development Report, suggested the World Bank positioned ‘fragility, 
conflict, and violence at the core of its development mandate’. It announced 
the creation of a ‘center of excellence’ on ‘fragile’ and conflict-affected 
states, the Center on Conflict, Security and Development (CCSD), with 
offices in Nairobi and Washington, both of which opened doors in 2012.84 
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These offices were to guide the Bank in the formation of a knowledge 
platform on ‘state fragility’ and conflict, to be made accessible to a wide 
range of professionals in headquarters and in the field, in the form of 
training courses, webinars and remote help-desk.85 To build this 
knowledge, the document proposed a new results metrics: ‘To monitor 
progress in FCS, the Bank will develop results metrics that are sensitive to 
conflict and fragility, using a combination of objective data, governance 
progress indicators, and stakeholder perception surveys.’86  
 Around the same time, the OECD was also making adaptations 
official and regulating a ‘fit for use’ approach to data. It argued for a ‘multi-
faceted’ understanding of the quality of data, to be adapted to the place, 
time and need of users.87 This idea of ‘fitness for use’ or ‘fitness of purpose’ 
had been discussed before in another OECD document, in 2008;88 
however, the approach seemed to become the standard practice around 
2011. The ‘fitness for use’ reasoning followed and was followed by other 
ideas of limitation in data collection and analysis. This understanding will be 
central for a discussion on ‘good enough’ data and policies in the next 
chapter. For now, it is important to highlight that this reasoning became 
largely seen by the governments of ‘fragile states’ as highly problematic, 
since ‘good enough data’ was also the basis for the allocation of important 
and much sought resources. 
 In this spirit, the g7+’s much cherished New Deal for Engagement 
with Fragile States is based on a set of tools that aim at ‘fragile states’ 
developing their own measures and targets, to avoid the many harmful 
donors assessments seen to be incompatible with a context of ‘state 
fragility’. The New Deal was signed by 35 countries, the World Bank, AfDB, 
ADB, EU, OECD and UN.89 It soon became part of the international 
dialogue on ‘fragile states’ by advancing a quite heavy-worded message: 
 
The current ways of working in fragile states need serious improvement. 
Despite the significant investment and the commitments of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action 
(2008), results and value for money have been modest. Transitioning out 
of fragility is long, [a] political work that requires country leadership and 
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ownership. Processes of political dialogue have often failed due to lack of 
trust, inclusiveness, and leadership. International partners can often 
bypass national interests and actors, providing aid in overly technocratic 
ways that underestimate the importance of harmonising with the national 
and local context, and support short-term results at the expense of 
medium- to long-term sustainable results brought about by building 
capacity and systems. A New Deal for engagement in fragile states is 
necessary.90  
 
 The message can be seen to have four pillars: emphasis on 
ownership, a demand for the adaptation of bureaucratic techniques to the 
context of ‘fragile states’, a commitment to capacity building and long-term 
engagement. The group would act in three fronts in order to get this 
message through: it has been lobbying the UN to have security indicators 
included in the post-2015 agenda; it has also been piloting their own 
Fragility Assessment and Spectrum to define new common and specific 
indicators of progress; and it has been engaging with donors to have them 
sign compacts that would take the New Deal into account (all discussed 
ahead).  
 The bottom line of these initiatives is a profound discontentment and 
concern with the impact of measurements done by outsiders and with the 
perceived overwhelming technical character of these exercises, which are 
said to leave aside crucial contextual considerations. In the case of ‘fragile 
states’, as acknowledged by the g7+ itself, this concern is not limited to the 
lack of consultation of the governments involved, but is also very much 
based on the recognition that national statistical offices in many cases 
cannot provide their own numbers to counter those produced by donors. 
Hence, the g7+’s emphasis on building capacity and the initiative to 
develop their own measurement tools. In that sense, the quantifying and 
classifying reasoning that composed and was composed with the ‘fragile 
states’ agenda has also contributed to re-shuffle the agenda. When ‘fragile 
states’ turn numbers into tools – or arms – quantification becomes a crucial 
point of departure for questions of power; and so this thesis argues. 
1.2. THE CIRCULARITY IN THE MERGE 
So far in this chapter, I sought to show how the measuring of ‘state fragility’ 
became a circular exercise, where ‘fragile states’ are constantly composed 
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by measurable features, as donors advance over indicators they can build 
and measure, and at the same time, as ‘fragile states’ are composed, new 
insights over their perceived characteristics lead to more research and 
statistical analysis to find correlations. In that circularity, the broad 
correlation between development and security became increasingly studied 
by staff in development agencies, efforts to reduce poverty and augment 
aid effectiveness led to a massive increase in data production and ‘fragile 
states’ turned into highly ‘categorisable’ and ‘rankable’ political realities. In 
that context, ‘fragile states’, in the form of the g7+, have proposed to 
counter this quantification and classification with their own numerical 
methods and to contribute to their development in their own ways. The next 
section seeks to exemplify the discontentment with donors’ measurements 
and their impacts by looking at the specific case of the CPIA and its 
implications. I show some key modifications made to the CPIA and related 
exercises in order to adapt to the merge of the ‘fragile states’ agenda and 
the quantifying and classifying reasoning. I use the case of Timor-Leste as 
example at certain points in the discussion. The idea is to follow the 
historical sociology in this section with a detailed example of how 
modifications influenced by the referred merge were implemented and with 
which impacts. 
 
2.   THE WORLD BANK’S CPIA:   
     ‘STATE FRAGILITY’ IS UNDER THE THRESHOLD 
 
The following discussion should shed light into the implications and 
relevance of rankings and broader classifying practices in terms of resource 
allocation, leverage and reputation for the countries concerned. This 
discussion also depicts a diffuse, virtual and indirect exchange between 
donors’ and their critics, exemplified specifically by the IDA replenishments, 
which are key processes whereby changes are proposed regarding the 
focus of the World Bank’s IDA ‘fund for the poor’, consequently, leading to 
changes in the CPIA rating system that provides its basis. The CPIA is, of 
course, only one form of classification, with specific practices and results, 
but it is highly important for the ‘fragile states’ agenda. In fact, as seen, 









most widely reproduced index of ‘state fragility’ in terms of its implications 
for policy decisions.91 
 The IDA replenishments are usually conducted by the World Bank 
around every three years to decide on modifications on the available funds, 
the eligibility criteria and the formulae related to resource allocation. The 
IDA offers concessional funds with the stated priority of reducing poverty,92 
however, this funding is much lower than the one available for IBRD 
borrowing countries:93 In 2013, the IBRD lending totalled $15 billion, while 
IDA funding for 33 ‘fragile states’94 from FY07-12 was $11.5 billion. In the 
same period, IDA funding for 31 non-‘fragile states’ was of $32.9 billion.95  
 The demand is much higher than the supply for ‘fragile states’. 
Hence, ratings such as those in CPIA can be crucial to receive valuable 
resources. In the following I arrange four main themes that help 
understanding the critiques to and the changes in the system in the last few 
years. The fifth sub-section provides my own overview of the most recent 
criteria, formulae and their implications. 
 
2.1. RE-WORKING INDICATORS, FORMULAE AND CRITERIA:  
THE MECHANISMS OF AID ALLOCATION 
 
In order to briefly locate the discussion, it is important to first give an 
overview of how the current CPIA classification system allocates resources: 
the system attributes scores according to countries’ performances in policy 
and institutional areas whose measurement is based on 16 indicators 
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distributed into four clusters: Economic Management, Structural Policies, 
Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity, and Public Sector Management and 
Institutions (A to D, respectively). Indicators in each cluster are rated from 1 
to 6, from ‘bad’ to ‘good’ performance, and scores are averaged to provide 
cluster scores and a total score for each country.96 Countries whose total 
score falls below 3.2 are classified as ‘fragile states’. 
 The most recently proposed formula for IDA allocation based on the 
CPIA ratings stands as  
 
          




 The CPR is the Country Performance Rating, which is calculated as 
follows: 
 
FIGURE 2: WORLD BANK'S COUNTRY PERFORMANCE RATING (CPR), AS OF IDA1798 
  
 The weights given for cluster A-C and D are 24 and 68 percent, 
respectively; while 8 percent is allocated to the portfolio performance rating 
(PPR). The PPR is measured according to the percentage of ‘projects at 
risk’ and the age of the portfolio.99 However, the IDA17 (reads ‘IDA 
seventeenth replenishment exercise’), in 2013, proposed to reduce the 
exponent of the CPR in the PBA formula to 4 with the stated goal of 
increasing focus on poverty reduction (discussed ahead).100 The IDA 
Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) uses the CPIA ratings to allocate 
resources, thus, classifying and ranking ‘fragile states’ (figures 3 and 4 
below), even if the system was not created for these exact purposes, as 
discussed. 
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FIGURE 3: 2011 IDA RESOURCE ALLOCATION INDEX (IRAI)
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FIGURE 4: 'HARMONIZED LIST OF FRAGILE SITUATIONS FY15'
102
 
                                                          
101









 In the most recent exercise, the bureaucratic routine to determine 
these numbers works in constant back and forth. The process for rating 
starts with a benchmarking exercise, currently conducted for 20 countries. 
This initial exercise produces the guidelines for ‘normal rating’. In a second 
step, staff on the field rate their countries from 1 to 6 (non-integer marks 
are allowed, such as 2.5, 3.5) according to the respective sectors in which 
their expertise is located (Education, Health and so on). Following this, the 
same staff consult (‘propose’, they say) local authorities, and finally write 
justifications (‘write-ups’) to accompany their ratings back to the chief-
economist in each Region in the headquarters, in Washington. The ratings 
and write-ups are checked for consistency inside the Region, forwarded to 
the person in charge of the CPIA exercise (currently, at Operational Policy 
and Country Services, OPCS), who send them to the Networks (Education, 
Sector and so on) to be checked for internal consistency and ‘calibrated’ 
across regions in each sector (for example, Gender). The Networks send 
the documents back to the director in OPCS, who forwards them again to 
the Regions. They respond to the Networks’ comments and the ratings go 
finally back to OPCS.103 This process is seen by staff as almost a ‘turf war’ 
between Regions and Networks, involving much internal contestation and 
disagreement.104  
 These precise disputes are beyond the scope of this discussion, but 
one can suppose they come exactly from the fact that ratings are originally 
subjective exercises, based on ‘write-ups’, that is, supported by allegedly 
extensive but quite subjective justifications. Accordingly, it is also natural for 
critics to question the lack of transparency in the exercise, as the write-ups, 
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fundamental in this rating process, are actually not published. Rui Coutinho, 
who is in charge of the exercise, justifies the confidentiality with a practical 
explanation: ‘The write-ups add to a couple of thousand pages and by the 
time they were published we would have initiated the new exercise.’ In 
addition, he says, the ratings are discussed with the respective national 
authorities twice, one in the ‘proposal’ by staff in the country and another at 
the end, after the final rating is achieved.105 This seems to be the extent of 
this exchange.  
 The formulae and the exercise, therefore, are currently still 
perceived as highly problematic, ‘a substitute for political negotiations’,106 
but they are already much changed in what regards their initial features. 
These changes are important in that they reflect the practical pressures in 
the game, the possibilities for manoeuvring among them and, crucially, their 
consideration is in tandem with the overall proposition in this research of 
looking at change, rather than assuming continuity. 
 
ANTECEDENTS OF A COMPLICATED QUANTIFYING SYSTEM 
 
In 1998, the CPIA was articulated for the first time as the basis of a 
performance-based allocation system in the World Bank. The stated 
objective was to systematically focus on performance but to also account 
for needs, capabilities and access to other sources of finance. At this stage, 
in IDA12, much of the very application of the formula relied on subjective 
judgment, even more than currently seen: For post-conflict countries, for 
example, situations were analysed and considered in an ad hoc and 
unofficial way. There was one form only of including some official weight to 
the limitations derived from crises and violence, through a ‘projects at risk’ 
measure, which had a 20 percent weight in the IDA rating.107 At the time, 
these ‘projects at risk’ also included ‘potential risk’, thus, the situations of 
crisis can be said to have been indirectly accounted for, so long as staff 
involved interpreted the ‘right’ amount of risk and explained this 
accordingly, which, of course, can be seen as highly problematic.  
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 In 2002, in IDA13, seemly responding to increasing demands for 
more transparency, the Bank published more elements of the formula for 
the CPIA ratings and IDA allocation. Two new factors were implemented, 
the age of the portfolio, to avoid penalising young portfolios in terms of 
results achieved, and a percentage calculation for ‘projects at risk’ that was 
commensurate with CPIA ratings, which made possible for this factor to be 
introduced in the CPIA calculation.108 This calculation was also made 
clearer for the first time, although not very detailed. The document stated 
that there was an effort to achieve consistency in ratings within and across 
regions, with the support of detailed questions and guides with typical 
ratings for specific situations, achieved through pre-established 
benchmarks. The country ratings offered were vaguely said to be then 
‘institutionally’ verified at the end.109 
 In the following exercise, IDA14 (2005), the CPIA ratings were 
finally disclosed (effective in 2006) and an IDA Results Monitoring System 
(RMS) was proposed to track the progress towards the MDGs. These 
initiatives only gained some operational viability, however, in IDA15 (2007), 
when the Bank engaged directly with the ‘fragile states’ agenda. The new 
document provided an analysis of different definitions used, arguing for an 
interpretation of ‘state fragility’ as a continuum, and creating sub-categories 
to be used in financing – ‘deteriorating’, ‘prolonged crisis or impasse’, ‘post-
conflict or peace-building transitions’, and ‘gradual improvement’, each with 
its specific characteristics and respective strategies for assistance.110 It also 
addressed the 3.2 threshold, but the document did not justify the choice of 
this rating for cut-off. In addition, ‘fragile states’ were approached as a 
group that was alarmingly lagging behind in the MDGs. Thus, the document 
also discusses the need to adapt the Bank’s understanding of the risk-
rewards trade-off for ‘fragile states’, stating that 
[o]n the one hand, their weak institutions mean that the probability of 
successful outcomes for aid-financed programs is lower than in more 
strongly performing environments…On the other, their high deficit with 
respect to MDGs means that where country programs – including those 
financed from aid – are successful, their development impact can be very 
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significant at the margin because these countries start from a low 
baseline.111 
 
 In parallel to these changes and as the formulae and calculations 
were made clearer, the critiques became more specific. A 2008 study 
commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development emphasised the impact of the margin of error in such 
small intervals as those precisely in the middle of the ranking, hence, 
between ratings 3 and 4, where the cut-off for defining ‘fragile states’ is 
situated.112 The document comments yet on the subjective decision made 
by staff in balancing external factors that impacted country’s performance 
when attributing their ratings; however, it points to the fact that, as the 
external factors have hardly any weight in a formula concerned with 
policies, this has minimum impact.113  
 In my view, it is strikingly ironic, nonetheless, that the only form of 
accounting for outcomes as influenced by external uncontrollable factors is 
through country team staff’s perceptions of these in a system that is 
supposed to both measure performance and be objectively quantitative. 
This is made even more problematic when staff in the field can be in charge 
of many different countries simultaneously. A country team officer tells of 
the pressure to write justifications (‘write-ups’) for his ratings, even though 
the number of countries (s)he is in charge of exceeds his/her said capacity 
to actually visit all of them.114 
 
They ask questions that come to us, the country offices, when justifications are 
not strong enough, when data and scores are not seen as compatible. We have 
13 countries and I haven’t been to all of them, but institutionally we are required 
to write assessments about all of them and collect valuable information.
115
  
 In the IDA16 (2011), changes to this bureaucratic process were 
proposed. There was a stated objective to reduce aid volatility, with 
changes to some aspects of the functional form and simplification of the 
methodology for IDA allocation.116 There was a quite straight-forward 
explanation to the exercise itself that indeed looked like a direct response 
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(and an absolutely non-apologetic one for that matter) to critiques regarding 
the ranking of countries: ‘Given that IDA’s resource allocation system is a 
zero-sum-game…the PBA formula measures a country’s own performance 
relative to those of all other IDA countries.’117 It was a practical decision and 
one linked to the limitation of resources; there was no expressed concern 
with the ranking as such. 
 Nevertheless, the IDA17 (2013) proposes to reduce the exponent of 
the Country Performance Rating (CPR) from 5 to 4 (see formula above) to 
allow increasing allocation for IDA ‘fragile states’ in detriment of IDA non-
‘fragile states’, which would also see allocation move from stronger to 
weaker performers. The document highlights, however, that the focus of the 
Bank would still be on high performance, thus, the top quintile countries 
would still see per-capita allocations more than twice of those in the lowest 
quintile.118 
 The declared overwhelming concern with performance and 
governance over the needs of ‘fragile states’, that is, the very priorities of 
these governments, is in fact one of the main substantial critiques long 
addressed to the CPIA exercise. In fact, this is combined with a view that 
the CPIA does not efficiently take into account the external factors, such as 
crisis and violence, which can affect performance. 
2.2. PERFORMACE VS. NEEDS AND THE ISSUE OF VIOLENCE 
 
In the IDA12 replenishment, in 1998, the Bank made firm commitment to 
focus on governance and performance. The IDA12 cited researches on the 
link between good governance and aid effectiveness,119 and in the interest 
of achieving the best ratio investment-results, the Bank clearly stated its 
purpose to privilege good performers. Thus, the World Bank would 
increasingly be criticised for attributing too much weight to governance and 
institutions through the CPIA ratings. Mostly, critics accused the Bank of, 
with its strong focus on governance, creating a kind of ‘punitive bias’ that 
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was counterproductive and affected precisely those countries that needed 
aid the most: ‘Policy-performance based allocations equally shift the 
priorities of interventions away from poverty reduction and the need for 
sustainable human development.’120 
 In IDA13 (2002), the Bank changed its discourse and proposed a 
renewed focus on outcomes and results and the monitoring of progress 
towards the MDGs, as part of an increased focus on poverty reduction. For 
this purpose, the Bank created the much debated Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP), which, together with the existent Country 
Assistance Strategy (CAS), would provide a refined analysis of a country’s 
initial scenario, allowing for better planning and monitoring of progress.121 
The CAS was already in use to determine risks, goals and indicators for 
each project, with an overview of the country’s situations. The PRSPs were 
supposed to add an element of ownership, since the strategy for poverty 
reduction would be aligned with the country’s own priorities and plans, as 
stated in national strategic papers.122 In addition, re-directing some 
attention to the external factors frequently pointed as lacking in the Bank’s 
analyses, the IDA13 introduced the Post-Conflict Performance Indicators 
(PCPI), which opened the possibility to evaluate performance in the special 
conditions of post-conflict and re-engagement countries. For access to 
these exceptional allocations, eligible countries would a) have been 
disengaged with IDA due to crisis; b) have had experienced short but 
severe conflict, with disruption of IDA involvement; and/or c) be a new 
sovereign state just emerging. Once deemed eligible, countries were 
evaluated according to the number of casualties in the conflict, the number 
of internally displaced people (IDPs) and the extent of physical destruction. 
Nevertheless, the document acknowledged the difficulty of getting hold of 
data in such contexts and recognised that much of this analysis would have 
to rely on subjective judgment of staff.123 
 At this point, critiques suggested the PRSPs were not tailored 
enough for the needs and specific context of ‘fragile states’. In fact, 
although the PSPRs were supposed to be linked to national priorities, and 
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therefore, be country-specific, the PRSPs annually presented similar 
focuses and goals. Even staff members in the Bank suggest there was too 
much consistency across the regions: 
The first generation of PRSPs all had Education and Health as priorities. The 
second generation focused on private sectors. Has the world agreed to the same 
objectives at the same time? It is a mix of many things. Sometimes they 
[government officials] really believe in these objectives, sometimes they want 
more money or hope to work here [in the World Bank].
124
  
 The IDA13 is indeed careful in phrasing how PRSPs would be 
helping decide resource allocation:  
Early experience shows that countries’ strategies have often given 
insufficient weight to issues that are important for sustainable 
development, such as the role of women, environmental management, 
fiduciary controls, and analysis of the social impacts of policy reforms. 
While recognizing that the PRSP is a country-owned document, Deputies 
reaffirmed that IDA should continue to advocate good policies.125   
 
 Moreover, the PRSPs would have three pillars: Prioritising public 
actions; managing resources with efficiency, transparency and 
accountability; and establishing M&E of progress. Hence, considering the 
Bank’s priorities and stated concerns, it is quite an understandable initiative 
for recipient countries to delineate national priorities that more or less 
showed enough conformity to these plans so as to guarantee some 
resources.  
 This perceived lack of ownership would be an increasing and 
powerful critique towards the Bank’s approach to ‘fragile states’ in the years 
to follow. The PRSPs were accused of being an expansion and repetition of 
the Structural Adjustments Programs (SAP) of the 1980s. The PRSPs’ 
stated focus on poverty reduction and good governance were seen as new 
clothes to old programmes. Moreover, critics accused the World Bank and 
IMF, with whom the Bank partnered for the PRSPs, of imposing priorities 
rather than obeying to the ownership principle the PRSPs were supposed 
to follow.126 Tellingly, the PRSPs were accompanied by a 1,260-pages 
sourcebook, covering absolutely all possible topics and providing matrices 
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with specific policies and timelines for action. A World Bank’s officer 
describes an interesting situation (s)he lived in Timor-Leste:  
Once I asked: ‘do you really want that matrix?’. The person said: ‘there are twelve 
donors here, it’s easier if I just agree.’
127
  
 There were hardly any alternatives that would be very different from 
those guidelines if a PRSP was to be approved; most recipient 
governments were either unwilling or (technically) incapable of taking a 
different path from those indirectly outlined. ‘[C]ountries that have been 
through past structural adjustment regimes and are now preparing PRSPs 
know what the Bank and the Fund want to see in such documents.’128 
There were other important obstacles to ‘true ownership’: Malaluan and 
Guttal point, for example, to the issue of language, as most PRSPs were 
not translated to the local language and, thus, were inaccessible to most 
local communities and NGOs, and made work more difficult even for senior 
officers.129  
In one meeting, all were there, so smart, self-confident, and the vice-president 
was reading the documents following lines with her finger! She is smart, don’t get 
me wrong, but it’s English, it’s not her language.
130
  
 Facing so many critiques, in the next IDA replenishment exercise, 
the IDA14 (2005), the Bank started important changes by a basic point of 
departure: The CPIA ratings were disclosed and the rating system was 
finally detailed. The IDA14 document explains how IDA decided on which 
projects to support as part of the PRSPs: The PRSPs would be reflected on 
the Country Performance Rating (CPR), since the PRSPs’ projects and 
goals would be analysed for the CPR formula (see formula on p. 114), and 
the CPIA would indicate areas where attention was needed, thus, 
influencing IDA allocation.131 The bureaucracy was immensely intertwined, 
virtually untraceable and yet, highly consequential for IDA allocations to 
‘fragile states’. 
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 Being so, the CPIA ratings were seen as a form of indirect or ex 
ante conditionality: ‘Instead of trying to induce governments to reform or 
create reformers, donors select genuine reformers and provide them with 
financing.’132 Considering the history of the previous impacts of SAPs’ 
conditionalities, many of such critiques were widespread by then. While 
some, as seen, criticised the overall focus of the Bank on performance, 
others in fact concluded that what was being evaluated was the formal 
existence of tools, not the efficiency of policies. In a 2005 document, the 
Agence Française de Développement highlights and criticises especially 
the fact that the CPIA ratings did not account for outcomes, focusing only 
on policies and institutions. In that way, it was argued, efforts to improve 
performance were left aside and the ratings were a ‘static measure of the 
political and institutional environment.’133 As such, some authors in the 
document concluded that the CPIA in fact evaluated the political and 
institutional tools of a country, rather than its performance.134 Moreover, as 
outcomes are left out of the calculation, so are any factors that can be 
influenced by external pressures and shocks, such as violence and 
conflict.135 These, however, are vital to understand constraints a 
government faced, the speed and quality of its decisions and the tools it 
was able to employ, which together can tell much about the performance of 
a country. 
 In fact, at that point the Bank had not treated ‘fragile states’ as ‘if 
having conflict was a separate problem, requiring separate responses’, 
hence, specific knowledge on the issue was yet scarce.136 Measuring the 
impact of IDA in ‘fragile states’ was seen as a difficult process, since there 
were no agreed upon indicators on peacebuilding and statebuilding to 
measure security, as there were for measuring progress towards the 
MDGs. Thus, the Bank committed to work with the OECD to develop ‘better 
indicators of progress’ in ‘fragile states’.137 
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 Indeed, the final move towards considering ‘fragile states’ a 
differentiated category came only with the parallel importance allocated to 
developing better statistics and better M&E systems in situations of crisis 
and conflict.  
2.3. STATISTICS FOR ‘STATE FRAGILITY’: DIAGNOSING TURNAROUND 
 
Around the same time when the above debates were taking place, the 
Bank, through an IDA14 dedicated to the MDGs, presented three main 
goals, among them, to strengthen the poverty reduction character of 
PRSPs, respecting ownership and national priorities, and to focus on 
measuring results and investing in national statistical capacity. The report 
identified that 50 percent of CAS documents reported a lack of statistical 
capacity in recipient governments, and this was seen a crucial gap to cover 
in order to achieve the MDGs and, thus, to reduce poverty. An IDA Results 
Monitoring System (RMS) was proposed to track the progress towards the 
MDGs and the PRSPs’ goals. The reasoning was all-encompassing: 
 
The paradigm of development effectiveness holds that good policies based 
on empirical evidence and a clear understanding of the development 
process will lead to improved outcomes, by directing scarce resources to 
their most effective use and ensuring that benefits flow to those in need. A 
corollary is that rigorous monitoring of programs and evaluation of results 
will lead to a better understanding of the development process, better 
policies, and further improvements in outcomes. This feedback loop, from 
results to policies to programs, lies at the core of the results agenda. 
Statistics are the information carriers that make the process work.138  
 
 
 Statistics were being proposed as vehicles of accumulated 
knowledge that would tell equally about past, present and future.  
 Crucially, however, this move towards improving M&E systems and 
the production of data related to ‘state fragility’, although contributing to 
establishing the Bank’s approach to ‘fragile states’ in more definite terms, 
did not reduce the focus on performance. A 2009 evaluation conducted by 
IEG had ‘confirmed the usefulness of the CPIA as a broad indicator of 
development effectiveness’, according to the IDA16 document (2011), thus, 
there was support to maintain the Bank’s focus on performance and 
governance.  
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 The focus on performance, in fact, can be considered stronger still 
in IDA17 (2013), and it has encouraged ever more investments in statistical 
analyses to understand how to facilitate better performance and avoid 
pitfalls. Moreover, as the concerns increased with understanding 
environments of conflict and its impacts over development, these statistical 
analyses moved to try to capture the precise conditions in which assistance 
could achieve optimum results, making assistance a priority when these 
conditions are already in place. For instance, PCPI countries whose rates 
stagnate or decline may not be eligible for further exceptional allocation, 
which shows that although the ‘fragile states’ agenda drew the Bank 
somewhat to the security realm, conflict situations are far from being a 
priority. At the end of the day, conflict and violence determine portfolio 
performance ratings and can reduce or even forbid allocation. The core of 
the approach still depends on the ‘potential for a well-defined role’ for the 
Bank, that is, results and measurable progress that can be attributed to the 
Bank and satisfy its stakeholders – an accountability absolutely all 
interviewees acknowledged and to which hardly any applied an apologetic 
tone of any sort.139  
‘We are, after all, a Bank.’
140
 
 The result of these moves, intrinsically connected to the advance of 
the Management for Development Results agenda, was the creation of a 
somewhat sub-category of ‘fragile states’, one with access to exceptional 
allocations attributed through the PCPI: Along with post-conflict and re-
engagement countries, the IDA17 proposes the category of ‘turnaround’ 
states, an addition supposed to increase the orientation of IDA towards 
poverty reduction, by making optimum use of situations of change.141 Very 
tellingly of a perhaps incipient turn towards yet another (sub-)nomenclature, 
the document advances the sub-category of ‘turnaround states’ as a 
possibility to ‘mitigate [the 3.2] threshold effects’ associated with the 
definition of ‘fragile states’.142 It seems the Bank is turning even more 
clearly towards opportunities to achieve a better risk-results ratio; after all, 
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‘turn around’ countries, by definition, are already in the process of turning 
around. The IDA17 justifies the new sub-category for the possibility to 
‘modulat[e] the level of assistance along the fragility continuum.’ It goes on: 
‘In doing so, the adjustment would enhance IDA’s capacity to provide timely 
and adequate support to help countries seize the opportunities presented at 
critical junctures on their path out of fragility.’143 Further ranking, it seems, 
would allow improved aid effectiveness – a fundamental rationale that has 
not changed but, instead, intensified. 
 Compatible with this urge to grasp the better moment for 
intervention, among the other goals of the IDA 17 was the creation of more 
responsive and agile operational policies to deal with ‘fragile states’ and the 
building of a ‘community of practice’ to be available across the Bank’s 
regions, supposed to be centred in the CCSD, as previously mentioned.  
 
2.4. ORGANISATIONAL RE-STRUCTURING AND ENGAGEMENT WITH ‘FRAGILE STATES’ 
 
Regarding themes, since the IDA17, the Bank is said to be ‘refocusing’ on 
‘citizen security’, justice and jobs, and the IDA17 mentions the contributions 
of the g7+ and the New Deal to forward a ‘new paradigm’ of development 
aid.144 Furthermore, after a decade of rapprochement, the document has 
many points to count as perceived positive contributions towards the ‘fragile 
states’ agenda. The portfolio performance in IDA ‘fragile states’ is 
supposed to have paired with non-‘fragile states’, seen as an achievement 
of operational and structural changes.145 In order to improve effectiveness 
even further, the Bank commits to support g7+ countries that have already 
completed their Fragility Assessment by including these measurements in 
their CAS and Interim Strategy Notes (ISN), which are designed as 
temporary project plans in situations of emergency, before CAS can be 
produced.  
 In addition, the IDA17 document mentions new incentives for 
qualified staff to work in ‘fragile states’, but the document also proposes to 
increase efforts to hire local staff and, interestingly, it affirms the Bank 
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created an indicator to measure ‘face time’ and monitor direct professional 
support to ‘fragile states’.146 These can be perceived as modifications 
implemented to respond to frequent criticisms towards the lack of country 
ownership and investment in capacity building in ‘fragile states’ in the 
context of the World Bank’s projects.147  
 
2.5. NOT ENOUGH CHANGES: THE PROBLEMS OF RANKING 
 
Looking at the CPIA ratings and the IDA exercise in general, critical 
remarks I already made regarded mainly the side-lining of security 
concerns, the doubtful approach towards increased ownership, and the 
proposed sub-categorisation of ‘fragile states’, which can lead to even more 
unquestioned focus on countries that offer more opportunity for change 
rather than those that present more needs. It is yet too soon to analyse the 
impacts of the changes proposed and implemented; however, some of the 
points raised by critics are still pertinent, as they were not addressed − or 
are likely to be − by the last replenishment exercises. Among these, there is 
the relevant critique towards aggregation in general: One substantial and, 
in the case of indices such as the CPIA, rather political point is the fact that 
multi-dimensional rankings that rely on aggregation of its several criteria 
have to develop one unit of measure to make all indicators 
commensurate,148 which can be extremely problematic when dealing with 
human, social and political elements such as ‘gender equality’ and ‘quality 
of public administration’.149 Rather like currency, the CPIA ratings allow one 
to know how much of ‘gender equality’ equals ‘x’ of ‘macroeconomic 
management’.150 Indeed, aggregation in multi-dimensional rankings tends 
to compensate non-substitutable variables, so that if ‘gender equity’ is not 
well rated, ‘macroeconomic management’ might compensate for it in the 
final average, when, in fact, they are obviously not to be substituted. In 
addition, as Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum point out, even more 
                                                          
146
 Ibid., p. 12, footnote 19. 
147
 Although the face time indicator, for example, easily begs questions as to what method 
will be used for measurement. 
148
 See Espeland and Stevens 1998. 
149
 Gutiérrez Sanín,  Buitrago et al. 2011. See Annex 2. 
150









problematic is the fact that these commensurate measures will be 
aggregated and visually simplified:  
….the main issue with these indexes is not so much the ever-difficult 
challenge of measurement but rather their common conceptual assumption 
that a multi-dimensional concept such as statehood can be aggregated 
and projected onto a uni-dimensional scale without a massive loss – and 
even distortion – of information.151 
 
 In a similar study, Gutiérrez Sanín, Buitrago and González conclude 
simply: ‘Since there are no substitution rates, multidimensionality cannot be 
disposed of,’152 that is, it should not be presented in any other way.  
 Finding yet another significant problem with aggregation, the 
authors suggest that ad hoc functional formulae have an underlining ‘what-
you-want-is-what-you-get’ rationale. If the researchers can decide on the 
aggregation formula to be applied to the set of variables already available, 
they can apply such a formula that will provide the kind of results already 
expected, in fact, ‘a big family of mutually contradictory – and otherwise 
perfectly reasonable – regression results.’153 Studies having the ranking as 
dependent variable would be hardly sound – perhaps even including the 
World Bank’s old and battered correlation between governance and 
performance.  
 Seeing that IDA replenishments are exactly periodic adaptations to 
the aggregation formulae, the issues above raise important questions. 
Nevertheless, the Bank has never made less than explicit its purpose to 
focus on cases that can generate more results for its portfolio; thus, ad hoc 
formulae might be a perfectly acceptable practice. The problem appears 
when a ranking that was created to allocate resources becomes a 
definitional matrix, even more in the case of ‘fragile states’, whose offices 
often cannot counter either numbers or financial categories and heavily 
depend on resources allocations. As quantification and classification 
flourished, therefore, their length of exposure was all along accompanied 
by the multiplication of alternative moves. 
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2.6. THE MOMENT FOR THE G7+, SELF-LABELLING AND SELF-MEASUREMENT 
 
This is the context in which the g7+ was founded, in between the World 
Bank’s attempts at further detailing the classification of ‘fragile states’, 
improving the investment-results ratio by investing in situations that already 
indicate positive turnaround, while also keeping an alleged concern with 
country ownership, and by slowly moving towards ever greater investments 
in quantification and M&E systems. Although one example of one form of 
quantification and classification, the CPIA exercise is a rich case of a 
history of critique towards these practices and how such practices have 
adapted over time. These are all crucial elements to understand how it was 
possible for the g7+ to be born and what luggage the group brought to the 
negotiation room. 
 In the following section, thus, I analyse how the debates such as 
those around the CPIA ranking can be seen to have culminated in the 
foundation of the g7+, with its specific agenda and positioning regarding 
both the ‘fragile state’ label and its quantification.  
 
3.  TIMOR-LESTE AND THE G7+:  
SELF-LABELLING AND SELF-  MEASUREMENT 
 
This section briefly discusses the trajectory of Timor-Leste in the last 15 
years and its co-foundation and chairing of the g7+ group in 2010. It also 
looks at the g7+’s projects, tools and practices and places the group in the 
context of the international dialogue on development aid just discussed. So 
far, the aim of the chapter was to delineate the dialogue in such a way as to 
highlight what roles and reasoning were formed and how they were 
practiced, in order to also indirectly suggest what possibilities there were for 
participation in this dialogue. In this section, I look at how these possibilities 
were explored by the g7+, having as important background the Timorese 
experience with donors and with the development agenda, and how these 











3.1. BEFORE THE G7+: TIMORESE INDEPENDENCE, TRANSITION AND CRISIS 
 
All analysts and policy-makers seem to agree that Timor-Leste was a 
diplomatic success story. In 1999, its leaders in the country – Xanana 
Gusmão and Bishop Belo − and mainly those in exile – among them, Nobel 
Peace Prize winner José Ramos Horta −154 achieved notoriety for the 
persistence and articulated advocacy for the country’s independence from 
Indonesia, which had annexed Timor-Leste in 1976, just as the country 
became independent of its former colonial power, Portugal. Occupying half 
an island, in the middle of the Indian Ocean and with no great economic 
potential then explored, Timor-Leste could easily have passed unnoticed by 
the international agencies in its fight to separate from Indonesia. However, 
its leaders effectively created international commotion for the cause, and 
Portugal heavily supported the agenda among donors, pushing the debate 
in the UN, along with other leaders. Moreover, the cause also gained strong 
support from the World Bank’s president, James Wolfenson, and the IMF 
president, Michel Camdessus.155 In August 1999, it finally culminated in a 
referendum conducted by the UN, the result of which was the much sought 
independence of Timor-Leste, announced on 4 September 1999.  
 The success of the cause is attributed to many factors.156 One of the 
most important, according to some analysts, was that the international 
community saw Timor-Leste as a possibility of success, hence, a good 
case in which to intervene and, then, reap the positive results. At the same 
time, because there was this possibility, there was also the expectation of 
achieving success, at whatever costs.157  
 However, the role of the national leaders should not be downplayed, 
and many donor agencies’ representatives still refer to their achievements 
as commendable:  
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Timorese resistance slowly created a successful international lobby. If you don’t 
exist in the US media, you don’t exist. They got to the US. They were well known 
for a while in foreign affairs.
158
 
 Facing this efficient advocacy, the expectations of donors when 
delegations finally set foot in Timor-Leste were immense:  
Donors were eager to show… ‘this time we will get it right’. I actually heard 
someone say ‘this country will go straight from third world to first world’.
159
 
 The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was 
established to allow for a smooth transition between the referendum, which 
decided for independence, and the coming elections. Indonesia, however, 
had not left in peace: Militias had destroyed around 70 percent of the 
Timorese infra-structure and left 75 percent of the population displaced.160 
The threat of such violence was well known among the population, yet of 
those who had registered for the voting, 98 percent went to the polling 
centres and many waited hours for the opportunity to vote.161 It is said that 
by 6.30am, around 50 percent of the population had already voted.162 In the 
context of such local response, one can imagine donors’ expectations were 
probably further increased.  
 Not surprisingly, thus, the mission established after the elections, 
UNTAET, is much seen as an ‘overdoing’ of the involvement donors had 
practiced since before the referendum. The transitional authority is said to 
have systematically overridden national representatives, and the period is 
seen by many, including former UN officers, as one of authoritarian 
execution of the UN mandate and alarming lacking of ownership and 
participation of the Timorese people. A former head of district 
administration for UNTAET, Jarat Chopra, highlights the uniqueness of the 
mission, as it attempted to build Timor-Leste ‘through UN statehood’: ‘This 
project assumed a state-centric terra nullius open season on institutional 
invention. East Timor was not, however, a political non-man’s-land.’163 Not 
indeed, if it was the much praised national leadership the one capable to 
                                                          
158
 Interview with Nuno Mota Pinto. 
159
 Interview with Anonymous 1, speaking about a situation before his/her own placement in 
Timor-Leste. 
160
 World Bank 1999. 
161
 Conflict Security and Development Group (CSDG) 2003, p. 222. 
162
 Martin 2001, p. 90. 
163









effectively ‘put Timor on the map’. Chopra’s heavy-worded article speaks of 
UN ‘absolutism’, ‘malevolence’ and ‘intoxication’ with power.164 The 
‘sovereignty’ of the UN mission was such that when the World Bank 
became the trustee of the international Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET), 
the authority signing the contracts was Sérgio Vieira de Mello, the Brazilian 
chief of mission, who embodied both Executive and Legislative powers. 
Chopra points to several instances when the mission led efforts to 
somehow deter increasing ownership.165 An account of this period and of 
the wave of donors arriving immediately after that by the now secretary-
general for the g7+, Helder da Costa, eloquently illustrates what the 
Timorese leadership felt at the time: 
In 1999, when the United Nations began its transitional administration, our 
education on global integration and the relevance of coordination between 
diplomacy, development and defence were in their infancy. When 
sovereignty was restored in 2002, the influx of aid, donors and NGOs, 
national and international, was in full swing as they established their 
compounds, procedures, plans, agendas and staff; and with  them  came  
a vast array of observances and theoretical approaches to the 
development of our country. The international organisations employed the 
brightest Timorese and trained them in foreign systems that were neither 
complementary nor prepared them for entry into government, leaving the 
government of the day with little capacity to fortify an impenetrable 
bureaucracy in the first sovereign state of the new millennium.166 
 
 In that context, the role of the World Bank is praised, first for its 
early engagement – the Bank had been preparing for reconstruction since 
the beginning of 1999 – and for its early concern with local ownership, 
through its Community Empowerment Project (CEP), which helped build 
local councils that were supposed to democratically decide on priorities and 
how to implement them. The UN is said to have been radically against the 
project, and some say it was seen as going against its own plan to focus on 
state-building.167  
Our approach put us in a natural conflict with the UN. I am not saying any of 
them is right, they have benefits. But the Timorese were caught a bit in between. 
The UN did a fantastic job with the violence at the time. They were trying to build 
a state. They brought 10,000 people to a country of 800,000 of which 100,000 
had left. So they were a significative part. There were traffic jams of white jeeps! 
We [from the World Bank] rode bikes. We were working with the locals and they 
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[the UN] were a lot in the compound. They had occupied the Presidential Palace. 
We were in a simple house.
168
   
 I can perhaps safely suppose this image would not correspond to no 
one’s idea of a World Bank delegation in a ‘fragile state’. However, reports 
and stories do seem to converge, and even among former UN members 
and external analysts, the World Bank was complimented by the early and 
close engagement.169 I would venture to say much might have been related 
to the chief of the Bank’s mission in the country, Sarah Cliffe, who had 
previously worked for the ANC in South Africa and had since created a 
reputation for focusing on security concerns and civil society.170 
 At the time, as seen in the previous sections, the Bank was refining 
its approach to conflict and its relation with development and was exploring 
approaches to deal with this connection. Many of the key substantial, 
structural and operational changes in the Bank happened in the early 
2000s, and it seems Timor-Leste was not only an experiment for the UN, 
but also for the World Bank, a chance to test the limits of its engagement 
with ‘fragile states’. Sarah Cliffe would become the director of the Fragile 
and Conflict-Affected States Group, the first internal sector created in the 
Bank to deal with ‘fragile states’. She is said to have also become close to 
the then future Minister Emília Pires, while working in Timor.171 At the 
beginning indeed, Emília Pires worked as part of the national transitional 
group, but was paid directly by the World Bank.172  
 After much opposition from the UN, however, the CEP was not 
concluded with success, although the effort drew attention amid the 
perceived authoritarianism of the UN mission.173 Nonetheless, some came 
to see the CEP as also lacking in local ownership at the level of decision-
making, and analysts point at this as a general tendency of the World 
Bank’s practices as trustee of the TFET.174  
 After 2002 and the end of the UNTAET, the country was thought to 
be on the right path to development. At the very end of the mission, many 
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spoke of its relative success, although this opinion changed considerably in 
the following years.175 However, a violent crisis in 2006 forced the 
government to call for troops from Portugal, Malaysia, Australia and New 
Zealand, for which Timorese representatives are said to have been deeply 
‘ashamed’.176 The call was just over a year after the last peacekeepers had 
left the country, and the civil unrest left 15 percent of the population 
displaced again.177 The causes are complex, multiple and beyond the 
scope of this analysis. It is however interesting to notice that the 
government was struggling with medium-term expenditure planning while 
external technical assistance was apparently focused on ‘core functions of 
the state’ and less so on budget execution and service delivery. This was 
seen as complicated still by the lack of technical capacity in the ministries, 
a huge problem in the country at the time and one highlighted in various 
reports. The IEG review of the World Bank’s work in Timor-Leste from 2000 
to 2010 evaluates many results as unsatisfactory, among them those 
related to capacity building and youth unemployment and dissatisfaction.178 
Moreover, it points to the slow approval of key projects due to bureaucratic 
procedures, even after the Bank had adapted some of the procedures for 
conflict and reconstruction situations. In addition, it is said that when finally 
approved, many projects were too complex in design for appropriate 
implementation (see figures 3 and 4 below).179 Considering that the 2006 
crisis is seen as very much linked to a high level of unemployment among 
youth in the capital and to the government’s lack of capacity to deliver long-
expected public goods, the specific gaps just listed were immensely 
problematic.  
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3.2. THE PATH TO THE G7+: DISSATISFACTION AND OWNERSHIP 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, after the civil unrest had ended, in 2007, the 
government decided to take initiative against the Bank’s advice and it 
increased spending using petroleum resources. By this time and almost 
simultaneously, the Bank had disclosed its CPIA ratings, and Timor-Leste’s 
first rating was 2.7, among the ten worst ratings in the list of 77 IDA 
countries; it could be duly labelled, therefore, as a ‘fragile state’ and could 
also be included in the PCPI list.182  
 There are still several challenges in Timor-Leste, but after 2007, the 
new government managed to take the country on a three-year-consecutive 
rate of 9 percent growth, in part related to the new security situation but 
also to the increasing public spending, decided against World Bank’s 
advice.183  
 
The role and influence of donors, including the WBG, has declined since 
2007. Though the country still requires substantial international technical 
support, increased hydrocarbon revenues make it less dependent on 
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foreign financial assistance. The Government of Timor-Leste shows 
growing frustration with what is seen as complex, heavy donor 
mechanisms that at times are perceived as delivering modest tangible 
benefits relative to investment and effort. It also appears more skeptical 
about the advice received from the WBG (and other donors).184 
 
 In May 2007, the Bank began new operations under OP8.00, 
discussed in the first section and responsible for increasing the speed of 
decision-making and implementation regarding operations in ‘fragile 
states’.185 However, the IEG report states that by that time, ‘[n]ot enough 
attention was paid to getting accurate and reliable data to monitor progress 
in critical areas.’186 Another key criticism of the report was the Bank’s 
approach to advice and training: The Bank is said to have focused on 
individuals rather than investing in institution-building that would be 
sustainable; there was a lack of follow-up training for those yet with poor 
skills in their area; much of the training and software provided were in other 
languages (mostly English, but also Portuguese, not spoken by many), 
making absorption difficult; and problems with literacy and numeracy were 
not properly and systematically addressed, among other issues reported. 
The review pointed crucially to a lack of a needs assessment and, most 
striking, a lack of accountability on the part of those providing the training: 
there was no survey to hear the opinion of the trained Timorese staff.187 
 The answer by the government came in a letter by Minister Emília 
Pires, attached to the IEG evaluation. In the document, she praised the 
assistance and support offered by the Bank and complimented the 
evaluation report by IEG. Nevertheless, she also pointed to several issues 
in the relationship with the World Bank. The Minister focused mainly on key 
technical issues and complained of the lack of cross-sectoral analyses, 
which, she argues, would be the one area where the Bank could provide 
crucial assistance:  
For international actors to expect a ‘fragile nation’ to undergo this 
process…when they themselves had not adequately addressed this 
challenge…over a decade with 26 donors to share the assignment; it is fair 
to say, international actors did not provide either a fair or reasonable best 
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practice example for strategic planning or implementation for the 
Government.188 
 
 The letter also presented strong complaints against the bureaucracy 
of the Bank, which was said to put ‘unreasonable restrictions’ to urgent 
requests by the government: ‘Often direct requests from leadership for 
simple but integral interventions are ignored or labelled “not within a 
program brief”…This causes frustration.’189 In that context, the Minister 
defended the implementation of ‘country-led strategies within country-led 
systems that are navigable’.190 She also criticised the IEG report for 
displaying ‘a lack of detailed data or qualified analysis to contribute to some 
conclusions’ − ‘like all documents produced by international actors’, she 
concludes.191 
 If this dissatisfaction over donors’ practices in the country had been 
felt in the Timorese government for so long, the 2008 Accra speech offered 
by the Minister Emília Pires was perhaps a reflection of such mood. The 
speech, mentioned in the first section, is seen as a key move in the path 
towards the creation of the g7+, with its complaints regarding the 
overwhelming presence and attitude of donors. In 2009, thus, in a 
seemingly attempt to analyse the impact of aid and aid agencies in Timor-
Leste, the government volunteered to be a pilot country in the Fragile 
States Principles Monitoring Survey, conducted by OECD-INCAF. In fact, 
the survey was seen as an opportunity to create the knowledge that the 
government lacked on what exactly was being done by donors in the 
country. There was a perceived lack of information-sharing and the 
government had no technical or human resources to keep track of 
projects.192 There was also a perception that donors’ programmes were not 
following the government’s priorities (this is further discussed in chapter 
five).193  
 The OECD-INCAF monitoring exercise was to analyse the 
implementation of the 2007 Principles for Good International Engagement 
in Fragile States, but the report first produced by the Timorese government 
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was considered somewhat negative in tone towards the donors in terms of 
what was expected of the survey.194 It seems the government used the 
survey to critically analyse the role of donors in the country in a perhaps 
more rigorous tone than the OECD-INCAF was willing to accept. An officer 
involved says the draft was negotiated but it ended up being accepted 
mostly as it was.195 However, I must say the report looks quite ‘balanced’ in 
language for an outsider, acknowledging many contributions by donors and 
the efforts to state-build Timor-Leste, but also pointing to key problems, 
mainly in the way capacity was being built and the lack of alignment with 
national priorities – although the national participants in the survey 
themselves stated there was still long-term planning to be done by the 
government for priorities to be made clear and donors to be able to follow 
them. In terms of capacity building, perhaps the most heavy-worded 
critique in the report, there were complaints regarding the lack of long-term 
investment, attention to ‘soft’ and basic skills first and appropriate transfer 
of knowledge.196  
 A Timorese Strategic Development Plan was only finally concluded 
in 2011 covering the period until 2030.197 The idea put forward was to 
slowly move towards determining both the country’s priorities and how to 
achieve them.  
3.3. THE G7+ 
 
So far, I have sought to show how Timor-Leste was and is still seen as a 
‘special case’ by international agencies, due to its peculiar history of 
efficient international advocacy, the fact that it was the first case of 
established UN (absolute) sovereignty, and the successful experience in 
transforming petroleum, Timor-Leste’s only true economic good, into an 
internationally acclaimed special fund.198 Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund was 
indeed ranked among the top five by international organisations a few 
times.199 Therefore, for a ‘fragile state’, the country is seen to have more 
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leeway with international donors than most. These factors were crucial for 
the country’s leadership in founding the g7+. 
They can afford to experiment; they have money to try for themselves.
200
  
 As seen in the first section, in 2011 Timor-Leste joined DRC and 
Liberia in organising a closed meeting between ministers from ‘fragile 
states’ in parallel to the 4th High Level Meeting on Development 
Effectiveness, in Busan. With this meeting and the proposition of a New 
Deal for Engagement with Fragile States, the group became officially part 
of an international dialogue on the agenda. The group was created with the 
main stated goal of developing a new paradigm for aid intervention, 
adapting the way in which aid would be ‘managed, designed and delivered’ 
in ‘fragile states’.201  
 The g7+ immediately started an international lobby through the 
much active leadership of Minister Emília Pires, the chair, and Helder da 
Costa, the secretary-general, working from the Secretariat established in 
Dili. Part of the group’s activities is financed by the Timorese government 
and part comes from donors through OECD-INCAF and the UN 
Development Program (UNDP), for instance.202  
 The g7+ was born amid donor sponsorship and support and has 
since engaged in all main donor forums regarding peacebuilding and 
statebuilding in ‘fragile states’. Their ability to infiltrate these dialogues has 
been commended by all sides (discussed in chapter six). 
They know how the aid game works, they can engage the donors in their level, 
they speak their language. This is very important.
 203
 
 The New Deal aims for development initiatives in ‘fragile states’ to 
be country-led, strengthen and respect ownership, invest and use country 
systems and capacity.204 Crucially, the group has repeatedly advocated for 
security indicators to be included among the next round of MDGs. After 
many years of analyses, data and meetings on the correlation security-
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development, after all, the MDGs did not include any indicators on security. 
This is perceived as a frustration by members of the g7+, whose main 
substantial message is that security has to be the foremost concern in the 
path to development.205 For Sarah Cliffe, now working for the UN Civilian 
Capacity Initiative, and Claire Leigh, the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI, UK) officer offering support to the group, the ‘novelty’ the g7+ brought 
to the table was indeed its advocacy regarding security, which Cliffe 
attributes to the trauma caused by the 2006 crisis.206 There is one thing to 
be highlighted, however, that the group focuses on security and 
development indicators.  
 As argued throughout the thesis, the capacity to engage with donors 
comes much from the adoption of quantification and classification, an 
indication of the impact of the merge of this reasoning with the ‘fragile 
states agenda’ in the possibility of dialogue available and made available 
for so-called fragile states. 
 
THE NEW DEAL 
The core of the g7+’s propositions, the New Deal, has three pillars that 
together speak precisely to the merge this chapter has discussed so far: It 
proposes that the priority area for donor attention be the Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) developed by the group. It also proposes that 
the new engagement follow a ‘progressive methodology’, from Fragility 
Assessment, to ‘One Vision, one plan’, Compact, Use of the PSGs to 
monitor, and finally, Support for Political Dialogue (together, the FOCUS). 
The first is the assessment tool I explore below, the second regards the 
unity the group purports to represent, the third is the deal donors and 
‘fragile states’ would sign after the assessment is made and following the 
PSGs, which are then used to monitor the engagement. Finally, the 
process of self-measurement and monitoring should lead to internal 
dialogue with diverse stakeholders in ‘fragile states’. The third pillar of the 
New Deal involves TRUST, the ‘mutual commitments necessary to ensure 
the viability of the New Deal’: Transparency; Risk sharing; Use and 
                                                          
205
 Ibid. This is discussed in details in chapter six. 
206









strengthening of country systems; Strengthening capacity; Timely and 
predictable aid (see figure 7 below).207 
 
 




 Regarding the meeting that anticipated the official foundation of the 
group, held in Dili, Timor-Leste, in 2010, the secretary-general, Helder da 
Costa, suggests that ‘it emerged clearly…that the central impediments to 
progress were young institutions, challenged by capacity constraints and 
maturity, and [the] lack of peace.’209 Hence, the group’s focus on not only 
peace but also capacity, accountability and ownership, based on the three 
pillars of the New Deal.  
 As the first step in the ‘progressive methodology’, the Fragility 
Assessment was the first piloted initiative of the g7+, conducted in 2013 in 
seven countries, including Timor-Leste itself. The Assessments started with 
a task force, formed by representatives from ministries, statistics offices, 
civil society and development agencies. Briefly, the exercise involved 
determining baseline indicators based on the g7+’s Fragility Spectrum, 
which establishes stages of fragility through self-assessment. The task 
force was in charge of determining a set of possible common indicators for 
all members and to test an internal dialogue that would lead to the 
proposition of country-specific indicators. The outputs include a Fragility 
Assessment report with a ‘filled out Fragility Spectrum that diagnoses 
where the country is presently situated with respect to each PSG goal’, a 
list of the different indicators, including pre-requisites for collection and 
monitoring, and a lessons-learned document.210 The Fragility Spectrum is 
divided into five stages: crisis, rebuild/reform, transition, transformation, 
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resilience.211 The position of a country in this spectrum begins to be 
determined in the internal multi-task force, held in each country conducting 
the Fragility Assessment. As part of the multi-task force, it is suggested 
each country organise a workshop where participants answer a set of 
questions regarding perceived drivers of previous crises, present risks, 
what the ambitions are for the future of the country, and what the critical 
areas are to measure progress against the PSGs.212 A technical group after 
that is to turn these insights into indicators for each PSG.213 Descriptive 
characterisation for each PSG was developed in meetings in Dili, and broad 
dimensions were formulated in another g7+ meeting in New York.214 
 The process is supported by the Steering Group of the IDPS, 
composed of a working group and a core group. The first is chaired by DRC 
and the UN, and the second, composed of representatives  from  
Afghanistan,  Sierra  Leone,  Timor-Leste,  the  United  Nations  
Development Programme  (UNDP),  the  World  Bank,  civil  society,  the  
g7+  Secretariat  and  two  experts.215 Together, they are in charge of 
‘guiding the selection of common/shared indicators and country-level 
indicators’.216 The goal is to have simple indicators and avoid overlapping 
with the MDGs.217  
 The Fragility Spectrum is said to work as a ‘diagnostic matrix’, with 
scales from 1 to 5, corresponding to the stages mentioned above. The 
stated objective is for the ‘Fragility Spectrum to become an innovative, self-
assessment tool for fragility in a particular country context.’218 As a pilot 
country, Timor-Leste has concluded its Fragility Assessment and Spectrum, 
and the final ratings are shown in the draft report as a table (see figure 8 
below). 
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 A detailed table with indicators for each PSG is presented at the 
end of the draft report.220 Each PSG was assigned a rating and, thus, a 
stage in the Fragility Spectrum, with the average presented in the table 
seen in figure 8 above. The indicators and the exercise itself are so far 
clearly much simpler than those executed by donor agencies, such as the 
CPIA, but for now that is the extent the group is planning to go, and for that 
the g7+ counts with the help of the IDPS and other donors, such as the 
ODI.221  
 The work of the group so far has been growing in two directions. 
The g7+’s stated rationale indicates the core objective to have not only 
security, but security indicators. 
Peacebuilding and statebuilding should be recognised as part of the post 
MDG framework so that the unique needs of fragile and conflict-affected 
states can be adequately addressed to ensure the cycles of instability stop 
and nations can start on a firm trajectory to sustained resilience, 
development and peace.222 
 
 The two fronts involved are intrinsically associated. One regards the 
measurement done by outsiders who ‘have not lived the same 
experiences’,223 measurements that, therefore, the group suggests, are not 
country-specific and would be ineffective to lead the country to 
development; and another front where the group struggles to have security 
measured among the post-2015 MDGs (in fact, to be called, it seems, the 
Sustainable Development Goals or SDGs). This is based on the perception 
among g7+’s representatives that such insertion is the only way in which 
                                                          
219
 Timor-Leste Government 26 Feb 2013, p. 5. 
220
 See Annex 6 for examples from the long list of indicators generated after the pilot 
studies. 
221
 More details in chapter five. 
222
 g7+, 'Pathways toward Resilience. The journey continues ...', p. 7. 
223









not only their realities of conflict will be properly addressed, but their lack of 
success in achieving certain development goals will be relativised by such 
realities instead of being considered failures or indications of unwillingness. 
That’s why we have a problem with indicators… We need to study what the 
indicators are going to measure. That is why we did the Fragility Spectrum first, 
so that we can recognise where we are. We don't go by the normal standard 
indicators because they [donors] have never experienced life like that, they don't 
know…The donors always want indicators. They don’t know how to work without 
this framework. We say it might not work, we try to explain. This is all a process. 
We try to understand why they need those things and they try to understand 




 Or at least this is the kind of exchange the group is seeking now. 
The new set of indicators is supposed to be more country-specific and the 
country-led exercise aims to build capacity and use country systems: 
Indicators should reinforce statistical capacity in countries undertaking 
fragility assessments. National statistical offices should lead and co-
ordinate the data collection process and should be the primary source of 
data, where possible. Indicators will be drawn from civil society, academic, 
private sector and UN/international agencies only when the national 
statistics offices cannot collect the data.225 
 
 
 These messages have been taken to different forums since 2011 
with relative success. Most agree there is certainly success achieved in the 
realm of the development agenda and international debates; it is yet to be 
seen, however, if the g7+’s propositions will be implemented.226 A key path 
to achieve this is to overcome the challenge represented by the post-2015. 
Minister Emília Pires is part of the High Level Panel that is currently 
debating what modifications to make to the MDGs and how. The report 
published in 2013 takes the quantifying and classifying reasoning even 
beyond what it has involved so far: 
We recommend that any new goals should be accompanied by an 
independent and rigorous monitoring system…We also call for a data 
revolution for sustainable development, with a new international initiative to 
improve the quality of statistics and information available to people and 
governments.227 
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 Moreover, the 2013 report calls on all countries ‘to recognise peace 
and good governance as a core element of wellbeing, not an optional 
extra.’228 It is to be seen if this goal will indeed be approved and included in 
the SDGs; it would be the culmination of the many events, practices and 
changes in development just discussed. We can add yet to this the ‘data 
revolution’ and ‘the aim to quantify targets whenever possible’ also 
proposed by the High Level Panel report and part of an already deep-
seated reasoning in the ‘fragile states’ agenda, as this chapter sought to 
show. The moment, context and rationale of the foundation of the g7+ are, 
therefore, both a derivation of these debates and a force contributing to 
steering them, even if its strength is yet to be established, as discussed 
ahead. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS: THE G7+’S MOMENTUM  
 
This chapter had a political sociological argument in the form of a historical 
(and technical) series of events, actors and practices. The purpose was to 
show how the ‘fragile states’ agenda merged with a quantifying and 
classifying reasoning that had slowly become entrenched in the 
development debate. Part of this entrenchment was due to an increasing 
perception that it was necessary to understand and measure the correlation 
between conflict and development to analyse how aid could be made more 
effective. This tendency to combine analyses of conflict and development, 
in turn, was made possible by a quantifying and classifying reasoning, but 
also contributed to create the momentum for a ‘culture’ of ‘development for 
results’. An ever higher investment in M&E became central to this ‘culture’ 
and crucial in the management of ‘fragile states’. Furthermore, the notion 
that development and security were connected (at least on paper) was 
made measurable and ‘monitorable’ in the context of ‘state fragility’ and the 
many ratings and rankings the agenda invited and fed. In the circularity of 
these events and practices, the more ‘fragile states’ are measured, the 
more an uncontested political reality they become. At the same time, the 
more pervasive a subject they become in international debates, the more 
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attractive a target for the production of statistical analyses looking to find 
correlations, probabilities and, thus, the keys to development. 
 The chapter looked at practices of classification to exemplify the 
impacts for so-called fragile states, and navigated the main critiques to a 
specific ranking, the World Bank’s CPIA, in order to illustrate how the 
agenda has adapted to the perceived negative results of the quantifying 
and classifying reasoning. The problems identified and criticised in the 
CPIA not only did not eliminate the exercise, but intensified the revisions 
that keep it alive and well. Revisions, however, lead to changes, even if 
small ones. Hence, as will be discussed ahead, what empowers the ever 
openness of this quantifying and classifying reasoning, its widespread use, 
is also what allows cracks to open. 
 In this context, the g7+ was founded, much guided by the efforts of 
Timorese leaders who had experience with a successful international lobby, 
had worked closely with donors in a unique form of intervention, and had 
been particularly well placed to also refuse demands of donors due to the 
country’s perhaps privileged position among ‘fragile states’, as a country 
with considerable resources. So far, the g7+ seems to obey the pragmatic 
reasoning discussed in the previous chapter: The group’s foundation looks 
both a natural development for the ‘weakest side’ in a too powerful agenda 
and an extremely important effort to contest and lead, one that uses the 
same language and tools, and precisely for that, has been able so far to 
reach some levels of the dialogue. The g7+’s approach seems to focus on 
‘what works’ - borrowing Hacking’s pragmatic argument. The next chapters 













Q U A N T I F Y I N G  A N D  C L A S S I F Y I N G  ‘ S T A T E  
F R A G I L I T Y ’ :  A D A P T A B L E  S T A N D A R D S  F O R  







The previous chapter discussed the practices advanced to determine what 
‘state fragility’ is and how to tackle it. In this chapter, I analyse what is it that 
leads to the perception that these practices ‘work’, in the sense in which 
Hacking expresses the idea: Practices that quantify and classify ‘state 
fragility’ become largely adopted when they are seen as effective in what 
they propose to do; in turn, they are seen as effective when they have 
results; and they have results when the standards of development results 
are fulfilled, as determined by the same agenda, through precisely these 
quantifying and classifying practices. Hence, the methods determine both 
the results achieved and what results can be expected, as both methods 
and object are enabled and limited by the same style of thinking and doing 
political management of ‘fragile states’. In this context, adaptable standards 
become the rule rather than signs of failure: Methods and object are not 
flawed if they cannot be seen as perfect; on the contrary, the fact that they 










 In the style of thinking and doing political management of ‘fragile 
states’, it is acceptable to adapt practices and plans and search for ‘fitness 
of purpose’ rather than perfection; this is how ideas of ‘good enough’ or ‘fit-
for-purpose’ data become ‘standards of good reason’, just as ‘fit-for-
purpose institutions’ and a tacit expectation of ‘good enough governance’ 
become largely proposed and adopted.  While many criticise what they see 
as an imposition of Western standards of statehood, this form of ‘niche 
standardisation’ is never explored.1 I argue this adaptability of standards is 
central for the authority of the (numerical) practices that classify ‘fragile 
states’, thus, for the political existence of the ‘fragile state’ itself. 
In this chapter, I suggest the merge of the quantifying and 
classifying reasoning with the ‘fragile states’ agenda has brought practices 
of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to conform with standards that are 
understood as adaptable and, most importantly, accepted as such.2 
Practices of M&E have met fierce limitations in ‘fragile states’ both in 
method and resultant object: Data can be difficult to collect and analyse 
and results are harder to achieve, at least in the way results were often 
comprehended; national statistical offices in so-called fragile states 
frequently lack staff and/or technologies; slow procedures and traditional 
norms can impede the development of donor projects; conflict and violence 
can turn apparently simple targets such as improved school attendance into 
challenges; the perceived lack of credibility of national leaders and/or the 
risk of abrupt political changes may discourage usual investments in 
institutional solidification; difficulty in finding centralised national databases 
might make it necessary to resort to local NGOs’ knowledge whose 
reliability was not pre-assessed; national ministries might need reports and 
analyses that are quick to read, use and adapt instead of complete and 
intricate documents. Facing these difficulties, ideas of ‘good enough data’, 
‘fit-for-purpose institutions’ and ‘good enough governance’ came to the fore 
in the measuring and management of ‘fragile states’ by donor agencies. 
These ideas can be said to represent a lowering of expectations and the 
modification of standards and, as such, they impact practices of 
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quantification and classification as much as they affect the idea of ‘fragile 
states’ itself.  
I argue it is because this reasoning contains in itself the possibility 
to authenticate imprecision and imperfection that these ‘good enough’ 
methods become accepted; and I suggest it is because these methods are, 
recently, intrinsically related to the management of ‘fragile states’ that 
imperfection and imprecision are also accepted in terms of governance and 
institutional performance. As measurable entities, ‘fragile states’ can be 
managed to an acceptable degree; and since degrees invite the fitting of 
solutions, fit-for-purpose remedies can and should be proposed, or so it is 
argued. Quantification turns difference into many manageable small parts. 
In this chapter, I explore practices of M&E that I suggest are central 
in the construction of ‘fragile states’. I do so by looking at the modified 
standards of data and ‘state’ they generate, enable and feed from. The first 
section of this chapter discusses how the quantifying and classifying 
reasoning so far explored authenticates imperfection and imprecision. I 
suggest this adaptable bar originated in a long tradition of statistical 
reasoning, with its insights and limits regarding what can be known and 
how much knowledge can be ‘effectively’ acquired, presumed and inferred. 
Subsequently, I focus on practices that construct ‘fragile states’: I discuss 
the practices of M&E attached to the quantifying and classifying reasoning 
analysed in the previous chapters and their connection with debates dating 
back to the nineteenth century. I compare the old achievements made by 
statistics with the recent changes in the World Bank to adapt to the agenda 
on ‘state fragility’. Following this discussion, the third section analyses 
changes in procedures in the World Bank and OECD that effectively modify 
standards for the practices of M&E themselves, in the sense that what 
needs to be monitored and how it will be evaluated are re-standardised, 
conforming to the perceived challenges of ‘state fragility’, which the same 
practices help to construct. In this context, the fourth section argues that 
the modification of standards in data production, analysis and in how data 
will impact policy-making also led to a modification in expectations. It 
became possible to argue for ‘good enough governance’ or ‘fit-for-purpose’ 
institutions as efficient, tailored and realistic solutions. The fifth section then 









the g7+’s practices, in the group’s advocacy for increasing tolerance 
towards more feasible development results. This analysis is crucial to 
understanding how the g7+’s practices can be located in the context of the 
style of thinking and doing political management of ‘fragile states’.  
 
1.  STATISTICS’  MANY SUCCESSES:  
    MAKING SCIENCE OUT OF THE UNKNOWN 
 
The previous chapter discussed the merge of a quantifying and classifying 
reasoning with the ‘fragile states’ agenda by reflecting on the ways 
statistics slowly became an essential part of how ‘fragile states’ are 
analysed and managed. As the concluding thoughts sought to highlight, the 
urge to understand the connection between security and development, the 
growing focus of development debates on aid effectiveness and the 
expanding interest in quantifying these connections were all intrinsically 
related. They were also mutually influential in delineating the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda, just as this agenda was central in making of these propositions 
such tantalising bureaucratic practices. 
 I argue in this section that in the style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states’, the statistical reasoning of the quantifying 
and classifying sort explored in the last chapter, and the old debates of 
which it is part, are crucial to understand how ‘state fragility’ and its 
accompanying remedies are made political realities. Moreover, I suggest 
these realities are connected by what I would call the metaphysics of 
correlation, one in which connections only need to hint at explanation, for 
which global data can be inferred from samples, feeding models with 
enough ‘goodness of fit’ to generate knowledge on possible results, the 
standards of which can be willingly adapted according to what is seen as 
appropriate for the different categories of polities.  I argue that this 
metaphysics of correlation is one based on the long history of success of 
statistics in turning lack of knowledge into science. The quantifying and 
classifying reasoning explored so far is capable of justifying actions based 
on what is not known and, at the same time, advocate a flexible 
management of expectations. In this section, thus, I briefly look at the long-









on the metaphysics of correlation, which is central to understand the 
practices that classify ‘fragile states’, discussed in the subsequent sections. 
 
WHAT WE DON’T KNOW DOESN’T HURT US? 
In the nineteenth century, when the modern conception of probability was 
being developed, Laplace famously stated that probability was ‘in part the 
result of our knowledge, in part, of our ignorance.’3 He was contributing to a 
then intense debate that was slowly but quite surprisingly bringing methods 
used to approach unknown physics to understand society. Quetelet, ‘the 
powerhouse of the statistical movement’,4 had already ‘transformed’, in 
Hacking’s view, ‘the theory of unknown physical quantities, with a definite 
probable error, into the theory of measuring ideal or abstract properties of a 
population.’5 He made such move through his now much-known use of the 
‘bell-shaped curve’ of normal distribution, itself a combination of 
observation, assessment of uncertainty and inferences regarding the 
unknown.6 His approach is not, by any means, a definitive, original or final 
statement in the history of probability – indeed, the maths behind the curve 
already existed; his innovation was in bringing the curve to the social realm 
and turning the mean into a real quantity exactly in cases where it would 
not naturally be considered so.7 I use his approach to the bell-shaped curve 
of normal distribution to highlight the main issues in the quantifying and 
classifying reasoning I aim to delineate here. Most importantly, I hope these 
issues will draw attention to both how old some of these debates are – and 
thus, how much time they sit comfortably in – and how highly powerful can 
be the results they help to produce in the specific case of the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda. 
Three elements gathered in the bell-shaped curve – observation, 
assessment of uncertainty and inferences – can be seen as the culmination 
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and the beginning of important impacts achieved by statistics in social 
sciences. They came about as part of a debate between objective and 
subjective approaches to probability, the opposition between the 
‘observation of frequency’ and the ‘reason to belief’ views. These debates 
and elements together led to our modern conceptions of correlation, 
statistical law and ‘goodness of fit’ of a model, all made political truths 
through historical changes in reasoning that slowly opened space for a 
tamed chance and its ‘indeterministic laws’.8 The combination of 
observation, assessment of uncertainty and inferences was a form of 
saving ‘chance’ without losing control of it. Certainty of a synthetic kind was 
combined with numerically assessed uncertainties, and thus, even chance 
could be controlled. 
The very possibility that indeterministic laws can be seen not as a 
paradox but as existent and autonomous, in the sense that they, by 
themselves, help explain social phenomena, is part of the many successes 
Hacking identifies in statistical history. Indeterministic laws sum up what I 
see as the deep-seated debates regarding what is reasonable to expect to 
know and what is acceptable to do with the unknown. In fact, in the 
nineteenth century statisticians succeeded in turning lack of knowledge into 
science precisely by quantifying the unknown. Numerically, the unknown 
was one more element in the construction of new laws about the society; 
far from being relegated to the realm of religion, mysticism or simply 
uninformed guess, the unknown was also measured and, thus, objective. It 
became acceptable not to know and reasonable to make decisions that, 
based on the unknown, cannot guarantee certainty. Not coincidentally, one 
of the paths that led to the bell-shaped curve employed the ‘law of errors’ – 
the curve itself being called ‘curve of errors’ by some. Statisticians became 
convinced that errors could tell of important things,9 and as the errors in 
measurement pointed to blanks, to the unknown, these were seen as 
insightful contributions, useful to establish the parameters of method and 
object. The method was not ‘wrong’ because it had led to errors; indeed, it 
was more scientific because it could lead to a realisation of such kind. The 
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method ‘worked’ because it would identify the errors born of its own 
practices. 
In the history of this statistical reasoning as presented by Hacking 
and Desrosières, I highlight the ideas of correlation, statistical law and 
‘goodness of fit’, all directly connected to the bell-shaped curve of normal 
distribution. I suggest the last two are part of the metaphysics of correlation 
to which I referred at the beginning of this section, and I also suggest this 
metaphysics is crucial in understanding why it became acceptable to affirm 
what ‘fragile states’ are and how better to manage them, even when dead-
ends in practices are so well known and criticised. To understand this point, 
it is important to analyse how each of the three factors contributed to make 
science out of the unknown. 
In both Hacking’s and Desrosières’s accounts of the development of 
statistical reasoning in the nineteenth century, the vigorous attempt to 
quantify walks side by side with the creation and establishment of new 
technologies of data collection and analysis. It is the ‘avalanche of 
numbers’10 produced during and after the Napoleon era that contributed to 
bring to the fore philosophical debates regarding the whole of society, and it 
was the polemics regarding the role of chance and reason that helped to 
encourage the production of new methods of data compilation. This mutual 
influence is a story of many unintended events and, as Hacking puts it, 
involved as much thinking as doing. Practices were constantly shaping the 
thinking and vice-versa, through the creation of new experiments and 
accompanying statistical laws.11 The bell-shaped curve, where my own 
story begins, was both a new experiment and a new statistical law; it also 
became a new political truth. 
 
THE METAPHYSICS OF CORRELATION AND THE ROLE OF ERRORS 
 
The history that starts with the bell-shaped curve and finishes with the 
‘good enough governance’ in ‘fragile states’ is, I suggest, one filled with 
attempts to reconcile the urge to know, grown out of and with an ever-
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expanding mass of numbers, with the increasing (and inevitably related) 
realisation that much remains unknown. 
What Hacking calls the second revolution – following the industrial 
revolution – is said to have been guided both by generalisers who sought 
laws to explain the society and by positivists who held ‘a vast enthusiasm 
for measurement for its own sake’, but the later would have held a special 
position in the coming of this second revolution.12 In the ‘measurement for 
its own sake’ rationale, the idea was that the more numbers were collected, 
the more regularities would appear and, thus, more statistical laws. After 
all, laws were ‘any equations with some numbers in them’, numbers made 
constant by the very reality created by the equation itself:13 ‘In mundane 
matters, relatively few things are constant, except what we make 
constant.’14 The question then was how reasonably to make science and 
decisions based on what was synthetically imposed.15  
According to Hacking, around the end of the 1820s, there was a 
clear division between what some called ‘moral science’, focused on 
objective ‘knowledge’, and ‘moral analysis’, serving purposes of decision-
making. This was in fact a separation between fact and value.16 Quetelet’s 
experiment with the bell-shaped curve was largely responsible for bridging 
this divide. The normal distribution was a law concerned with the average; 
the curve has a mean and a measure of dispersion, and measurements 
cluster around the mean if the average is reliable.17 It was the product of a 
years-long obsession with numerical regularities and the attempt to derive 
laws from such events. Moreover, it was a leap from the individual to the 
general, through the generation of equivalences and practices of encoding. 
‘How to derive a whole [society] from units [individuals]?’ was a question 
whose answer depended on finding a commonality in individual traits that 
could be summed up as the traits of society, hence, as average traits.18 
This commonality was also in a common cause, or rather, a set of 
independent minute causes that preserved both the general and the 
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individual:19 ‘Free acts are minuscule causes that cancel out and allow of 
the larger regularities. Conversely, those larger regularities do not preclude 
individual free will.’20 According to Hacking, Quetelet believed in the 
perfectibility of men.21 His normal distribution regarded people as a 
measurable object: ‘Where before one thought of a people in terms of its 
culture or its geography or its language or its rulers or its religion, Quetelet 
introduced a new objective measurable conception of a people.’22 It was the 
first step to manage the ‘average individual’, through social policies that 
would ‘preserve or alter’ qualities of a people.23 The ‘average man’ had 
many critics, but still, it ‘stuck’.24 It would later serve as the basis for 
eugenics.  
Discussing Quetelet’s average man, Desrosières raised the 
question ‘how can collective objects − aggregates of individuals − be made 
to hold?’ His answer, I suggest, is another brick in the pragmatic building, 
and one which perfectly mirrors Hacking’s idea of self-authenticating style 
of thinking & doing. 
[T]he conventions of aggregation, whose various justifications and 
 supports depend on circumstance, find their meaning within the 
 framework of the practices they account for. When the actors can rely on 
 objects thus constructed, and these objects resist the tests intended to 
 destroy them, aggregates do exist – at least during the period and in the 
 domain in which these practices and tests succeed.25 
 
The modified but still present versions of Quetelet’s average man 
owe much to the reasoning that brought this to bear in the nineteenth 
century, which is still present in social science and policy-making.26 The 
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‘framework of practices’ in which an idea of ‘normal’ was born was the 
framework of medicine, where pathological was a variation in normality, 
thus, a matter of degree. However, when Comte, in its progressionist 
approach, transported this notion of normal to politics, it was imbued with a 
new meaning; it was not ordinary anymore, but a purified state to which 
everyone should strive: ‘Progress and the normal state became inextricably 
linked.’27 Quetelet had made artificial mathematical quantities into real 
quantities, had attributed this to ‘a people’, had still being able to save ‘free 
will’. Comte went a step further, making a positivist (in his sense of it) use 
of the curve of normal distribution. With Comte and the introduction of the 
bell-shaped curve in politics, Hacking suggests there was a new layer of 
‘hidden power’ beyond the fact/value divide: A new and lasting tension was 
created in the idea of normal – normal as average or as a ‘figure of 
perfection’.28  
As the story illustrated so far, this tension was produced along years 
of debate on how to accommodate fact and value, deterministic causes, 
numerical regularities and free will. It culminated in the transplant of 
‘normal’ to politics in the form of debates on social progress and the 
perfectibility of ‘men’. It is important now also to discuss how these ideas 
were accompanied by the development of techniques and practices to 
understand how social traits and political results could be managed and 
coordinated. If the ‘normal’ was something everyone should strive to 
achieve and if society, existing as a whole, could be perfected to achieve 
certain expected results, it was necessary to develop the mechanisms to 
manage this perfectibility; therefore, understanding how variables 
connected was crucial. As statistical laws became used to explain and 
predict, they took a further step into autonomy,29 but they were still attached 
to a ‘constraint of having to integrate “external causes” – that is, differently 
constructed facts.’30 The positivist answer to what was perceived as the 
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‘metaphysics of causality’31 was to develop and advance the conception of 
correlation.  
The ‘mythology’ or ‘fiction’ of causality32 was slowly substituted by 
the idea of correlation, which was made ‘as real as causes’: ‘Henceforward 
the philosophical view of the universe was to be that of a correlated system 
of variates, approaching but by no means reaching perfect correlation, i.e. 
absolute causality.’33 This followed certain understandings that ‘everything 
in the universe occurs but once’.34 Nevertheless, the impossibility to know 
all cases by studying one was to be seen not as a failure in producing 
knowledge, but as a new avenue of investigation for statistics. Correlation 
indicated how variables related, and the accompanying technique of 
regression would analyse what that relationship was.35 The question 
became: ‘Can we find a regular relationship that fits well with the data we 
have?’36 Regression was then an attempt to model this relationship through 
a linear model, which would ideally reduce errors, that is, the distance of 
the measurement from the line.37 The model would be measured by 
‘goodness of fit’, achieved through the calculation of the coefficient of 
determination: It was, in practice, the measurement of the proportion of a 
variable that could be related to the other one; it was a meagre (measured) 
contribution to ‘explanation’, not more, not less. The very notion of 
coefficient was the admission of degrees of certainty as scientific enough. 
 Correlation was not perfect causality, but it nonetheless became a 
new political truth, made visible and real by statistical laws and techniques. 
‘Correlation and regression enabled previously separate objects to hold 
together. They constructed a new type of spaces of equivalence and 
compatibility.’38 Indeed, even a high correlation did not imply causation, so 
in fact correlation merely indicated that certain things happened 
simultaneously. All the rest was unknown. However, this ‘unknown’ was 
modelled, the errors were measured and acknowledged, and since the 
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expectation of identifying causality was long gone, correlation generated 
autonomy, it helped to tame chance.  
Just as the reality of things could be invoked to solely pragmatic ends, and 
 on condition that the routines of perception be maintained, in the same way 
 ‘causation’ could only be invoked as an admitted and therefore predictable 
 correlation of likely probability.39 
 
As a ‘likely probability’, correlation was measured in the amount of 
information it could potentially offer; what I call metaphysics of correlation 
was not a promise of knowledge, but on the opposite, an authoritative 
‘scientific’ acknowledgment of ignorance. And so it remains. 
 
2.  FILLING ‘STATE FRAGILITY’  WITH SCIENCE:  
    WHEN ENOUGH IS ENOUGH 
 
The ‘scientific objectivity’ of the unknown became a triumph of statistics, its 
epistemological rite of passage to autonomy. Its transplant into politics and 
the current role it plays in political decision-making would only ratify 
Hacking’s view on the many successes of statistics as a form of thinking 
and doing. It is also, in my view, a perfect case of what Bourdieu called 
practical sense, as discussed in chapter two: Social statistics became 
practical by the very force of its imperfectability, thus, for its ever-perfectible 
character, which makes of it also such reasonable a tool – how bad can its 
use be if it never means to offer more than enough truthfulness?  
 As this statistical reasoning merged with the ‘fragile states’ agenda, 
the statistical reasoning did not abandon its old ways. In fact, if anything, 
the old practices are reproduced in larger scale, with the help of ever more 
technological means and with impacts that would not have been foreseen 
by the nineteenth-century’s most famous statistics enthusiasts. In this 
section I discuss the role of the central notions just explored – part of what I 
called the metaphysics of correlation – in measuring and classifying ‘state 
fragility’. I argue the success of the science of the unknown is an essential 
part of what allows ‘fragile states’, with all its supposed causes, 
consequences and proposed solutions, to exist as political truths. 
 In this section, I focus on one feature of the ‘fragile states’ agenda, 
the idea of ‘good enough’ or ‘fit-for-purpose’ data, present in monitoring and 
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evaluation (M&E) practices towards ‘state fragility’. Not that this is uniquely 
applied to ‘fragile states’, but I here seek to highlight the specific practices 
and impacts in this agenda. The idea of ‘good enough data’ is a first 
important step towards understanding the adaptation of M&E practices 
around notions of ‘fitness of purpose’, ‘best fit approaches’ and institutions, 
and ‘good enough governance’. These ideas are intrinsically connected to 
the statistical reasoning that interpenetrated the agenda and tell as much 
about the urge to produce numbers, as about the expectations this 
quantified knowledge generates. The statistical reasoning that inherited the 
metaphysics of correlation does not require perfect causality, ‘real’ numbers 
or direct indicators (as opposed to proxies), and it values form, visualisation 
and consumption at least as much as it values numbers themselves. In that 
context, ‘good enough data’ is practical, acceptable and authoritative - its 
provisional character not a weakness, but a scientific acknowledgement of 
the (temporarily) unknown.  
 While many critics point to the inaccuracy of certain data, the choice 
of indicators or the artificial commensuration of certain political features of a 
state, one central consideration is missing: Analysts in general know the 
extent of the problems and limitations of the numbers they produce, so do 
the particular kind of consumers for whom the numbers are produced. Yet, 
these quantifying and classifying practices hold. 
2.1. PROVISIONAL NUMBERS AND THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF IMPERFECTION 
 
Lampland has a specific name for such cases, ‘provisional numbers’, which 
are knowingly temporary and incomplete, but not for that reason less 
used.40 They are different from ‘regular’ numbers in that they are not 
‘referent to stable entities which carry the same meaning no matter what 
their context’.41 Their ‘value’ is not in being ‘real’, but as I understand it, in 
creating acceptable and practical temporary political realities, that is, 
objects that help to investigate other social phenomena, a view that 
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resonates what Hacking calls ‘scientific realism’.42 Indeed, ‘[f]or those who 
use numbers day in and day out, the observation that numbers are 
temporary devices is banal.’43 The issue is not that imperfect numbers need 
to be ‘unmasked’ but, instead, how they become accepted and authoritative 
in their known imperfection.  
 Critics who focus on errors as if they are weakness in the statistical 
reasoning alone worth of the critique fail to realise that errors are very much 
part of statistics’ scientific profile, and also well known by those who 
produce and use them in an everyday basis. 
After all, provisional numbers correspond to the style of thinking & 
doing in which context they are produced and studied, a style of reasoning 
that opens space for making science of the uncertainty. In that sense, I 
hereafter use ‘provisional numbers’, ‘good enough data’ and ‘fit-for-
purpose’ data interchangeably; they are what their context make of them, 
and are made authoritative because they are part and productive of a 
specific style of thinking & doing. Lampland locates provisional numbers in 
the context of ‘formalizing practices’, which involve quantification, 
standardisation and rationalisation; they are practices which not only 
depend on and generate numbers and categories, but are also based on a 
specific style of reasoning.44 ‘[I]n specific contexts numbers must be as 
temporary and as fluid as the quotidian, recurring processes used to 
stabilize experience and produce knowledge are.’45  
I argue this temporary character becomes socially comfortable46 in 
the context of the metaphysics of correlation discussed. The metaphysics 
of correlation analysed in the previous section is one that stands 
comfortably among uncertainties, errors and the unknown, as long as these 
are also modelled, measured and visualised. In that sense, provisional 
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numbers are not only acceptable but very much in agreement with the style 
of thinking & doing discussed so far. As seen, precisely because this style 
of reasoning turns errors, uncertainty and the unknown into science, it also 
invokes a perennial re-work of numbers and practices: ‘Idealized conditions 
are never reached, with the consequence that the need to adjust, 
accommodate, and re-calibrate is ever present.’47 The style of thinking & 
doing based on quantification and taxonomy is, thus, made to last also by 
the virtue of its partly provisional character.  
Similarly to Lampland, I do not argue there are only provisional 
numbers in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. Nevertheless, as the target of so 
many critics when it comes to data collection, analysis and repercussion is 
often based on such numbers, they become an interest point for 
discussion. The bottom line is that this data, be it called by scholars  ‘good 
enough’, ‘fit-for-purpose’ or provisional, is not necessarily named as such 
by producers and users, but are practically acknowledged as ‘provisional’ in 
the context in which they become accepted. 
2.2. GOOD ENOUGH DATA: THE PRACTICALITY OF IMPERFECTION 
 
Indeed, ‘fragile states’ are largely seen as major challenges to M&E 
practices, and although no specific term is officially used in guidelines or 
parameters for the practices of staff in donor agencies, there is a 
commonsensical acceptance that in the case of ‘fragile states’, the 
standards for data need to be flexible, which in fact indicates data can be 
good enough. The term encapsulates well the overall rationale that in 
contexts where data collection and analysis are extremely difficult and 
action needs to be sped-up, good enough data is seen as better than no 
data at all.  
To look into these elements, I analyse the case of the Education 
sector in Timor-Leste and the impacts of good enough data or provisional 
numbers produced in this context being absorbed and reverberating in the 
World Bank’s CPIA exercise. The case illustrates both the practical 
acceptance of such data and its adapted standards, and the unintended 
powerful impacts it can have on the classification of ‘fragile states’ through 
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practices of M&E. 
Have you ever had indicators that you stopped using after criticism? 
One indicator we had to improve or change was related to school enrolment. It 
wasn’t fit for purpose. No data is perfect, all are estimates.  The MDGs on 
Education are not about enrolment, they are about completion, but there are no 




The indicator on completion is more complex than it may look 
because it involves data that is not often recorded and because it 
encompasses other numbers that are usually difficult to collect, such as the 
number of children out of school. I select the latter indicator for my 
illustration.  
The indicator on ‘out-of-school children’ might shed light on how 
many children enrolled but never completed the course, either because 
they failed exams or because they dropped out. It is rich in examples of 
how the unknown become scientific through numbers, how the metaphysics 
of correlation previously discussed impact the way knowledge is 
understood and used, and the many powerful and unintended impacts of 
practices of M&E towards ‘fragile states’.  
In Timor-Leste, how do you usually collect data if access to information is 
sometimes difficult or if there is no infra-structure to help? 
We have something, we call it ‘good enough data approach’, like in the case of 
the Education Management Information System [EMIS], which is relatively 
comprehensive and reliable. But also the GPE process is intended for states with 
limited capacity. First, we rely on international agencies to collect data on behalf 
of the country when capacity is missing. My teams also collect data. The EMIS is 
also very good; they get technical advice and support from the World Bank.
49
 
As a key part of the MDGs indicators on Education, the rate of 
children out of school is measured even if numbers are known to be far 
from perfect. I here discuss the specific use of this indicator in the 
application of Timor-Leste for additional financing from the Global 
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Partnership for Education (GPE), for which the World Bank is a Supervisor 
Entity.  
In this application and in the monitoring of the projects that followed, 
a mix of international databases, national strategic plans and UN datasets 
were used to fill in the blanks in data.50 In fact, for many of its own 
measuring and evaluation, the World Bank feeds from the same databases 
used by GPE, from the Education Policy and Data Center, in Washington.51 
As one set of provisional numbers that are good enough, these 
measurements are very successful in creating an aura of objectivity but do 
not necessarily explain neither the Timorese Education sector, in this case, 
nor why this aspect of the sector should impact the classification of Timor-
Leste as a ‘fragile state’. Yet, these numbers travel, are absorbed, 
accepted and influence changes in the standards of practices and results.52 
The ‘rate of children out of school’ is perceived by statisticians 
themselves as a measurement highly prone to error. A GPE report 
acknowledges that it does not capture irregular attendance patterns, and it 
is usually measured either through administrative records or household 
surveys,53 both only good enough for the task. Administrative records can 
be biased through over- or under-reporting, can contain errors transplanted 
from census-based projections (good enough predictions based on 
inferences and correlations regarding the whole of the population), and only 
reaches formal education. Household surveys, in turn, are not specially 
designed to target education, and measurements regarding the rate of out-
of-school children can ignore erratic attendance or non-attendance after 
enrolment. Moreover, not all practices of data collection, whichever they 
are, can happen at the same time to level collection and, thus, attendance 
records.54 The GPE tested the use of household surveys to measure the 
rate of out-of-school children in an Indian district and in fact registered a 
‘strong underestimation’ of more than 50 percent.55 Yet, not only the rate of 
out-of-school children is a constantly used indicator in most development 
indices, as it can also be a crucial one. 
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The rate of out-of-school children has an important impact in the 
analysis of the outcomes produced by a GPE project in any partner 
country, as one of the indicators in the cluster of Education. In the M&E 
practices that accompany the GPE grant to a ‘fragile state’, performance is 
crucial, as it stands for 1/3 of the weight in the allocation formula – the other 
2/3 being distributed between population size and country needs.56 The 
government of Timor-Leste has been a ‘partner country’ since 2005, having 
the World Bank as a Supervisor Entity, responsible for developing a 
programme for the indicative amount to be allocated.57 That means that the 
‘state fragility’ label has at least three direct impacts in these dynamics; it 
helps to define eligibility (Timor-Leste is defined as a ‘fragile state’ by the 
World Bank),58 it is numerically part of the resource allocation formula under 
‘Needs’ (‘fragility’ is measured as a 0-1 variable),59 and it determines the 
amount of resources the Supervisor Entity, or the World Bank, will receive 
itself for supervision work – if the state is ‘fragile’, the allocation for the 
Supervisor Entity is double the usual $100,000 per year.60 Nevertheless, 
the connection between the quantification and classification of ‘fragile 
states’ by the World Bank and this instance of provisional numbers is also 
very diffuse and can be much more subtle and pervasive. 
As discussed, the rate of out-of-school children will determine the 
rate of success of a project, that is, the performance of a ‘fragile state’. In 
the case of Timor-Leste, where the Supervisor Entity is the World Bank, the 
projects related to the GPE grant and supervised by the Bank will also 
count towards the Country Portfolio Rating (CPR), which measures the rate 
of the Bank’s successful projects and is an essential component of the 
CPIA formula (see formulae in the previous chapter).61 The first data to fill 
in the CPR, as seen, comes from subjective write-ups produced by World 
Bank’s local teams. These documents are not made public, but one can 
expect that the indicator on children out of school will have been absorbed 
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by the reports produced by the team and will become somehow reflected 
on the write-ups.  
For this part of the exercise, the CPIA Education indicators, as 
others, are rated from 1 to 6, and the benchmark results serving as 
guidelines for staff include considerations such as ‘[s]trategic national 
education policies, high standards, and effective use of public and private 
resources support a good quality, universal basic education system’, to be 
rated by staff according to his/her perception of how successful the country 
has been in this realm.62 It is reasonable to expect such perception will 
naturally borrow from indicators seen in reports and projects, the only ones 
available. Thus, the indicator on children out of school crosses to a new 
realm. 
After the write-ups reach the headquarters in Washington, they will 
be ‘calibrated’, in a respondent’s words, across sector or network 
(Education) and region (East Asia and Pacific), to make sure ratings are 
relatively consistent in between similar countries and in the same sector.63 
Thus, calibration is a practical adaptation to final consistency, that is, to 
level measures so as to make them congruent with a practical 
understanding of the ‘common’ in the Sector or Region. On the other hand, 
staff members in the field practically make their ratings adequate 
considering the calibration they anticipate. 
We are supposed to recognise the fragile states characteristics in the country 
context. When the project is being prepared, they [in the headquarters] will 
assess if we adequately analysed the risks of the project, for instance. It is always 




Practically anticipating the calibration in the headquarters, staff 
members in the field increase the measures. A pre-established notion of 
countries’ degrees of ‘fragility’, therefore, is necessary to determine this 
balance, as much as the ‘calibration’ will numerically classify ‘fragile states’. 
The balance is based on the common sense of local teams, who produce 
the write-ups, and headquarters staff, who subjectively encode ‘efforts’, 
‘problems’ and ‘results’, group countries and make ratings compatible and 
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averaged. Interestingly, the write-ups are the main form through which an 
understanding of ‘relative effort’ or ‘relative performance in the face of 
specific obstacles’ is accounted for, based on local staff’s perception of the 
situation in the country. However, in the ‘calibration’ process across 
Regions and Networks, ratings are averaged, and although the stated 
purpose is exactly to acknowledge differences in comparison with other 
similar countries, the idea of relative performance is lost among arbitrary 
averages, inferences and commensuration.  
There is in this process a constant back and forth of subjective and 
perceived objective elements: The rate of out-of-school children, made out 
of good enough data, perhaps practically and pre-emptively counter-
calibrated, circulates as objective measure; it reaches the headquarters, 
where write-ups from local teams and calibration by Region and Network – 
based on the respective staff’s understanding of what numbers should 
‘logically’ be to  establish a normal rating, by encoding and comparison; 
that is, ‘kinds’ of countries and ‘types’ of problems and results are encoded, 
made commensurate and grouped in order to achieve comparability. Timor-
Leste’s results on Education will need to be compatible to the country’s 
position as better performer among other East Asia and Pacific countries, 
and its positions as lagging behind in this specific sector of Education if 
compared to, for instance, non-‘fragile states’.65 
As seen in the previous chapter, when this calibration is finished, 
ratings for all criteria are gathered in their respective clusters, which are 
averaged and then included with their specific weights in the final formula to 
determine the country’s CPIA score. In composite indicators such as those 
in the CPIA multi-dimensional ranking, clusters are not correlated; instead, 
each criterion, thus each cluster, is correlated to the dependent variable, in 
this case, ‘countries with good policies and institutions’. It is established 
that, for example, a low number of children out of school is correlated with 
good education policies, which in turn are correlated to the overall 
performance of a country in terms of policies and institutions. In this 
correlation, as pointed out by many, there is an undue total 
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compensation:66 If scores are low in Education, a sub-area of criterion 9, 
‘Building Human Resources’, but high in Health, another sub-area under 
the same criterion, one might unduly elevate the total score of that criterion. 
The same goes for compensation between criteria in the same cluster, 
which might unduly elevate the score for the cluster as a whole.67 Hence, a 
provisional number such as ‘out-of-school children’ might contribute to 
lower or raise the rating for different criteria or the cluster itself, having a 
definite, if small and indirect, impact in the final classification. 
Remembering a quote from the previous chapter by the same World 
Bank member of staff who spoke of a ‘good enough data approach’, it is 
important to highlight how much ‘good enough data’ goes into the CPIA 
exercise by also taking into account how much work is expected from 
country teams: The country team leader for the GPE projects was in charge 
of 13 countries in the East Asia and Pacific region and was required to visit 
each every six months to follow up projects. (S)he unilaterally decided to 
pay monthly visits instead, but still, (s)he admits (s)he had not been able to 
visit all of them by the time (s)he was to produce the write-ups for the CPIA 
exercise.68 (S)he points at the many pressures in the Bank for quick data 
and says the Bank’s environment is characterised as one of hard work and 
rigorous peer-review, which leaves one to conclude that in the context of 
matching rigour and the virtual impossibility of producing perfect numbers, 
‘good enough data’ became an acceptable, common and practical reality. 
The end use of ‘good enough data’ is hardly pre-established, it can hardly 
be programmed and does not point to possible authorship, considering the 
intricate ways in which the numbers travel.69 Yet, it is one, if small, crucial 
step in the quantification and classification of ‘fragile states’. 
Considering the pressures and limitations in data collection and 
analysis, it is not hard to understand how ‘good enough data’ or provisional 
numbers make themselves acceptable, authoritative and, actually, the very 
‘standards of good reason’ in the quantifying and classifying practices 
towards ‘fragile states’. There is in this process an imbued reasoning that 
eliminates the need to ‘explain’; what we find instead are good enough 
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correlations that in their imperfection become practical and powerful. When 
the very reasoning is that errors are not a problem as long as they are 
approximate enough, accounted for, measured and pointed out, fit-for- 
purpose or provisional numbers are a natural part of the data.  
The next section adds more practicality to this analysis, by 
discussing how good enough data can also modify the standards of the 
very practices of M&E towards ‘fragile states’, hence contributing to adapt 
method to data and also to authenticate methods’ own provisional status. 
 
3 .  OFFICIALISING FLEXIBILITY:  
    FOR EACH DATASET ITS OWN METHODS 
 
The ever-perfectible character of certain political numbers and the 
ephemeral correlation they point at authenticate each other by adjusting 
standards towards compatibility − not perfection. After all, in the absence of 
external canons of truth – abandoned with causality − classifications and 
measurements in use become the very ‘standards of good reason’. It does 
not matter that there is a stated recognition that no perfection can be 
reached. It is enough that the measurement keeps assessing its own 
limitations. In the case of the ‘fragile states’ agenda, limitations in data and 
goals are ubiquitous; meanwhile methods do not die out, they adapt to 
modified standards that they help to create by delineating themselves their 
limitations. 
In this section, I discuss how this mutual self-authentication works 
specifically in terms of the officialisation of flexible procedures by the World 
Bank and OECD in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. While ‘good enough data’ 
becomes accepted and routinised, the World Bank and OECD also lean 
towards applying ‘best fit’ approaches to M&E in ‘fragile states’. 
3.1. QUALITY IS RELATIVE 
 
Identifying appropriate indicators on FCS [fragile and conflict-affected 
 states]-related issues that can be used in a project results framework could 
 be a challenging task. First, indicators usually refer to broad concepts such 
 as fragility, resilience, peace, and/or stability that are difficult to measure. 
 Second, indicators are influenced by numerous elements in the project 
 context. Third, observable changes in FCS context are normally a long-
 term undertaking. Nevertheless, project teams should explore the  













The guidebook quoted above was prepared by the World Bank to 
frame M&E practices in the context of Managing for Development Results 
(MfDR), discussed in the previous chapter. It details how to adapt the 
standards for methods related to M&E practices; for instance, by using 
‘“good enough” proxy indicators relevant to the project when measuring 
complex issues (e.g., state presence could be measured by communities in 
which administrative offices are functioning).’71 This is an example of 
substantial change to methods of M&E in ‘fragile states’ based on the kind 
of ‘good enough data’ discussed in the previous section. The overall 
rationale, as expressed in an OECD document, is that now the ‘[q]uality [of 
data] is defined as “fitness for use” in terms of user needs.’ Moreover, the 
document suggests that ‘[t]his definition is broader than has been 
customary [sic] used in the past when quality was equated with accuracy.’72 
This step does not so much make inaccuracy acceptable, but flexibilises 
the understanding of quality itself. The quality of data and method in the 
context of ‘fragile states’ is seen as also a matter of capacity of absorbing 
data, speeding-up decision-making and responding to emergencies when 
emergencies come:  
Even if data is accurate, they cannot be said to be of good quality if they 
 are produced too late to be useful, or cannot be easily accessed, or appear 
 to conflict with other data. Thus, quality is viewed as a multi-faceted 
 concept. The quality characteristics of most importance depend on user 
 perspectives, needs and priorities, which vary across groups of users.73 
 
In this flexibilisation of standards in method and data, there are two 
fundamental ideas, timeliness and accessibility, said to be especially 
relevant in the case of ‘fragile states’. 
How is data analysed in the context of your work in the field? 
We provide briefs, what we call just-in-time reports, different products to the 
clients, so that they can be used in the way that is more relevant to the country. 
In my view, there is always a problem: Rigorous standards of analysis and 
presentation can be at the expense of the accessibility for the clients. The priority 
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in doing best-quality products means that there may be less likelihood that 




In the context of balancing accuracy and practicality, both the World 
Bank and the OECD have been adapting M&E in ‘fragile states’ to become 
compatible with situations of limited data collection and analysis. It is still an 
incipient process and donors are clearly hesitant in using any official 
terminology that might indicate ‘inaccuracy’; however, the flexibilisation of 
practices is increasingly patent in official documents and is certainly clearly 
expressed by staff in terms of common sense decisions routinely taken and 
tacitly accepted, as the interview above highlights. For instance, even 
before the operational changes in the World Bank, discussed in the 
previous chapter, procedures were already adapted in loco as staff working 
in Timor-Leste perceived the need to accept that certain methods for 
analysis would need to be adapted to the country’s ministerial capacity. 
How were things implemented in Timor-Leste at the beginning, considering the 
difficulties? 
Sometimes people need to see failure to adjust. At the beginning, there were 
over-planning, over-reporting, things were overly sophisticated. With the Public 
Finance Management Capacity Building Programme, for example: The manager 
was hesitant to take it to the Board, it was too demanding. They ended up having 
to reformulate it one year later. Sometimes it’s really in time of crisis that 
changes happen. Sometimes, it needs to become evident that something is not 
working in order for it to be improved.
75
 
The first documents related to the Public Finance Management 
Building Programme in Timor-Leste, mentioned above, dated from 2005, 
were brief and at the same time ambitious in expectations: The training 
programmes involved ‘including short-term consultant inputs, professional 
development programs, distance learning events, language training, and 
specialized workshops’; continued placement of advisers; integration, 
expansion and related training regarding new systems for finance 
management; a special funding for ‘creative thinking’ pending application 
and planning by the ministry; and ‘essential project management and 
performance monitoring costs, including local travel and communications, 
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and language interpretation’.76 In 2006, after the ‘failure’ mentioned by the 
officer from the quote above, the document prepared by the World Bank 
was much longer and more detailed, with incremental results to be 
achieved in smaller scopes than expressed in the 2005 document. It 
expressed the need to adapt – the word had not been used in the 2005 
document. It ends with a note:  
Preparation of the program benefited from technical diagnostic reports and 
 assessments of experience with capacity building in Timor-Leste. These 
 studies, and the GoTL’s direct input based on its own assessment of its 
 capacity constraints, provided the foundation for the design of the 
 program.77 
 
It also contains an extremely detailed table of ‘risks’ to the 
implementation of the project, most related to constraints in capacity.78 The 
risks were accompanied by proposed pre-emptive solutions for each 
possible problem to be faced. It is clear that the one-year gap in between 
the documents culminated in a more carefully phrased and phased plan of 
action.  
The example serves to illustrate the constant and mutual influence 
of practices developed and adapted in loco and the official adoption of 
procedures that are seen to respond to the need to make adaptations, so 
that their effectiveness can also be measured, monitored and evaluated. 
The practical sense that leads staff to adapt practices in the field reflects an 
understanding of what ‘fragile states’ are and how to remedy ‘state fragility’ 
as much as it contributes to shape these ideas. ‘One of the fundamental 
effects of the alignment between practical sense and objectified sense is 
the production of a world of common sense.’79 The common sense, as all 
common senses, was widespread. 
The OECD’s document Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in 
Settings of Conflict and Fragility is an eloquent illustration of the way the 
organisation also moved towards tailoring practices of M&E to ‘fragile 
states’. The document makes an interesting division between impacts 
produced at the programme level and results produced on the context, that 
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is, on the big picture related to peace and the state itself. What the 
document says, in practice, is that, while at a very micro level, M&E 
practices might be able to determine if a specific action, part of a particular 
project, caused a certain result, this rationale cannot or can hardly be 
extended to the big picture. 
The rigorous quantitative methods associated with impact evaluation and 
 randomised control trials are considered not feasible in many situations of 
 conflict and fragility, (although useful experiments are underway at the 
 programme level). Still, it is particularly difficult to apply such methods to 
 high-level questions of peace and conflict across various interventions at 
 country level or to assessments of overall donor engagement in a conflict 
 setting. Where causality cannot be reliably determined using rigorous 
 methods, evaluators may present plausible explanations for their 




The document adds that, following this division in two levels, it may 
be necessary to change the focus from ‘impacts’ to ‘outputs’ when 
conducting M&E in ‘fragile states’ – that is, to acknowledge what a specific 
intervention can achieve, and how it might correlate with the overall goal of 
developing ‘fragile states’ without any possible certainty of this impact. The 
document repeatedly warns that ‘[f]ewer rigorous methods are used and 
questions of causality are often inadequately addressed’ in such 
assessments.81 Again, the issue in evidence is not so much perfect 
accuracy, but ‘adequately adjusted methods’ – rigour, not rigidity – and the 
understanding that certain aspects of project implementation will only ever 
modestly account for identified results, not explain them. 
3.2. FLEXIBLE METHODS: DONORS’ CAPACITY AND WILLINGNESS TO ADAPT
 
 
There is yet another crucial aspect of this advocated adaptability in M&E 
towards ‘fragile states’. It comes, or so it is said, as a result of donors’ 
realisation that although aid was growing, results were not yet satisfactory:  
There is…an increasing body of evidence to suggest that aid aimed at 
 achieving sustainable peace and development is not making a lasting 
 contribution to peace and development. In 2005, a review of more than 75 
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 evaluations in the conflict fragility field pointed to substantial weaknesses 
 in programme effectiveness, design, and management.82 
 
Practices of M&E, thus, also became a matter of donors’ capacity 
and willingness to improve their own analyses and projects – an ironic play 
with the words so often used to measure and define ‘state fragility’ itself.83 
With that search for improvement, came the need to constantly balance 
speed and quality. 
Evaluators must prepare for risks, develop robust designs, and ensure 
 sufficient flexibility to counter the challenges of unpredictability and 
 complexity. They should select methods that help to capture complex 
 social change processes and illuminate interactions between interventions 
 and the context.84 
 
Hence, on the one side, practices and objectives need to be 
‘evaluable’;85 on the other, evaluations and evaluators need to adapt to the 
limitations in the very framing of solutions proposed for ‘fragile states’. 
Development and peace are too ample goals for causality to hold; the 
metaphysics of correlation, in turn, applies quite well. The re-standardised 
methods both adapt to the said volatility of ‘fragile states’ and contribute to 
compose this ‘fragility’, by reinforcing the view that, in such contexts, 
nothing is stable. In the face of time and technical efficiency constraints, 
methods that achieve ‘enough’ become ‘standards of good reason’. 
Regarding the compacts guidance [part of the New Deal], a lot of this is still 
perfectible, but we decided we need to move ahead, we are going to get them as 
good as we can get and then push them out.
86
 
As donors promote the use of ‘best fit’ M&E approaches to ‘fragile 
states’, however, it is perhaps inevitable that the limitations of explaining 
how and what results can be achieved lead to a management of 
expectations regarding the very solutions generally proposed. The similarity 
in terminology is telling: ‘good enough’ or ‘fit-for-purpose data’, ‘best fit 
approaches’ or methods, and finally, ‘best fit institutions’ or ‘good enough 
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governance’. The style of thinking & doing based on official imperfection 
advances a view of objectivity and scientificity, while all along also creating 
its very adaptable standards. The convergence is both a common sense 
and a practical construction. In the next section I explore how ‘good enough 
data’ and ‘best fit approaches’ help delineate what remedies are proposed, 
tailoring expectations regarding what ‘fragile states’ can achieve in terms of 
peace and governance. 
 
4.  GOVERNANCE FIT FOR ‘FRAGILITY’ 
 
In the style of thinking and doing political management of ‘fragile states’, 
the flexibility of the method is connected to the flexibility of the solutions 
proposed and, thus, to the ‘degrees of fragility’ the statistical reasoning 
contributes to establish as common sense in the agenda. The imperfection 
of quantification and the imperfection of classification hold hands and by 
doing so the imperfection recreates itself; it limits the reality of what it 
measures by managing expectations of how this reality can be transformed. 
I suggest in this section that the ‘routines of encoding and 
taxonomy’87 produced in practices of quantification allow for the political 
existence of different categories of ‘states’, numerically and, thus, minutely 
differentiated. In this context, ‘good enough governance’ is a specific 
remedy for a particular case. I argue here that the move is circular: 
Quantification, classification, political realities and solutions are mutually 
influential and part of a self-authenticating style of thinking and doing 
political management of ‘fragile states’. The quantifying and classifying 
reasoning implies that ‘[t]o communicate information in the aggregate, we 
must first classify’,88 and to classify complex political issues, one needs also 
to compile and aggregate a certain volume of data. This is an excellent 
description of a ranking’s engines.  
In the case of ‘fragile states’, the increasing volume of quantified 
analyses regarding ‘fragile states’ allows for more ‘granular’89 
categorisations and specific labels and, thus, also has an impact on the 
kinds of solutions that become proposed and accepted. In turn, more 
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specific categories invite efforts to refine and tailor practices towards these 
groups; hence, more statistical analyses are produced. ‘One may try to hold 
a representation constant and change practice to match it, or vice-versa.’90 
In these dynamics, there is as an idea that donors’ practices and 
propositions need to be ‘realistic’, which so well resonates Hacking’s 
pragmatic stance on reality: ‘New ways to tell the truth about X change our 
conceptions about X’, and vice-versa.91 Hence, being ‘realistic’ is practical 
and self-evident. 
4.1. GOOD ENOUGH GOVERNANCE 
 
The idea of ‘good enough governance’ is throughout expressed in 
documents and informal settings, although diversely named. Central to it is 
the notion of ‘tailoring’, that is, making problems, analyses, projects and 
solutions compatible. The term ‘good enough governance’ itself was used 
in 2002 by Merilee Grindle in a study commissioned by the World Bank. 
The purpose was to discuss how development aid could take into account 
‘feasibility’ and prioritise interventions, rather than expecting full 
accomplishment of many perfect tasks at once. A long list of disordered 
‘unrealistic’ expectations, she said, would only hinder the goal of poverty 
reduction.92 The paper had been commissioned exactly to analyse how 
development aid and poverty reduction could be made mutually 
supportive.93 ‘Good enough governance’ would be ‘a condition of minimally 
acceptable government performance and civil society engagement that 
does not significantly hinder economic and political development and that 
permits poverty reduction initiatives to go forward.’94 She argues: 
 
….‘good enough governance’ may become a more realistic goal for many 
 countries faced with the goal of reducing poverty. Working toward good 
 enough governance means accepting a more nuanced understanding of 
 the evolution of institutions and government capabilities; being explicit 
 about trade-offs and priorities in a world in which all good things cannot be 
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 pursued at once; learning about what’s working rather than focusing solely 
 on governance gaps; taking the role of government in poverty alleviation 
 seriously; and grounding action in the contextual realities of each 
 country.95 
 
Interestingly, in a 2007 revision of this first paper, Grindle takes 
issue precisely with methodology:  
Methodological choices about how to study the issue of governance and 
 development have considerable impact on findings; ‘large N’ studies tend 
 to find consistent correlations between development and good 
 governance, while ‘small-N’ studies tend to demonstrate that development 
 is not fully dependent on ‘getting governance right.96 
 
She suggests that in the hast of transforming academic research 
into policy, reports ‘short-change methodological and empirical 
ambiguities’, and argues it is not a given at all, for example, that good 
governance contributes to growth and poverty reduction – ‘there remain 
doubts about issues of measurement, causality and sequence.’97 Yet, she 
does not propose a dismissal of M&E practices; in fact, she says analysts 
seem to agree, including herself, that ‘although the measurement of good 
governance is problematic and inexact, it is worth the effort to attempt such 
work in order to clarify thinking and to set a basis for cross-national and 
longitudinal comparisons.’98  
In addition, at the end of her 2007 article, she proposes that the 
different levels of ‘fragility’ be used as signposts to calibrate intervention 
and, thus, to determine the contents and limits of ‘good enough 
governance’:  
As the notion of fragile states suggests, states differ in terms of their 
 institutions, organisation and legitimacy. At a very general level, weak (or 
 collapsed) states are characterised by low (or very low) 
 structural/institutional stability, low (or very low) organisational capacity, 
 and strongly questioned (or non-existent) legitimacy. In contrast, stronger 
 states demonstrate higher levels of structural/institutional stability, 
 organisational capacity and   legitimacy. It is reasonable to assume that 
 such characteristics set the general constraints within which governance 
 interventions can be successfully introduced and carried out. Thus, 
 practitioners concerned about matching interventions to the characteristics 
 of particular countries might begin by assessing the strength and 
 coherence of the state in the particular country.99   
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In different phrasings, the idea took off, not just born out of Grindle’s 
texts, of course, but also borrowing from the 1990s and early-2000s 
debates on aid effectiveness and the relationship between security and 
development, as seen. ‘Matching’, ‘tailoring’, ‘fitting’ became common 
verbs, just as ‘realistic’ became a necessary virtue of evaluation and 
evaluators.  
Thus, in 2009, a World Bank document investigating the links 
between governance, conflict and ‘fragility’ also argued for ‘good enough 
governance’ to become a standard goal. It suggested the notion would 
bring a ‘nuanced understanding’ of ‘settings that are not ideal’: ‘Governance 
reform in fragile and conflict-affected environments must be built on realistic 
objectives and context-specific approaches.’100 The World Bank’s 2011 
WDR, in turn, expressly placed ‘best fit institutions’ at the core of the report, 
arguing for interventions to be adapted to ‘local conditions’.101 Among the 
guidelines to develop ‘the best fit strategy and programs’ for each ‘fragile 
state’, the WDR recommends ‘[b]eing more realistic about the number of 
priorities identified and the timelines.’102  
I suggest these changes in approach were and are a reflection of 
the change in the official framing of the tasks, of the already on-going 
commonsensical adaptations staff applied in their work and of the very 
limitations made political truths by changes in the standards related to data 
and methods. 
How was the context in the World Bank when the Global Center on Conflict, 
Security and development was founded? What were you trying to achieve? 
We had concluded the [2011] WDR exercise and there was a question of how we 
were going to implement it. The question was: How should our work change 
when working in these countries [fragile states]? We knew before that we 
needed to do something different but the WDR organised this. In terms of fragile 
states, there was an understanding even before that they were different.
 103
 
How was the context when you worked for the World Bank in Timor-Leste? What 
kind of services were you offering? 
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The hegemonic thinking of the time [2004] was not so much poverty any more, 
but governance, institutions as magical wands, instead of being endogenous. 
There was a belief that these institutions would change reality, so there was 
pressure to have sophisticated systems. I always use an analogy to explain: 
Imagine a guy who lives in a tropical country goes to a tailor and asks for a suit. 
The tailor then looks at the model the guy drew and says ‘that’s fine, I’ll do it, but 
you need long sleeves’. The guys answers ‘But it’s hot here!’ The tailor replies 
‘But suits have longs sleeves’. The guy agrees but the tailor keeps going: ‘You also 
need pockets’. The client says to that: ‘I don’t carry anything!’… By the end of the 
process, the guy will have a beautiful and expensive traditional suit that, 




Here a caveat is in order: Perhaps there was already a ‘feeling’, 
before the 2011 WDR that adaptation in the solutions proposed was 
necessary, but this was certainly mixed in application. Donors’ and ‘fragile 
states’ government’s understandings of ‘flexibility’ were always contentious, 
as the discussion on Timor-Leste in the previous chapter sought to 
highlight. I come back to this important point in chapter six. Nonetheless, 
the practice of ‘realistic’ flexibility became widespread. 
4.2. ‘TIMOR-APPROPRIATE’ GOVERNANCE 
In the case of OECD countries, or the INCAF specifically, these moves 
were very much reflected on the 2009 and 2011 exercises of the Monitoring 
International Engagement in Fragile States, of which, as seen, Timor-Leste 
was voluntarily a pilot country. The exercise is an interesting reflection of 
the ‘best fit’ debate and the role of data and M&E practices in the changes 
advocated in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. 
Crucially, the 2009 Monitoring report had a whole section devoted to 
the theme of ‘good enough governance’. As the exercise involved different 
meetings and interviews with international (including the World Bank) and 
national stakeholders, opinions cannot be individually attributed. However, 
in one specific section devoted to governance, it is clearly reported that 
‘one development partner’ argued for a change from ‘ideal’ to ‘good enough 
governance’ or yet, a ‘Timor-appropriate system of governance’.105 The 
report states: 
Participants stressed that ‘good enough’ governance is not about 
 compromising respect for the rule of law, human rights or accountability. 
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 Rather, it is about supporting systems, structures and approaches that are 
 appropriate for the local context, i.e. affordable, sustainable, and taking 
 into account local culture and capacity. ‘Good enough’ governance is also 
 about starting with the basic set of conditions needed for a functioning 
 state and progressively building them up over time.106 
 
Interestingly, here the requests of Timor-Leste, the g7+, World Bank 
and OECD seem to agree. The above quote, for instance, does not seem 
to have been denied or refuted by any Timorese representatives, nor have I 
heard of a disagreement of this kind in the interviews I conducted. 
Disagreements as to how adaptations of standards should be made are, of 
course, multiple, as will be discussed in chapter six. However, adaptable 
M&E practices, tailored solutions and ‘realistic expectations’ are expressed 
parts of the g7+’s agenda since its inception and essential elements in the 
group’s advocacy for a country-owned and country-led development 
process. It is in this intersection, thus, that I look at how the g7+’s initiatives 
have so far connected to the changes discussed up until this point. It is not 
yet time to analyse the g7+’s position in terms of relations of power, but it is 
important to take a first step in understanding what parts of the changes 
explored so far in the chapter are also part of the g7+’s propositions and 
how so. 
 




The F in FOCUS, stands for fragility assessment, now a sound 
 methodology developed by us, for us in the g7+, with support from our 
 partners to identify where we are as a country on the spectrum of 
 fragility.107 
 
The g7+ has so far made stated efforts to tailor practices, measures and 
solutions to the specificities of ‘fragile states’ as a group and, it is officially 
planned, of individual member countries. In advocating this tailoring, it has 
kept so far a relatively coherent focus on the adoption, in each step, of 
numbers and plans that can be developed and monitored by country 
members’ own offices, using indicators that would be ‘adaptable to norms 




 Timor-Leste’s Finance Minister Emília Pires’s speech in the workshop that launched 
Timor-Leste’s Fragility Assessment exercise. As seen, ‘FOCUS’ refers to one of the pillars of 









and traditions of the country and able to be localised to the country 
context.’108 The three pillars of the agenda proposed by the group, FOCUS, 
TRUST and the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), part of the 
New Deal discussed in the previous chapter, take issue with how data is 
collected in analyses regarding ‘fragile states’ and argue against ill-adapted 
development solutions that tend to reflect donors’ models and side-line 
national specificities.109    
 In the 2010 Dili Declaration, the g7+ identified a list of ‘challenges to 
achieve peacebuilding and statebuilding goals’ in ‘fragile states’; among 
them were ‘[u]nrealistic timeframes for reform, weak capacity to implement 
plans and limited effectiveness of capacity development approaches’; 
‘[l]ack of data and reliable statistics to inform planning for peacebuilding 
and statebuilding’; and ‘[i]nsufficient flexibility, speed and predictability of 
transition financing and limited effectiveness of existing instruments.’110 In 
terms of statistics, therefore, the main problem is said to lie not with the 
internal accuracy of the analyses per se, but with the fact that most M&E 
practices do not adapt enough to the varied contexts of ‘fragile states’, both 
as a group and as individual countries inside that group, and that they do 
not encourage the future use of national capacity. Hence, for example, the 
issue would not be that indicators are incorrectly measured, but that 
inappropriate indicators are used, instead of flexible models with 
contextually adapted indicators measured by national offices. 
Our fragility assessments are important as a first step. Sometimes assessments 
are done about us and we don’t know anything about it! I say, do pay attention 
to details, do try to understand problems that countries face, don’t just jump to 
the conclusions. We need to think outside the box, and more, try to step into 
someone else’s shoes. We had some advisers once telling us that at that time 
electricity was not sustainable, not a good priority. I said: ‘Take his passport, put 
him in a village in the middle of nowhere and let him feel on his skin how it is!’
111
 
At the beginning of their work, the g7+’s working group on 
indicators, composed of 15 to 20 members of the IDPS and chaired by the 
UN and DRC, argued for the implementation of a ‘bottom-up’ approach to 
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select and develop indicators for the Fragility Assessments.112 The 
expressed aims involved having ‘simple, relevant indicators that can be 
adapted to the country context, reflecting both short and longer-term 
progress’, which would ‘avoid duplication with more general development 
indicators (e.g. MDGs)’, and would also ‘reinforce national statistical 
capacity, and emphasise reliable and transparent data collection 
mechanisms.’113 The report on the undertaking of the exercise states:  
 
Each pilot country [including Timor-Leste] adopted a distinct approach to 
 developing their fragility assessments, field-testing their spectrums, and 
 identifying appropriate indicators, while maintaining the fundamental 
 principles of a country-owned, country-led process that was participatory in 
 nature. This exercise was led internally by the g7+ focal point within their 
 institutional affiliation within government.114 
 
I analyse the extent to which these aims were fulfilled when 
discussing power in chapter six. Here it is important to highlight the 
common lines of practice between the g7+’s agenda and the donors’ 
approaches so far illustrated. Crucially, the g7+’s propositions around 
contextualised indicators has, among other goals, the objective to ‘inform 
results measurement and M&E of national and/or partner-supported 
programmes.’115 The data for the Timorese fragility assessment was 
collected in interviews, group discussion and ‘desk studies’, all guided by a 
set of main questions: 
 
1. Where we are now, if compared with past situation? 
2. What are the challenges that we all need to pay attention? 
3. What needs to be done to improve? 
4. Where are we in Fragility Stages and how we define our situation in 
stages? 
5. How do we know whether we made any progress or not in the future? 
[sic]116 
 
The first to third questions fed the analysis of the country’s PSGs 
summary and the fourth and fifth questions were used to determine the 
country’s position in the Fragility Spectrum for each PSG. Qualitative 
information collected was quantified to be rated from 1 to 5 and scores 
were made equivalent to each stage of the Spectrum: crisis, rebuild-reform, 
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transitions, transformation and resilience, respectively.117 As previously 
seen, the Timorese assessment – or, for now, any of the others − does not 
rate the country with one averaged total score, but it does average the 
measurements for each PSG. For the data collection, each PSG was 
subdivided into dimensions and sub-dimensions and each PSG was 
allocated a few indicators, no more than five.118 In the PSG2, Security, for 
instance, indicators included the ‘number of police [sic] (by gender and 
district) with Tertiary Education from a total of Police [sic]’ and the ‘number 
of refugees (include IDPs) resulted from conflict’.119 A simple average 
between these and other three indicators provide the score 3 (Transition) 
for the Timorese PSG2, on Security.120  
As rankings on development do not usually include security 
indicators and this is precisely one of the g7+’s main advocacy lines, the 
PSG itself is unusual as a measure of ‘state fragility’ focused on improving 
development. It can also be said that the first indicator, on the Tertiary 
Education of police officers, is perhaps a quite particular one, probably 
derived from the problems the country faced in the 2006 crisis.121 Tellingly, 
regarding these two specific indicators, the report recommends providing 
‘scholarship to those who wish to continue their study or provid[ing] relevant 
training to increase their skill and knowledge’, in the case of the educational 
level of police officers. The report makes no recommendation to deal with 
the second indicator, on refugees, nor is this indicator quantified and 
weighted in the final PSG score.122  
The examples illustrate well the stated mission of the g7+: ‘The core 
mission of the g7+ is to promote peacebuilding and statebuilding as the 
foundations for transition out of the margins of conflict to the next stage of 
sustainable development.’123 The key: not ‘development’, but ‘the next 
stage’. ‘The long-term horizon can hardly be seen through the fog until the 
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basic architectures are in place, institutions have been strengthened and 
peace consolidated and forward planning can take place.’124 
The donors were following what? There was no leadership from the fragile states 
themselves, and you need that. Because they [donors] want to align their 
objectives with something and they couldn’t. Align to what? There was no 
framework. It was all done by donors, so it was their understanding. They didn’t 
understand our problems, they didn’t understand our challenges, so we had to 
start something. They want to help, but if I, in a fragile state, don’t tell them, they 
will do something else, because nobody else told them how to do it.
125
 
It is about doing the assessment ourselves, measuring ourselves, and focusing on 
our priorities, our structures, our national systems. Sometimes donors want to do 
something now but it will not be sustainable after they live, it’s too much. We 
prefer what is sustainable. We are always being measured, ranked…We need to 
do it [the measurement] ourselves.
126
 
In ‘doing it themselves’, the g7+ has so far followed some of the 
commonsensical practices in vogue in the ‘fragile states’ agenda: The 
group develop and is applying its own kind of M&E system in the form of 
Fragility Assessments; it has taken a practical approach towards data and 
method – ‘we will do what we can do’; and it contextualises, categorises 
and manages expectations through a ‘next step’ approach towards 
development – the target being the next stage in the spectrum rather than 
the last one, in striking resemblance to the notion of ‘good enough 
governance’, at least in reasoning.  
In that sense, the g7+’s quantification and classification also reflects 
a style of thinking & doing based on scientific uncertainty, or ‘adaptable’ 
scientificity. The core concern is not so much with the accuracy of 
measurements, with the labels applied along with the numbers, nor with the 
fact that quantification is taking place in such complex environments. 
Rather, these practices and the metaphysics of correlation embedded in 
them are very much present in g7+’s practices as well – having police 
officers with tertiary level of education is correlated with increasing security, 
which, in turn, correlates with a more developed country. Moreover, 
together, several of these correlations are able to tell where countries 
stand, individually, in a spectrum of five development positions. It is 
essential to stress these similarities and the practicality in them in order to 
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move on, in the next chapters, to understand their impacts in the relations 
of power in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. 
 
6.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
This chapter reflected on the status of ‘practical use’ and ‘scientific 
authority’ achieved by statistical reasoning through its ever-perfectible 
character. Re-inventing numbers in that context is a reasonable activity, not 
a rational one. The many successes of statistical reasoning in the 
nineteenth century contributed to make of statistics a powerful and practical 
tool by turning uncertainty and error into reasonable science. It follows that 
the reasoning that makes the quantification and classification of ‘fragile 
states’ so tantalising a project is old enough to breed in criticism. This 
chapter was based on the understanding that one cannot look at the 
possibilities of change without understanding what is it that makes this 
reasoning so powerful. Being accepted as incomplete and imperfect is the 
achievement of a style of thinking & doing that now is seen to ‘work’.  
 As the chapter suggests, the style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states’ not only constructs ‘state fragility’, it 
constructs the accepted method to ‘understand’ and act upon ‘fragile 
states’; hence, the re-working of this method does not indicate a vanishing 
object, but a ‘moving target’.127 A moving target is one that is harder to hit 
but that, nonetheless, is a target. As the quantifying and classifying 
reasoning is constantly refined in search of better numbers and inferences, 
it leaves the political reality of ‘fragile states’ untouched. The idea that there 
are more efficient practices that can refine the method only stimulates the 
sense that the method and the object are right there for use and 
understanding. 
 The possibility raised by the transplantation of the metaphysics of 
correlation to the social sciences was that of turning disputable and artificial 
‘social numbers’, so hard to be certain about, into political truths capable to 
anchor policy-making. This chapter traced the connections between this 
metaphysics of correlation, the ideas of ‘good enough data’, ‘best fit’ 
methods, ‘good enough governance’ and, crucially, the incipient practices 
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with which the g7+ has been advocating the flexibility of methods and 
procedures, contextual development assistance and realistic expectations. I 
suggested these elements are all intrinsically and powerfully but subtly 
connected. They all borrow authority from the old and well established 
success of statistics in making science out of the unknown and they feed 
from the possibilities this generates of authenticating ever-perfectibility. 
Because social statistics are not aiming at truth, truthfulness can be just 
enough.  
The ‘fragile states’ agenda relies on these achievements of statistics 
as much as it constitutes a perfect realm in which their ever-perfectible 
character can grow. As ‘fragile states’ present so many practical difficulties 
in data collection and analysis, methods are also acceptably flexible and 
tailored to the ‘good enough data’ possibly available. Methods become ‘fit-
for-purpose’ by the need to speed-up decision-making and offering 
accessibility to ministries with perceived low capacity; however, the 
flexibility of these methods also allow for ‘good enough data’ and, thus, 
imperfection to be reproduced, along with the image of imperfection of the 
‘fragile state’ itself. As ‘fit-for-purpose methods’ and ‘good enough data’ 
make evident the limitations of quantifying and classifying practices, such 
as M&E methods, it is also clear that the very correlation between variables 
is of limited understanding. Hence, it is practical and commonsensical to 
control and manage the expectations of what can be achieved through 
these methods. I suggested, thus, that these practices respond to practical 
sense, based on the pressures to produce accessible and well-timed 
analyses, staff’s practical experience facing the limitations of all sorts in a 
‘fragile state’, and the demands placed upon staff in the headquarters to 
also reflect the advocated need for flexibility in operational procedures.  
The limitations the methods encounter indicate that interventions 
also need to be reduced in terms of expectations, contextualised, tailored 
and re-standardised. Borrowing Steven Epstein’s brilliant terminology, I call 
this overall dynamic ‘niche standardisation’.128 Niche standardisation 
creates intermediate categories that are made compatible precisely though 
their intermediate character: to ‘fragile states’, ‘good enough governance’; 
to ‘good enough governance’, the ‘best fit methods; to the ‘best fit 
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methods’, ‘good enough data’. The reasoning in degrees reverberates 
everywhere in the line. While what I called political sceptical approaches 
focus on the ‘Western standard’ being forwarded with the labelling of 
‘fragile states’, they miss the powerful practices and implications of 
adaptable standards in this niche standardisation. Measuring and 
managing down to the details of quantified degrees are at the centre of the 
agenda and, as seen, have particularly powerful impacts. 
I conclude with two other important points. One is in the awareness 
regarding this niche standardisation. In the practices analysed, actors were 
aware of the limitations of data and methods. As Desrosières says,  
[i]n their everyday practice, statisticians are plunged into a world of 
 conventions, which they record or shape themselves. The fact that the 
 measurement results from this sequencing of conventional decisions is 
 therefore self-evident to them.129  
 
As statistics become nested130 in policy-making, covered by layers 
of technologies, practical considerations of time and distance, and 
concerns with objective ‘visualisation’ and accessibility in a digital world, 
statisticians do not ignore the limits and problems of numbers; they 
incorporate these realisations in the form of quantified errors and numbers 
that are knowingly temporary. Therefore, critiques that aim at the 
inaccuracy of data, beyond the obvious importance of pointing at perhaps 
accidentally mistaken numbers, very much miss the target. Errors are part 
of the game. 
The second point is in that taking this self-awareness into account 
does not mean to reduce the role of power in these practices. On the 
contrary; as will be discussed, the powerful impacts of the re-
standardisation achieved through quantification and classification are made 
evident everywhere. After all, ‘fit-for-purpose’ is never fit for one purpose – 
not collected, nor used for one purpose only. Just as the ‘average man’ 
travelled, so do many indicators on ‘state fragility’. Common senses 
become common out of practicality. 
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E X P E R T I S E  A N D  O B J E C T I V I T Y :   







Many scholars are familiar with Orwell’s story reproduced in Scott’s book 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance: A British colonial officer is egged by 
natives to shoot a rogue elephant, but he does not want to; he feels guilty 
and would rather not kill the animal. However, not willing to be seen as 
either indecisive or coward, he is trapped into the expectations generated 
by his own dominant image. Scott concludes: ‘If subordination requires a 
credible performance of humility and deference, so domination seems to 
require a credible performance of haughtiness and mastery’.1 One’s image, 
be it powerful or powerless, is both fortunately and unfortunately attached 
to its own set of related expectations. Comparing his fieldwork observations 
of Kabile rituals in the Algeria of the 50s and 60s with the bureaucratic 
institutionalisation of ‘modern’ practices of power, Bourdieu adds a crucial 
element to this ‘credible performance’, the gentler power of bureaucratic 
practices. In this sense, in the ‘fragile states’ agenda, the powerful practices 
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of quantification and classification can make the trap of expectations 
regarding the ‘most powerful’ more subtle but not less important. Practices 
considered technical are not free from expectations; in fact, they are 
surrounded by threats of obsolescence.  
 ‘A man possesses in order to give. But he also possesses by 
giving’.2 Technical skills are valued when they are useful, but ‘utility’ is self-
authenticating in a style of thinking & doing that relies on ever-perfectible 
methods and objects. In the ‘fragile states’ agenda, the value of 
bureaucrats and their work is not in accumulating numbers but in producing 
and providing useful ones. In this context, it is true that the unmet technical 
demand to produce up-to-date data further exacerbates the perception that 
‘fragile states’ are ‘fragile’, but also important and central to this chapter is 
the fact that this technical demand creates crucial pressures on donors’ 
offices as well. Significantly, bureaucrats can become dependent on their 
ability to provide data that is consumed.  
Based on these ideas, this chapter develops three streams of 
analysis: First, I look at the perceived ‘incapacity’ in ‘fragile states’ offices, 
specifically in Timor-Leste. Next, I transit from this image of ‘incapacity’ to 
how expertise is brought to fill the blanks in the g7+’s offices. Finally, I look 
at what this exportation of expertise means for exporters themselves. I 
argue these dynamics are all intrinsically connected, and together they 
point to the particular conception and impacts of this quantifying and 
classifying reasoning. The goal is indeed not in making broad statements 
about statistical reasoning; instead, I suggest that the quantifying expertise 
analysed here is played in a very specific way in the ‘fragile states’ agenda.  
Along these streams of analysis, I offer three broad arguments. I 
suggest that quantification and classification form a particularly fluid form of 
expertise, less dependent on institutions as ‘nexus of exchange’ to be 
circulated.3 Moreover, as an expertise that therefore carries its own 
‘universal’ authority, I argue that in the highly political ‘fragile states’ 
agenda, numbers tend to be practically used as gatekeepers, somehow 
guaranteeing that actors can also circulate. This argument is inspired by 
Porter’s view on the mix of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (in terms of scientific 
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community) in certain disciplines.4 He suggests that where science and 
politics can easily be mixed, ‘mechanical objectivity’ tends to become 
prominent, answering to pressures for ‘impersonality’. This brings me to my 
third and intrinsically connected point. Borrowing from Dezalay’s and 
Garth’s understanding of an import-export market of expertise,5 I suggest 
two peculiar phenomena take place in the ‘fragile states’: Exporters, led by 
the practical pressure to increase utility for their own expertise, work from 
within donor agencies attending to the requests of ‘fragile states’ for data 
and statistical analyses or are often exported themselves to work as 
‘outsourced staff’. Their work needs to be both clearly effective in terms of 
the expertise imported, and absolutely impartial in their technical character.  
These suggestions indicate that by constructing ‘fragile states’, 
professionals in donor agencies create the very bar, that is, the very 
standards of what an expert on ‘fragile states’ is, and these standards then 
can also be measured, managed and compared. In fact, these experts 
have come to occupy the central tiers of the game, playing as ‘double 
agents’:6 They export crucial and highly technical expertise to the offices of 
‘fragile states’, but also significantly rely on this expertise being useful, thus 
necessarily engaging in assisting the importation and somewhat attending 
to the needs in these offices.  
 Hence, quantification and classification are practices of power, but 
they also introduce important caveats and nuances to these practices: The 
more professionals find, they more they are compelled to find, in a routine 
of ever-perfectibility of data, methods and results. The technologies and 
methods that accompany current ‘haughtiness and mastery’ encase their 
very own political traps.  
 
1.  ‘THESE PEOPLE ARE REALLY POOR’:   
 TIMOR-LESTE AND THE CHALLENGE OF CAPACITY 
 
In this section, I discuss the unbalanced presence of skills and expertise in 
the agenda by highlighting the challenges the Timorese government faced 
in the years that led to the g7+ foundation. The perceived ‘lack of capacity’ 
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in the country is essential to discuss, subsequently, how expertise is 
negotiated to fill in and to actually create niches of ‘(in)capacity’. 
 
1.1. DATA AND EXPERTISE:  
FILLING IN THE BLANKS IN A COUNTRY LEFT TO SCORCH 
 
One of the earliest available reports on the physical and human conditions 
in Timor-Leste soon after independence, in 1999, was produced by a joint 
assessment mission led by the World Bank. It detailed the destruction of 
infra-structure and the lack of skilled staff as major concerns. I here 
reproduce two of the most shocking descriptions: 
 Buildings and equipment in the small modern sector have been decimated. 
 The physical infrastructure and equipment in every bank has been 
 destroyed or looted, and there is currently no payments system in 
 operation enabling public or private entities to pay salaries or goods and 
 services…Even more importantly, there is a drastic shortage of skilled 
 personnel for the secondary and tertiary sectors: most technical  positions 
 were occupied by Indonesians who have left the country.7 
 
The civil service is not currently functioning at any level in East Timor. Over 
70% of administrative buildings have been partially or completely 
destroyed, and almost all office equipment and consumable materials have 
been destroyed. Government archives have been destroyed or removed. 
Accurate figures are not available on the number of civil servants 
remaining in the territory, but at least 20-25% − those estimated to be of 
Indonesian origin – are likely to have left. Indonesian civil servants were 
concentrated in the higher grades and skilled technical positions, so this 
creates a serious skill deficit for the civil service.8 
 
The overall impression seems to have been of a country beyond 
usual ‘state fragility’. Paul Collier cites in his book The Bottom Billion a 
conversation he had with a peacekeeper from Gambia − itself, in his words, 
‘one of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa’: ‘When I asked him 
about the situation in East Timor, he told me that it was terrible. “These 
people are really poor,” he said.’ Collier concluded: ‘If he thought so, they 
were.’9 Staff used to poverty and conflict say they were shocked by the lack 
of material and human capital, even as far as in 2004, two years after the 
transition period led by UNTAET: 
 
                                                          
7
 World Bank 1999, p. 3. 
8
 Ibid., p. 4. 
9









There wasn’t anybody who could do a macroeconomic framework. Nobody. No 
one could take the basic macroeconomic variables and project economic growth, 
taking into consideration budgets etc There was no single macroeconomist. There 
was one lawyer, Brazilian or Portuguese, writing all laws for the country. There 
was no single qualified judge.
10
  
This was thoroughly acknowledged by Timorese officers 
themselves. Even with certain budget available, it is said to have been for 
many years greatly difficult to actually implement the budget, due to a lack 
of skilled officers in planning and execution projects and owing to the fact 
that statistics necessary to know the sectors in which implementation would 
take place simply did not exist. In 2007, just after taking office in the 
Ministry of Finance, Minister Emília Pires wrote, together with World Bank 
advisor Michael Francino: 
Planning is meant to augment the budget process, but owing to the degree 
of complexity and the weak capacity skills of staff involved, best use has 
yet to be made of systems in place…To cite one example, in an effort to 
eradicate illiteracy, the decision was made to prioritize education in the 
budget. That translated into allocating more money to the sector, but no 
discussions took place on how that money should be spent. There was no 
analysis of how many people were actually illiterate, or what their age 
ranges were, or how many children were attending school, or whether 
those outside school were not attending.11 
 
The difficulty in producing necessary data and the lack of skills in 
making use of whatever data existed were intermingled in the perceived 
overall lack of technical capacity in the country. The Timorese were not 
used to occupying high positions, as these had always been the privilege of 
Indonesians. 
Very suddenly [after independence], junior staff became senior, but they had 
spent their whole life under Indonesian rule hearing ‘you cannot spend money, 
you cannot take responsibility’. They were not used to disbursing money and 
they didn’t know how to.
12
 
After all, spending money in the budget is also skilled work, even 
more so when government officials are accountable to donors. In these 
circumstances, disbursement needs to be followed by proper forms, 
reports, tables, graphs and technical language. 
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I had been living and working in Indonesia, after studying there. When the 
transition was to end, I applied for a job in the government in Timor. First I 
worked in the Budget Office, and we prepared the annual budget and mid-budget 
update. I became a focal point for the Ministry of Agriculture. But there were 
many difficulties: I didn’t know what I had to do. Our manager was from 
Australia. We all went together to the Ministry of Agriculture with an advisor to 
take a look and I was then beginning to learn. In the Budget Office, there were 
three advisors from Australia, four from Portugal and eleven nationals. What we 
need… We have to know the budget law, the calendar [of government activities], 
how to deal with people, we have to know the system and software. For 
example, we started using the Free Balance software for budget, so we received 
training from the software company.
13
 
Pires and Francino point at the general fear new Timorese officers 
felt of disbursing money as a key obstacle for the government; they say the 
refrain in the Ministry of Finance was ‘Careful, careful… Let’s not make 
mistakes. Otherwise, the donors won’t give us any more aid.’14 However, 
this was also the Ministry facing the highest expectations among those 
assisted by donor agencies, including the World Bank.15 The Timorese 
fiscal management system was said to be ‘world class’, ‘designed largely 
by Bretton Woods institutions’ with ‘extensive monitoring and control 
mechanisms’ and thus requiring ‘a pool of highly skilled personnel to 
operate it.’16 Indeed, the Ministry of Finance as a whole seems the perfect 
illustration of the lack of capacity both donors’ and Timorese officers 
identified at the time. It is important to understand how these lacunae were 
faced, as this indicates both the power of the quantifying and classifying 
reasoning explored so far and how its related expertise and skills are 
moved between actors, hence, what kind of relations this reasoning 
incentivises. I select two examples I believe detail well these dynamics. 
1.2. HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS: THE ULTIMATE CHALLENGE 
 
The first example is in the difficulties the Timorese Ministry of Finance 
faced to produce macroeconomic analyses in the first years after the UN 
left the country, from 2005 onwards. The first household survey, central in 
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producing basic national data, was only finally concluded in 2011.17 This 
kind of survey is essential for the planning of development policies and, 
thus, considered a key dataset both for government and donor agencies. It 
is said, for instance, that information on the wealth of a country and 
administrative data on unemployment benefits can come from national 
accounts, but only household surveys can offer detailed information on 
poverty and unemployment. By definition, because it collects information 
directly from households, this type of survey is better equipped to discount 
the ‘state effectiveness’ variable that could intervene in the very possibility 
of unemployed people registering for benefits, for example.18  
 Governments design policies for specific purposes…[b]ut policy goals are 
 reached not simply because the government wills them to be so, but 
 through the interaction of the programs and household or individual 
 behavior.19 
 
It is not surprising, thus, that the UN Statistics Division has declared 
household surveys ‘one of the most important mechanisms for collecting 
information on populations in developing and transition countries,’20 and 
both the UN and PARIS21 have declared household surveys key forms of 
monitoring the progress towards the MDGs.21 
Therefore, Timor-Leste’s first household survey, almost fully 
produced by national offices, was highly valued by the Minister of Finance 
herself. The foreword of the publication, by Minister Emília Pires, praises 
the exercise as completely designed and conducted by the National 
Statistics Directorate, with ‘incidental’ help from the European Union.22 
Nevertheless, it seems the survey was not seen as good enough by the 
Timorese government at the time. An interviewee mentioned the not-so-
welcome reaction of the government,23 and it does seem the case that 
some in the government thought there was considerable room for 
improvement. The fact is that in the same year, the World Bank was 
contacted to provide training on a new software, ADePT, developed by the 
                                                          
17
 See glossary in Annex 8.  
18
 For more examples and a discussion, see Muñoz and Scott [ ]. 
19
 Ibid., p. 7. 
20
 United Nations 2005, p. 4. My emphasis. 
21
 Muñoz and Scott [ ]; United Nations 2005 
22
 Timor-Leste Government 2011b, Foreword. 
23









Bank itself and capable of generating statistical analyses with ‘no need’ of 
much skilled human work.24 
The free software is especially valuable for analysts in developing 
countries, where expensive statistical software tools and training are often 
hard to come by. With built-in modern statistical technology and a user-
friendly interface, ADePT empowers policy practitioners − including those 
with limited programming skills − to conduct sophisticated economic 
analysis…The World Bank, which already offers its data free to the world, 
is focusing on sharing its expert knowledge as well.25 
 
‘Sharing’ being to export, this is a rich example of how the 
quantifying expertise circulates. Moreover, it already indicates the 
peculiarity of this circulation in the ‘fragile states’ agenda: Based on the 
‘universal’ language of statistics, this expertise is more automatically 
imported by the offices of ‘fragile states’, with reduced costs of ‘translation’, 
that is, the need to ‘reinterpret learned practices’ to the local audience.26 
However, its exportation by producers requires a constant struggle among 
these to increase expertise and being able to produce what can be useful, 
that is, what can be adapted to different contexts. 
By automating the process of data analysis, analytical outputs can 
be easily and cheaply produced, requiring less time, fewer resources and 
skills; thus, the software is supposed to be a perfect product for ‘fragile 
states’.27 ADePT is the main tool suggested by the International Household 
Survey Network (IHSN) for implementing surveys and analysing results. 
The IHSN is an international network whose stated mission is to ‘improve 
the availability, accessibility, and quality of survey data within developing 
countries, and to encourage the analysis and use of this data.’28 Among its 
partners and sponsors are the World Bank and OECD via PARIS21.29 In 
2005, the UN had produced a report that stated the importance of making 
household survey a matter of constant monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
instead of ad hoc initiatives.30 In that sense, the IHSN could mean that M&E 
applied to ‘fragile states’ are indeed constantly conducted and, most 
importantly, made available internationally for any stakeholder. Moreover, 
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what is involved in this initiative is constant ‘collaboration’ and ‘technical 
assistance’.31  
It is perhaps pointless to search for the specific reasons that led 
government officials to decide the first Timorese household survey was not 
good enough and that the use of ADePT was necessary to improve data 
production and analysis; the point I want to highlight instead is that the 
technical skills perceived as necessary for the implementation of the 
surveys were lacking in Timor-Leste and were acquired through – or rather 
substituted by – training in the use of a specific software, a software that 
does the analysis for the analyst. Of greater significance still is the fact that 
this software is somehow part of a larger network that seeks to make 
household surveys − key in the formulation and implementation of 
development policies − ongoing exercises of M&E, available internationally 
for free use by any actors. These dynamics are crucial to discuss power in 
the next chapter, but here they first tell of the nuances in the game. Below, I 
add the second illustration to this argument. 
 
1.3. FOLLOWING DONORS’ PROJECTS, CHECKING FOR PRIORITIES 
 
There is another example I find eloquent in showing how the lack of skills 
and expertise can be ‘accommodated’ in ‘fragile states’. I depart from a 
perhaps ironic point: In Timor-Leste, until 2010, the government had no 
central database regarding the investments and projects of donors in the 
country. It is said that the overall feeling among government officials was 
that the donors were not following the National Priorities, established in 
2007 and pre-dating the Strategic Development Plan, finalised only in 
2010.32 However, the government had no means to confirm this impression. 
The system used to monitor the donor activities in the country was based 
on the use of Microsoft Access, but it is said no national counterparts were 
properly trained in the use of the system before the 2006 crisis. When the 
overseas advisors left amid the chaos of the crisis, ‘the system was left in 
disrepair’.33 An Australian advisor who worked inside the Ministry of 
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Finance, contracted by the World Bank, says of the time when he arrived, 
in 2007: 
I can’t even know how to use Microsoft Access, so I had no idea of what to do 
with it. Then the Japan Development Cooperation Agency funded a guy to work 
on an Excel sheet to catch the long-term projects going on. But it was an Excel 
spreadsheet! Every quarter, every six month, the email would go and ask every 
donor to submit data on their projects and he would then compare in this sheet 
with hundreds of pages. It was not accurate, and relatively unhelpful. We had an 
idea of what development partners were doing, but we had the data in a way 
that was too difficult to extract meaningful information. We were relying on 
development partners attending meetings of the National Priorities working 
group to discuss the projects, to get a better sense of what the donors were 
doing. Now we have the Transparency Portal. It took a few years to get it done. 
We looked at a huge number of options, Cambodia, Vietnam… In the end we 
went with the Development Gateway [software], which is more expensive, but 
more flexible and tailored. It can deliver modules that target fragile states, the 
Paris Declaration, the New Deal and other processes. It is much simpler to use, 
far more so than the Excel spreadsheet. Before, the ministries didn’t even look at 
the numbers, because it’s not something they vote on anyway. Now, the 
ministries don’t need to go through all this process, they can just click on a 
button and the report is generated.
34
 
The story is an example of the unbalanced skills and expertise in 
the ‘fragile states’ agenda. In many circumstances such as the described 
above, the data needed might require one person, one software, one 
annual report, but these might be just the things that the government 
ministries’ cannot afford to offer due to some lack of technical capacity. 
Even advisors struggle to cope with new techniques of data production and 
analysis. At the same time, this information is crucial. Therefore, the role of 
‘importers’, contrary to the approach political sceptics often take, needs to 
be explored in terms of what the lack of this quantifying expertise might 
represent: In this case, not importing the expertise would mean not being 
able to follow the very projects developed by donors in the country – one 
important layer of nuances to be considered. 
Therefore, not only might the lack of data hinder government 
policies, but it might as well make it impossible for the government to know 
if donors are following national priorities. In this case, again, the end point 
of the technical capacity-building was an international platform, the 
Development Gateway. The solution found by the government was in 











following international standards of aid management that had been ‘tested’ 
in several ‘fragile states’.  
The Development Gateway, a non-profit organisation, works in 20 
countries, mostly those considered ‘fragile states’ by donors.35 Among the 
Development Gateway’s financial partners is the World Bank, and among 
its technical partners is the OECD.36  
We host global information platforms that provide access to critical 
development knowledge, data and resources. We implement aid 
information management systems that allow governments to make more 
informed decisions…we provide training, workshops, and process analysis 
to strengthen our partners’ capacity to manage their own information.37 
 
Again, the lack of skills and expertise in Timor-Leste led the 
government to seek international platforms that provide software to 
automatise data analysis and make data available in a global scale. The 
implementation involves the assessment of capacities and skills in the 
government, training and capacity-building, and the development of 
templates for periodic reports and routine practices of data collection and 
analysis. The institutionalisation itself requires also extending the software 
to line ministries, offering technical support and training. 38 Most importantly, 
these steps and the program as a whole are said to be especially 
interesting for ‘fragile states’ because they already incorporate the 
measuring of progress regarding the goals proposed by key documents in 
the agenda. These would include the principles on ‘ownership’, ‘mutual 
accountability’, ‘alignment’ and ‘harmonisation’ of aid, and the effective 
introduction of ‘management for results’, with ‘result-oriented reporting and 
target monitoring tools’.39 In the whole process, thus, a ‘fragile state’’ 
capacity is measured, the measures are made available in international 
platforms, and these measures are used to tailor solutions for each case of 
‘fragility’. The central point is that neither ‘fragile states’ offices can do 
without this expertise, nor can experts succeed without making themselves 
useful in such offices. 
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1.4. LAYERS OF NUANCES 
 
The technical moves in these examples are crucial to understanding the 
practical pressures over ‘fragile states’’ officers to import expertise and, 
thus, the quantifying and classifying reasoning itself.  
 When ‘fragile states’’ officers require and accept to import expertise, 
including those that actually involve automatising crucial analyses in which 
decision-making is based, practical pressures need to be taken into 
account. There was in the respective cases discussed here, for example, a 
need to acquire this expertise precisely to be able to measure the needs of 
the population and to follow projects being implemented by donors. 
However, importing this expertise implies reinforcing the quantifying and 
classifying reasoning imbued in it, making it possible for databases to be 
created that will be used internationally and for international platforms to be 
generated allowing for on-going monitoring and comparison. 
 Nevertheless, the role of ‘users’ in the case of this specific expertise 
places staff in ‘fragile states’ in a position to request but also somehow 
challenge donors’ staff to provide the sort of useful expertise they 
themselves so eloquently advocate as essential for development to take 
place. Moreover, these experts are expected to do so quietly and almost 
invisibly. 
 
2.  REMOTE AND OUTSOURCED DONOR ASSISTANCE:  
‘WE ARE BEHIND THE SCENES’  
 
As ever-perfectibility and, therefore, adaptation and flexibility become part 
of the practical sense in the style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states’, methods and objects, that is, the very 
expectations and results linked to ‘state fragility’, need to be constantly re-
worked and re-shaped. 
Adapting methods and expectations implies changing routines of 
practices, techniques, technologies, structures and even institutions. The 
g7+’s Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), TRUST and FOCUS 
would be the group’s form of attempting to establish the parameters of how 
this flexibility or re-standardisation of methods and expectations are to take 









human – working groups need money and logistical support to get together 
to develop indicators; the g7+’s office in Dili needs more staff, up-to-date 
reports, know-how in organising international conferences and holding 
diplomatic multilateral and bilateral meetings as part of the UN General 
Assembly; focal points need technical assistance and political leverage to 
implement the Fragility Assessments in their ministries; and so on.  
Nonetheless, as part of the group’s demands for more ownership, 
this external assistance is carefully implemented; advisors and contact 
points become what I call remote or outsourced staff, offering assistance to 
the g7+, paid by donor agencies but acting ‘behind the scenes.’40  
2.1. WESTERN EDUCATION AND BACKGROUND: THE NEED FOR STAFF 
 
From 2011 to 2014, in the period in which the g7+ can be said to have 
quickly conquered some international ground, there were several 
challenges and obstacles to the group’s agenda, both in terms of content 
and regarding the means available for circulating this agenda. Crucially, it 
has been considerably difficult for g7+’s members to conduct the exercises 
necessary to develop the Fragility Assessment indicators, as the skilled 
logistics of the exercise make technical assistance a common requirement. 
It is not perhaps surprising then, that even amid the claims for more 
ownership the g7+ is closely tied to donor representatives in most of the 
steps its members take. 
 The g7+ secretariat was established in Dili, in 2010/11, amid the 
severe capacity constraints discussed in the previous section. It achieved 
eight members of staff in 2013, two of them seconded by the World Bank 
and the UK Overseas Development Institute (ODI); another is a national 
from Australia.41 
Because Timor had kick-started the group, our role in the NDAE [National 
Directorate for Aid Effectiveness] expanded quickly, with donor and government 
coordination of specific development goals. It became the local secretariat for 
Timor’s engagement with the g7+ and some of the OECD processes. We also then 
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The Timorese NDAE, in the Ministry of Finance, came about as a 
result of the increasing perception that it was necessary to monitor donor 
assistance and to confirm that donor practices followed the then newly 
established national priorities. The previous section illustrated some of the 
obstacles the department and the Ministry of Finance as a whole faced in 
terms of skills and technical challenges. Nevertheless, and in fact perhaps 
not surprisingly, this Ministry was to become the core of the g7+’s 
secretariat. Accordingly, the demands increased even more and technical 
assistance quickly poured in. 
The World Bank has employed a focal point in Kenya to work for the 
g7+; the OECD-INCAF had employed another one in Paris, coordinating 
the IDPS and supposedly working for both donors and the g7+, and this 
has now moved to be a focal point from Liberia. In addition, the ODI has a 
line of research, the Budget Strengthening Initiative, said to be providing 
reports and studies as requested by the g7+. The support is characterised 
as a kind of ‘pro-bono think tank assistance’ based on technical/knowledge 
support.43 All these cases of technical assistance are paid for by donor 
agencies, not hired by the g7+ per se, although there seems to be at least 
an element of direct choice involved in some of these contracts. Betty 
Maina, the former World Bank focal point for the g7+ in Kenya, for example, 
was a personal request of the secretariat. 
It seems the technical assistance in general was not trusted, but they trusted me. 
I had worked in Somalia in 2003, in the final peace discussions and the 
elaboration of the first constitution. I had worked for associations in Kenya. I 
guess it was good that I am African.
44
 
At the basic level, these were contracts necessary to increase the 
number of staff working for the g7+. At the beginning, the staff in the 
secretariat were also part of the Timorese Ministry of Finance itself, thus, 
they had other work to attend to and were not exclusive of the g7+. Focal 
points in other member countries also have their own work in their 
ministries, hence, they struggle to find time to dedicate to the g7+ activities. 
Most of the focal points in the g7+ have full time jobs! They can’t do everything.
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This has slightly changed, at least at the secretariat itself, as the 
group grew in its ability to sit at international tables. Helder da Costa, a 
Timorese with a PhD in Trade Policy from the University of Adelaide, South 
Australia, slowly firmed his position as the General Secretary of the g7+, 
although he is still also a Ministry adviser for aid effectiveness; and Habib 
Ur Rehman Mayar was seconded from the Afghan Ministry of Finance to 
work as Senior Policy Specialist. Felícia Carvalho, a Timorese who also 
studied in Australia and has a background on Public Health, is one of the 
few who have worked with the g7+ since 2010, and in the secretariat she 
provides most of the logistical support the group requires for meetings and 
communication. Their Western background and education are considered 
critical by themselves in the work they perform. Minister Emília Pires herself 
was raised in Australia; she has a BA in Statistics by the University of 
Latrobe in Melbourne, and a MA in Science in Development Management 
from the London School of Economics. 
When you are sitting there [at international tables], you see how they see you. I 
think the donors needed someone to tell them how recipients were seeing them 
too.  I did both roles. Also, I came from a developed country. I was brought up in 
Australia for 25 years, so my education is a Western kind of education. I never 
lost my roots though. So yes, I was able to articulate some problems in a 
language donors would understand and on the other way as well. I translated 
what donors said to a language that recipients could understand too. I don’t 
mean French, English…but a comprehension of words and policies.
46
 
This ‘Western education’ and overall background experience in 
working with donor institutions seem indeed crucial for double agents in the 
offices of ‘fragile states’. As mentioned before, Minister Emília Pires had 
worked with the World Bank in the early years of Timor-Leste 
independence. Siafa Hage, the new g7+ focal point for the International 
Dialogue, is a Liberian citizen with a BA and a MA from the University of 
Michigan.47 The new chair of the g7+, Sierra Leone’s Finance Minister 
Kaifala Marah, has a MA from the State University of New York and a PhD 
from the University of Hull, UK.48 In the context of the g7+, there are, 
however, only a few who have this kind of ‘Western education’. Therefore, 
secondments are frequent.  
                                                          
46
 Interview with Emília Pires. 
47
 From Linkedin profile. 
48









In 2011, a policy analyst was seconded from ODI, and in 2013, the 
World Bank seconded another analyst, both to become Programme 
Officers in the g7+ secretariat.49 As of 2014, ODI is selecting one more 
person to be seconded to the g7+.50 Considering all of the secretariat’s 
work is paid for by the Timorese government,51 these outsourced 
professionals seem to be generally welcome. These are expensive 
advisors that would be paid out of the Timorese budget otherwise or not 
hired at all. 
 The conditions of these secondments or outsourcing are perhaps 
unique. They are not simply advisors but ‘dislocated’ ones, as they are 
officially subordinated to the secretariat, although still accountable to 
donors.52 It would be fruitless to attempt to deduce how much of their 
‘loyalty’ lies with whom, since, to say the least, they all come from different 
countries, organisations and backgrounds and have diverse job 
descriptions. Therefore, while the discussion around staff may be seen as 
basically pertaining to the size of the g7+ team or may lead to an endless 
quasi-psychological search for loyalties, I instead look at how it crucially 
involves the ‘loan’ to the g7+ of important sets of skills.  
 
2.2. EXPORTING EXPORTERS 
 
These skills are loaned because they are perceived as needed, and they 
are developed because they are seen as useful in the practical sense at 
play. The way these perceptions or expectations are developed and 
reproduced is crucial to understanding how practices become largely 
adopted and, thus, authenticated, taking with them the very object of ‘state 
fragility’.  
 Crucially, I argue the ‘double game’ played by these ‘double 
agents’/experts is of a peculiar type precisely because rooted in statistical 
reasoning. Indeed, one of Porter’s great contribution to understanding the 
particular authority attributed to quantification is in highlighting that this 
authority is based on the opposite of what elites and politicians make use 
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of; quantification tends to discredit judgment and discretion.53 Not that this 
battle is ever definitely won, but the external regulations around quantifying 
practices are certainly a constant push towards the prevalence of an 
‘objective’ image. In that sense, quantification is also the arm to be used in 
realms where trust is lacking: ‘Mechanical objectivity’, or rather the image of 
it, ‘serves as an alternative to personal trust.’’54 I suggest this creates a 
special condition in the highly quantified ‘fragile states’ agenda, whereby, 
beyond the double game Dezalay and Garth depict, ‘exporters’ are either 
remotely or de facto exported themselves into ‘importers’’ systems, loaned 
in their expertise exactly because this expertise can be allegedly trusted to 
be impersonal. It is important to analyse how expertise and skills invite 
such nuances in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. 
 
2.3. THE G7+’S COUNTRY-SPECIFIC INDICATORS: WHAT YOU CAN DO IS WHAT YOU ARE 
 
Apart from financial and staff support, the focal points paid by donors and 
working for the g7+, remotely or not, bring essential skills. Of utmost 
relevance so far, these outsourced staff have been providing support for 
one essential activity of the g7+’s agenda, the formulation and 
implementation of the Fragility Assessment and the accompanying 
development of the PSGs.  
 Betty Maina, who was hired by the World Bank as a g7+ focal point 
in Kenya, was in charge of offering technical assistance in the steps 
towards developing the Fragility Assessments: 
 
Part of my work involved helping with the Fragility Assessments and to develop 
the indicators to help track the progress against the targets of the assessment. In 
total, we were, I think, five helping work on the guidelines to develop the Fragility 
Assessments and to help them [g7+ members] to interpret what it represented 




The information available on these steps is scarce, not least 
because even staff members involved do not have an overview of the 
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process, since there is still no central knowledge base, for example, or an 
official means to account for all activities and procedures related to the 
work of the g7+.56 The main document detailing the process of developing 
the g7+’s ‘fragility’ indicators was produced in 2013, based on the results of 
a meeting in DRC. The Note on the Fragility Spectrum explains how the 
g7+’s members developed their country-specific indicators. It constantly 
emphasises the need to carefully avoid using the ‘menu of indicators’ as 
templates or prescriptions. One can say the process is composed of two 
main general steps: understanding where the country is, that is, which 
specific situations it faces, and finding the indicators that correspond to 
these situations, in terms of measuring both what is happening in the 
present and how much improvement can and should be expected to 
achieve the specific target set by the country.  
Crucially, the stages in the spectrum (crisis, rebuild/reform, 
transition, transformation, resilience) are not pre-defined: Each g7+ 
member defines their own understanding of each stage and, accordingly, 
positions the country in the spectrum. By defining stage 1 and stage 5, for 
instance, the idea is that not only each member sets its own targets but it 
acknowledges its own point of departure, thus its Fragility Assessment 
would evaluate relative performance rather than absolute achievements. 
The Note on the Fragility Spectrum is said to offer a ‘consolidated 
fragility spectrum’ based on the experiences of the five pilot countries 
(Sierra Leone, Liberia, South Sudan, DRC and Timor-Leste).57 It offers a 
‘menu of indicators’ that gathers the indicators proposed by these 
members; however, the menu is said to offer ‘inspiration’ rather than 
prescription, which is also how it is proposed to be used for the definitions 
of the stages themselves. Focal points in member countries are to receive 
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 The document states that the template ‘[a]ims to track incremental 
progress, and to assist countries in the development of their own targets 
and goals…instead of merely judging progress from an ideal end-state’.59 
Moreover, the idea is that the Fragility Spectrum and Assessment would 
‘ensure that the indicators identified are not only country specific, but are 
also chosen with a particular stage in the fragility spectrum in mind.’60 
Therefore, the exercise does seem to make it possible to increase focus on 
performance as opposed to the usual default privileging of outcomes, as 
chapter three highlighted in the case of the World Bank’s CPIA, for 
instance. The focus, as discussed, is on the ‘next stage of development’, 
rather than on development itself. 
 The document suggests that g7+ members can use the 300 
indicators-long list produced after the five pilot studies to select those 
indicators which fit their own self-identified stage of ‘fragility’ or develop 
their own indicators, variously focusing on inputs, capacity or outcome 
indicators, for example, according to the stage identified.61 It is argued this 
would help to manage donors’ expectations and lead to an understanding 
of ‘realistic progress’.62 
It is important to analyse the technical steps taken to construct 
these country-specific indicators. A statement by a key donor 
representative siting in the New Deal Working Group on Indicators is 
eloquent:63 
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Not all INCAF members are taking their tasks in the [Fragility Assessment] pilots 
seriously and many don’t seem aware of their commitments. I was told one 
[donor] representative answered, when asked what their role was in the pilot, 
that his/her work was only ‘symbolic’.
64
 
 The statement was part of this officer’s presentation to the OECD-
INCAF high-level ministerial meeting in June 2013 as a representative of a 
donor agency. (S)he is also a member of the Working Group on Indicators. 
The tone was of indignation: The reported answer by a fellow donor 
representative who ‘should’ be helping a g7+ member in conducting its 
Fragility Assessment was perceived as disrespectful towards the 
commitment donors made to the process. Precisely this ‘commitment’ is 
central here: OECD-INCAF representatives who are allocated seats in the 
various subgroups working on the implementation of the New Deal are 
supposed to offer technical assistance and follow the exercise from a close 
distance, being visibly efficient but also ‘objective’ experts inside countries’ 
systems – exported exporters. Their role is meant to lack subjective 
discretion, but not to be ‘symbolic’ – on the contrary, they are supposed to 
be useful. 
 
2.4. DIAGNOSING AND MAKING ‘INCAPACITY’ 
 
As of 2013, the Working Group on Indicators was supporting the pilots of 
the Fragility Assessment by compiling all indicators in a long list,65 which 
was then ‘narrowed down and refined…by identifying commonalities among 
countries, considering their relevance, coherence as a group, measurability 
and the availability of data.’66 These supporting activities are of high 
relevance; they involve the judgment of feasibility of data and the purpose 
of the exercise as part of the g7+’s agenda. Moreover, by making these 
judgements through practice, these activities in fact contribute to delimit 
and mould the kind of indicators adopted in the Fragility Assessment. In 
intense self-authentication, the judgment of what g7+ members’ statistical 
offices can collect and analyse helps determining what they will analyse. 
Therefore, the measured capacity helps to define and construct ‘state 
                                                          
64
 My transcript from the June 2013 INCAF high-level ministerial meeting. Anonymity 
protected under Chatham House rules. 
65
 See Annex 6 for part of this list. 
66









fragility’ as political truths.  What ‘fragile states’ can measure becomes what 
‘fragile states’ should measure, and what is measured becomes part of the 
quantified definition of what ‘state fragility’ is. Moreover, this composition is 
very much mediated by exported experts working from within. 
Paradoxically, this determination of what can be done somehow 
answers to the very demand by the g7+ that indicators correspond to 
national statistical capacity, so that harmful, useless or hard to collect 
indicators are cut out and national statistical offices are moved into action, 
reinforcing the use of country systems.67 The Fragility Assessment is, after 
all, a claim for contextual and country-specific indicators that can be 
measured by country-systems, that is, a claim for indicators whose 
availability and utility are made ‘realistic’ for each g7+ member. These are 
practices, methods and objects made ‘good enough’, adaptable and ever-
perfectible; their contextual character builds authenticity amid an agenda 
full of ‘degrees’, ‘stages’, and not least, provisional correlations. The implicit 
idea in the g7+’s propositions is to improve the technical performance of 
national institutions by starting at a lower level and slowly building up 
capacity. Skills and ‘state fragility’ would drag each other slowly upwards, to 
the next stage in development. The limitations applied by the practical 
sense around ‘can’ are, therefore, as defining of ‘fragile states’ as ‘countries 
low in capacity’ as it may contribute to move capacity beyond the initial 
limits. 
Nevertheless, it is also important to notice that in the work to 
increase ownership through incremental expansion of national statistical 
capacity, donor technical assistance in the form of exported or loaned 
experts has been fundamental in providing the tools, methods and practical 
know-how for quantification and classification – and not least, in diagnosing 
and making the very contours of ‘fragile states’’ capacity. In this context, 
pressures and demands have also mounted among professionals in donor 
agencies; they have become trapped in a style of thinking & doing that 
promises ever-perfectibility. Their role cannot be symbolic, but their 
effectiveness needs to play out only in the ‘objective’ terms of quantification 
and classification. For that, their expertise expands towards all-
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encompassing skills, becoming a burden to which their efficiency practically 
and constantly contributes. 
 
3.  THEIR DEVELOPMENT IS YOUR DEVELOPMENT:  
WHAT EXPERTS ARE EXPECTED TO KNOW ABOUT ‘FRAGILE STATES’ 
 
In his book Beloved Land, George Peake, a former ‘development worker’ 
who spent four years in Timor-Leste, tells of the sense of impotence 
bureaucrats often trapped themselves into and how much this was due to 
their own methods of investigation and intervention: 
 
Flush with cash from oil and gas reserves, Timor-Leste no longer feels 
beholden to either the United Nations or to donor organisations for very 
much. Members of the government either cancel meetings at short notice 
or keep senior aid bureaucrats waiting for hours before they deign to see 
them – yet such powerful signs of lack of interest in their endeavours are 
not reported back to headquarters…‘Why don’t you report this petulance 
back to New York?’, I asked casually, adopting the city-based shorthand of 
the international bureaucrat. ‘I can’t do that,’ he groaned, as he hoisted 
himself on his own petard, ‘because we’ve been spinning them good-news 
stories for the past few months’.68 
 
In the narrative of exaggerated success created by bureaucrats 
then, cases of ‘petulance’ from Timorese officials could not be included, 
under the risk of bringing the whole narrative down. Donor staff found 
themselves trapped in their own good books. I here apply the same irony to 
the set of skills and interconnected topics increasingly seen as necessary 
to measure and manage ‘fragile states’. 
 As ‘fragile states’ are portrayed in donor reports as a maze of 
conflict and development issues that can be measured and managed, it is 
up to donors’ staff to rise to the challenge and develop the methods and 
solutions that can achieve positive results. Impossibilities and failures are 
circumvented by steering adaptability, the implication of which is that 
professionals in donor agencies are trapped into ever-perfectible and ever-
expandable skills.  
My argument does not mean that this somehow dilutes the 
responsibility of officers in ‘fragile states’, since, crucially, this is not a game 
of absolute gains – one’s increasing demands are not another’s decreasing 
ones. However, understanding the implications of different sets of skills and 
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their respective traps contributes to putting ‘weak points’ in evidence 
instead of hiding them: By assuming that the high level of expertise in 
donor’s offices represents an unmitigated source of superior influence and 
imposition, a scholar can ironically set aside the very ways in which 
professionals in donors agencies are constantly held to check, trapped into 
their very practices and skills. 
In the ‘fragile states’ agenda, ever-perfectible skills indeed create 
important traps. Development experts can no longer argue their projects 
were ambushed by a conflict situation, because since recently their reports 
say that development and conflict should never have been studied and 
acted upon separately in the first place. These experts can, instead, take 
courses, training and advice from help-desks on ‘fragile states’ and read 
the many ‘conflict and fragility’ reports produced by the headquarters.  
This section argues that the expansion of expertise towards ‘conflict 
and fragility’ in the World Bank and OECD has embraced and fed the ever-
perfectible character of quantifying and classifying practices, and with that, 
created important efficiency traps for donor staff.  
Perfection is an acknowledged moving target; it is the very 
imperfection of quantifying and classifying practices that make their 
associated skills transferable, otherwise each and all such practices would 
be deemed to achieve a freezing point and close onto themselves. It is the 
practical sense illustrated in the previous chapter that leads this 
imperfection to reproduce itself, and with that, the implication for donors’ 
staff is that they are expected to both identify and solve the next 
quantifiable challenge. Moreover, as the pressure mounts, anticipating the 
next quantifiable challenge might in fact create the problem, as expected in 
a self-authenticating style of thinking & doing. 
Of numbers, Porter says ‘[t]hey are intimately bound up with forms 
of community, and hence also with the social identity of the researcher.’69 
Thus, the supposed objectivity and technicality of quantification and 
classification practices not only construct the political truth of ‘state fragility’, 
but also define what an expert in ‘fragile states’ is by establishing the 
practices to be produced and reproduced and the set of skills to be 
possessed. The notion of ‘traps of ever-perfectibility’ means to apprehend 
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precisely what these practical impositions consist of and how they are 
played out in the ‘fragile states’ agenda.  
 
3.1. MANAGING CORRELATIONS, DEGREES AND TURNAROUNDS:  
PREPARING FOR SURGICAL ASSISTANCE 
 
To look at the traps of ever-perfectible skills, I analyse both what kind of 
expertise donors’ staff have been developing in what regards ‘fragile states’ 
and what kind of bureaucratic incentives donors’ staff receive to specialise 
in ‘state fragility’. The expertise discussed here points at what ‘ever-
perfectible skills’ mean, that is, how they have been made to constantly 
expand – in what directions and with which signposts. In addition, the 
incentives subtly tell of the hesitations managers encountered in recruiting 
experts for ‘fragile states’ and how these were overcome, hence, how 
practical pressures helped to produce expert staff. 
 A key to understand what elements compose this expertise and how 
this expansion is conceived and managed resides precisely in looking at 
how expertise can be developed if the target is a moving one. If ‘fragile 
states’, as seen in the previous chapters, combine many conflict and 
development challenges in a dynamic scenario, and if analyses and 
solutions should be tailored and flexible, how is a body of expertise to be 
developed at all? In my view, one expression recently adopted by both 
OECD-INCAF and the World Bank is an eloquent illustration – the notion of 
‘turnaround’ situations.  
 As the argument goes, all ‘fragile states’ can achieve a turnaround 
situation, as long as the right inputs are provided, in the correct amount and 
at the precise time when they can be more efficient in producing as much 
result as expected. The idea of turnaround was born as the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda and the quantifying and classifying reasoning merged, amid 
attempts to understand the many ways conflict and development could 
correlate, influencing the possibilities of aid effectiveness. In that sense, 
although seemly too technical a subject, this is actually a central point in 
the discussion so far. I suggest the notion of ‘turnaround’ can be seen as 
one of the names given to a general and practical methodology adopted by 
quantifying experts to deal with one specific object of research, ‘fragile 









classification. Here, it serves as one way of illustrating the expertise 
involved in these methods, by looking at a specific way of phrasing the 
methodology on which these practices are supposed to be based. 
 
ENABLING UPWARD SPIRALS 
In 2008, a key OECD document emphasised the need to thoroughly 
investigate the correlations between development aid and conflict: The 
Service Delivery in Fragile Situations stated the perceived urgency in 
finding the key to unlock the many correlations between conflict and 
development so as to prompt ‘upwards spirals’. 
Just as mounting fragility and deteriorating services can be mutually 
reinforcing tendencies, improving services may enhance social and 
economic recovery, overcoming fragility in a virtuous upward spiral. The 
influence is reciprocal. But effecting a turnaround is no easy matter. The 
same cluster of influences that created the vicious cycle of fragility will also 
tend to prevent its reversal.70 
 
 Significantly, the document points at the importance of mastering 
the correlations between development and conflict in order to enable 
positive influences, as opposed to inadvertedly setting them in an even 
more damaging spiral of ‘fragilisation’. It mentions the need to identify and 
measure opportunities for effective intervention:  
Post-conflict situations present unique opportunities: for turnaround, 
building back better service sectors and using service interventions to build 
peace, reconciliation and political legitimacy. Entry points for long-term 
reform must be rapidly identified and exploited.71 
 
 The notion of ‘turnaround’ is interesting; it tells of the methods, skills 
and expectations that became associated with ‘fragile states’. It combines 
the idea of ‘degrees of fragility’ − which need to be measured in order to be 
managed – and the notion of ‘good enough’, accompanied by its impulse to 
adapt, flexibilise and tailor. ‘Turnaround’ can be used to measure how 
effective aid is in lifting ‘fragile states’ one degree above their current 
‘fragility’. Moreover, it implies constant monitoring and evaluation; it 
advocates timely and surgically precise intervention, in the right amount for 
a controlled effect – the best investment/result ratio. These requirements 
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add great pressure to the work of donors’ staff, indirectly demanded to 
know of all factors that make ‘fragile states’, while also able to measure it 
on an on-going basis, decide exactly when to act and how. 
 Again here, the double game of Dezalay and Garth requires fine-
tuning for this specific agenda: The ‘translation’72 that importers needs to 
execute in order to adapt technologies to local audiences very much counts 
on the exporters themselves anticipating what these adaptations might 
entail. Ever-perfectible quantification and classification in terms of degrees 
imply more exact prescriptions or, at least, they constantly create the 
pressure for such solutions, the perfection never being the target itself. 
A rich example of how tailored the ‘turnaround' notion is supposed 
to render interventions is provided by what probably is the earliest and most 
central work on the topic: Collier and Chauvet looked at ‘turnarounds’ as 
something with a start and end point, whereby it stands to be measured 
and classified what specific kinds of development aid can determine what 
specific positive changes in policies, institutions and governance, and most 
importantly, how much of these are correlated.73 Through regressions and 
probability, the authors seek to calculate how likely it is that donors can 
contribute to such turnarounds.74 Interesting conclusions include the 1.79% 
probability of ‘a sustained turnaround starting in any year’, and that the 
‘mathematical expectation of the duration’ of ‘state fragility’ would be 56 
years.75 However, most important is that the reasoning in the paper is one 
that seeks to divide to rule: It extricates the various elements of the 
solutions proposed and quantifies the probable impact of each of them in 
specific contexts, in order to tailor interventions for different ‘degrees of 
fragility’. Here, quantification, classification and their accompanied 
encoding are fundamental steps towards achieving ‘realistic’ solutions and 
managing expectations.  
In their paper, for example, Chauvet and Collier analysed the impact 
of secondary education in achieving sustained turnaround and of technical 
assistance in promoting turnaround itself. The conclusion for the first 
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correlation is perhaps shockingly detailed for social scientists: ‘[I]ncreasing 
the proportion of the population with secondary education from the mean 
found in LICUS countries, 7.791%, to 8.791%, would raise the probability of 
reform from 1.79% per year to 1.93% per year.’76  
 Former director of the World Bank’s Development Research Group, 
Collier’s influence in donors’ policy towards ‘fragile states’ is long 
documented. He has been called for advice numerous times during the 
elaboration of the 2011 WDR and the creation of the CCSD,77 and his 
research is often incorporated in the Bank’s procedures.78 Moreover, and 
interestingly, a paper of his sits alone among the exclusively g7+-produced 
documents on the website of the group.79 The specific paper with the 
quantifications just cited, co-written with Lisa Chauvet, was largely quoted 
in the OECD’s Service Delivery in Fragile States, and the idea of 
‘turnaround’ – or simply a ‘transition out of fragility – was placed in the 
centre of discussions on how to make development aid effective in contexts 
of ‘state fragility’.  
As early as 2005, the Bank’s concept note on ‘fragile states’ also 
suggested: 
[A] highly dynamic environment also means that the direction of 
performance may itself change rapidly: situations of prolonged crisis may 
achieve a rapid turnaround or, conversely, post-conflict or gradual reform 
situations may shift into renewed risk of political instability or blocked 
reform. Hence it may often be desirable for country assistance strategies to 
identify not only the country’s current performance and direction, but also 
the probability of a shift in scenario within the basic typology above, 
requiring adaption to a rapid turnaround or deterioration in the 
environment.80 
 
 However, it took a few years for these ideas to lead to 
organisational and procedural changes. In the Operationalizing the 2011 
World Development Report, the World Bank proposed an adjustment to the 
framework of aid to include ‘turnaround situations:’81 ‘These mechanisms 
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will require guidelines to staff on the types of eligible activities, ways to 
monitor outcomes, and country eligibility criteria.’82 In 2013, as seen, the 
World Bank’s IDA17 finally implemented this new framework and included 
‘turnaround’ as a category in great part overlapping with ‘fragile states’. The 
rationale presented is based on the idea of transition as a spiral, discussed 
in the 2011 WDR, and the document mainly argues for the seizing of 
opportunities for change at critical moments’, through ‘well-targeted and 
well-delivered aid’.83 The report states that the idea of ‘turnaround’ 
emphasises the notion that it is possible to ‘modulate’ the level of 
assistance along the ‘fragility’ continuum. The modulation would allow for 
‘timely and adequate’ responses, and open space for more flexibility 
towards longer timeframes of reform84 – no resources wasted. 
 Crucially, the notion that the Bank can act on situations of 
transitions or where ‘turnaround’ moments can be identified has been a key 
entry point for the Bank’s own positioning in the debate, since ‘conflict’ was 
never its area of expertise. As a development agency, the idea that it can 
enable turnarounds by making surgical use of development tools at its 
disposal has been fundamental in making it an important player in the 
highly political agenda of ‘fragile states’. The Bank cannot make use of 
force to stop conflict, but it can make conflict less probable by investing in 
the social conditions that facilitate peace or, so the argument goes, it can 
enable a quicker and sustainable return to peace after conflict by providing 
the social incentives that would keep actors away from violence.  
 The challenge, therefore, has been how to identify the context for 
the use of each tool, how much of the tool to be used and how to use it. In 
scenarios perceived as extremely volatile, risky and hardly predictable, this 
has increased the pressure on donors’ offices to produce more and more 
quantified reports of each possible impact. This ‘on duty’ expertise, 
adaptable and timely, generates important pressures over experts to be 
constantly alert, to all kinds of developments in the field, in the numbers – 
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national and international – and in the overall ever-changing ‘fragile states’ 
agenda. 
Most important in this context, these moves have represented 
important organisational changes in OECD and the World Bank, involving 
the introduction of an intense routine of training and learning that is, by 
design, intended to be recurrent. There have also been changes in the 
incentives offered to existent staff to work on ‘fragile states’, and there was, 
fundamentally, a re-structuring of departments and sectors so as to allow 
for interconnected analyses and, crucially, the exchange of know-how. The 
expectations corresponding to these moves are mounting, and 
professionals can be seen trapped into ever-perfectible expertise. In this 
reasoning, the ‘ideal advisor’ is as moving a target as the perfect method or 
the complete turnaround of a ‘fragile state’.85 
3.2. THE MAKING OF AN ‘IDEAL ADVISOR’: MANAGING EXPERTISE AND EXPECTATIONS 
 
In the 2012 Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and 
Fragility, the OECD listed the main criteria to judge the efficiency of M&E 
practices: relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and efficiency, all 
to be adapted to the context of ‘fragile states’ and to the realities of data in 
each country.86 The document also discusses some quantitative methods 
that can be useful for M&E practices in ‘fragile states’, including the so-
called ‘quasi-experimental approach’, ‘whereby statistical techniques are 
used to construct a control group that can serve as a counterfactual.’87 The 
counterfactual is necessary to evaluate impact through the simulation of 
what the reality would be like had no intervention taken place. 
 What is relevant at this point is to observe what these kind of criteria 
entail for experts involved. 
 
THE IRONIC CONTRAST IN OECD: PEER-REVIEWING, EXPECTATIONS AND STAFF 
Staff in OECD-INCAF have been increasingly expected to provide expertise 
to OECD governments regarding all aspects of ‘state fragility’, from conflict 
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to statistical practices of M&E. In order for this to be possible, these 
professionals have to carry some background experience in the field and 
pass through a programme of constant training, learning and peer-
reviewing that is also much based on the ability to quantify and classify. 
I had a background in peacebuilding and statebuilding, having worked for the UN 
in Liberia and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. I also 
wanted to try and have more influence. We [in INCAF] work with donors and 




In addition to hiring professionals with previous relevant experience, 
just before INCAF was founded, OECD had been increasingly steering 
several of its sectors and departments to connect and share knowledge so 
that their mixed expertise could enlighten practices of measuring and 
managing ‘fragile states’.  
Evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities poses unique 
challenges. For instance, work ‘in’ and ‘on’ conflict involves activities that 
differ from well established development operations and takes place in 
highly politicised environments. Access to reliable data is scarce and 
misinformation is rife. The evaluation process itself may have unintended 
consequences by influencing the behaviour of conflict protagonists. 
Because of these and other obstacles, guidance is needed to help improve 
evaluation techniques in this rapidly evolving field.89   
 
In order to publish the Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in 
Settings of Conflict and Fragility, there were two years of tests and peer-
reviewing among donor agencies. The results of these were exchanged 
and analysed in a 2011 workshop, which is said to have gathered around 
65 participants from OECD-INCAF and the OECD-DAC Network on 
Development Evaluation.90 The minutes of the workshop list as one of the 
highlights of the event the merge of the Network on Conflict, Peace and 
Development Co-operation (CPDC) and the Fragile States Group, created 
in 2003, as seen in chapter one: ‘The merger of CPDC and the Fragile 
States group enabled a wider focus combining peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, recognising that this is 95% part of the same agenda.’91 
Furthermore, as the workshop itself made clear, the merge meant that staff 
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working on ‘fragile states’ were now meant to develop expertise on 
‘fragility’, conflict and evaluation practices.  
Few would dispute that settings of conflict and fragility are complex, 
combining multifaceted, multi-directional change processes with high levels 
of unpredictability, a general lack of information, and potential strategic 
misinformation. The way programmes are implemented on the ground may 
differ widely from original plans, as practitioners change what they are 
doing to adapt to an evolving conflict. As a result, it may be difficult to 
identify what exactly should be evaluated. Although unpredictability and 
complexity may be inevitable, their frequently negative ramifications for 
evaluations need not be. Evaluators must prepare for risks, develop robust 
designs, and ensure sufficient flexibility to counter the challenges of 
unpredictability and complexity. They should select methods that help to 
capture complex social change processes and illuminate interactions 
between interventions and the context.92 
 
One can imagine, however, how difficult it can be to find someone 
who holds expertise in quantifying and classifying statistical methods, 
technologies and software of statistical analyses, peacebuilding, conflict, 
statebuilding, development and ‘state fragility’. By stating that these are 
necessarily interconnected topics, the demands over the expertise in donor 
agencies are also raised. Staff then are pressured to find the ‘right’ partners 
to provide authoritative knowledge in the area they ‘still’ do not master, or to 
find support to measure and evaluate more and more quickly. 
I think we were a bit heavy-handed in Busan [2011]; INCAF was driving the 
agenda too much. But that was because there was a lot of pressure on us. We 
had to produce something for Busan, there was time constraint. In practical 
terms, we were four or five people, excluding support staff.
93
 
 Interestingly, by the time of the Busan meeting, the work of INCAF 
was being largely coordinated by one person, Erwin van Veen, from the 
above quote, and the work of IDPS was mostly conducted by another 
single somehow outsourced member of staff, Donata Garrassi. Indeed, 
since 2009, OECD-INCAF has produced dozens of reports but it counts 
with only four or five exclusive analysts at one time. From 2010 to 2013, 
Donata Garrassi, alone, was in charge of coordinating most activities of the 
IDPS, even though this role was never clear on the website of the initiative: 
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Sometimes it is horrible. Even though I work for everyone, it always looks like I 
am on the donor side.
94
 
She helped organising the g7+ technical and ministerial meetings, 
assisted in the production of material for the IDPS website, helped with 
contacts and logistics overall, presented updated reports in international 
conferences, not only of the IDPS’s work but also, at times, covering for 
colleagues from donor agencies, as was the case in at least one occasion 
when I was present. There, she also provided advice regarding the g7+’s 
possible next steps. In addition, when I arrived at the UN building where I 
was to attend the UN General Assembly parallel ministerial meeting of the 
g7+ and donors, in September 2013, she was in the hall, welcoming the 
participants and giving directions. She had said before that she was 
relieved that ‘someone from the g7+’ was joining the IDPS ‘to help’ her.95 
However, it seems that in 2014, Siafa Hage, a g7+ focal point from Liberia, 
effectively substituted Garrassi in the post. She is now a ‘peacebuilding 
advisor’ in OECD. During the June 2013 INCAF meeting that anticipated 
this substitution, there was much talk about the need to have an ‘IDPS 
person’ from the g7+, who would be capable of bringing the experience of a 
‘fragile state’ while also having the mandate to advance the group’s 
agenda. Garrassi’s expertise and background did not involve that much. 
Indeed, in OECD, the routine of peer-learning easily traps staff 
working in ‘fragile states’ in an ever-expanding search for expertise. As the 
themes linked to the agenda multiply, so their expertise is supposed to, and 
most importantly, the various OECD networks and sectors – on Evaluation, 
Governance, Capacity Development, and so on – make these traps even 
more effective: Since the multi-faceted knowledge is available in different 
departments and since peer-learning is at the core of the work in OECD, 
learning more skills by working with other areas is a practical and 
‘reasonable’ expectation.  
 
THE IRONY IN THE WORLD BANK: CLASSROOM AND CAREER 
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In the World Bank, the traps are set in a different way: There are different 
‘specialisms’ in diverse departments, but mostly, training sessions, e-
courses and workshops are centrally organized so that staff working on 
‘fragile states’ are actually somewhat trapped in a routine of classroom 
learning. They are expected to sign up for different courses and there are 
newly established rules for career progress that in fact require that staff 
have experience of directly working in some aspects of ‘fragile states’. 
When the Center on Conflict, Security and Development (CCSD) was 
created, in 2011/12, the team gathered was purposefully diverse in their 
background experiences: The Center has experts on gender, justice, 
procurement, environment, M&E practices and other themes perceived to 
be linked to ‘state fragility’. 
When we became the CCSD, we doubled the sector’s size from what it used to 
be. The team is very diverse now and this has been scaled up. Now because we 
have more people, we are closer to the field and we have more specialists who 
work on specific things. We are able to respond much earlier [to crises], and our 
work is much more upstream [it communicates more easily with managers and 
directors]. There is increased speed and flexibility. The amount of time to get a 
project approved, get disbursement, all that has decreased. Fundamentally, we 
also have more people trained: We have 14 courses on working in conflict-
affected and fragile states – 380 people taught [until April 2013]. We also have e-
learning… This is all representative of this increasing knowledge and capacity 
development in the Bank.
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 In fact, there are at least three ways in which the role of staff 
working in and on ‘fragile states’ in the World Bank has changed: Staff have 
new career incentives to both somehow incentivise and make subtly 
mandatory that analysts have experience in the field. In addition, in order to 
prepare for this experience and to improve their capacity to learn with this, 
professionals are expected to attend seminars, workshops and training 
sessions, besides providing themselves some of the courses and advice 
regarding ‘state fragility’. They are also expected to partner with other 
sector and networks in the Bank, for example, collaborating with the Open 
Data initiative by providing data and requiring assistance in their own 
analyses. These three sets of changes are crucial to understanding the skill 
traps in which staff in the World Bank find themselves. 
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 Before the many structural changes in the Bank, it is said most 
analysts clearly prioritised working for middle-income countries or emerging 
economies rather than ‘fragile states’. 
Here it seemed the level of development of the country was your level of 
development, as a professional. No one wanted to work with the poor countries; 




I think, before, there was no compensation [for working in fragile states]: There is 
a lot of internal competition in the Bank and it seemed people were less 
competitive after working in fragile states. People like the challenge but they 
need to be sure…When you work in fragile states, you see less difference, you 
have fewer things to show. I don’t think the financial compensation is as 
important as the career incentives they give now. It used to be the case, for 
example, that someone working in a ‘fragile state’ would miss out on the 




After the IEG 2006 review of the World Bank’s work on ‘fragile 
states’, the first of its kind, and the 2011 WDR,99 the World Bank created 
incentives for recruiting and retaining staff.100 In terms of ‘reputation 
incentives’, the changes implemented after 2011 include placing country 
managers in ‘fragile states’ at the same level of those in other countries, 
which answers to the overall feeling, exemplified in the first quote above, 
that working in a ‘fragile states’ equalled poor skills.101 Moreover, the World 
Bank started recruiting international staff with local experience and more 
seniority to work in ‘fragile states’102, so that for internationally-recruited 
staff, experience working in ‘fragile states’ became a ‘strongly desired skill 
for promotion to senior jobs’.103 In addition, to tackle precisely the fear of 
isolation staff used to experience, as expressed in the second quote, the 
Bank’s various sections have received a directive to offer ‘predictability’ 
regarding future assignments for staff coming back from ‘fragile states’.104 
Finally, and although staff interviewed for the 2013 IEG review of the 
Bank’s work on ‘fragile states’ say this is the least relevant of the changes, 
there are new financial incentives for staff working in ‘fragile states’: There 
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are now an ‘assignment-premium bonus’, a ‘fragile states premium’, a 
‘hazard pay’, a ‘rest and recuperation’ pay, and a ‘hardship differential’.105 
 However, these incentives and the increasing ‘fragile states’ 
portfolio of the World Bank have also raised the pressure for staff to 
develop new skills or expand existent ones, seen as necessary for such 
assignments. There are direct and punctual expectations, such as the fact 
that staff working in ‘fragile states’ now have to attend a ‘mandatory 
management training’, but interestingly and very importantly, there is 
indirect and subtle pressure for staff to return the investments and 
opportunities the Bank is providing. The further differentiation of situations 
across the ‘fragility’ spectrum, including the new ‘methodological’ notion of 
‘turnaround’ countries or situations, and the increasing quantification and 
classification of ‘fragile states’ leads to expectations that skills will follow, 
simultaneously expanding to encompass more topics, and specialising, by 
developing expertise that is compatible to each and every category of ‘state 
fragility’. 
 For that, the World Bank has aimed to develop a ‘community of 
practice, inside and outside the Bank itself. This has been interestingly 
exemplified in terms of quantification and classification practices, by 
partnerships with the WBI to provide advice to the g7+ regarding extractive 
industries.106 This in turn counts on the intense data collection and analysis 
executed by the Mapping for Results initiative of the Open Data sector in 
the World Bank and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).107 In this 
case, the ‘community of practice’ the World Bank is said to be creating is 
also expected to fill the gaps in skills whenever the staff in the Bank 
requires further expertise. If the CCSD did not have the whole set of skills 
necessary for the project, it nonetheless was expected to understand what 
the necessary skills were and find the correct partners inside and outside 
the Bank, keeping the Bank sitting at the table. Ironically, the demand in 
this specific case was generated by a request made by the g7+ (discussed 
in the next chapter). 
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In accordance with the increasing demand for more experts and 
expertise, the Bank, mainly though the CCSD, has also increased the 
number of ‘staff learning events’, with ‘tailored workshops’, training 
(including regional trainings in Africa), a core course on Violence, Conflict 
and Fragility, offered twice a year, and courses on implementation, mostly 
led by the CCSD Nairobi hub. 
 I registered for the Violence, Conflict and Fragility e-course as an 
external ‘expert’, together with a total of 500 internal and external experts 
from around the world, to understand more of what is taught in such 
courses. This e-course offers an intense forum for exchange of ideas. 
However, the contrast is striking between how much it is expected the 
course will achieve in terms of capacity-building Bank staff and how basic 
the course material and activities are. The course generally focuses on the 
‘causes’ of ‘state fragility’, the remedies to be applied and the ways in which 
donors can help with this cure.108 
Following insights from the 2011 WDR on transition out of ‘fragility’ 
and the IDA17’s proposition of including a ‘turnaround’ category, the course 
looks at how to identify challenges and opportunities in ‘fragile states’, work 
with these to enable transitions and make them last. However, the content 
of the course material is rather basic. For instance, although the main 
reports on ‘state fragility’ published by the Bank advocate that work in 
‘fragile states’ should connect concerns with development and conflict, in 
practice, the course very much separates the causes of conflict in a 
schematic matrix: The activity includes matching causes and the category 
of causes – economic, justice, security, global. Moreover, the reading 
material is mostly composed of extremely short summaries of main texts in 
academia and policy – they are usually two to five pages-long, and only 
short references are provided. 
It seems that WBI staff themselves struggle to find the formula of 
how better to teach such highly complex and layered issues to the rest of 
the staff in the Bank. Thus, it is not only a matter of analysts working in 
‘fragile states’ being expected to take the many courses available, but also 
of other analysts being able to provide those courses and build their 
content in the right measure, considering time constraints on both sides. It 
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also seems, however, that some of the courses offered with exclusivity to 
the Bank’s staff are more intense and technically proficient.  
I think the courses that the CCSD is offering, some are very good. One, developed 
by Gary [Milante, former head of the CCSD in Washington] was especially good, 
with complex and detailed simulations with imaginary fragile states.
109
 
 Nonetheless, the CCSD staff does not only design and provide 
courses and training. It also offers a remote helpdesk for advice on any 
aspects of ‘state fragility’, whenever local teams request help in designing 
or implementing programmes. The CCSD also provides staff that can be 
immediately transferred to work with local teams in case there is the need 
for someone to be covered or if the team identifies the need to have an 
expert on a specific subject.110 Moreover, the CCSD maintains constant 
monitoring of a few non-disclosed countries unofficially considered ‘fragile 
states’ but not classified as such by the CPIA. Such countries, such as 
Mali, as one interviewee said, are monitored for incoming crises, so that the 
Bank is in a position to act fast in the opportunities that might appear for 
positive transition or ‘turnaround’.111  
 This constant monitoring is mostly done, however, by one single 
person, Khadija Sheik, who is a junior professional in the team. She is also 
the person in charge of the PCPI indicators. In fact, although the extended 
team, considering the hub in Nairobi and including support staff, is 
supposed to be composed by around 40 analysts, the sector in the 
headquarters is a small area with a few cramped offices. Sheik herself 
shares a windowless office with two other analysts. Each one is supposed 
to be the CCSD expert in their area, able to travel to ‘fragile states’ at any 
moment if requested, while also responsible for contributing to the design of 
courses, the publication of reports and the advice provided by the helpdesk. 
 Nevertheless, the 2013 IEG review of the World Bank’s work on 
‘fragile states’ has suggested the CCSD has still to greatly increase its 
impact on the field. It has been considered quite effective in reaching out 
for partnerships with other agencies, such as UNDP, but less effective in 
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providing operational support.112 In 2013, after only two years as head of 
the CCSD, Milante has left to work for a think tank, and for months he has 
not been replaced. 
 To better understand the efficiency traps in which staff find 
themselves in the World Bank, the leaflet for a recent internal Human 
Resources campaign is telling: 
 





                                 
           
             
 
 
 The leaflet both illustrates the pressure and demand for staff to 
increase and improve their expertise and it acknowledges the traps that this 
pressure might create by offering constant support to staff working on 
‘fragile states’.113  
 While the many topics related to conflict and ‘fragility’ are 
considered interconnected, not only ‘fragile states’ are defined by their 
measured capacity to move out of crisis and poverty, but also donors are 
trapped into the practical expectation that they will at least know what is to 
be known in order to achieve effectiveness – of development aid and of 
states. As donors’ reports sell an image of measurable and manageable 
‘state fragility’, experts become at least greatly expected to be themselves 
able to measure and manage ‘fragile states’ in their most particular details 
and the correlations between them. 
 
4.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: SKILLS AND THEIR TRAPS 
 
If the idea that technical capacity somehow contributes to exert 
disproportional influence over ‘fragile states’ offices is an easy critique, it is 
                                                          
112
 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Dec 2013, pp. 104-105. 
113
 This leaflet was around in the World Bank during the Fragility Forum, in April 2013. 
FIGURE 10: 'ARE YOU UP TO THE CHALLENGE', LEAFLET 









however less obvious and at the same time extremely important to 
understand that this technical capacity also exerts a toll in donor agencies.  
 I do not claim that quantification is nothing but a political solution to a 
 political problem. But that is surely one of the things that it is, and our 
 understanding of it is poor indeed if we do not relate it to the forms of 
 community in which it flourishes.114  
 
In order to understand what empowers such practices and skills to 
construct ‘fragile states’ it was important to not only discuss what their 
absence represent in the offices of ‘fragile states’, but also what traps they 
facilitate when supposed abundant in donor agencies. Amid the moving 
target of unpredictable turnarounds and transitions from conflict to 
development, donor staff become inexcusable experts in endless upwards 
spirals of expertise; moreover, an expertise they themselves practically 
help to make a necessity in the agenda. These experts no longer have to 
shoot an animal, but they do need to constantly write a report, offer advice 
and find the right numbers, even if not actually up to these tasks. In 
addition, as their expertise are either remote or completely exported, 
expected to make itself always useful, these experts constantly play a 
‘double game’ in which they need to be both visibly effective and absolutely 
objective.  
The supposed ‘objectivity’ in quantification would be the 
‘methodological equivalent of gray suits, adopted by men who otherwise 
would have even less chance of acting autonomously’.115 The point is 
precisely that, while this expertise provides authority to those who lack the 
authority of votes, it also is less guaranteed a form of resource. Hence, the 
‘double agents’ in the central tiers of the game have a peculiar dynamic: As 
the expertise is by definition an ever-perfectible one, those who Dezalay 
and Garth would call ‘exporters’ – those who provide the technologies to be 
absorbed and adapted locally by ‘importers’, in this case, in ‘fragile 
states’116 – are constantly under pressure to increase and improve their 
own expertise, egged on by the practical expectations of the game they 
themselves help to create. By quantifying and classifying, they contribute to 
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reinforcing this style of thinking & doing, but by doing so, they are 
themselves also constantly pushed over to expand their own expertise. 
I suggest these traps are crucial to understand the nuances in the 
impacts of the quantification and classification of ‘fragile states’, thus, also 
central to think of the entry points for change or weak points of power. In 
depicting the realm of quantifying bureaucrats as the central tiers in the 
game, I aimed to introduce here a point central to the discussion on power 
in the next chapter: Quantifying and classifying is an expertise ‘especially 
compelling to bureaucratic officials who lack the mandate of a popular 
election, or divine right.’117 Being so, this expertise, with its set of resources 
and skills, places actors in these central tiers somehow at a distance from 
other tiers, being that of politicians in donor governments or local leaders 
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T H E  C O S T S  O F  E N G A G E M E N T  A N D  
D I S E N G A G E M E N T :  S Y M B O L I C  P O W E R  A N D  T H E  





In the two previous chapters, I analysed the practices that classify ‘fragile 
states’ and how these practices become ‘socially comfortable’, that is, how 
what they entail in terms of techniques, expertise, skills and results – or 
effectiveness – becomes naturally expected.1 My objective so far has been 
to discuss these practices and skills in their capacity and authority of subtle 
classifiers, practically composing both ‘fragile states’ and experts. In this 
chapter, I look at what is gained and gambled when these practices and 
skills are at play. I suggest what is at stake in this game is the identification, 
analysis and management of ‘fragile states’, that is, these are the issues at 
hand when actors relate and negotiate. Being so, I look at these stakes to 
analyse what costs there are for engagement and disengagement for the 
different actors involved.  
 As the initial chapters argued, politically sceptical approaches that 
suggest the altogether dismissal of the label and of the rationale in which it 
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is embedded paradoxically eliminate from the debate both the practical 
pressures upon ‘fragile states’ offices to engage and how nuanced 
engagement can be. Ironically, this overlooking often leads these 
approaches to ignore precisely the weak links in the chain, thus, the 
constraints in power and possibilities for change. 
 This chapter suggests that the widespread presence of the 
quantifying and classifying reasoning has made non-technical 
disengagement impractical but has also entailed particular costs of 
engagement to all actors involved. Quantification sees donors in an 
increasingly quick and complex competition for the provision of data and 
analysis – the more the ever-perfectibility of tools and practices is 
advocated, the more the arena for competition is enlarged and the more 
demanding the game becomes. This demand often comes from the very 
‘unskilled’ clients to whom donors have been exporting technical products, 
such as the g7+ itself. Hence, the same practices and skills that place 
certain analysts in a position of power have also the potential to be entry 
points for weakening and change. Meanwhile, the ability of g7+’s 
representatives to play the quantifying and classifying game has also taken 
a toll on some of what were supposed to be their main goals: How to fight 
off the negative connotations of the label? How to avoid over-quantification 
after creating a Fragility Assessment? How to ignore international 
databases when national offices have no other statistics to provide and 
assessments need to be filled out? How to escape the trap of setting 
common measures and targets and feed comparison once a group is 
constituted? I take stock of the different costs involved in all these 
dynamics and what they represent in terms of relations of symbolic power.  
 Discussing these nuanced and mutually impactful costs leads to a 
practical and relational approach to power; moreover, one that takes into 
account the authoritative and impactful position of the quantifying and 
classifying reasoning, while also considering the difficulties of analysing 
and countering such a subtle form of power. Therefore, I suggest this to be 
symbolic power, a power that is exerted through the recognition of the 
authority of its methods, and the misrecognition of its exercise as power. 









that counts on the complicity of those seen as least favoured by it2 − a 
recognition, misrecognition and complicity that were everywhere in the 
practices and skills discussed so far. 
 By analysing how quantifying and classifying practices are made 
flexible and ever-perfectible, I sought to highlight their mutant character. 
Accordingly, identifying, analysing and managing ‘fragile states’ are also 
ever-changing practices, in that they are based on ever-perfectible 
knowledge and skills. I suggest that the adaptations this ever-perfectibility 
invites are constantly negotiated, never consensual or given. To even 
negotiate, however, actors need to have crossed a threshold and have 
become players, being minimally versed and ‘competent’ in the style of 
thinking and doing political management of ‘fragile states’;3 and once 
players, they have different views of what their world should look like. 
Reversely, these different ‘worldmakings’ at play are intrinsically connected 
to the resources actors have and, thus, to the diverse impacts with which 
they are unequally affected. Essentially, thus, symbolic power is in that the 
authority of quantifying and classifying practices obfuscates their impact in 
both reinforcing quantification and classification as a threshold in the game 
and in providing authority to the label these practices help to generate. 
  I divide these elements into two main streams of analysis: I first 
analyse the weight the very threshold of quantification and classification 
has on the possibilities to play the game, thus looking at how actors 
become players. Second, I discuss what strategies these actors develop to 
advance their view of the issues at hand, and how they mobilise their 
capabilities and abilities for that matter. 
 I subsequently take both these analyses a step further, to look at 
how the symbolic power in the ‘fragile states’ agenda has been able to 
strengthen and expand the quantifying and classifying reasoning to the 
point of risking alienating or, rather, allowing the self-alienation of 
politicians, that is, the detachment of what I previously called the central 
tiers of the game from the tiers of politicians. I also look at how this 
expansion has entailed a subtle countermove from the g7+ itself to hold to 
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stories that representatives feel should not be quantified – but which can 
easily be lost precisely in the group’s quantifying tools.  
 Depictions of symbolic power are indeed to be blurred and nuanced, 
always relational and containing in themselves instances of moves in 
perhaps opposite directions. In this spirit, I argue that both the label and the 
quantification are corroborated, but also that by playing the g7+ creates for 
itself possibilities of moulding the changing common-sense, and most 
importantly, it generates pressures over experts to constantly produce and 
provide data that can be useful. These traps of effectiveness, I suggest, are 
important weakening points in the symbolic power discussed. 
   
1.  SYMBOLIC POWER AND NUANCES: WEAKENING FROM WITHIN 
 
The combination of the two previous chapters offers the realisation that 
ever-perfectible practices and ever-perfectible skills together create the 
enabling conditions for competition among providers: As seen, expertise in 
data and software are not authoritative if possessed only, they gain 
authority in use and in been seen as useful, hence, in being transmitted in 
the first place. After all, quantifying and classifying practices are developed 
towards management and ‘fixing’, thus, their products need to be used and 
they are improved through use itself, constantly adapting to ‘realistic’ 
procedures and expectations.  
 What is crucial to explore here is that the need to provide useful 
tools and analyses is a fundamental component of the relations of power in 
the agenda; it is the circulation and wandering of techniques and numbers 
that this need to provide invites that bring about the points of entry for 
weakening and changing power. As both skills and tools travel in time and 
space,4 they are no one’s indefinite monopoly. Davis, Kingsbury and Merry 
briefly acknowledge this point, but not the enormous relevance of it:5 
‘[T]hose with special expertise in the construction or analysis of indicators 
can overcome these impediments to technical contestation and exercise 
greater influence than they could in purely political settings.’6 In the last part 
of this chapter, I take issue with the ending of this quote, but for now it is 
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important to emphasise that there is a crucial possibility of exercising 
influence that becomes more fluid across different agencies, government 
offices and other groups. The wandering of quantifying and classifying 
practices, essential for their authority, is at the very core of their subtle 
weaknesses. This is a key feature of symbolic power, although seldom 
appreciated in Bourdieu’s work: ‘The actions necessary to ensure the 
continuation of power themselves help to weaken it.’7 
Bourdieu suggested that whenever there are no institutional 
mechanisms to guarantee the reproduction of power, power tends to be 
reproduced in a daily basis, taking a personal cost in direct investment.8 In 
my view, the very crucial transferable and mutant character of quantifying 
and classifying practices makes of them somewhat ‘non-institutional’ – at 
least in a more perennial and contained sense – but also highly 
competitive. On the one hand, taking part in the ‘fragile states’ agenda 
requires embracing the quantifying and classifying reasoning, as 
disengagement from such practices is too costly. On the other hand, the 
provision of measures becomes a demand in itself, going beyond the value 
of each method or tool, and creating a high price of engagement for 
producers: Guided by the practical sense in the style of thinking and doing 
political management of ‘fragile states’, they see themselves trapped into 
competition for the provision of such products, since the resource from 
which they derive authority is by necessity always travelling and ever 
changing. 
 Beyond the mere exercise of power, the notion of symbolic power 
involves a fundamental questioning of what it means to practice power in a 
subtle way. What makes of symbolic power power, even if subtle, is 
precisely its ability to derive authority from the ‘naturalness’ of its practices, 
exerting influence without openly manifesting it as such. This is, however, 
an exercise of practical sense, not of rationality; it is guided by a sense of 
the socially comfortable, a feeling for the game. When I combined insights 
from Bourdieu’s and Hacking’s work in chapter two it was precisely to 
disentangle the idea of power from programmatic strategies: The style of 
thinking & doing is that what works, and by working, it subtly hides the 
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mechanisms that make it possible. There is power in these mechanisms 
and in their practical hiding, and numbers are especially fit for such power. 
Without entering into too dense a philosophical debate, Porter’s words 
resonate well here: ‘Scientific objectivity’, such as that attributed to 
statistics, ‘provides answer to a moral demand for impartiality and fairness’ 
 – deciding without seeming to decide, as well said in another quote of his.9 
  In this sense, the idea of symbolic power implies a ‘social alchemy’, 
which takes place when resources through which power circulates are 
perceived as authoritative but not vehicles of domination as such.10 The 
practical sense in the quantifying and classifying reasoning would be a 
major catalyst for this alchemy, changing highly problematic measurements 
into quasi-scientific policy-making through the dazzle of attractive 
databases, visually provocative rankings, an avalanche of numbers,11 the 
automatism of software analyses and free international data banks – all 
following the metaphysics of correlation that not only dismisses the need for 
perfection, but actually embraces error, as long as properly measured and 
presented. In this style of thinking and doing, while numbers and categories 
create extremely relevant impacts, the subtlety, blurriness and un-authored 
way in which this happens dilutes perceptions of power. Moreover, as 
donors’ staff are pressured and trapped and as ‘fragile states’ recur to self-
labelling, the whole agenda seems fraught with too many caveats; not, 
however, if the caveats themselves illustrate a nuanced form of power in 
these dynamics, an understanding that opens space for looking at 
possibilities of weakening and change. To that effect, the idea of symbolic 
power is indeed uniquely eloquent. 
As seen in chapter two, the practical recognition and misrecognition 
of symbolic power are achieved both via objective and subjective means, 
by advancing a view of the world that somehow answers to the categories 
of perception and appreciation developed in the objective conditions of this 
world, and in this view being advanced by those who hold authoritative 
objective positions, that is, the resources or capitals valued in the game.12 
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Therefore, what follows is a self-evident world, what Bourdieu called 
‘doxa’.13 The capacity, urge and means to quantify and classify help to 
compose the political truth of ‘fragile states’ as quantifiable, classifiable and 
manageable. Most importantly, the objective and subjective practical 
impositions are subtle victories of symbolic power, exerted with the 
complicity of those who could be said to be most disfavoured by it.14 This is 
so exactly because the world of these actors is naturalised, since ways of 
perceiving the world are issued by the very structures of such world. That 
naturalisation, in turn, combined with the lack of certain resources makes of 
disengagement not only too costly but simply not comfortably envisaged.15  
Bourdieu called this relational or even circular reasoning structural 
constructivism – not far removed, I suggest, from the circularity Hacking 
identifies in his own take on style of thinking & doing. Fundamentally, the 
recognition of authority and naturalisation or misrecognition stem from 
internal canons, which means that reasonableness is itself contingent and 
contextual –  what is socially comfortable, as simply but powerfully phrased 
by Bowker and Star.16 
 I focus here on what, in my view, is the richest and most interesting 
part of Bourdieu’s work on symbolic power, which is precisely in being 
coherent with a view of the world where practical sense answers to 
ontological complicity and, thus, where possibilities and constraints are 
necessarily related and relational, constantly negotiated and re-generated. 
Accordingly and crucially in this research, classifiers and classified are as 
flawed oppositions as structure and agency, and the classification implies 
power as much as it contains the mechanisms to weaken or change it. 
While power is commonly attached only to an understanding of forceful 
engagement, which is the centre of many politically sceptical approaches to 
the topic of ‘fragile states’, symbolic power is in the nuanced forms through 
which engagement and disengagement are constantly balanced, and most 
importantly, not imposed to do so but led by the force and subtlety of 
practical expectations.  
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2.  THE THRESHOLD OF QUANTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION:   
BECOMING PLAYERS 
 
The first step in analysing the symbolic power in the ‘fragile states’ agenda 
is based on looking more precisely at who the actors involved are and how 
they were able to qualify as players in the game of ‘state fragility’ 
classification, that is, what capitals they bring to identify, analyse and fix 
‘fragile states’. In this section, I analyse the role quantification and 
classification have in turning actors into players and how the recognition of 
the authority of the methods in quantification and classification turn these 
methods into gatekeepers of the agenda themselves. In the case of the 
g7+, I look at the role of Finance Ministers in the foundation of the group as 
the actors who were able to play the quantifying and classifying game, thus 
crossing the threshold and allowing the g7+ to become a player. I also 
discuss how it was possible for the group to adopt such contentious a label 
as ‘fragile state’ has been. In addition, in the case of what I call official and 
unofficial quantifying experts, that is, staff from inside or outside donor 
agencies, I look precisely at how this quantifying and classifying threshold 
expands the possibilities of becoming players to quantifiers previously 
outside the agenda, thus, also increasing the competition to provide data. 
This is all central to understanding later what strategies these actors seek, 
considering the capitals they hold, to advance their own take on the 
classification of ‘fragile states’. 
 
2.1. THE G7+ AND ITS FINANCE MINISTRIES:  
       EMBRACING QUANTIFICATION AND THE ‘FRAGILE STATES’ LABEL 
Externals and internals to the g7+ suggest that it was crucial for its 
successes that the group started by the action of Finance Ministers:17 
 
It was important that they were ministers of Finance, not diplomats; they can 
talk about what they are really doing. When you can actually link dollars with 
priorities, you show you know what you are talking about. They also carry some 
legitimacy because they are the ones making decisions.
18
 
Maybe that‘s how Ministers of Finance work, making things happen. We are 
action people, we go out, we want results, maybe that’s what we do. I was never 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, so I don’t know. Maybe they are tied to politics. We 
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are not very much tied to politics. We pick up the phone. They write documents. 
They are very much into protocol. We are very pragmatic.
19
 
As those who ultimately decide on the allocation of scarce 
resources from development assistance, and those who command the 
ministries where ‘development directorates’ are usually located, the 
Finance Ministers of the g7+ do seem to have ‘credibility’, as Wyeth says, 
in carrying the message of the group. Vanessa Wyeth, now head of OECD-
INCAF, worked for the International Peace Institute (IPI) providing support 
for the then Liberian Finance Minister, Amara Konneh, in the High Level 
meeting in Busan, when the g7+ was officially announced. According to 
Wyeth, the moment was fit for the foundation of the g7+ mainly and 
precisely due to the strong participation of Finance Ministers.20 
They know how to play the aid game; they can engage the donors in their level, 
they speak their language. This is very important. These people are technocrats 
with many connections. Emília Pires worked with the World Bank in [Timor-
Leste], Sofia Borges [Timorese ambassador to the UN] is married to a high senior 
UN official [chief of UN OCHA’s Policy Development and Studies Branch]; Sarah 
Cliffe and Emília are friends too.
21
 
 In fact, one can notice that also and crucially, donor staff who have 
experience working directly with key representatives in what are now g7+ 
offices have climbed up to central positions in donor agencies, such as the 
case of Wyeth herself, but also, as seen, Sarah Cliffe (previous head of the 
Fragile States Unit in the World Bank and now in the Civil Capacities Group 
in the UN), Ozong Agborsangaya-Fiteu (Senior Officer in the CCSD) and 
Claire Leigh (Head of the ODI’s partnership with the g7+). All of them have 
worked directly with g7+ representatives, providing logistic support, 
background papers and platforms of exchange, before or at the very 
beginning when the g7+ was being established. 
 Coming back to the key role of Finance Ministries in the advance of 
the g7+, it is important to notice both the many obstacles and the 
expectations attached to such ministries in ‘fragile states’, especially in the 
case of Timor-Leste. As the previous chapter showed, the Finance Ministry 
in Timor-Leste was the institution to which the highest expectations of 
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donors were attached. The Ministry was said to have been designed largely 
by Bretton Woods institutions with a ‘world class’ management system, and 
the sector received a large proportion of the aid allocated by development 
agencies.22 Moreover, as it is generally the case in other ‘fragile states’, the 
Timorese Finance Ministry is in charge of coordinating development 
assistance and aid effectiveness, and it is the home of the National 
Statistics Directorate, thus coordinating quantitative research on key 
aspects of the government and its relation with donors.23  
 In addition, during the period when the UN was acting in the 
country, many key government figures, such as Minister Emília Pires 
herself, as the quote above says, were in close contact with staff from the 
main development agencies, through the many committees formed to 
allegedly include nationals in decision-making (see chapter three). 
Furthermore, and as said by the minister herself in the famous Accra 
speech mentioned in chapter three, there were at the beginning more than 
250 donors representatives in her office at one time, a boom of interest that 
is acknowledged by many.24 The Finance Ministry was the institution that 
most needed the quantifying skills to follow the work of these many donors 
and to program their own priorities and projects, and also the ministry that 
most criticised the assistance provided by donors. As seen, the initiative to 
become a pilot country in the OECD-INCAF’s Monitoring the Principles for 
International Engagement in Fragile States25 came exactly from the 
perception that the Finance Ministry did not know what donors were doing 
in the country: They had no central database for development assistance 
and donors projects, and no M&E system at place to follow what was being 
done by donors. 
 Data is a necessity for both international actors and the Government to 
 guide intervention and public policy. Without quantitative and qualitative, 
 timely and evidentiary data, it is near impossible to accurately determine 
 intervention or the necessity and impact of an intervention in the short, 
 medium or long term. Timor-Leste has consistently debated reports 
 which have used outdated data and statistics…The Government  considers 
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 the support of accurate data collection one of the single most important 
 contributions that international actors can make at any stage in 
 development in order to determine intervention and budget accordingly.26 
 
 Signed by Minister Emília Pires in a feedback letter attached to the 
IEG evaluation of the work of the World Bank in Timor-Leste, the document 
quoted above is illustrative of how the Timorese Finance Ministry has often 
felt both compelled to generate data and to find the support to do it as well 
as the international standards required. I suggest this position, shared with 
the Ministry of Finance of other member countries, was key in the 
establishment of the g7+, providing the tools for the group to cross the 
quantifying and classifying threshold in(to) the ‘fragile states’ agenda. In 
fact, quantification is central in Finance Ministries in general, and in the 
case of Timor-Leste this Ministry was key in establishing the National 
Strategies and other fundamental directives in the still young country, often 
going against the advice offered by donors.27 The Finance Ministry was 
also the institution to conduct the first quantitative national researches, like 
the Household Survey (see chapter four), seemly paving the way for more 
ownership in crucial data collection and management in the country.28 
Indeed, such national initiatives are reason for pride in many ‘fragile states’, 
as was the case of the Fragility Assessments themselves. 
 
The Timor-Leste Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2011 is the 
first survey of this type ever conducted in the country. It is also special in 
the sense that it was undertaken entirely by the staff of the National 
Directorate of Statistics and funded from national resources. Only limited 
and occasional technical assistance was provided from abroad.29 
 Taking a broader view, it is important to highlight that all focal points 
of the g7+ in member countries work in the Ministry of Finance. The 
representative who was nominated the new chair of the g7+ in 2014 is 
Kaifala Marah, Minister of Finance and Economic Development of Sierra 
Leone. In addition, the Fragility Assessments are conducted chiefly by the 
statistical offices of these ministries in pilot countries. Hence, I suggest the 
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quantifying and classifying reasoning so central in the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda was nowhere more present than in Finance Ministries. 
Furthermore, their role in kick-starting the group, I argue, was thus a major 
factor in making the g7+ able to play the game. Founded by Finance 
Ministries, the group was already well positioned to cross the threshold into 
the ‘fragile states’ agenda to at least become a player in the game. 
 
TAKING A BUREAUCRATIC STANCE ON THE LABEL 
Also important, I suggest this position, based on the bureaucratic power of 
Finance Ministries, has been fundamental in giving the g7+’s 
representatives the possibility to embrace the ‘fragile states’ label that 
diplomats and Foreign Offices could not afford to adopt, due to political 
constraints. This is not to say the label is not contentious inside the group; 
in fact the dissidence within the g7+ and the strategies to win ever more 
cohesiveness despite this dissidence are discussed in detail in the next 
section. However, I suggest the fact that the label was adopted at all is very 
much linked to the fact that the group was founded and is materially 
supported by Finance Ministries.  
 The g7+’s official position so far has been to leave room for internal 
dissidence, while managing to retain the official external identity of the 
group. 
We didn’t decide to call ourselves ‘fragile’; we knew we were ‘fragile’…But we 
say we’re easy. They can call themselves anything they like. Some say they are 
less resilient or more vulnerable. Others say ‘fragile’, we don’t have an issue. We 
don’t go about all these names…
30
 
 There is also an attempt to reframe the label or redefine it. Indeed, 
representatives have been emphatic in saying they use the label in their 
own way. 
Our definition is... It's like a child, we are still young. If you are ten years old, how 
can you have all institutions in place? It's not strong, that is it.
31
 
We have our own definition of the label. Countries which need more care, more 
support. We make an analogy with a glass of champagne: if you don’t handle 
with care, it can break.
32
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 Slowly and only in 2013 was an official definition more clearly 
formulated and adopted in an official document: 
 
A state of fragility can be understood as a period of time during nationhood 
when sustainable socio-economic development requires greater emphasis 
on  complementary peacebuilding and statebuilding activities such as 
building inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good 
management of resources, and accountable and fair service delivery.33 
 
 
 The change was subtle but doubly relevant:34 
We are struggling with the labels now and we prefer ‘situation, but we are not 
so much trying to change as we are trying to redefine it. So, for example, political 
issues such as legitimacy are avoided. Instead of ‘legitimate politics’, we use 
‘inclusive politics’, because some politicians don’t like being considered part of 
an ‘illegitimate’ government, of course. 
 The definition has been growing steady as the group establishes 
itself; definition, expectations and the group itself have walked hand in hand 
(I come back to this point ahead). Indeed, while the official discourse is that 
g7+ countries can use whatever label they prefer at least internally, there 
have been roadshows, meetings and much internal talk in attempts to get 
buy-in from all ministries in all countries and to gain increasing unity for the 
group.35 Nevertheless, I suggest the source of strength of the g7+ is also so 
far its source of weakness or limitations: The dissidence regarding the 
label, for instance, is said to be founded mainly in the fact that so far the 
engagement in the agenda and with the g7+ has been led by Finance 
Ministers, without the participation of Foreign Affairs. 
There are historical issues in the agenda...these were ministries of Finance 
mostly, and they were the ones who carried the New Deal. They had then a 
problem bringing this message to other politicians. In a meeting, for example, 
the Finance Minister of South Sudan said they have been having difficulties 
selling the terminology. Same thing with DRC – but that is just the label.
36
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The language really depends on the context; there are different connotations. In 
diplomacy, the label is trickier. We have been speaking to the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and now they understand it, they have been more flexible.
37
 
 In the next section, I look specifically at the strategies around the 
quantification and the label itself. Here it is important to emphasise the fact 
that the Finance Ministries, with their statistical reasoning and less 
problematic political positioning, have been at the centre of the g7+’s 
foundation and development. The symbolic power is in that the g7+, 
through its members’ Finance Ministries, has found the capitals necessary 
to become a player in the classification of ‘fragile states’, but with that the 
group has now to thread carefully in defining the contours of the common-
sense they want to advance, avoiding the pitfalls of over-quantification and 
managing the costs of corroborating the game through the labelling. 
 It would not be symbolic power though if there were not pressures 
as well over those who are yet seen as most favoured by the agenda. 
Contrary to common sense, I suggest these other actors are better called 
‘quantifying experts’ exactly to highlight the pressures that have eliminated 
the barriers around donor agencies, opening space to many experts able 
to, simply, quantify. 
 
2.2. QUANTIFYING EXPERTS: OPEN DATA AND THE TRAPS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 
A key entry point of weakening or change in the balancing of engagement 
and disengagement, that is, in symbolic power, is not without irony. The 
merge of the quantifying and classifying reasoning with the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda has paved the way to make data absolutely central in the 
development initiatives towards’ fragile states’. With that came the practical 
pressure to make data available to be further used – if development is the 
ultimate goal, it became reasonable to expect that data from the 
governments and from major donors are made more transparent and 
available. This practical sense culminated in ‘open governments’ 
initiatives38 and also in a general ‘open data’ move that has encompassed 
major donor institutions. Open data is defined by the World Bank as 
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‘technically’ and ‘legally open’.39 The irony is in that the more the World 
Bank, OECD and other donors open their databases and advocate for open 
data policies in ‘fragile states’, the more pressure there is to be constantly 
up-to-date with the competition, represented by any other experts able to 
quantify. In turn, the open data rationale pushed the quantifying and 
classifying reasoning even further, turning data into something 
‘glamorous’,40 desirable and essential for all aspects of development.  
 ‘Fragile states’’ offices now facing the demand for open data can 
choose from an increasing array of providers, from think tanks, university 
research groups, private companies and consultants – as in the case of the 
Development Gateway software discussed in the previous chapter –
besides the usual big donors, all taken on board due to their statistical 
capacity. The power to classify with its authority based on quantification 
ironically trespasses the borders of donor agencies and invites in other 
quantifying experts, opening competition among highly-skilled staff of 
diverse organisations. The nuanced features of symbolic power are exactly 
in these dynamics: While the competition is open enough among these 
experts to create weakening pressures over the positions of ‘official’ 
donors’ staff, it is far from open enough to become ‘democratic’. The 
unbalance of skills between these experts and ‘self-quantifiers’ in ‘fragile 
states’ guarantees the symbolic power is power – ‘one person’s 
infrastructure is another’s brick wall, or in some cases, one person’s brick 
wall is another’s object of demolition.’41 
 As data becomes a necessary and valued raw product, the ‘new 
oil’,42 open for grabs to be further re-worked and used in the making of 
other products, and as numbers and classifications travel, competition 
develops in many different directions. Indeed, who knows who can take the 
next interesting step with data produced by other parties?  
I look at one example of these dynamics to better illustrate who 
these quantifying experts are and how some of them, externals to ‘official’ 
donor agencies, become allowed in the ‘fragile states’ agenda, making the 
position of donors’ staff as quantifiers and classifiers less guaranteed. It is 
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important to clarify that what I call quantifying experts is the ensemble of 
‘official’ donors’ staff and any other quantifying experts that somehow 
become players in the agenda. The issue being precisely that this 
ensemble is not a given, but constantly negotiated and changed, and that 
‘fragile states’, as users of data, become crucial in these negotiations – the 
nuances the notion of symbolic power invites. 
 
OPEN SEASON ON OPEN DATA 
One example of these negotiations or, rather, of how they open space for 
external experts, can be found in the urge to create international platforms 
based on open data and open source software to allegedly facilitate and 
improve governance in ‘fragile states’. This kind of initiative very much 
counts on data produced by major donors being free but does not, in any 
way, guarantees that such producers will have a relevant role in the use of 
it. Moreover, the specific project discussed here relies on requests by the 
g7+, taken by quantifying experts to represent windows of opportunity to 
gain new territories in the agenda.  
The previous chapter briefly mentioned the request made by the 
g7+ to the CCSD, in the World Bank, for assistance in the development of 
strategies for their extractive industries, which also involved assistance in 
the establishment of mechanisms of ‘fragile to fragile’ cooperation. The 
request led the CCSD to form a partnership with the UNEP in a project 
entitled Geo-mapping Extractive Resources in the g7+ Fragile States.43 The 
request of the g7+ was first addressed by the WBI, followed by a workshop 
organised in 2012.  
 
We [the WBI] help with capacity-building in three ways. The first is through 
knowledge exchange. One example is the extractive sector. We connect g7+ 
countries which are new to the industry. South Sudan, for example, needed 
guidance. Timor-Leste could participate. We connect ministries of natural 
resources, procurement sectors, we brought Ghana as well, which has stronger 
governance capacity in the extractive industry. But Timor went well through its 
transition, so we can learn with that as well. The second thing is that we offer 
innovation. We offer a report or we offer dynamic maps, infomedia, interactive 
spatial and temporal information. This helps the dialogue with the population as 
well. And third, we help with collaboration: We usually offer support to 
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governments, we try to create collaboration among all stakeholders, help with 
coalition building. We are one of the few who have been providing capacity and 
support to the g7+ in the last few years.
44
 
 In collaboration, the WBI, CCSD, the Open Data sector of the World 
Bank, UNEP and the g7+ have agreed the project would take off with the 
following plan:  
 The primary purpose and long term goal of the proposed mapping platform 
 would be to become the global data repository and international standard 
 for boundary and ownership information for all extractive industry 
 concessions and contracts in fragile states.45  
 
As additional contributions, the coordinators envisage the platform 
can work as an example of ‘innovative’ big data46 and it would support the 
monitoring of indicators post-2015.47 What is interesting about it for the 
discussion here is that the project in practice counts on having constant 
access to open data. The working draft states that generating data is 
excessively expensive and that the ‘rate of change of open source mapping 
software’48 is simply too high, that is, such softwares change too often for 
the platform to be fit for one type of software only.49 The platform would 
invest in ‘developing data layers that are compatible with open source 
standards and that can be used by all open source mapping platforms 
going forward.’50 For this reason, 80 percent of the total costs go for design, 
data management and, crucially, maintaining relationship with data 
providers and users (I come back to this last point ahead).51 If almost none 
of the investment will be directed at generating or buying data is because 
the international platform will count on open data becoming a largely 
available component.  
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It is not surprising, thus, that the initiative was presented by 
Agborsangaya-Fiteu, from the WBI, in an international conference held in 
March 2014, with the aim to create a Blueprint for Immediate and Long-
Term Spatial Data Needs of Post-Crisis Government, especially targeting 
‘fragile states’. The event was organised by the Center for International 
Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) and the Earth Institute, both at 
Columbia University, and participants included technical experts from 
Google, the UNEP, the African development Bank and g7+ representatives, 
including Minister Emília Pires and Helder da Costa, from Timor-Leste and 
the g7+ secretariat, among other analysts from think tanks, NGOs and 
private companies.52 The coordinators53 argue the project is necessary to 
address important issues in the ‘fragile states’ agenda.  
Knowing what questions to ask and understanding the issues and needs of 
a country context is critical to the process of understanding what data to 
collect and how to apply it…Fragile states governments haven't found a 
way to secure the data revolution dividend in a lasting manner.54 
 
 
Most importantly, it is suggested there is a need to understand what 
specific data from this set could be produced and used in which specific 
‘stages of fragility’, an area of future work in the project. Therefore, spatial 
data is argued to be of extreme relevance for policy-making, remedying the 
‘information vacuum’ in which ‘fragile states’ are said to make decisions 
and providing tailored inputs for development solutions.55  
 The support offered by the experts who coordinated the project 
involved the creation of an ‘independent international advisory group’ and a 
‘technical support unit’. In addition, there is an expectation to raise core 
funds and to have an ‘administrative agent to accept projects funds’.56 Both 
kinds of support were requested and said to be welcome by the g7+ 
representatives present in the conference, seemly an attempt to address 
the perceived lack of understanding by g7+ officers themselves of how 
spatial data can be useful for their governments.  
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At present, fragile countries are unable to articulate their needs clearly and 
to craft cost-effective strategies for whole of government activities. The g7+ 
member states request ongoing independent advisory services based on 
[a] lack of understanding of spatial data means and their associated 
benefits toward cost-effective strategies. They request support with 
evaluations of their own needs and of those external actors offering 
services.57 
 
 The project also requests that ‘data created in the context of 
development projects is repatriated to the government for further use.’58 
The donors and coordinators involved are supposed to raise funds for the 
initiative, select and develop pilot studies with g7+ countries, which will be 
submitted for analysis by the governments in question and the secretariat 
of the group, and support countries with specific data collection and 
analysis, not to mention offering the technical and supposedly independent 
advisory support in the form of the working groups requested.59  
 Nevertheless, so far the OECD, although allegedly seen as an 
internationally valued body for data production and analysis, has not been 
involved. The World Bank itself contributed for the ‘expert consultation’ by 
presenting its Geo-mapping project, but it is not clear what its role would be 
in the international platform of spatial data for ‘fragile states’.  
These absences and ambiguities in regards to OECD and the World 
Bank, in terms of participation in the project, are an eloquent component of 
the symbolic power in the style of thinking and doing political management 
of ‘fragile states’. The World Bank, for instance, has made huge 
investments in open data, perhaps helping to turn it into an acceptable and 
desired policy for other providers through its immense datasets made freely 
available.60 Thus, its non-guaranteed place in a platform such as that 
promoted by CIESIN, after the presentation of an existing related project, 
invokes the caveats that so subtly compose symbolic power. The World 
Bank was an earlier official advocate of open data, an initiative supported 
by president Zoellick. In fact, this was considered something to be proud of 
among the Data Sector staff. Neil Fantom, one of the coordinators of the 
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Open Data Initiative in the Bank, proudly published an amusing picture with 
Zoellick in an event to celebrate the initiative. 
 
 




Two key achievements of the project are said to be that now the 
Bank can publish to the International Aid Transparency Initiative’s registry 
and can engage with indicators on development progress.62 However, the 
same dear idea of open data places the World Bank in a somewhat non-
institutional position: Open data does not hold the institutional mechanisms 
that might guarantee a privileged position in terms of data analysis and use, 
at least not as much as other kinds of tools; in fact, any such position needs 
to be fought case by case with direct engagement. As the style of thinking 
& doing evolved to make of data a ‘raw’ product, it becomes less of a given 
what will be made of it.63  
The data provided in the Geo-mapping project is open and can be 
used in international projects like the ‘Blueprint for fragile states’ spatial 
data platform without its accuracy, usefulness, quality or reputation been 
any kind of guarantee that the World Bank itself would play a role in the 
platform initiative. Moreover, much depends on the g7+’s requests: The 
platform needs to be seen as useful (and be indeed used), and the kind of 
data to be made available needs to somehow be seen as interesting by the 
countries in the g7+, which requested the assistance in the first place.  
This is not to say g7+’s officers have somehow a superior power to 
influence and mould the process, but that donors do not hold this power, 
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much less alone. Users become vital for the power of the methods donors 
themselves are so prone to exalt and develop. The influences are still 
asymmetric – hence, power – but importantly blurred.  
The style of thinking & doing has been set to increasingly take into 
account also the visual aspect of quantification and classification, which 
turned it all so tempting to make such attractive products openly available. 
The reasoning, the technologies, the comfortable are all essential elements 
to make this circularity ‘work’. Nonetheless, open data implies by nature a 
lack of institutional restraints for use, re-work and re-aggregation. What we 
see then is that the end-use of such products are chased up by quantifying 
experts, led to pursuit and somehow dispute the chance to make interesting 
use of their own data. This is a crucial aspect of symbolic power; the power 
to represent the world and the authority to convey this representation are 
constantly fought for in subtle terms. Moreover, the number of players in 
this case has been increasing exponentially, as the ‘fragile states’ agenda 
creates the conditions to embrace ‘unofficial’ quantifying experts and 
reduces the ‘certainty’ in the role of ‘official’ ones. 
In the case illustrated, open data is eagerly flowing towards the 
‘vacuum of information’ in ‘fragile states’, subtly reinforcing the notion of 
‘state fragility’ but also subtly placing donors in less guaranteed positions of 
direct influence. Providing (open) data is ever more essential in generating 
authority for engagement in the agenda; the very high position accorded by 
the ‘blueprint’ project to the relationship with data providers is an important 
sign of this. However, disengagement is a constant risk, against which 
donors need to fight case by case, by providing always more data and 
attempting to secure a position on the uses made of it.  
2.3. THE RISKY BUSINESS OF POSITIONS 
 
What these two sub-sections sought to highlight, together, is the 
uncertainty and nuances the symbolic power invites. Through its authority, 
symbolic power established the threshold which actors need to cross to 
become players. However, through its subtlety, it also make the position of 
players a less guaranteed one, as symbolic power brings within it its very 









of Finance Ministries, or through the traps of effectiveness in open data. 
Therefore, actors are constantly engaged in practices that simultaneously 
attempt to avoid re-disengagement (losing ground), while also trying to 
shape the change to come. The following two sections focus on how these 
attempts take place. 
 
3.  STRATEGIES AROUND THE LABEL:  
‘THEY’,  ‘WE’,  DISAGREEMENTS AND THE BLURRINESS EVERYWHERE 
 
As symbolic power in the style of thinking and doing political management 
of ‘fragile states’ unfolds by both retaining the authority in its methods by 
managing the costs of its subtle influence, a crucial step in understanding 
symbolic power is in looking at how these costs are managed considering 
the positions of actors. Sticking to the relational approach advocated so far, 
I do not focus on the actors, but on the issues in which their efforts seems 
to be most strenuous – therefore, indicating more is at stake: the 
quantification and the classification or labelling itself. I suggest these are 
the realms in which the g7+ and the quantifying experts most intensely try 
to shape the changes to come, thus, those are realms that very much 
illustrate the symbolic power at play. 
 
DESCRIPTION AND PRESCRIPTION: THE WAYS OF SYMBOLIC POWER 
 
The complicity of the g7+ with the labelling is central in the symbolic power 
I identify. In this sense, I suggest a rich way to portray this component of 
power in symbolic power comes from the combination of ideas of 
description and prescription.64 Together they allow analysing precisely how 
label, labelling and group compose one another.  
 In the ‘fragile states’ agenda, politically sceptical critics are right to 
point at the heavy impact labels with such negative connotation have on the 
way international politics are played out around those so-named. The 
nuances of such impacts, however, are many and extremely important. On 
one hand, the price of disengagement with the classification is high: 
Ignoring the style of thinking & doing political management of ‘fragile 
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states’, with its quantifying and classifying reasoning, implies leaving aside 
the possibilities of somewhat directing the work of ever-perfectibility. On the 
other hand, the price of engagement with this style of thinking & doing is to 
corroborate the reasoning that helps to compose ‘state fragility’ as a 
political truth. Hence, it means to be accomplice, for instance, in practically 
defining what the offices in ‘fragile states’ can measure and in establishing 
how ‘fragility’ can be overcome – through quantified methods. These two 
prices are connected by the ability of symbolic power to turn description 
and prescription of a group into one and the same: 
[I]t is in the constitution of groups that we best see the efficiency of 
representations, particularly those of the words, words of order, the 
theories that contribute to make the social order by imposing principles of 
di-vision, and in general, the symbolic power of all political theatre that 
executes and officialises the visions of the world and the political 
divisions.65 
 
 For Bourdieu, scientific practices have the power to produce a 
‘theory effect’, by representing the world in such coherent and empirical 
form (description) that not only a representation is created but also the 
conditions for practices to erupt in engagement with this representation, 
positively or negatively, but in either way constructing the world itself 
(prescription).66 When those in the group labelled adopt practices of either 
refutation or acceptance of the label, the engagement helps to corroborate 
one vision of the world and its divisions by acknowledging the existence of 
the category. Moreover, this acknowledgement of either type is more likely 
to occur if the category easily corresponds to the modes of perception and 
appreciation actors practically acquired and developed. In the case of 
quantification, Porter eloquently puts it: ‘As with the methods of natural 
science, the quantitative technologies used to investigate social and 
economic life work best if the world they aim to describe can be remade in 
their image;’67 that is, the world and the category, inseparable, have equal 
potential to influence each other and just as much.  
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 In Bourdieu’s formulation, this regards the complementarity of 
objective and the subjective stakes in the symbolic power, which gives 
‘authority’ a central role in the production of di-vision in the world. The 
authority is as reliant on actors’ positions as it is on the potential of the 
representation itself to make the world self-evident.68 Hacking has worked 
along the same line, highlighting the crucial peculiarity of the interaction of 
labels with human kinds.69 Since the notion of human kinds would not 
necessarily fit the idea of groups in general, such as the g7+, I need to be 
careful in tracing a comparison between Bourdieu’s ‘theory effect’ and 
Hacking’s ‘looping effect’. That said, however, the mechanisms of 
engagement and disengagement, description and prescription are so 
commonly appropriate to both that comparison to that extent can be rich.   
For Hacking, the interaction of a label produced in a style of thinking 
and doing with a certain human kind/group has the potential to create a 
looping effect, by which kind and knowledge grow together: Cause, 
classification, and intervention are ‘of a piece’.70 He sees cause here as 
‘practical causality’ and intervention as a general form of management. 
Both are intrinsically connected, as practical causality would be the thinking 
and doing in terms of principles that one can use to interfere and manage, 
which he accords close proximity with economics. Moreover, the two 
elements are fundamental in defining the label:  
[T]o acquire and use a name for any kind is, among other things, to be 
willing to make generalizations and form expectations about things of that 
kind. We should take for granted that guessing at causes goes hand in 
hand with increasingly precise definition.71  
 
Thus, labels, definitions, causes, expectations and the group itself 
also are of a piece, together measured and together managed. Here, the 
discussion in chapter four comes to mind, as the multiplication of sub-
labels, correlations and proposed fixtures walk hand by hand. To think of 
these dynamics in broader terms, Bourdieu’s synthesis is powerful: ‘The 
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categories according to which a group thinks of itself and according to 
which it represents its own reality contribute to the reality of the group.’72 
 Symbolic power, therefore, describes and prescribes, being power 
because it is able to create a balancing between the high prices of both 
engagement and disengagement. Engagement is somewhat complicity; 
disengagement is ‘heretic’, as Bourdieu phrases it, implying political 
struggle.73 I suggest the self-labelling and self-measurement of ‘fragile 
states’ so far have had within parts of both – a heretic complicity, defining 
of and defined by symbolic power. 
The balance between engagement and disengagement is, 
therefore, a practical understanding of the costs and gains in making 
description and prescription into one piece. In the following I analyse 
instances of this balancing by looking at the strategies actors put into 
practice in what regards the labelling, to subsequently discuss strategies 
around quantification. 
3.1. WE, THE FRAGILE STATES 
If the coming change in the world is to be moulded, symbolic power is in the 
exercise of an influence that practically attempts to secure for one or 
another actor the most significant power over how this moulding will take 
place. As the g7+ plays the game, there is a constant but subtle struggle 
over how exactly the commonality of ‘fragility’ should be played out. 
 Interviewees stated there has been considerable pressure from 
donors for the g7+ to speed up the development of common indicators,74 
which would, of course, fit perfectly with the style of thinking and doing 
political management of ‘fragile states’: Common indicators would facilitate 
commensuration and comparison, hence, also enabling ranking in the 
name of the need of donors to establish priorities. The said pressure of 
donors over the issue of common indicators – as opposed to country-
indicators, as seen – is hardly something obviously stated and one can 
assume it is probably carefully managed in private meetings and 
conversations. However, the subtle defensive positions by g7+ 
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representatives in meetings seem to almost silently answer to these 
demands, as instantiated in the quote below by a g7+ officer during an 
OECD-INCAF meeting: 
We have to be sensitive in not imposing indicators that are not useful for some 
countries. We should focus on ground realities, and development partners 
should take this into account. There is also a sense of progress that needs to be 
undertaken in countries that are not being piloted. The deal is overarching, 
everyone agreed to it.
75
 
 The group has systematically avoided mechanisms that might 
facilitate comparison among member countries and rankings. The g7+ 
states, for instance, that even if the Fragility Spectrum is the basis of the 
much quantitative Fragility Assessment, it should be seen as a qualitative 
tool, which ‘attempts to understand the specific stage a country may be in, 
taking into account the overall transition process underway.’76 The main 
document on the Fragility Spectrum warns of the danger that donors may 
see it instead as a quantitative tool and use it for comparison and ranking: 
‘It is important to continue to emphasize that the fragility spectrum is 
predominantly a tool for internal benchmarking and it is not intended to rank 
countries at a particular level.’77 In order to avoid these possible uses of the 
Spectrum and Assessment, the g7+ argues standard quantitative indicators 
should be avoided, just as no g7+ country should be placed entirely in one 
category of the Spectrum: ‘The strength of the fragility spectrum lies in 
assessing the different dimensions and increasing sensitivity to the linkages 
between them, which will get lost if countries are placed wholly in one 
particular stage.’78 Most interestingly, the document on the Spectrum says 
that the way two g7+ countries are in the same stage is qualitatively 
different from one another. The key is in that instead of generic stages of 
‘fragility’, the g7+ advocates a mutant analysis of ‘experiences’:  
[B]oth the consolidated spectrum and indicators menu will continue to be 
living documents, constantly evolving to reflect the manner in which fragility 
is experienced in fragile states and the measures that fragile states feel are 
relevant in helping them progress to resilience.79 
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 One aspect is highly eloquent of the reasons why a warning by the 
g7+ against comparison has been perceived as necessary: South Sudan’s 
and Sierra Leone’s – not Timor-Leste’s – Fragility Assessment, which were 
highly supported by donors, both offer a subtle comparison with other 
countries that conducted pilot studies (although avoiding exclusively 
allocated stages in the Spectrum): 
   
 




In addition, South Sudan’s and Sierra Leone’s assessments, as 
opposed to the Timorese one, offer a list of common indicators at the end 
of their reports.81  
It would be fruitless to attempt to trace the influences of each donor 
representative in each part of every Assessment produced so far, 
considering the mix composition of working groups, the presence of 
consultants, steps of revision and so on.82 Nonetheless, the fact that at the 
time of these reports the g7+ was chaired by Timor-Leste, in the figure of 
Finance Minister Emília Pires, is telling, just as the country’s long claim for 
more ownership in development assistance. 
What is important to consider is that common indicators became 
expected as the g7+ consolidated itself as a group. Since its inception, the 
group’s stated strength was precisely in their shared experiences with 
‘fragility’: ‘We are all emerging from fragility and have been affected by 
conflict.’83 I suggest that as the group consolidated the ‘we’ in such 
circumstances, the g7+ indeed helped to create it, for good and for worse.  
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The reality of our existence as conflict-affected states often comes into 
play whenever we try to meet. In a euphoric party after the g7+ Busan 
meeting, Guinea Bissau’s Minister of Economy, Planning and Regional 
Integration, Helena Nosoline Embaló, graciously offered on behalf of her 
country to host the g7+ ministerial meeting in 2012. In New York earlier in 
the year, we became concerned for her safety during unrest in her country, 
but were relieved to find that she was well, but had been detained and was 
unable to leave her country. One of our ‘focal points’ from Somalia recently 
avoided a suicide bombing that injured others who were with him. At each 
event our Afghani friends overcome many challenges to be with us. And 
yet each time they turn up with determination, enthusiasm and a smile. I 
am indeed very proud of our g7+ family.84 
 
 Many suggest the cohesiveness of the group is in fact a comfort, 
and that is one of the very reasons offered to explain how the g7+ was born 
in the first place, out of a sense of commonality of experiences and 
challenges. 
When we came together [in 2008, Accra], we found out we had so many 
similarities... Shouldn't we maybe share our experiences: ‘How did you solve this 
problem...? This is how I did…’ So we wouldn't feel we are alone. And then it just 
developed through... We should have a voice and a position on this, because this 
is a policy that affects all of us. We needed to know we were not alone…At the 
beginning, it was very hard. It felt like we were backwards, or there was 
something wrong with us... But we said ‘no, there is nothing wrong with us. It's 
the situation we ended up in, we are all human beings, should all be respected 
and look at each other as normal human beings, and you happened to be born in 
a country that was not correct [sic], so now that you are there, you want to fix it, 
let's give hands to each other’. So we tried that... and slowly we managed not to 
feel this complex of inferiority, guilt, whatever... It is like... ‘Hey, I am here to fix 
it, nobody is forcing me, I want to do it myself, and I want to do it because no one 




 The price of this engagement, however, is to powerfully create 
‘fragile states’ as a political truth, with the accompanying expectation that 
the g7+ generate common indicators to not only firmly establish differences 
in problems and rates of progress among members but also to clearly 
enclose ‘state fragility’ issues in one clear-cut group, differentiating it, for 
instance, from ‘other developing countries’.  
 
The passage from the stage of practical group to the stage of instituted 
group…supposes the construction of a principle of classification capable of 
producing the set of distinct properties that are characteristics of the 
collection of all members in the group and the annulment, at the same 
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time, of the set of inappropriate properties that a group or the collection of 




It seems that as the cohesiveness of the group grew in importance 
for its members themselves, it has also become practical for donors to 
differentiate among groups of recipients. As the world was able to adjust to 
the representation, the representation became stronger, increasingly being 
accepted as objective itself. Ironically and powerfully, this becoming of the 
political truth of ‘fragile states’ unfolds even if representatives have not 
reached a consensus over the label within the very g7+. Managing 
disagreements within involves many costs, which also serves to point at the 
high investments the group has made in the game. 
 
THE DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN 
 
Inside the g7+, the ‘fragile state’ label is said to be tolerated by the 
government of some member countries only to a certain extent. Indeed, the 
official position of the g7+ in terms of the label adopted is said to also vary 
depending on the setting. 
It is different when you are talking about yourself and when someone else is 
talking about you. I think countries are more comfortable with applying the word 
‘fragile’ to themselves than when external bodies use that term. Also, in the g7+ 
it is different –  some countries are using the word in a different context…using 
language such as ‘the g7+ group of…post-conflict or conflict-affected countries’, 
and they will say instead of ‘fragility’ spectrum, they will call it ‘resilience’ 
spectrum. So, different countries will use different language depending on 
receptivity. Some countries are very comfortable in using the word ‘fragile’, such 
as Timor-Leste, other countries such as DRC have issues in using the term 
politically, so they use different language.
87
  
 The quote above reflects Claire Leigh’s position as someone who 
has been providing technical and analytical support to the g7+ since its 
inception. She leads the ODI Budget Strengthening Initiative (BSI), which 
was the one referred to, previously, as the provider of some sort of ‘pro-
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bono think tank assistance’ to the g7+. She worked for both Tony Blair’s 
Africa Governance Initiative and as a senior policy advisor for Gordon 
Brown’s Strategy Unit. Her experience involves also providing advice to the 
governments of Liberia and Rwanda. In addition, she supervises the work 
of outsourced ODI staff exported to the g7+.88 Her opinion in what regards 
the interaction of g7+ representatives with major donor’ offices, therefore, is 
telling at least of something to be analysed. 
  On the issue of g7+ members having diverse receptivity to the 
‘fragile state’ label, there are indeed important internal tensions and country 
representatives are not shy of admitting them. In general, the 
representatives who serve as focal points for the g7+ agree with the use of 
the label but they face difficulties in selling it to other authorities in their 
governments. 
Many people in the countries don’t like the label yet and we keep balancing. 
They sometimes prefer ‘resilience’.
89
 
Part of my work was to help the African countries to reengage with internal 
bodies. There were some clashes. Something that has been very challenging is to 
have this language adopted. The label ‘fragile’ is very contested and the African 
Union doesn’t use it.
90
 That resulted in a lot of backlash. It was hard to advance 
the fragility agenda in Africa. The g7+ has refined the label. [In 2012], there was 
work to convince stakeholders, irrespective of nomenclatures, that the principles 
[PSGs] are the core.
91
 
The term of ‘fragility’ is difficult’. In political terms, it is difficult. Two countries 
are not going to use ‘fragility’, but we don’t try to force.
92
 
 According to interviewees, and despite the use of the label in 
documents produced in those countries, South Sudan and DRC are the two 
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countries facing most internal resistance to the label in their governments. 
The reasons for that are beyond the scope of this research, but it is 
important to highlight that yet, these governments still use the label in 
certain documents, such as South Sudan’s own Fragility Assessment, and 
the Note on Fragility Spectrum, produced after meetings in DRC.93  
 As the symbolic power of the classification gains increasing 
complicity through self-assessments and self-labelling exercises, it seems 
the price of re-disengagement (after engagement) is even higher than 
before the existence of the g7+, as it now would involve breaking with an 
already existent platform, which in spite of its yet incipient successes is, 
nonetheless, a platform. The looping or theory effect that enabled the group 
to exist and consolidate now sets new layers to the price of disengagement. 
The success of the g7+’s self-classification enabled the creation of a quite 
known platform but have also trapped its members into advancing a label 
with which not all its representatives are necessarily comfortable. 
3.2. MIXED FEELINGS: THE EXPERTS WHO ARE ALSO ‘FRAGILE’ 
As this looping effect intensifies, however, there is another crucial impact 
that needs to be analysed. As the group’s identity becomes stronger, some 
quantifying experts seem to be drawn to their own national identity in terms 
of how their countries of origin would fit into the g7+’s grouping of ‘fragile 
states’. As it happens, quantifying experts in donors agencies who are 
nationals from ‘fragile states’ often seem to confuse their own roles, split 
between their nationality and their employer. This is in itself powerfully 
illustrative of the double game discussed before, of the way the label and 
the group become a political truth and of the symbolic power in these 
dynamics of description and prescription. 
Well, they know they have problems, they want to get out of it. It’s like 
alcoholism, you first have to admit. What should they call themselves? They are 
trying to say that, because they are X, we have unique problems that need special 
solution. We are not like others. We need a special name, special categories, 
because we need more resources and customised solutions. There is a purpose in 
coming together as a community. First, for privileges… But we are not saying we 
are all the same, that’s why each is doing their own Fragility Assessment. People 
are always stronger when they come together, that’s why the EU got together.
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Interestingly, Agborsangaya-Fiteu, from the quote above, used 
‘they’ and ‘we’ interchangeably; the ‘we’ was not direct voice in a pretended 
dialogue. She previously worked for the Fragile States Unit of the WBI and 
is currently a senior officer at the CCSD. With degrees in Political Science 
obtained at Georgia State University, she has also worked for the Freedom 
House and The Carter Center. In addition, she is proud of having been 
engaged with the g7+ since its inception, when, as seen, the group is said 
to have requested help from the WBI, and most telling, she is a 
Cameroonian citizen, which might explain at least part of the ‘we’.95 At the 
same time, her view is also very complimentary towards what she 
perceives to be the group’s ownership of the Fragility Assessments. 




The way the ‘they’ and ‘we’ come to the fore and back away is an 
eloquent illustration of how the making of the group is constantly and subtly 
negotiated, navigating prescription, description, engagement and 
disengagement. Moreover, as the cohesiveness of the group around one 
label gains strength, it is important to notice many among donors’ staff find 
themselves ambiguously positioned, their ‘double game’ even more 
nuanced. The confusion between ‘they’ and ‘we’ in cases such as this can 
corroborate the grouping even further. However, the successes of an 
institutionalised group come at the cost of institutionalised expectations.  
 
4.  STRATEGIES ON NUMBERS:  
    THE PRESSURES FOR AND RISKS OF OVER-QUANTIFICATION 
 
As the g7+ plays the game, adopting the label and practicing the 
quantifying and classifying reasoning, the group is increasingly expected to 
show results as a group, while at the same time the enclosing of its 
members under one label leads to practical expectations as to how 
members should compare among themselves. By engaging, they gain 
some space to develop their own measures and targets, and much 
importantly, financial and technical support for this; nevertheless, by 
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engaging, the symbolic power in the agenda reaches its most efficient 
point, when it becomes implacable by being practiced through the simple 
order of things.97  
In the following, I analyse how these expectations play out in terms 
of the quantifying reasoning in the agenda and how over-quantification can 
illustrate one important realm where efforts to shape the changes to come 
encounter each other. 
4.1. ‘WE ARE JUST HUMANS’: STORYTELLING AND THE BURDEN OF QUANTIFICATION 
 
Engagement in the game involves practically measuring just how much to 
concede to the style of thinking & doing – how much complicity, how much 
heresy.  
 The g7+ representatives clearly struggle to have just the right 
amount of quantification, participating in the race for numbers but also 
somehow working to keep alive what they consider that cannot or should 
not be measured. Permeating this section is, thus, a discussion around the 
expansion of the agenda over non-quantifying methods – what does all that 
imply for stories without numbers and things that cannot be measured? 
Meanwhile, quantifying experts seem keen to push the g7+ in the direction 
of further quantification, side-lining unquantifiable forms of knowledge that 
g7+ representatives, in an obviously privileged relationship with their own 
history and culture, might be able and willing to bring to the fore instead. 
 
THE ATTEMPT AT STORYTELLING 
 
I believe nothing portrays the g7+’s reaction to the threat of over-
quantification better than the Q&A session of the meeting organised by the 
group as part of the 2013 UN General Assembly. The representatives 
speaking for the group in the meeting received in general many questions 
regarding how well placed the New Deal components are to provide 
quantified insights into ‘state fragility’. Nevertheless, the g7+ 
representatives repeatedly answered to such questions with general 
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narratives based on local stories and examples. For the unique dynamic in 
that meeting, I quote my transcript of this episode at length. 
D1: The quality of these compacts will very much speak to all of us in the rest of 
the world as to how serious you are – if they have targets, if they have 
monitoring systems associated with them that can be measured, if they have 
some high aspirations for both international partners to behave differently and 
for countries to improve governance and absolutely respect human rights and 
governance priorities. Then they will be seen as real vehicles. Much additional 
investment may be done in the pursuit of ending extreme poverty. If they don’t, 
then I’m afraid many will look at this effort as a very good effort but one that will 
take many, many more years to get the credibility that will allow for more 
investment. So the question I’d ask is: Do you believe, as we construct these 
compacts and the New Deal goes forward, that they can be tangible, specific, 
have targets, for poverty reduction, for kids in school, for MDGs outcomes, and 
have a very robust and shared monitoring platform, so in the future we can say 
‘ok,, because we did that, these are the results we achieved’? 
g7+.1: We believe the results are very important but to get to the results, first 
we need to know what the problem is. This is why we came up with the FOCUS 
and the TRUST elements of the New Deal. And the first step is the fragility – or 
some like to call it vulnerability or resilience – assessment. This is important. 
Because sometimes these assessments are done about us and we know nothing 
about it –  we don't know what the disease is, so how can we fix it? That’s very 
important. Recently, I was sitting in an IEG evaluation of the World Bank for the 
last 10 years, and the World Bank itself recognised this, and I said to them 'at 
least now, we have 18 countries that are willing, open to do this Fragility 
Assessment.' There is no shame in it, we don't think that because we are in 
problem [sic], that we brought us to it, and that we are weak not because we 
want to be weak, it's circumstances. Do pay attention to the details, do try to 
understand problems that countries face, don't just jump to the conclusions. We 
need to think outside the box, and more, try to step on someone else's shoes. 
We had some advisers years ago and they said electricity was not sustainable. I 
said 'take his passport, put him in a small village in the middle of nowhere and 
let him feel on his skin how it is!' 
D1: But my question was more on the compact, a plea to push ourselves beyond 
our comfort zones and be more specific about what we can achieve together. 
We have seen it happen in certain settings, but if we make it institutional, then I 
believe we will see much more finance flow through these countries, because 
this is where the fight against poverty will be either won or lost. 
g7+.2: We discussed with USAID: The food we eat comes from Uganda, and we 
have the World Food Program there. But we believe if they built a road instead 
of bringing things from Canada, I don't know, it would be much easier – the 
prices would go down, the hungry would have something to eat. Now, because 
of that cooperation between donors and the ownership of the problem, they 
gave the go ahead and we have this wonderful road, and it works. I hope you will 
give us more money to extend the road. On the issues of human rights, because 
there were problems with that road, the LRA was causing problems, we touched 
bases again and asked very fast motorcycles for our policemen to help monitor 
the road, and now there is a continuing patrolling of the road. It is a successful 









D2: If you look at the Afghanistan’s mutual accountability document and the 
Somalia compact, with its annexes and details, there is a lot of focus on 
resources and deliverables, and how we should get there. They are quite strong 
contracts in that sense. And then the obligation turn to us, because as partner 
countries, we are far from living up to the aspirations in these contracts as well, 
in terms of delivering on budgets, delivering through systems, in national 
institutions, and let it show that the ownership and leadership are there. We 
must turn this into a positive circle... deliverables, yes, and partner countries also 
showing trust and using national systems.  
D3: Good that 18 countries accepted to take part. We are taking stock of the 
MDGs here, so how can we use this to make sure the MDGs will be met and that 
then we should have a special view on fragile states? Because none of the fragile 
states have reached any of the MDGs. We were hosting one of the thematic 
consultations of the pot-2015 precisely on conflict and disaster and for us this is 
a very dear task to make sure that peace and security will be finally included in 
the new goals with very specific indicators, so that it can be measured and 
results can be delivered.  
g7+.1: Just to remember that we are dealing with people. Our governments are 
people. They [donors] walk in as if you can control everybody, as if we are 
homogeneous, as if we are… We are people; we have our own conflicts inside. If 
the national government need to show some win-win, that means someone has 
to support this, otherwise they will lose credibility in the eyes of people. I 
consider myself as donor, because I am the Finance Minister, not the Foreign 
Affairs Minister, although some people think I am... At the Ministry of Finance, 
we are afraid of disbursing money just like that. We have to buy time... 
sometimes you have to divert... At my ministry, for example, I have no systems 
in place... and procurements were giving me a headache, because I had people 
saying 'hey, I defended the country, now you come here with your beautiful 
Western ideas and put all these systems... I don't know how to read and write 
and you don't give me any projects. On top of that, it is my money', they would 
say. Then if you don't have the political tools to fight back... I gave the 
procurements to my prime-minister and the donors said 'you can't do that, 
you're the Finance Minister, you have to have the procurement rule on you'. I 
said 'no, he has the political leverage; he is allowing me to set up systems 
quickly'. Now I have set up the systems, now I can take it back. I needed time. All 
these combinations, you need to understand. The understanding is very 
important... we are just normal human beings.
98
 
In this meeting, there was a clear pressure from most donors over 
g7+ representatives to offer at least examples of how the New Deal could 
answer to the agenda’s need for quantifiable indicators and measurable 
means of monitoring their progress. Donors D1 and D3 were clear in that 
demand. The pressure was particularly strong when the discussion focused 
on the possibility of adding security goals to the post-2015 agenda. As seen 
in chapter three, the pressures for security and development to be finally 
measured in the same set of post-2015 goals have been mounting as the 
                                                          
98
 2013 UN General Assembly, g7+ parallel meeting with donors. Anonymity protected under 









quantifying and classifying reasoning and the ‘fragile states’ agenda 
merged. Nonetheless, the debates are nothing like settled yet. As the g7+ 
representatives embrace quantification and classification, they are 
expected to present a more detailed numerical system to measure security, 
but the fact is that they have managed to at least have a place at the tables 
where this debate is unfolding. 
In the meeting transcribed above, g7+ representatives repeatedly 
answered with stories to the admonitions to offer a M&E system for 
security, as one can gather from statements by g7+.1 and g7+.2. This was 
so palpable for those watching the exchanges that D2 seemly came to the 
rescue, apparently attempting to bridge questions and answers by 
suggesting there was much to grasp from the stories g7+ representatives 
were telling but at the same time bringing the discussion back to compacts 
and measures.  
The g7+ stories illustrated aspects of ‘state fragility’ that seemed to 
them better described in non-quantified ways, which gave the impression of 
a rebuke or at least an indirect argument against over-reliance on numbers. 
Following the theoretical discussion in chapter two, it is pointless to try to 
guess why, individually and internally, they decided this was the best way 
to answer donors’ questions. Nonetheless, the episode seems to denote a 
clear divergence on the way ahead for the political management of ‘fragile 
states’. The fact is that many questions regarding specific indicators 
remained unanswered, even in the face of obvious financial baits, as D1 
and D3 were clearly offering.99 The quote below from D4 is even clearer in 
this aspect. 
D4: Somalia had a very helpful compact, with indicators. They have a very 
complicated situation there. We have 200 million euros a year to spend. We 
have a facility for financing, but it won’t work if there is not security. If you don’t 
include state building, peacebuilding, security [indicators], I can’t use these 200 




 Facing such apparent opportunities, the evasiveness of the answers 
by the g7+ representatives was privately said to be frustrating by some in 













the audience that were actually hoping to see the g7+ advancing further in 
its agenda. A representative from a civil society platform eloquently stated: 
The meeting was an opportunity, but they [g7+] didn’t manage it well. The US 
government, for instance, has already sent different guys to talk to them. This 
time they sent another one. He was clearly saying they believe in the security 
goals to a certain extent. He was asking questions… They didn’t answer. It should 
have been a wake-up call: ‘There is not much result’. But it’s ok, the US is aware 
of that. The result in post-conflict situations is actually a process. But they didn’t 
show much of this process either. They could have talked about the compacts, 
about the dialogue in Somalia, they have already gone beyond the Fragility 




 If even when important resources are at stake, and even after so 
much effort to develop and implement the Fragility Assessment with all its 
measurable indicators and targets, scenes like these still occur, important 
questions need to be raised regarding just how comfortable g7+ 
governments are with their role in the style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states’. On the one hand, they are supposed to now 
measure themselves, using country systems and national statistics as 
much as possible, with a Fragility Spectrum that is expected to both take 
into account each country’s point of departure and establish ‘realistic’ goals 
for each national context.102 On the other hand, their embracing of some of 
the rules of the game creates the expectation that the quantifying and 
classifying reasoning will be extended to all areas of development and 
security, accompanied by tools to constantly monitor and evaluate 
progress. As the group juggles prescription and description, it creates 
important opportunities for engagement, but its members are also faced 
with the high costs of expectations related to this engagement. Indeed, it is 
clear how expectations and generalisations are intrinsically connected and 
how heavy their weight is in making the group they describe. After all, the 
unmet expectations can subtly reinforce the idea of ‘incapacity’ associated 
with ‘state fragility’. The statements of the kind ‘it is a nice effort, but…’ well 
reflect that point.  
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4.2. QUANTIFICATION STRIKES BACK 
 
Nevertheless, central here is also how subtly the game was played in the 
meeting quoted above in terms of the role for the quantifying experts. Now 
that the quantifying and classifying reasoning has expanded to the point of 
co-opting ‘fragile states’ themselves, now that it is so central in this agenda, 
quantifying experts (in this case, official ones) are caught in their own 
demands for data: ‘Please, give me indicators, so we can allocate our 
funding’ (‘if you want some of it’ hanging in the air). The more quantification 
and classification are practiced as ‘objective and impartial’ forms of political 
decision-making, the more they strike back, requiring from experts further 
coherence in their game.  
D5: Statebuilding is essential for peacebuilding, a social contract. We are still 
risk-averse. I go to my parliament, if I ask more money from the government on 
budget to Afghanistan, they look at me as if I am crazy… They say I take too high 




 Quantification and classification were made guarantees of good use 
of money, so they became also necessities, held to their own success, 
even when practiced through the mechanisms of the g7+. 
 Also important is the fact that by providing indicators on security that 
can be advanced in the context of the UN, in the case of the discussion in 
the transcript above, the g7+ would seemly furnish donors with the tools to 
advance security indicators further in the post-2015 agenda, by providing 
the authority of the least favoured, hence, reinforcing the impression that 
this is an universal project.104 
D5: Of course, there is a lot of big scale scepticism, people who think ‘security is 
our issue, keep away from it’. There is still a lot of compartmentalisation, we are 
thinking in silos, people who want to grab the agenda, protect, ‘security is for us, 
development is here’. We need to break down these silos, and the only way to 
do so is to bring these stories from the ground and see what works and how it 
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works. The compacts are making this case well.
105
 
 The compacts, as seen, being the g7+’s Mutual Accountability 
Framework or the New Deal compacts, it is striking to see how much 
donors count on g7+ ‘contextual’ quantifications to be able to ‘break down 
the silos’ of security and development, by expanding the reasoning even 
further and, thus, inserting security indicators in the post-2015 agenda. 
 The risk for the g7+ is in being easily co-opted by the much broader 
and intense political agenda in the UN context. What the group has 
attempted so far is to match this agenda on the post-2015 goals with its 
proposition that indicators to monitor any progress be above all contextual, 
the country-specific realities playing a bigger role than common indicators 
could possibly depict, as the storytelling in the UN meeting was perhaps 
practically attempting to advocate.  
 
5.  LABELS, INDICATORS AND THE NEW YORK BUBBLE 
 
I suggest in this section that as the g7+ as a group of ‘fragile states’ 
increasingly becomes more of a group, the least comfortable other groups 
are with its existence and the more aware its members themselves are of 
the label they are putting forward. These points are important for my 
argument on symbolic power in at least two ways. They reflect the power in 
the agenda by drawing attention to the fact that, even with some internal 
dissidence that is very much centred on the label, the self-labelling cannot 
just be radically changed or interrupted now that the game is being played. 
It also reflects the ways in which the symbolic power in the agenda holds its 
very possibilities of weakening and change, after all, the external 
antagonism is in fact very much a reflection of the successes of the group, 
whose existence as such came to bother some externals only when it was 
strong enough to make some room for itself, for which self-labelling was 
fundamental. Moreover, these examples lead to questioning the common-
sense assumption that technicality averts politics. It is rather an issue of 
understanding what technicality does to the possibilities of engaging 
politicians. 
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5.1. FINANCE MINISTRIES AND THE CAREFUL USE OF LABELS 
 
The fact that the g7+ agenda is very much contained in Finance Ministries 
is seen by some as a crucial obstacle for the group to overcome in order to 
mould the changes to come. The internal cohesion and buy-in of the g7+’s 
agenda is at stake, but not only. Many also argue that the g7+ now needs 
to find its way through to reach politics in the New York bubble. 
They had a problem bringing the message to politicians. It still remains a very 




Both internal and external challenges, therefore, seem centred on 
the ability of the g7+ representatives to recruit other ministries in their 
government, beyond the Finance Ministry, effectively mobilising politicians. 
The New York bubble, it is said, cannot be punctured unless the g7+ gets 
its agenda passed by the political obstacles involved with the label adopted 
and its attempt to have security goals – the PSGs – included in the post-
2015 agenda. Although the image of such obstacles seems discouraging, it 
is also a sign that the g7+ reached a certain level of access to the table to 
the extent that it cannot at least be ignored. The g7+’s adoption of the label 
and of the quantifying and classifying practices towards ‘fragile states’ 
might act in complicity to reinforce the symbolic power in the political truth 
of ‘state fragility’. However and crucially, in doing so, it also helps to 
produce and reproduce a divide between the g7+ and ‘other developing 
countries’, making it a practical necessity that the latter’s representatives 
acknowledge the g7+ − again, for good and for worse. In this 
acknowledgment, there is a possibility the g7+ may need to work in two 
fronts, winning over donors and ‘other developing countries’. 
The g7+ moderates its language depending on which international organisation 
it is talking to. In the World Bank, the word ‘fragile state’ is a very accepted term 
which describes a certain type of country and its relationship with the Bank. 
Within the UN, the word is much more contentious, so when we are writing and 
advocating within the context of New York we probably use different language. 
We won’t use ‘fragile states’…more ‘conflict-affected and post-conflict’.
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5.2. PLAYING UN POLITICS: LOYALTIES AND MISTRUST 
 
There are important reasons why the label and the group itself are 
contentious in the context of the UN: The g77, currently representing 133 
‘developing countries’ in the UN,108 sees the group as a form of ‘divide-and-
conquer’ initiative; moreover, many seem to consider the g7+ a OECD- or 
donor-led project, a suspicion that is strengthened by the use of the ‘fragile 
state’ label; and finally, the PSGs are also unwelcome and perceived by 
some of ‘the other developing countries’ as an attempt to securitise 
development or to at least divert attention from important economic 
issues.109 The last point has been intensely debated in the context of the 
High Level panel formed to think the post-2015 agenda, and it was also 
debated in the parallel meeting organised by the g7+ as part of the 2013 
UN General Assembly. 
g7+.3: The business of the UN is peace, it is about development, and human 
rights, and they have never been more needed today to really see and make 
sure we give everyone this opportunity. In the New York bubble, we are 
distanced from this but opportunities like this, we cannot forsake, we have to 
execute the Charter. 
D4: It is hard to imagine someone would object to incorporating peace and 
security to this agenda. [g7+.3] mentioned the New York bubble. I want to ask 
what it takes to bust that bubble and get peace and security to the negotiation. 
Do you feel confident about it? Do you feel we are winning? What can we do to 
support that campaign? 
g7+.1: I just cannot understand why would someone object. My country is the 
classical example. If we hadn't fought for peace, we would never be where we 
are. We had thousands of refugees. We had to address the security and 
instability first. I don't understand, but we need to convince them... Maybe they 
have been living in this bubble for too long. 
g7+.2: No doubt we are puncturing that bubble right now. Peace and stability 
have a meaning. Before the peace process, 200 thousands kids went to school. 
After that, more than a million. This is peace and security. That is why peace is at 
the heart of sustainable development, because we have seen it.
110
 
Again, the question regarding the possible introduction of security 
goals in the post-2015 agenda was answered somewhat with storytelling, 
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but beyond this, one point comes to the fore: The donors such as D4, who 
have engaged with this proposition and supported the PSGs, now count on 
the g7+, as an authoritative representative of the ‘fragile states’, to help 
advance the agenda in the UN. This can be seen as a sign that the g7+ has 
managed to make important wins through engagement, but this has come 
with the expectation that the group will provide some kind of strategy 
founded in solid indicators, which the vagueness and consternation of the 
storytelling seem to evade. Moreover, such expectation by donors has led 
‘other developing countries’ to see the g7+ with suspicious eyes, most felt 
by those working directly with the UN politics. 
We need to dispel the idea that this group is led by donor agenda. Sometimes I 
ask donors not to support us so much because it leaves me to dispel this feeling. 
We need a supportive mechanism in New York. We are talking to the UN about 
it. We have to make sure the person follows out mandate. We are very short-
staffed and, to be honest, that's what I have been doing mostly, focusing on this 
agenda. The way the group came about is not very helpful either. We need to 
distance ourselves constantly. We need to be in partnership, there is no way 
other than two-way conversation; however the choice of language is crucial. The 
language raises a lot of suspicion from the g77. We also have to show the group 
is very diverse, rich in different experiences. There is also this perception in the 
g77 that there is an attempt to break the group into subgroups. We have 
explained the problem is not about more money but to be more effective. We 
want to be more efficient and we want to have a voice. This agenda has been 
hugely driven by Finance Ministers, and Foreign Ministries have not been 
involved. We are in a situation where ambassadors want to help but are not in a 
position to help because they have no orders from above, as Foreign Ministers 
are not in the loop. The pressure on the g7+ is enormous, so any ambassador in 
London, New York... needs strong mandates.
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The statement above was given by a key ambassador of a g7+ 
member state to the UN in the context of the June 2013 OECD-INCAF 
ministerial meetings. On the one hand it reflects the considerable 
achievement of the g7+ in being noticed and weighted by the g77, with its 
60 years of experience and 133 members, besides having its PSGs 
discussed, on one way or another, in terms of the future of the MDGs. On 
the other hand, the tensions in the context of the UN are clear and 
represent a considerable obstacle. At lunchtime during the same OECD-
INCAF ministerial meetings, the overall challenge to the g7+ was indeed 
said to be in the possibility of having ambassadors with full mandate to 











work the politics out in the UN.112 In fact, the challenge of advancing the 
PSGs as a whole and mainly in the context of the UN ‘bubble’ had been 
discussed as early as 2011 in the form of a four-points ‘political strategy to 
secure international acceptance of the PSGs’: 
 
• The PSGs are seen by some as an OECD-led initiative, and the 
 BRICS and emerging economies may in particular be wary for this reason.  
• The G77 sees itself as the sole legitimate voice of developing countries at 
 the UN, and therefore some G77 members may feel threatened or 
 confused by the g7+. Likewise the LDC [Least Developed Countries].  
• Fragile countries that are not g7+ members may be nervous of any 
 agenda that may apply to them, or could reject references to ‘fragility’ 
 altogether, due to concerns over sovereignty and opening the door to 
 external interventions.   
• Finally the UN structure divides institutions broadly into those focusing on 
 either development or security. As the PSGs cover both, they fall 
 awkwardly between and across the two major silos of the UN.113   
 
At that point, one of the main recommendations was for ‘g7+ 
members to ask their foreign ministries to issue formal instructions to their 
embassies in New York to take forward the g7+ agenda.’114 Since then, 
these issues have developed rather slowly, with the g7+ representatives 
clearly wary of taking too big steps in the context of the UN. The group 
considered trying to get a resolution approved in the 2012 UN General 
Assembly but this was postponed, apparently indefinitely. In 2013, the g7+ 
still did not pursuit this path, but decided to invest in the parallel meeting 
that I was able to observe.115 Minister Emília Pires, however, is one of the 
members of the High Level Panel on the post-2015 agenda, an institution 
said to reflect the UN Secretary General’s agenda to advance security 
further in the future goals.116 
What becomes clear is that to advance in the political realm of the 
UN, the g7+ needs to at least simultaneously make political advances 
internally as well, to acquire the support of its politicians. In an internal 
confidential report concerning OECD-INCAF meetings held in April 2014, 
the author, not a representative from any donor government, states that it is 
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still vital for the g7+ to involve other ministries beyond Finance. However, 
this is coupled with a diagnostic that donors in OECD-INCAF are also 
trapped in that they have not managed to ‘get the legislature in their 
countries to allow the flexibility needed for governments’ aid agencies to 
make the decisions they need.’117 It seems that, without seeing compromise 
from donors’ governments in the form of more political commitments, the 
g7+ itself has also failed so far to take its agenda beyond Finance 
Ministers. Moreover, with all such obstacles, the attempt by the g7+ and 
some donors to advance the PSGs in the context of the UN has also been 
facing many challenges. 
The specific goals of the g77 or the internal debates of the UN are 
beyond the scope of this research, but the facts above help to illustrate 
what kind of external antagonisms the g7+ has been facing as a reflection 
of its own successes in at least making some of the points in its agenda 
known.118  
5.3. SHATTERING AND REBUILDING COMMON SENSE 
 
Indeed, as the symbolic power in the agenda led disengagement to imply 
too high a cost, nothing was guaranteed in terms of successes or failure 
once engagement and complicity took place. It is a fact that self-labelling 
encloses the group, consecrating the political truth of ‘state fragility’, while 
at the same time powerfully creating the group from which a platform can 
first take form.119 It is not, however, a given the kind of balance to take 
shape between engagement and disengagement. In fact, the dynamic 
nature of such balance is precisely what makes it political: ‘The heretical 
discourse’, which Bourdieu suggests starts with and necessitate a political 
subversion, ‘needs not only to contribute to shatter de adherence of the 
world to the common sense in publicly manifesting the rupture with the 
ordinary order, but also to produce a new common sense and make it 
penetrate.’120 Hence, in between shattering and building common sense, 
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the balance of engagement and disengagement is dynamic and, in being 
so, political; it involves the constant negotiation around what contours the 
changing common sense is to take. The issue is then how to make these 
contours to be established and hold in a favourable way. In the case of the 
‘fragile states’ agenda, I suggest the achievements of the g7+ are precisely 
due to its ability to embrace the quantifying and classifying reasoning in the 
agenda and to enable a powerful grouping; nevertheless, its further ability 
to mould common sense seems limited and attached to the possibility of 
advancing its agenda to the other tiers in the game, encompassing also 
politicians from ministries beyond Finance and Economic Development, 
and thus encouraging its own inclusion in crucial political debates in 
international tables.  
 
6.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: POLITICIANS AND TECHNOCRATS 
 
To speak of symbolic power in the classification of ‘fragile states’ is to 
discuss the impacts of a style of thinking & doing that subtly imposes itself 
through the practicality of numbers, statistical analysis, indicators and all 
the simplified visual resources they generate. If symbolic power is in the 
authority of practices and tools that exert important influence without 
seeming to dominate, the long-date, deep-seated and well-established 
statistical reasoning that permeates the development agenda is a powerful 
ally. Moreover, if symbolic power is marked by the complicity of those who 
seem least favoured by it, in the case of the g7+, self-labelling and self-
quantification are telling forms of corroboration.  
 Nevertheless, the notion of symbolic power is mainly and 
fundamentally about the relational, subtle and mutually influential pressures 
in the game: While the g7+ embraces quantification and classification, it is 
able to play the game, but it also faces the pressures of accompanying 
expectations, pushed to emphasise commonalities, to develop security 
indicators that can be advanced in the context of the post-2015 agenda and 
to propose more forms of measuring the progress of its own PSGs. Donors, 
on the other hand, have had to compete for the production of data in the 
agenda they themselves have contributed to make increasingly quantified. 
                                                                                                                                                    










In this competition, quantifying experts of any background and affiliation 
can become players, precisely because quantification is a fluid capital. In 
addition, the competition is also dependent on the demands of users, 
hence, often relying on the requests of ‘fragile states’. Finally, the symbolic 
power in the agenda has moved the g7+ forward, for good and for worse: 
The better it plays the game, the more involved it becomes with other 
realms of the agenda and the less sufficient its members’ capitals, as other 
environments require different kinds of resources. In this sense, the g7+ 
has also been propelled to increase quantification, at the risk of losing the 
local un-measured stories its representatives have held dear so far. These 
are the same representatives who have been facing enormous pressures to 
engage politicians in ministries beyond Finance, to be able to extend the 
debate to the ‘upper-tiers’ at home, in donors’ governments and at the UN, 
where the g7+ has faced antagonism from other groups of ‘developing 
countries’.  
 On the other hand, I have sought to show how donors have 
struggled with the pressures they have helped to create by making 
numbers essential to make decisions on the ‘fragile states’, even relying on 
the g7+ members to produce some of these. Furthermore, they also now 
rely on the g7+ providing the legitimacy only the complicity of the least 
favoured can provide. 
 Therefore, the instances of symbolic power discussed in this 
chapter speak back to the view that technicality disguises politics and in 
fact empties development assistance from political struggle. Beyond the 
perhaps more obvious point that all such instances clearly offer political 
stories, it is important to point out that actors involved in these dynamics do 
not face politics blindfolded. 
It is a common argument that the increasingly high technical level of 
discussions on ‘state fragility’ in general has de-politicised the debate on 
practices of development assistance. One hears of the ‘technicist and 
apolitical nature of development discourse’, the ‘technicians of global 
governance’, and the ‘de-politicis[ation] of the debate on fragility’.121 After 
having dedicated many pages to how this technicity came to be so central 
in the agenda, while at the same time arguing it composes important 
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aspects of the symbolic power in the classification of ‘fragile states’, I 
obviously do not discard politics but instead make a point of reminding the 
distinction between politics and politicians. As the critics above criticise 
depoliticisation, they also obviously point to the fact that there exists politics 
in this dynamics, or it could not be said to be hidden at all. The issue is not 
that politics is replaced by technicality, since it is a central aspect of 
symbolic power, but that the successes of technicality, while leaving certain 
tools of influence to navigate away from producers, also tend to create a 
comfortable and practical form of (self-)alienating politicians.  
Politics is not lost in the style of thinking and doing political 
management of ‘fragile states’, but politicians might be. It is not by chance 
that ministries of Foreign Affairs and the debates of highly political issues in 
the UN have been perceived to be beyond the reach of the g7+: The style 
of thinking and doing political management of ‘fragile states’ through 
quantification and classification creates intermediate tiers of actors and 
practices to analyse and fix ‘state fragility’ and makes the figure of the 
decision-makers or the politicians more distant and fleeting, just as the 
numbers side-line local stories. To consider all this, however, a cynical form 
to affirm that politicians can still call the shots, any shots, without so much 
as an acknowledgement of what numbers say or by making numbers fit 
pre-established lines of decision, is to ignore the important paths open 
through the symbolic power discussed here. Quantification and 
classification practices might somehow facilitate the (self-)alienation of non-
technocrats, but they also open the doors for a kind of engagement by 
‘fragile states’ that might not exist otherwise. The fact that some obstacles 
exist to the implementation of the g7+ agenda should be seen as a mark of 
its achievement in producing such agenda and making it sufficiently known 
to be deterred. 
 As also said, however, as the g7+ plays the game, it also risks 
devaluing one of its key assets, its members’ local knowledge and local 
stories, that is, that which can hardly be measured or at least whose 
highest value is not in the measures that they could generate. In one 











 What did we do to become normal? I remember one, very small example: 
 The prime-minister, in the middle of so many priorities, he wanted to do a 
 garden…And he ordered to put in the swings for the little kids. And we 
 thought: ‘Prime-minister, we’ve got things to do, we’ve got no electricity, 
 we’ve got no roads, and you want a garden for the little children?’ And he 
 goes, ‘Yes, we need for the next generation to be brought up in a normal 
 life. They need to know that there are swings to play with, there are 
 gardens that you go to, that mothers and children can smell the roses and 
 stuff like that – that is normal life.’ And when the garden was ready, you 
 should have seen – you know, people queue up for shops etc in other 
 countries – children were queuing up to take a chance on the swings. They 
 cried, they stayed until midnight, just to have the swings. And that’s when I 
 thought, that is normalization.122 
 
 Timorese representatives have always said that a key problem with 
statistics on their country was that they were inaccurate, outdated or simply 
did not reflect the relative successes in certain areas. The g7+ has also 
stated in various documents and occasions that the group wants to bring to 
the fore the ‘true experts’ on ‘state fragility’, their own citizens,123 and to 
take into account each country’s particular experience. The problem is that 
by playing the game of quantifying and classifying ‘fragile states’, un-
measured and highly qualitatively local stories like the above, while richly 
telling of the peculiar circumstances and achievements of each country, 
might be increasingly pushed aside. 
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C O N C L U S I O N S  
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This research was much guided by an understanding that the ‘fragile states’ 
label is indeed powerful in the way it can impact aid allocation and political 
leverage. It was also led by a realisation that the way ‘state fragility’ is 
quantified carries important influences not only over aid allocation, but also 
over the internal politics and policies of ‘fragile states’, their government 
cohesion, citizens’ perceptions and international negotiations. However, 
precisely because of these impacts, the path chosen was to analyse how 
classification and quantification are practiced, how they become 
authoritative and what influences they exert over diverse actors. Problem-
solving approaches often take classification and quantification to senseless 
peaks of bureaucratic and schematic analysis, frequently feeding 
unnecessary poorly established statistical correlations to the highly 
impactful dynamics of aid and development assistance. Politically sceptics, 
on the other hand, can be as fervent prosecutors of the power relations in 
these dynamics as they are dismissive about what it takes to disengage 
completely and, most importantly, silent about how nuanced engagement 
can be. In this sense, this research was simultaneously aimed at 
understanding the impacts of these dynamics and the limitations of 
critiques that address them.  
 I followed the classifying and quantifying practices back and forth, to 
look at how quantifying and classifying practices directed at ‘fragile states’ 









and what the g7+’s embracing of them has entailed so far. What this made 
possible was to open space to turn power into a question instead of an a-
temporal given answer: I asked ‘What practices classify “fragile states” and 
what are their impacts?’, and I approached this question without taking for 
granted what power is, who exerts it and how. By looking at quantification 
and classification in the form of monitoring, selection for aid, evaluation, 
advising, ranking and the basic practice of data collection, I suggested that 
practices that classify ‘fragile states’ are those able to reinforce the 
authority of the very quantifying and classifying reasoning permeating these 
dynamics. That includes not only direct practices of categorisation but, 
crucially, any practices able to construct ‘fragile states’ as measurable and 
manageable political truths. As such, these practices are largely impactful 
but importantly subtle, blurred and hardly traceable. Therefore, this 
research pointed at a style of thinking and doing political management of 
‘fragile states’ that does not operate by imposition, but through practical 
sense and symbolic power instead. 
  
1.  STYLE OF THINKING AND DOING POLITICAL MANAGEMENT OF           
‘FRAGILE STATES’ : THE ENTRENCHMENT AND IMBRICATION OF   
STATISTICAL REASONING 
 
In criticising what I called politically sceptical approaches to the topic of 
‘fragile states’, I sought to emphasise the role of practicality in the way 
‘fragile states’ took to self-labelling and self-measuring. By practicality I 
mean that there is a hugely successful history of statistical reasoning that 
permeates current policy-making and that has been especially impactful in 
the case of the ‘fragile states’ – so much so that disengagement away from 
quantification and its accompanying classifying practices became 
impractical. By combining the notion of a style of thinking & doing with the 
idea of practical sense, I aimed at highlighting how a statistical ‘way of 
reasoning’, as Hacking puts it, became entrenched in the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda. I also analysed how this reasoning is capable of self-authentication 
through the practicality of what ‘works’, that is, through circularly making 
methods and objects match each other, moulding simultaneously what is to 









 The politically sceptical quest to dismiss or attempt to ‘positively’ 
substitute the label is only theoretically possible because it empirically side-
lines the practical issue of how quantifying and classifying practices are 
entrenched and imbricated in the policy-making towards ‘fragile states’ – 
not that they are, but how so. Moreover, the politically sceptical quest also 
ignores how subtle these practices are, hence, how much difficult it is to 
counter them on the basis of allegations of direct imposition, and 
intrinsically related, how they become practical as paths towards 
participation, even if an unequal one.  
 When Lampland and Star use the term ‘imbrication’ to understand 
how standards are constructed, they mean exactly to evoke a ‘picture of 
uncemented things producing a larger whole’ in such a way that ‘each part 
may shift in character over time as the whole is edited or rearranged.’ 
Crucially, these uncemented parts are ‘not stacks’, but ‘overlapping layers’, 
like in ancient stone walls.1 The initial layers of my own account – my 
‘whole’ – were formed by the nineteenth-century epistemological, ethical, 
logical and philosophical successes of statistical reasoning.2 I suggested 
these successes led to what I called the metaphysics of correlation, 
whereby knowledge is ever-perfectible, thus, imperfect data and analyses 
are accepted and even embraced, as long as errors and limits are duly 
measured.  
 The layers above these were slowly formed by the merge of this 
‘imperfect’ quantifying and classifying reasoning with the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda. My brief historical sociology in chapter three and the subsequent 
discussion on quantifying and classifying practices in chapter four sought to 
show how a rationale of Measuring for Development Results (MfDR) 
increasingly became the basis of development assistance, embracing the 
metaphysics of correlation that allows for ‘good enough’ methods and 
results. All along, I sought to show the ‘unusual transparency’3 in the self-
authentication of this style of thinking & doing, in the sense of visual 
access, and most recently, of open access or open data. The aim was to 
show how this transparency invoked increasing criticism from 
representatives of  ‘fragile states’, regarding the data used, the practices of 
                                                          
1
 Lampland and Star 2009, p. 20. 
2
 Hacking 1990, p. 4. 
3









collection and analysis, the results achieved and the fixtures proposed 
based on these data and analyses. It was in this context that the g7+ was 
born, much influenced by the intense search for ownership of one of its 
founding countries, in the figure of the Timorese Finance Ministry. I 
suggested the ‘transparency’ of the statistical analyses that classify ‘fragile 
states’ makes it all so tempting to representatives of ‘fragile states’ to 
engage and to attempt to reform quantifying and classifying practices; 
moreover, it makes it too impractical to disengage, as statistical reasoning 
is at the very basis of every report, strategy, solution and monitoring 
proposed and applied. To disengage would reinforce the image of 
incapacity and/or unwillingness of ‘fragile states’ without making these 
practices any weaker. One does not refute a label, but the style of thinking 
& doing in which it is based. The power in this impracticality is clear through 
this push to engage, but it is also clearly subtle and nuanced, imbricated in 
the routine of bureaucracy.  
 
2.  PRACTICAL SENSE:  
    GOOD ENOUGH METHODS FOR GOOD ENOUGH RESULTS 
 
I suggested this routine of bureaucracy is as much an attempt to respond to 
the changing contexts of ‘fragile states’ as it helps to compose these 
contexts themselves, in ontological complicity.4 The practical sense is in the 
anticipation of the potentialities of the game and in the practices that 
engage with these anticipated realities, thus, constructing and constantly 
moulding the game itself.5 At the centre of this understanding is the 
dismissal of rationality and of the notion that such practices are 
programmatic, answering to a collective intention. Thus, I aimed to depict 
practices in their blurred unfolding and the caveats of their impacts, 
showing the impossibility of neatly connecting intentions with specific 
‘results’. In fact, numbers, in their independent wandering, defy this clear-
cut approach to politics, making it generally impossible to trace authorship.6 
 In the ‘fragile states’ agenda, the World Bank’s and OECD’s 
quantification and classification practices, for example, have increasingly 
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adopted a ‘fit-for-purpose’ approach to data and related policies that is 
hardly institutionalised; it is instead rather messy and made flexible through 
practical sense. Actors in the field constantly attempt to adapt such 
practices, as in the case of monitoring and evaluation (M&E), to the 
constrained contexts related to crisis and poverty, both responding to and 
creating multiple standards. Good enough data becomes acceptable to 
understand and develop fit-for-purpose institutions, which will then 
contribute to establish good enough governance in ‘fragile states’. As 
practices of data collection, analysis and intervention adapt to volatile 
contexts, they also create diverse acceptable standards of what is efficient 
and good in and for ‘fragile states’. I suggested the g7+ has somehow 
embraced this ‘good enough’ reasoning, albeit with different propositions. It 
proposes, for instance, that data for the self-assessments of its member 
countries will be preferably as good as its offices can produce them without 
resorting so much to international institutions. The group also counts with 
external advisors to evaluate these possibilities. That way, the g7+ member 
governments practically limit what they can measure, inevitably fixing a bar 
and helping to compose ‘state fragility’ as a political truth. 
 Crucially, therefore, this niche standardisation,7 coming from 
different directions, is full of negative potential for ‘fragile states’, 
considering the lower bar in which they operate, but it also attends to the 
requests of ‘fragile states’’ representatives for differentiated methods that 
would take into account the peculiarities of each country. In fact, the g7+’s 
Fragility Assessment and Spectrum are based on an understanding that 
statistical analyses of progress need to take into account the different 
points of departure of countries, the relative successes considering the 
level of ‘difficulty’ faced in each context, the diverse priorities in each 
country and the local perception of success. With these tools, the g7+ 
seemly defies the expectations of political sceptics, by not only embracing 
the label of ‘fragile states’ but also by adopting some of the methods that 
enable this label and its impacts.  
 However, by engaging, the g7+ has also advanced a somewhat 
different agenda, advocating more experience-focused assessments, that 
is, analyses based on the experience of each ‘fragile state’ and how this 
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experience is perceived. It suggests ‘fragile states’ in the same level of the 
Spectrum, for instance, should be understood to be qualitatively different in 
their experiences.8  
 Having discussed the practical pressures for engagement, the idea 
with this discussion was to analyse how engagement is in fact taking place. 
Indeed, to turn power into a question requires understanding what is 
involved in the complicity of the g7+ with the quantification and 
classification of ‘fragile states’. 
 
3.  UNBALANCED SKILLS: CAPACITY, EXPERTISE AND TRAPS 
 
A research that proposes to combine the structural constructivism of 
Bourdieu with the dynamic nominalism of Hacking, however, cannot focus 
on practices alone. What classifies ‘fragile states’ is not the practicing of 
monitoring, evaluation, data collection and so on, but the thinking and doing 
of which these practices are part. Thus, this research also looked at the 
skills and resources necessary for these practices to take place and at what 
makes it possible for actors to occupy different positions around these 
practices. Moreover, by looking at these skills and resources, it becomes 
possible to analyse the nuances in the game.  
 The increasing statistical expertise associated with the ‘fragile 
states’ agenda enables a deeply unequal relation, considering the 
conditions of most offices in ‘fragile states’ in terms of material resources 
and skilled staff. However, this expertise is also extremely fluid: It navigates 
more easily than perhaps other forms of capital, as it can often involve 
training offered by only a few professionals, can be much based on the 
automatism of software, and it can also be offered by independent 
researchers and consultants. Therefore, statistical expertise has expanded 
the scope of professionals seen as able to engage with the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda in terms of supporting development policies, and it has singled out 
in the offices of ‘fragile states’ those few professionals who can more easily 
work with such methods.  
 Hence, the ‘fragile states’ agenda I look at, merged with a 
quantifying and classifying reasoning, includes actors beyond the usual 
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‘poverty-oriented’ departments (now also ‘conflict-oriented’, at least 
officially), to encompass in the case of the World Bank, for instance, the 
Data sector, WBG Information and Technology Solutions and the World 
Bank Institute (with a focus on learning). In the g7+, in turn, actors involved 
often work for the Finance Ministries of member countries and have 
experience of studying and working in Western countries and/or for 
Western institutions. Those are the central tiers of the game and the focus 
of this research. These central tiers are occupied by those with 
considerable knowledge of statistics and the practices that accompany 
them. 
 Precisely, one crucial aim of this discussion over skills and technical 
resources was to bring in the nuances of the game, to avoid taking for 
granted what power is, who exerts it and how. Opening space for blurs and 
nuances sheds light on striking ironies. The peculiar relation 
producers/users developed along statistical practices was an eloquent 
example. Most professionals dealing with ‘fragile states’ have to be experts 
on all the ‘correlates of fragility’ and on the calculation of these correlates, 
‘uncovering’ causes and predicting results. This means that statistical 
reasoning becomes the very bar with which experts are measured, and in 
this sense, it composes ‘state fragility’ as much as it helps to compose 
donor experts themselves. Most importantly, however, these compositions 
are always relational and mutually influential. Indeed, one fundamental 
aspect of statistics is that they need to be used and be perceived as useful, 
even more so when an increasing number of experts can offer the same 
products. Hence, users, that is, the very offices in ‘fragile states’ that often 
do not hold such resources, can have important roles in the pressures 
generated over donor agencies’ staff. I called these pressures traps of 
effectiveness, and I sought to draw attention to their potential to enable 
change and to somehow weaken the symbolic power in the game. This is 
only a potential impact, however, to the extent that ‘fragile states’’ 
governments in the g7+ are able to continue playing the game. In order to 
request expertise, they also need to corroborate quantification and 
classification, becoming accomplices in the composition of ‘state fragility’. 










4.  SYMBOLIC POWER, GROUPING AND GROUP EXPECTATIONS:  
    BALANCING ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT 
 
If one takes into account the foundation of the g7+, its self-labelling and 
self-measuring, questions come to the fore as to the context in which such 
practices, normally perceived as oppressively Western, came to be 
adopted. I argued that to dismiss the engagement of the g7+ and/or to 
simply ignore it while one advocates the dismissal of the ‘fragile states’ 
label is to paradoxically silence the very forces of change critical 
approaches are supposed to encourage. Looking at these forces, on the 
other hand, means to draw attention to the impacts of quantifying and 
classifying practices and to the accompanying crucial blurriness of the 
relations in the ‘fragile states’ agenda.  
 The relational character of the quantifying and classifying practices 
discussed here makes of ‘classifiers’/’classified’ a flawed opposition. The 
notion of symbolic power instead is fundamentally related to the way 
engagement and disengagement are in a constant, dynamic, practical and 
political balancing, to the extent that no position is definitely demarcated. At 
the bottom of this balancing, the idea of symbolic power highlights the 
subtle but authoritative influence of quantifying and classifying practices in 
keeping the costs of disengagement too high for it to be practically 
envisaged. Indeed, including contributions of sociologies of quantification 
allowed me to look into how quantifying practices establish and constant 
monitor their own authority, becoming themselves gatekeepers in the 
classification of ‘fragile states’. Crucially, these contributions highlight the 
fact that experts are usually much aware of the fact that numbers are not 
perfect and cannot be, but instead have authority in their apparently 
paradoxical constant search for improvement, most importantly, 
improvement in use. The practical sense in this ‘imperfect use’ makes of 
quantification and its accompanying classification powerful but subtle 
practices. 
 Taxonomy is, in a way, the obscure side of both scientific and political 
 work. But the study of taxonomy cannot be reduced to the unveiling of 
 hidden relationships between these two dimensions of knowledge and 
 action – as is sometimes the case in a sociological criticism of science, 
 which swings directly from a purely internalist position in terms of power 
 relationships and social control. The question, rather, is to study in detail 









 together – which in fact precludes the opposition between analyses 
 described as technical or social.9 
 
 I suggested the authority of (technical) statistical reasoning has 
been crucial in advancing the symbolic power of highly impactful 
quantifying and classifying practices, to the point of achieving the complicity 
of those perceived as least favoured by it. Meanwhile, the indirect, nuanced 
and mutually influential form with which these practices take place makes 
symbolic power able to guarantee its reproduction through the subtlety of 
the order of things. I argued such nuances are extremely relevant to 
consider the possibilities for change and weakening of this power. To 
ignore this subtlety is to ignore precisely how symbolic power carries its 
weak points within. 
 In that sense, I pointed at key nuances in the ‘fragile states’ agenda, 
all of which underscore the looping or theory effect of numerical labelling,10 
that is, how prescription and description become one and the same.11 I also 
sought to illustrate and emphasise the ‘unresolvable contradiction’ in 
symbolic power: ‘[R]esistance can be alienating; submission can be 
liberating.’12 Sociologists of quantification and related practices also 
highlight this blurriness: 
 We have observed several dances between classifier and classified, but 
 have nowhere seen either unambiguous entities waiting to be classified or 
 unified agencies seeking to classify them. The act of classification is of its 
 nature infra-structural, which means to say that it is both organizational and 
 informational, always embedded in practice.13 
 
 I discussed, for instance, how the more the g7+ manages to 
successfully identify itself as a group, the more expectations are generated 
that a commonality will play out in the form, for instance, of common 
indicators. These, in turn, contrary to the group’s representatives’ 
propositions, might encourage internal comparison and perhaps even an 
internal ranking. Hence, the more the group gains access to international 
tables, the more the g7+ is expected to act as a group, stepping over the 
particularities its representatives so vehemently emphasise. On the one 
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hand the grouping allows a distinction in relation to other groups – ‘to exist 
socially is also to be noticed, in fact, to be noticed as distinct.’14 On the 
other, it might erase distinction within, which is precisely what the g7+ has 
tried to avoid.  
 In addition, as the g7+ embraces quantification and classification, it 
is increasingly pushed to offer more and more indicators, mainly security-
specific ones, and quantified systems of M&E. However, g7+’s 
representatives have so far resisted these moves, and indeed, they have 
often resorted to storytelling instead of numbers to depict their national 
problems. Yet, the pressures for numbers are mounting and the embracing 
of quantification threats to take a toll on this storytelling. Once a player, 
there is after all a pressure to play, and the g7+ is being taken on its 
practical disposition to quantify. The costs and the benefits of engagement 
are always relational, in that they cannot be considered in isolation. 
 One key and extremely subtle aspect of the symbolic power is 
precisely in the way even those perceived as most favoured by the 
classification of ‘fragile states’, that is, donors in general, are in fact also 
constantly struggling to keep its stakes in the game. One example is that, 
despite the hesitations towards common and security indicators and new 
M&E systems, the g7+’s representatives have used the platform created to 
request data services from diverse agencies, in order to provide the 
information ministries are still lacking. With that, as what I called ‘unofficial’ 
quantifying experts come to the fore, there is a competition for this 
provision, one which is currently much based on open data and free 
software. These are usually offered by major donor agencies, capable of 
executing massive data collection and compilation. Nevertheless, in the 
competition described, their roles are not guaranteed in the final use of this 
data and in the relations to be established with g7+ governments. As the 
pressure increases upon donor agencies’ staff to acquire and improve 
statistical knowledge and as data sectors are increasingly involved in the 
development assistance to ‘fragile states’, quantifying experts become 
trapped into providing ever more data, to the point where open data risks 
becoming almost a minimum standard. Nonetheless, the more such data 
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are produced, the least the roles of their producers is guaranteed in the 
game, adding more layers of nuances to the ‘fragile states’ agenda. 
 I suggested all these dynamics contribute to further reinforcing the 
grouping of the g7+, for good and for worse. In fact, I argued the more 
known and accepted the group is, the more antagonism it faces in major 
forums, such as the UN, and the more antagonism it faces, the more the 
g7+’s existence, platform and agenda are known and debated. Indeed, 
rivalries seem to have emerged inside the UN, where ‘other developing 
countries’, such as those in the g77, have suggested the g7+ is part of a 
donor-driven divide-and-conquer strategy and have denounced the self-
labelling and self-measuring as proves of such attempt. Ironically, the label 
is not consensual at all in the g7+, and is actually at the centre of much 
internal negotiation.  
 It seems, however, that again, for good or for worse, the platform is 
now too much to lose and the costs of re-disengagement are even higher 
than the costs of disengagement first were. The more and the better the 
g7+ representatives play the game and gain access to international tables, 
the more internal and external dissidence the group faces and, at the same 
time, the more attached it is to the game. This reflects the embracing of a 
style of thinking & doing capable of self-authentication, that is, capable of 
matching methods and objects in ever-perfecting mutual composition. As 
the g7+ enters the game, struggling to define the contours of the changing 
common sense – in the identification, analysis and management of ‘fragile 
states’ – it engages in what Bourdieu calls heretic discourses. The g7+s 
attempts to shatter the existent common sense while at the same time 
preserving part of it, a part on which a reshaped common sense might 
actually build. These stances are balanced through constant work, in the 
practical evaluation of the costs of engagement and disengagement. 
 I suggested that by looking at the power in the ‘fragile states’ 
agenda as symbolic power, all these nuances come to the fore, taking into 
account the existence of the g7+, its self-labelling and self-measuring, the 
possibilities generated by its creation, the traps born out of the relations 
between the group’s representatives and quantifying experts, and most 









oppressor/oppressed divide; instead, a form of engagement that carries not 
only threats of inequality but also possibilities of change. 
 I concluded that at the heart of the constant internal and external 
dissidences the g7+ is facing is the rather exclusive hold the group’s 
Finance Ministries have on the agenda. The group has not yet been able to 
engage other ministries, just as in general it also deals mostly with 
representatives from the Finance Ministries of donor countries. Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, for instance, have been usually absent from most of the 
g7+’s activities. Thus, the main challenge the group faces, in terms of 
advancing its agenda further, is in the ability to engage with politicians. The 
‘unresolvable contradiction’ of symbolic power is, by definition, not to be 
easily resolved by this move, but this move can give a positive (temporary) 
tilt in the balance of engagement and disengagement. 
4.1. POLITICS AND POLITICIANS 
 
I have showed how politicians in the g7+ and in donor countries have so far 
occupied different tiers in the game, largely detached from the quantifying 
and classifying practices and the debates around them. These practices 
are undoubtedly political, and this whole research was based on this 
understanding, but I suggest the also technical character of such practices 
has facilitated the (self-)alienation of politicians. Recommendations of 
quantifying experts are not necessarily absorbed and reports on ministerial 
meetings indicate decisions taken among mostly Finance and Development 
Assistance ministers are hardly ever translated into official procedures and 
rules in the respective competent decision-making bodies.  Foreign Affairs 
offices and diplomats have no mandate to discuss the agenda on indicators 
in the UN, and Foreign Affairs in the g7+ member governments seem 
hesitant to counter regional institutions such as the African Union in order 
to use the ‘fragile states’ label.  
 Still, I argued that the alienation of politicians should not be 
interpreted as if quantifying and classifying practices have use only to the 
extent where they can serve decisions already made by politicians. This 
thesis sought to show exactly that numbers, methods and tools are not 









doing that responds to as much as it composes the world with which it is 
meant to engage. This point needs a back-and-forth illustration, which I 
offer below. 
4.2. AGAINST CLEAR DIVIDES: THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF A BLUR 
 
Quantifying and classifying practices create a world that is measurable and 
manageable to its tiny details through provisional and imperfect 
correlations. To understand the impacts of such world-making in a way 
congruent with the approach adopted throughout this thesis implies a back-
and-forth reasoning. 
 Certainly, as this thesis sought to show, these numbers have an 
important role in policy-making, able to guide poverty reduction, health and 
education priorities, and to stabilise finances. This was nowhere here 
denied. However, the quantifying and classifying reasoning in itself 
contributes to constructing a view of ‘fragile states’ that makes uncertain 
fixtures acceptable, that allows trial and error with human misery, that 
makes errors reasonable, that also depicts as reasonable the amount of 
investment in the development industry, that encourages constant 
monitoring and measuring of progress, and that subtly holds resources 
hostage to measured predictions that are only good enough. Going back 
again, however, the quantifying and classifying reasoning in their symbolic 
power, as opposed to an overt one, also often leaves arms unattended in 
the fluidity of statistical expertise, opening important and unique paths for 
‘fragile states’ in the form of the self-labelling and self-measurement 
adopted by the g7+. To ignore these possibilities, the fact that the g7+ now 
has at least a seat at the table, is to dismiss altogether the possibilities of 
change that practically unfold in the ‘fragile states’ agenda, hence, to 
paradoxically eliminate these very possibilities. ‘To change the world, one 
has to change the ways of making the world, that is, the vision of the world 
and the practical operations by which groups are produced and 
reproduced.’15 By embracing the label and the quantification, the g7+ has at 
least made a move towards having a say in the practical operations through 
which the world of its members are constantly constructed. Therefore, to 
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take quantification and classification as tools available for the utilitarian 
moves of (self-)alienated politicians is to ignore the important unique 
potential they offer for change. 
 
5.  FUTURE POSSIBILITIES FOR RESEARCH 
 
Two elements of the research were mentioned for the importance they 
have in the dynamics studied, but only further research can do justice to the 
role they can play in the ‘fragile states’ agenda. The very discussion on the 
(self-)alienation of politicians can be further explored in the context of the 
UN, where the antagonism between ‘developing countries’ can shed light 
on the different points-of-view of each actor, thus, providing insights into 
what kinds of challenges, for instance, the g7+ might face. Moreover, a 
study on the role of politicians in these dynamics can say much about the 
common argument that technicity evades politics. Important aspects of this 
discussion have been addressed in this thesis, and this divide has been 
essentially disputed, but much can still be said about the way politicians 
engage with the technical aspects of quantification and classification.  
 The second and crucial aspect to be explored in future research 
regards the role of storytelling as a capital for g7+ representatives, in terms 
of the unique access to local knowledge and local perceptions and the 
support a consideration of these factors might gain from local populations. 
As the g7+ embraces quantification, will it be able to hold to some of this 
storytelling? What value does storytelling have and might have? If 
storytelling loses even more ground, would country-specific experiences, so 
much valued by g7+ representatives so far, also be lost in favour of 
common indicators? In that case, would the group sustain itself? 
 Parallel to both debates is the future of discussions on the post-
2015 agenda and the possible inclusion of security indicators. If security 
indicators, one of the priorities of the g7+, are indeed somehow included in 
the post-2015 agenda, it might give the g7+ prominence among ‘developing 
countries’ groups. It might also contribute to place the g7+ in a relatively 
interesting position when structural and procedural changes are effected in 
donor agencies in order to adapt to measuring and managing security 









the g7+’s engagement with quantifying experts so far may also shed light 
on the role security experts might have if security indicators become part of 
the post-2015 agenda. 
 This thesis opened space to explore these future developments by 
offering an account of the historical context in which the g7+ was born, the 
role of quantification and classification in the development sector, the 
symbolic power and the implications of these practices, and the way M&E 
practices have become adaptable and improved in use, providing authority 
to good enough data, methods and results. These historical and 
sociological foundations can contribute to understanding what possibilities 
and constraints an unresolvable contradictory engagement carries within. 
 
6.  THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
To look at the practices that classify ‘fragile states’ and their impacts in this 
thesis meant not to question the reality of ‘state fragility’ but rather to 
analyse what it takes for quantification and classification to represent 
anything and what they fail to show. That involved looking at how these 
practices become authoritative, how their authority is exerted and what this 
implies for the different actors involved.  
 Undoubtedly, as the many cases illustrated in this thesis sought to 
show, there is power in the way quantification and classification can impact 
assistance to ‘fragile states’, the political leverage of these governments 
within the country and in international forums. There is no denying the 
relation between ‘fragile states’ governments and donors is a fundamentally 
unequal and asymmetric one. Notwithstanding these impacts, however, it is 
also clear quantifying and classifying practices have merits in organising 
priorities, allocating resources accordingly and monitoring the efficient use 
of these resources. The question I faced was then how to combine these 
understandings in order to take into account the existence of the g7+ and 
its self-labelling and self-measuring, without assuming what these entailed, 
and also considering the powerful inequalities within these dynamics? The 
highly bureaucratic and often damaging quantification and labelling by 
donors is an easy target for criticism and rightly so, but what to say of the 









agenda when they seem oblivious to both the practical pressures to engage 
and the nuances in this engagement? This research took issues with the 
silencing of these studies to the engagement taking place through the g7+, 
but most importantly and generally, it criticised the approach to power such 
analyses convey. 
 Attached to homogenised collective intentions that rely on the 
researcher’s own deductions, political scepticism assumes a one history, 
one power narrative that is paradoxically detrimental to its very purpose to 
‘uncover’ the violent ways through which postcolonial countries are 
constructed and managed. It fails to analyse, for instance, the unique 
impacts of an increasingly adopted but essentially mutant statistical 
reasoning that is a) based on historical and deep-seated epistemological, 
ethical, logical and philosophical successes, b) currently evolves in quick 
and constant adaptation to changes in software, techniques and other 
resources, and c) also travels at incredible speed and diffusely, making the 
attribution of authorship, at minimum, a fruitless exercise. These 
considerations contribute to opening space for change in three main ways. 
 First, while political scepticism points at the classification of ‘fragile 
states’ as an imposition of a Western standard of statehood, it fails to 
analyse the important ways in which the metaphysics of correlation, deeply 
embedded in current statistical reasoning, actually encourages a niche 
standardisation16 that flexibilises this broader standard, effectively creating 
new ones to every new (numerical) sub-category of ‘state fragility’. This is 
not to say that the general Western-inspired takes on different aspects of 
governance is not practically imposed to the governments of ‘fragile states’, 
but that the degrees of ‘efficiency’ with which this importation takes place 
and is accepted to take place are as impactful as the broader exported 
Western notion of statehood. The approach taken in this research 
importantly incorporates these debates. 
 Second, this research avoids a paradoxical silence on the many 
elements that can subtly but effectively lessen the asymmetry in these 
relations of power.  
 ….strategies designed to establish or maintain lasting relations of personal 
 dependence are, as we have seen, extremely costly, with the result that 
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 the means eat up the end and the actions necessary to ensure the 
 continuation of power themselves help to weaken it.17  
 
 The indirect influence in the notion of symbolic power opens space 
to consider the ways in which the resource-wise privileged position of 
donors incurs in important costs. Absent or unacceptable forms of 
domination are, in symbolic power, replaced by subtle forms of indirect 
influence, which by nature requires that privileged actors pay a ‘personal 
price’.18 In the specific style of thinking & doing addressed here, the 
authority of quantifying and classifying practices needs to be constantly 
reasserted, since institutional and direct impositions are generally ruled out. 
The open-end of this authority, thus, leaves space for competition, and the 
final influence of quantifying experts is less guaranteed. Meanwhile, these 
experts face constant pressures in donor agencies to expand their 
expertise, caught in traps of effectiveness that are also influenced by the 
demand of officers from ‘fragile states’ themselves, as users. Therefore, the 
analysis of such traps can be central to understanding the possibilities for 
change existent in the game. 
 Third and lastly, an account of the context in which the complicity of 
‘fragile states’ with quantifying and classifying practices was born and is 
developing is crucial to understanding what possibilities these practices 
generate. As widespread practices in the policy-making towards ‘fragile 
states’, they are better scrutinised than dismissed with ‘sweeping 
generalities’,19 on the account of a homogenised collective intention that is 
supposed to dominate all engagements with postcolonial countries. 
Historical direct resistance to direct influence or oppression has usually 
been marked by new labels and new categories – non-aligned, Afro-
American, homosexuality20. I suggest the adoption of the ‘fragile state’ 
label, whose definition is barely modified by the g7+,21 does not represent 
submission, that is, it does not discard resistance. Rather, it reflects the 
subtle form of power in the game, whereby the label is perhaps less 
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 As opposed to homosexualism. 
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 As would have been the case, for instance, of the ‘black is beautiful’ movement (Bourdieu 
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itself. Even a sense of pride in being ‘resilient’ that some could expect to be part of this 









relevant and it is more important instead that the practices through which it 
is constructed are somewhat appropriated – because, first and foremost, 
perhaps contrary to arms of direct influence, these practices can be 
appropriated at all. To ignore these practices, thus, is to ignore a world of 















       ANNEX 1:  TABLE OF INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS 
 
INTERVIEWS/MEETINGS 
Date Place/via Name Org. Position 
08/03/2013 
Skype, from 
Sydney Stephen Close WB 
Human Development Specialist, International Trade and 
Development (WB); experience with Education Sector Policy; 




Francisco  Christian Lotz UNDP Peacebuilding Specialist.  
08/04/2013 
WB, 
Washington Gary Milante WB 
Senior economist, director of the Center for Conflict, Security 
and Development; worked in the WDR11.  His stated 
interests are in applied game theory and modelling the 
political economy of peaceful compromise. He has conducted 
research in Sudan. Milante has taught the World Bank's core 
course on fragility and conflict for internal and external 
audiences and leads the 'Carana' post-conflict recovery 






Alternate Executive Director Representative for Albania, Italy, 
Malta, Portugal, San Marino, and Timor-Leste. Previously: 
Interamerican Development Bank.  
09/04/2013 
WB, 
Washington Neil Fantom WB 
Manager, leads the World Bank’s Open Data initiative, 
oversees World Development Indicators and Global 
Development Finance and the compilation and dissemination 
of the associated datasets. Worked in initiatives to help 
'developing countries' improve statistical capacity, working in 
Malawi and Botswana for eight years. Prior: worked for DFID 
and the Statistical Office of the European Commission. 
Studied statistics and mathematics. 
09/04/2013 
WB, 
Washington Anonymous 1 WB 
Senior Public Sector Specialist, East Asia and Pacific, worked 
in Poverty Reduction Strategies, worked in Timor-Leste. 
10/04/2013 
WB, 
Washington Wolfgang Pohl WB 








Senior Operations Officer, works now in the CCSD, worked for 
the Fragile States Unit previously and in the WBI, providing 






Task team leader in Timor-Leste in 2000, Gender Specialist. 
He arrived just after the referendum in the country with the 
first team of the World Bank. 
11/04/2013 
WB, 
Washington Jo Kelcey WB 
Former Education Specialist at the World Bank's 
headquarters in Washington. 
11/04/2013 
WB, 
Washington Khadija Shaik WB 
Junior Professional Associate, works in the CCSD and is the 
person in charge of calculating the PCPI and monitoring 
countries that do not make the list but are 'of concern'. 
12/04/2013 
WB, 
Washington Rui Coutinho WB 







Timorese government, Economics and Development 
Directorate, Economist (received training at the World Bank). 
19/04/2013 
Skype, from 
Sydney Leigh Mitchell WB 
Team member in Timor, working inside Timorese government 
on aid effectiveness. 
16/05/2013 
Skype, New 
York Ian Martin UN 
Human Rights adviser, former Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary-General for the East Timor Popular 
Consultation.  
06/06/2013 OECD, Paris 
Vanessa 
Wyeth OECD 
Peace and Conflict Adviser in OECD, now ahead of INCAF. 
Previously: International Peace Institute.  
06/06/2013 OECD, Paris 
Erwin van 
Veen OECD Occupied the position now occupied by Vanessa Wyeth. 
06/06/2013 OECD, Paris 
Donata 
Garrasi OECD 
Conflict and governance expert at OECD, previous 
coordinator of the International Dialogue on Pecabeuilding 
and Statebuilding. 
06/06/2013 OECD, Paris 
Mbairo 
Mbaiguedem Chad 
Deputy Director-general for International Cooperation - 









Cooperation, focal point for g7+ in Chad. 
06/06/2013 OECD, Paris 
Anonymous 
commentator USAID 




Paris Jolanda Profos OECD 
Policy Analyst in OECD-DAC, in Peace, Security and 
Development Team, she manages the yearly report on 
financial assistance to 'fragile states'.  
08/07/2013 
Phone, 
London Claire Leigh ODI 
Head of International Partnerships in Budget Strengthening 
Initiative, leads ODI's support to g7+ 
17/07/2013 
Phone, 
New York Sarah Cliffe UN 
Former chief of mission for the World Bank`s programme in 
Timor-Leste, 1999-2002; led the Bank`s Fragile and Conflict-
Affected States Unit, 2002-2007; Bank`s director for East Asia 
and Pacific, 2007-2009; was special representative and 
director for WDR; now Special Adviser and Assistant 
Secretary-General of Civilian Capacities in UN. 
23/08/2013 
Phone, 
Nairobi Betty Maina WB World Bank`s former focal point for the g7+ in Nairobi. 
06/09/2013 
Phone, 
Sydney Anonymous 2 AusAID 
Fragility and Conflict Branch, Humanitarian and Stabilisation 






Carvalho g7+ Programme and Coordination Officer, g7+. 
24/10/2013 
UNGA, New 
York Habib Mayar g7+ Senior Policy Specialist, g7+. 
25/10/2013 
UNGA, New 
York Emília Pires Timor  Minister of Finance, Timor-Leste; previous chair of the g7+. 
13/10/2013 London Paul Okamu ACP 
Head of the African Civil Platform, present in the main 
ministerial meetings at OECD, also present at the parallel 
meeting organised by the g7+ during the 2013 UN General 
Assembly.  









The main topics discussed involved how donors were 
supporting the g7+’s initiatives, the evolution of the New 
Deal working groups and the g7+’s own requests. I attended 
as observer. Anonymity is protected by Chatham House 
Rules. 











The meeting was organised by the g7+ and attended by 
senior professionals from development agencies, such as 
USAID, UN and the World Bank, representatives of donor 
governments (mostly, as far as I could tell, from Finance or 
Development Assistance Ministries), and representatives 
from civil society. I attended as observer. Anonymity is 





















ANNEX 2: CPIA CLUSTERS AND GUIDELINES FOR SCORES 





Following the example provided most often in this research, the explanation 
below is on the Education sub-component. It shows the details of the rating 
process in terms of the guideposts distributed to staff. 
 
 The breadth and quality of a country’s human capital is a key determinant 
 of its economic growth and social development, including global attainment 
 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), over half of which relate to 
 Human Development (HD) outcomes.  This criterion assesses the national 
 policies and public and private sector service delivery that affect access to 
 and quality of:  (a)  health  and  nutrition  services,  including  population  
 and  reproductive  health,  (b)  education, ECD, training and literacy 
 programs, and (c) prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
 malaria 12…Each  of  these  three  major  areas  of  human  development  
 should  be  rated  separately  on  the scale from 1-6 outlined in the 
 attached Box [see below].1 
 
In the table below, I organise and reproduce the individual guideposts 
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CPIA - GUIDEPOSTS FOR RATING
2
 
Component 9 - Building Human Resources 
Sub-component: EDUCATION 
1 
Policies,  spending,  and  effectiveness  are  nonexistent  or  grossly  inadequate  to  assure  literacy,  
universal access  to  basic  education,  equitable  access  to  ECD  services,  and  adequate  post-basic  
education and training; teacher and student learning standards are nonexistent or grossly inadequate.  
2 
Policies,  spending  and  effectiveness  are  inadequate  to  achieve  universal  basic  education,    literacy,  or  
equitable ECD access;  teacher and student learning standards are low; policies  for post-basic education  
and training are inappropriate and/or poorly implemented.  
3 
Policies, spending and effectiveness are adequate to achieve progress towards universal basic education,   
literacy, and equitable ECD access; standards for teacher preparation, student learning, and oversight of  
private/NGO  providers  exist,  but  lack  key  elements  or  implementation  is  weak;  policies  for  post-
basic education and training exist but are inadequate in some areas or ineffectively implemented.    
4 
Policies,  spending  and  effectiveness  are  generally  appropriate  for  sustained  progress  towards  
universal basic education,  literacy,  and more equitable access to reasonable quality ECD services, although 
there may  be  gaps  or  inconsistencies;  standards  for  teacher  preparation,  student  learning,  and  
oversight of private/NGO providers are largely appropriate, although implementation may be incomplete; 
policies in place  for  post-basic  education  and  training    are  appropriate  for  sustained  progress  on  
quality,  equity of access, and the efficiency of resource use.  
5 
Policies, spending and effectiveness are appropriate for achieving universal basic education of reasonable  
quality,  universal literacy, and equitable access to reasonable quality ECD services; standards for teacher  
preparation,   student   learning,   and   oversight   of   private/NGO   providers   are   appropriate;   system  
performance and student learning outcomes are tracked, and increasingly used to guide policy; policies for  
post-basic education and training services are appropriate, and quality, equity of access, and efficiency of  
resource use are good 
6 
Strategic  national  education  policies,  high  standards,  and  effective  use  of  public  and  private  
resources support  a  good  quality,  universal  basic  education  system,  good  quality,  equitable  ECD  
services, and diversified,  good  quality  post-basic  education  and  training  systems  adequate  to  support  
economic development and life-long learning; government oversight of private/NGO providers is effective; 
school performance  and  student  learning  outcomes  are  systematically  tracked,  with  feedback  to  
schools and parents;  performance  data  and  evaluation  guide  policy;  at  all  levels  of  education,  equity  
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ANNEX 3: STATISTICAL METHODS 
 
 
The curve of errors, bell-shaped curve or Gaussian curve of normal distribution. 
 
Examples with different values of correlation coefficient. 
Correlation shows how related two variables are; regression points at what 
that relationship is. Regression is an attempt to ‘model’ the relationship.  
 
 The model’s error is represented by the vertical distance to the line. 
The better the model, the smaller these errors will be. The linear regression 
model is a linear relationship between two variables. It is linear, and 
therefore, shown as a straight line. This is known as the ‘best fit’ line 
through the data, that is, the line that minimises the sum of the squared 
vertical distances of each point from the line.1
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 Explanations reproduced from the course ‘Introduction to Statistics’, administered by Derek 













Method for determining allocation of a Global Partnership for Education 
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ANNEX 5: NEW DEAL WORKING GROUPS 
 
The table below was provided by the newly established New Deal Helpdesk 
(NewDeal.helpdesk@pbsbdialogue.org.) 
 
Co-Chairs of the International Dialogue 
1 g7+ Co-Chair of the International Dialogue – Sierra Leone 
1 Development partner Co-Chair of the International Dialogue - Finland 
Members of the Steering Group 
1 Co-Chair of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) 
1 Chair of the g7+ or member of the g7+ quintet 
6 Representatives from the g7+ pilot countries: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, 
democratic republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan 
6 Representatives from development partners: Australia, European Union, France, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States 
2 Representatives of civil society (South and North) - Pregesco (DRC), Cordaid 
(Netherlands) 
1 Representative of the United Nations: PBSO/UNDP 
1 Representative of the multilateral development banks - World Bank 
Observers to the Steering Group (to be decided on a case-by-case basis) 
1 Rotating seat for representative from development partners 
1 Rotating seat for representative from g7+/recipients of development co-operation 
2 Flexible seats for other stakeholders (e.g. private sector, non g7+ members, PBC Chair) by 
invitation of the International Dialogue Co-Chairs 
  
 
The Working Group consists of: 
 
ID Secretariat ID Sec 
ID Secretariat ID Sec 
ID Secretariat OECD 
ID Secretariat New Deal Help Desk 
ID Secretariat ID Sec 
OECD OECD 
Observer Finn Church Aid 
Observer International Labor Organization (ILO) 
g7+ Central African Republic 
g7+ Central African Republic 
g7+ g7+ Secretariat 
g7+ g7+ Secretariat 









g7+ g7+ Secretariat 
g7+ Liberia 






CSO SLANGO, Sierra Leone 
CSO Interpeace, USA 
CSO 
Civil Society Core Team on the Peacebuilding & Statebuilding/ 
AGENDA, Liberia 




















INCAF World Bank (Sierra Leone office) 
INCAF World Bank 
INCAF World Bank 












ANNEX 6: DIMENSIONS OF THE PSGS: EXAMPLES FROM THE 
G7+’S ‘MENU OF INDICATORS’ 
 
 
The explanation attached: 
The following table represents a compilation of the indicators that were 
identified by the five pilot countries. This Menu of Indicators provide 
countries  an opportunity to identify those indicators that could be of use in 
while conducting their  fragility  assessment  fragility  spectrum,  and  serve  









basket of indicators. The following indicators are expected to serve as a 
reference point, rather than being a prescription on which indicators should 
be used by countries for their fragility assessments. The indicators 
presented below stem from the fragility assessments from the five pilot 
countries. Some minor reordering has taken place, and duplications 
removed. At the time of publishing of this document, some countries have 
not yet validated their indicators, and for this reason the countries from 
which these indicators were formulated are not mentioned. Not all 
indicators presented here will indeed be measured by these countries, as 
country-specific baskets of indicators still need to be made in most of these 
countries. Over time, more and more countries will start to use (some of 
these) indicators to monitor progress on the Peacebuildling and 
Statebuilding Goals. As more countries conduct their fragility assessments 
and develop other indicators, this menu will continue to grow. This menu 
therefore needs to be seen as a work in progress.  Please  note  that  
some  descriptions  below  are  not  yet  presented  as  ‘indicators’,  but  
rather  as  ‘target  areas’  that  would  still  require  further  work  to  be 
developed  into  indicators  that  are  measurable.  The  most  obvious  
ones  are  followed  with  the  word  (target)  in  brackets,  but  many  
others  will  also  require further technical work before they become fully 
measurable. This type of technical work will need to be done at country-
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This was proposed in the context of a project that was to be implemented 
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ANNEX 8: GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS 
 
BIG DATA: ‘High dimensional data [big data] occurs when both “n” (sample size) as 
well as “p” (the number of available variables) are large.’ Ironically, the current race for 
methods involves reducing these dimensions: ‘The key objective of the empirical 
methods [towards big data] is to reduce this large dimension to a manageable set of 
variables (or what is referred to as ‘dimension reduction’)…Prediction inference meets 
causal inference: both inferences share a common goal, reducing the dimensionality of 
high dimensional data to a manageable subset of variables with the objectives of 1) 
relating it to structural parameters of interest (causal inference) 2) making predictions 
(prediction inference).’ The resultant expectation: ‘With a large set of variables from 
different data sources, you generate lots of correlations. Some of these correlations 
might be the key to the missing key variables in a given context that small RCT studies 
with a limited number of controls might not provide (read omitted variable bias).’1 
EVALUATION: The OECD defines evaluation as ‘[t]he systematic and objective 
assessment of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy, its design, 
implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of 
objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability’. It adds that 
‘[a]n evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the 
incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients 
and donors. Evaluation also refers to the process of determining the worth or 
significance of an activity, policy or program.’ And it concludes with a note: ‘Evaluation 
in some instances involves the definition of appropriate standards, the examination of 
performance against those standards, an assessment of actual and expected results 
and the identification of relevant lessons.’2  
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY: The World Bank defines a household survey as ‘any survey 
that is administered at the household level. It collects information about the household 
and the individuals living in those households.’3  
 
MONITORING: The OECD defines monitoring as ‘[a] continuing function that uses 
systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the 
main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent 
of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds’.4  
OPEN DATA: Data ‘available in a machine-readable standard format, which means it 
can be retrieved and meaningfully processed by a computer application’, and ‘explicitly 
licensed in a way that permits commercial and non-commercial use and re-use without 
restrictions.’5  
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE: A document prepared for the World Bank describes 
open source software as those whose code ‘was made available to all’ and for which 
‘any user could offer modifications and enrichments to any part of such code’. This is to 
be differentiated, therefore, from free software.6  
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5
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